Shimmon v. National Screw & Tack Co.
Opinion of the Court
Prior to January 1, 1908, there existed in the city of Cleveland two Ohio corporations, the National Screw & Tack Company and the Union Steel Screw Company, the outstanding stock of the National Screw & Tack Company being $1,000,000, and that of the Union Steel Screw Company being $542,500. The latter company was a going concern, but not operating to the satisfaction or benefit of those having capital invested therein. The former company was regularly paying dividends of 6 per cent, to its stockholders, and had assets exceeding all its liabilities, other than its capital stock, in the sum of $1,366,886, as found by accountants satisfactory to both companies.
About January 1,'1908, negotiations began or were had between the two companies, which resulted in an offer by the National Screw & Tack Company to purchase the plant and assets of the National Steel Screw Company for $461,125, to be paid in the preferred stock of the National Screw & Tack Company. This proposition was submitted to the board of directors of the Union Steel Screw Company March 13, 1908, and suitable resolutions were adopted providing for its acceptance. A printed notice, of date March 28, 1908, was accordingly mailed to each stockholder that a special meeting of the stockholders was called to convene at the office of the company April 30, 1908,
At this .time the National Screw & Tack Company was engaged in other profitable lines aside from the manufacture of screws or wood screws, and the stockholders of the Union Steel Screw Company were informed in the letter of March 28, 1908, that, “while the directors of the Union Steel Screw Company have been endeavoring for the last two years to take on other lines of manufacturing business, they see no prospect of engaging in anything which will warrant the investment of the necessary capital.”
At the stockholders’ meeting of April 30, 1908, there were 4800 shares represented, out of the entire issue of 5425 shares of stock; and upon the ballot and canvas it appeared that 4800 shares voted in favor of accepting the offer and proposition of the National Screw & Tack Company, and no shares voted against it.
Thereupon the National Screw & Tack Company proceeded according to law, and, in compliance with the agreement, increased its capital stock and issued to the shareholders of the Union Steel Screw Company, in proportion to their holdings, 4610 shares of 6 per cent., cumulative, preferred stock; and, increasing its board of directors from seven to nine, elected two of the preferred stockholders to represent these shareholders on the board, upon which board they have had like representation continuously.
Before this issue of prefered stock, the National Screw & Tack Company had only common stock; and in its articles of incorporation there was no provision for preferred stock. Both common and preferred shareholders have been paid 6 per cent, in dividends on their investment since the date of the absorption of the Union Steel Screw Company. Stockholders’ meetings have been held regularly every January or February. At the stockholders’ meeting of January 19, 1911, there were present and voting 8823 shares of common and 3831 shares of preferred stock. A resolution was unanimously adopted providing for an increase of $250,000 of common stock, for the purpose of distributing a 25 per cent, stock dividend to the common stockholders. Similar action to declare a stock dividend of 20 per cent, to the common stockholders was taken January 15, 1913. The necessary legal measures to effectuate these distributions of stock dividends to common stockholders were taken, and stockholders’ meetings called as required by law. At all these meetings the preferred stock was well represented, and no objection was made to such distribution of stock dividends.
To these distributions and to the proposed distribution of stock dividends no objection has been made or protest entered by any of the persons to whom the preferred stock was originally issued; nor have the directors representing the preferred stockholders on the board ever objected to or protested against these' issues, or taken action of any kind to prevent them. At the stockholders’ meeting of the Union Steel Screw Company on April 30, 1908, which approved the sale to the National Screw & Tack Company, one man represented, and perhaps largely controlled, ten-thirteenths of all the stock of the Union Steel Screw Company. This gentleman is now and has been a member of the board of directors of the National Screw & Tack Company from the date of the absorption. The minutes of the corporation disclose that he has been almost invariably present at board meetings. He was present at every meeting which declared a stock dividend to common stockholders, and invariably voted in favor of such distribution of stock dividends.
