State ex rel. Gentsch v. Hirstius
Opinion of the Court
This opinion is based upon a special demurrer filed by the defendant, A. J. Hirstius, to the amended petition of the plaintiff. '
1. In an opinion rendered on the 7th day of February, 1913, the late Judge W. A.. Babcock sustained a demurrer filed by the defendant Hirstius to the original petition. In the original petition the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant Hirstius the profit claimed to have been made by him while sheriff of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, in feeding prisoners committed to his' charge in the jail of said county. Judge Babcock,in a carefully prepared opinion, which I have read several times, held that the plaintiff did not state a cause of action against the defendant. I fully concur in this opinion, and feel that little more can be said than was said by the learned judge in the opinion referred to.
Section 2997 of the code, as I view it, clearly intended to give to the sheriff, "in addition to the compensation and salary” provided for in Section 2996, such an amount as the county commissioners should allow him quarterly, for the keeping and feeding of prisoners as provided by Section 2850 of the code.
The provision at the close of Section' 2997, providing for the filing quarterly by the sheriff of a full and itemized account of all his actual and necessary expenses, mentioned in said section, before they shall be allowed by the county commissioners, does not refer to the matter of keeping and feeding prisoners, but refers to the actual and necessary expenses particularly referred to in said section. Without attempting to encumber this opinion by quoting from the opinion of Judge Babcock, I will only say that, in my opinion, this matter is one which calls for action by the Legislature, and not by the courts.
I do not want to be understood, in what I have said or may say in regard to the law of this case, as I understand it, that I ap
2. After the demurrer to the original petition was sustained, the plaintiff filed an amended petition, in which he set out in separate causes of action, covering both terms of the defendant Hirstius as sheriff, the amount of profit the defendant is claimed to have made in feeding state prisoners, the profit made by him in -feeding United States prisoners, and the profit derived by him in feeding city prisoners; and he seeks a judgment against defendant Hirstius for all these profits made by him in feeding these various classes- of prisoners.
I have already disposed of the claims in reference to state prisoners in following the ruling made by Judge Babcock, above referred to.
I confess at the outset that the remaining question, relating to the feeding of United States and city prisoners committed to the custody of the sheriff and confined in the jail of the county, is more diffieut of solution. The determination of these questions, however, depends upon a reasonable and proper construction of Section 3179 of the code, and Sections 2977 et seq., of the salary act.
Section 3179 provides that the sheriff is required to receive prisoners charged with or convicted of crime committed to his custody by the authorities of. the United States, and to keep them
This' section of the code does not impose the duty of subsisting United States prisoners, committed to the jail, of the county, upon the sheriff; yet I think the statute contemplates that the sheriff might contract with the United States authorities to perform this service; and if he should do so, he may provide to perform this service for any sum agreed upon, provided it did not exceed the sum allowed by law for feeding state prisoners. It seems clear to me that the United States authorities, and the city authorities, in the event city prisoners are committed to the jail of the county, could provide for their subsistence by contract with parties other than the sheriff.
There seems to be no dispute in this ease between counsel, that if the sheriff subsist federal and city prisoners committed to his custody, without a contract with the federal and city authorities for payment for such service, he would be compelled to render this service gratuitously. His account could not be allowed as a valid claim against the county or state, as neither the county nor the state has incurred any obligation in regard to those classes of prisoners. When the jail fees are paid to the county commissioners, all claims of the county, in so far as imposed by Section 3179, are satisfied. There seems to be no warrant for plaintiff’s attempt to recover the profit which he claims the defendant made in feeding federal and city prisoners. If the amounts received by the sheriff for rendering this service constitute an allowance or perquisite received by him under Section 2977 and Section 2996 of the code, then he should pay it all into the county treasury, and not merely the profit if any, made by him. What construction should, therefore, be placed upon these statutes in order to avoid absurd consequences and the doing of injustice to any of the parties involved in this action,
The only, reason urged why this money received by the sheriff from the federal and city authorities should be turned into the county treasury, is that the salary act, Section' 2977 provides that all fees, allowances and other perquisites collected, and received by law, as compensation for services, shall be for the sole use of the treasury of the county in which they are collected. The question therefore presents itself as to whether or not these' amounts received by the sheriff for subsisting federal and city prisoners are allowances or perquisites collected or received by law. In my opinion the fees, allowances and perquisites referred to in Section 2977 and Section 2996 of the code do not refer to any fees, allowances or perquisities, except such as are fixed by law for services and duties imposed, by law upon the sheriff. A1Í these fees, etc., are to be collected by him and paid into the county treasury. These fees, allowances, etc., are fixed by Sections 2845-6 et seq., of the code. The duty of subsisting federal and city prisoners not being imposed upon the sheriff by law, and any sum he may receive for such subsistence not being fixed by law, but his compensation arising only from contract, I am of the opinion that under the provisions of the salary act he is not required to turn said moneys into the county treasury. This must be so, or else we are bound to conclude that he must render this service for nothing. Should the court place a construction on these statutes, which would lead to this absurd consequence, and do an injustice to the defendant, when state and county have incurred no expense or liability in relation to such prisoners?
In the case of Moore v. Givin, 39 0. S., 661, the law is stated in the first syllabus:
“It is the duty, of courts, in the interpretation of statutes, unless restrained by the letter, to adopt that view which will*511 avoid absurd consequences, injustice or great inconvenience, as none of these can be presumed to have been within the legislative intent.”
Another consideration in construing these statutes, which the courts may take judicial notice of, is the construction which they have received by the executive departments or bureaus which have had to deal with these matters. Sutherland on Stat. Con., Section 474; Dutoit v. Boyle et al, 16, O. S., 400-407; Wark v. Carrington, 34 O. S., 64-75; State, ex rel. v. Akins, 18 C. C., 349; 116 Mo., 196; 72 Fed., 46; 152 U. S., 211-221.
The state bureau of inspection and supervision has repeatedly examined and approved the accounts of the sheriff of Cuyahoga county relating to the keeping and feeding of prisoners, and it has uniformly approved said accounts. As late as January 25, 1913, the chief of the bureau wrote as follows:
‘‘ That the matter of the payment of the board of prisoners to the sheriff and his authority to retain the same for his own use always seemed so clear to us that we have never asked the legal department of the state for an opinion, and we never had the matter questioned. ’’
Counsel for defendant sets out extracts in his brief from several reports made by the bureau at different times, all going to show that a construction of the statutes under consideration here, •favorable to the claims of the defendant, has always been placed upon them by those having to deal with them.
Taking all these matters into consideration, I am of the opinion that the defendant, Hirstius, is entitled to retain the payments received by him for the subsistence of federal and city prisoners committed to his custody and confined in the jail of the county.
3. The defendant, Hirstius, urges another ground of objection to the several causes of action set out in the amended petition, which I believe deserves attention. The plaintiff seeks to recover the profit which he claims the defendant made in “feeding prisoners.” The compensation awarded the sheriff by law is for the “keeping and feeding” of prisoners. This is particu
I am, therefore, of the opinion that it is not sufficient to constitute a cause of action based upon these statutes, when no mention is made of a part of the service provided for in the statute and for which compeUsation is allowed.
For all the reasons set out above, I sustain the special demurrer to plaintiff’s amended petition.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.