Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Cincinnati & Indiana Western Ry. Co.
Opinion of the Court
It further alleged that the defendant company was engaged in constructing a steam railroad in Cincinnati in that part of the city known as the Millcreek bottom; that the surface of the ground is much below the level of which said railroad was being constructed, and that by reason thereof the defendant company
In its second cause of action the plaintiff sets up the defendant company and its agents were engaged in the building of a railroad track to be operated by steam in Garrard avenue in the city of Cincinnati in front of its said premises, and that said defendant company was engaged in driving a great quantity of piles in said avenue to a great depth for the purpose of constructing thereon a trestle for the accommodation of its road in said Garrard avenue, and that they were intending to and would complete the structure, which, when done, would extend in front of its property to a varying height from one foot to twenty-five above the established grade of Garrard avenue, and from three feet to sixty feet above the level of its present grade, and would-extend at the bottom nearly the full width of said avenue, and that the construction of said trestle in said avenue and operation of the railroad thereon in front of the lots of the plaintiff would destroy and greatly impair the usefulness of said avenue for street purposes as a highway and would destroy and greatly impair the rights of the plaintiff in said street, as owner of said premises abutting thereon where the value of its lots would be greatly deteriorated, and that by reason of the premises the plaintiff would suffer great and irreparable injury as the owner of said lots, and prays for an injunction against the defendant and its agents from encroaching on its said premises in any manner, and from erecting in Garrard avenue in front of its property the said trestle, and
On December 23, 1902, the defendant company filed its answer. It denies that the plaintiff is the owner or in possession of the lands described in the first cause of action, and says that all said lands so described, a strip thirty feet wide, extending from Dayton street southwardly to Liberty street, commencing about the section line, and being the east thirty feet of said lands, has been dedicated to public use, and owned in fee by the city of Cincinnati for street purposes and constitutes a part of Garrard avenue in said city. It admits that it is driving, a great number of piles as alleged in said petition, and that it is engaged in the execution of this work as’ alleged, but denies that it threatens to or is about to enter upon any property of the plaintiff or construct any railroad thereon in whole or in part. It says that all its work of construction has been and will be done in Garrard avenue which is dedicated to public use; that its work of construction was entered upon and done and is being prosecuted under and by authority of an ordinance passed by the Board of Legislation of the city of Cincinnati on the-day of April, 1902, and an agreement between the city and itself whereby it was granted permission to construct its railroad in said Garrard avenue and used and occupied the same for railroad purposes, with its trestle, tracks and other structures.
In answer to the second cause of action it says that it admits that itself and its agents are building a steam railroad track in Garrard avenue in front of the premises of the plaintiff, except as to the east thirty feet thereof, which has befen dedicated to public use, and constitutes a part of Garrard avenue. It admits that it is now engaged in driving wooden piles into the soil of said avenue for the purpose of constructing its trestle for the accommodation of the railroad, and that it intends to, and will complete the structure; that when the same is finished it will extend in front of plaintiff’s premises from a point opposite Dayton street to Liberty street, but it denies that the construction of the trestle in said avenue and the operation of
On March 25, 1904, the defendant company filed an amended and supplemental answer in which it sets forth that since the commencement of this action, to-wit, in March, 1903, the plaint
Since the filing of the original petition, as appears by the subsequent pleadings and the evidence, the right of the defendant to cross the plaintiff’s property has been granted it by virtue of an agreement entered into between the parties. Therefore the only question before the court is that presented by the pleadings relative to the building of the trestle in Garrard avenue and any injuries that may accrue to the property of the plaintiff that abuts upon Garrard avenue.
The evidence shows that Garrard avenue is a dedicated street, not improved or made, the present surface of which, including the present surface of plaintiff’s property, lies fifteen or twenty feet below the surface of the established grade of Liberty street and the established grades of streets crossing Garrard avenue.
It is admitted that Garrard avenue has no established grade. The city of Cincinnati, by ordinance, extended to the defendant company the right to occupy Garrard avenue with its trestle for railroad purposes; that since the bringing of the suit the agreement set up in the supplemental answer of the defendant was entered into between the parties, whereby permission was given to cross the property of the plaintiff. And the real question, therefore, is as to the injury to any property rights which the plaintiff may have in Garrard avenue by reason of the building of the trestle, by which the entrance of the railroad into the city is effected.
The rights of an abutting property owner in a street is a right of ingress and egress to and from his property. In the case at bar the plaintiff’s ground is being used for no purpose
The testimony clearly shows that in the condition in which the property is at present, no material injury would happen to the plaintiff’s rights of property by the erection of the trestle. . And if Garrard avenue should ever afterwards be filled up to the established grade of Liberty street and those streets crossing it, and the lot of the plaintiff should be filled to its established grade, that even then, with the trestle as erected, or with the standards to support the railroad being placed plumb upon the fill of Garrard avenue, the property rights, to-wit, the ingress and egress to the plaintiff’s property, would not be injured. Railway Co. v. Lawrence, 38 O. S., 41.
In addition to this, the agreement made between the plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the defendant was allowed to cross the property of the plaintiff and to run its track 200 feet down Garrard avenue, would, in equity itself, estop the plaintiff from the complaint it now makes. For the reason that the testimony clearly shows that by the building of the trestle over plaintiff’s property, and the agreement to build a steel trestle within a specified time, unless the defendant could extend its road down Garrard avenue, so as to bring its trains to grade, the defendant would have acquired no use for the .purchase of the right to cross plaintiff’s property, and the expense that it has gone to in building its trestle over the property of plaintiff, and the further agreement to make said trestle a steel bridge in course of time would avail the defendant nothing.
The court is further of the opinion that an injunction will not lie because the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; that is, for the damages that might accrue by reason of the property rights of the plaintiff being infringed, a jury could be impanneled to assess the damages therefor, by reason of the
Again, the public, so far as the use of Garrard avenue is concerned, is not complaining, but it is a private owner of abutting property. And it is a well settled rule of law that public rights can not be worked out through private rights, and vice versa.
The court is therefore of the opinion that the city of Cincinnati having given to the defendant the right to erect its trestle, and the agreement having been entered into between the plaintiff and defendant as set out in the supplemental answer, and no material injury having resulted to the property rights of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff having an adequate remedy at law for any infringement upon such rights, if such rights have been infringed upon, the injunction should not be allowed. And an order may be taken in accordance herewith.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.