On November 22, 1915, the plaintiff claims he purchased five shares of this preferred stock, and that the same was duly transferred to his name on the books of the company on January 22, 1916. He brings this action, as stated in the brief of his counsel, “to compel the company, in the distribution of the stock dividend declared on January 19, 1916, to recognize the preferred stock, and distribute said dividend equitably as between preferred and common stockholders. ’ ’ In the prayer of his petition he asks for an accounting and disclosure, with a view to equalizing dividends upon both preferred and common stock, and asks that the company be enjoined from proceeding as proposed by its board of directors in January, 1916.
The declaration of claim for relief, as outlined by counsel in their brief, will only be considered, including, of course, the prayer for injunction. There is, then, but one question presented, and that is: Have the preferred stockholders of the
In many instances the mere statement of a proposition unerringly points to the answer raised by the issues involved therein. We think the case now before the court falls into this class; and if the answer is not pointedly suggested by the facts as recited, it is because there is lack or want of clarity of statement, by the court or a poverty of language to so paint a word picture that a label to identify it would be wholly unnecessary.
As shown by the stock certificate, the preferred stock was entitled to the following rights, privileges and preferences over the common stock:
(a) The annual, cumulative, 6 per cent, dividend.
(b) In ease of dissolution or liquidation, the preferred stock and accrued unpaid dividends shall be paid in full before the common stock, from assets remaining after liquidation.
(c) The authorized preferred stock, $461,000, shall not be increased, nor shall the company’s property be mortgaged, without the consent in writing of the holder of at least three-fourths of the preferred stock, or by like vote at a metting of the preferred stock called for that purpose.
(d) While the company reserved the right to redeem the preferred stock at any time at-its own option, such redemption must be in cash at par, plus accrued dividends, and no less than the whole of said preferred stock shall be redeemed at any time.
(e) No dividends shall be paid on the common stock, or declared thereon, so long as any dividends are accrued and unpaid on the preferred stock.
With two representatives on the board of directors, to aid in shaping the policy of the company, and keep in touch with its activities, the holdings of these preferred stockholders are as secure as any investment of capital can be under modern industrial conditions.
The situation, as stated, at the time negotiations between these corporations began, the action taken by them, the letter of March
Where the intention of the parties to a contract is not expressly stipulated in the instrument itself, or if there is any doubt as to the intention of the parties, the court, in attempting to arrive at the meaning and intention of the parties, should give great weight to the acts and conduct of the parties, and to the construction and interpretation by them placed upon it for many years continuously after it had been entered into with full knowledge of the questions involved; and it should receive this interpretation, though it may still b.e opposed to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used. Cincinnati v. Gas L. & C. Co., 8 C. C., 429.
It has been generally held in this state, “where the language of a contract is ambiguous,” or the intention of the parties not clearly stated, that “it is proper for the court to consider the interpretation and construction that the parties themselves have placed upon it, as evidenced by what they have said and what they have done.” M. E. Church v. Water Co., 20 C. C., 578.
It is undoubtedly true, as stated by Cook, Corporations, Section 269, that ‘ ‘ a share of stock is a share of stock, whether preferred or common;” but admitting this to be true, it nevertheless must be conceded that the preferred stockholder may, by contract, waive many if not all of his rights of supervision or participation in profits or dividends in excess of those stipulated in the stock certificate. It is insisted, however, that it was clearly the legislative intent, as expressed in the statutes, that
There is no evidence before the court as to meetings, resolu tions and votes thereon of the National Screw & Tack Company relating to the negotiations and purchase of the assets of the Union Steel Screw Company. Whether the purchasing company could secure the requisite vote to amend its articles of incorporation, or not, we are not advised. However, it does not follow that, because it failed to make such amendment, it did not intend to limit the right of the preferred stock to the dividends named in the certificate. The fact that it issued stock dividends only to holders of common stock in 1911 and in 1913, and now again proposes to do so, and the fact that the preferred stockholders not only acquiesced in these distributions, but, through their representatives on the board, and they personally at stockholders’ meetings, voted for such distribution, is not only significant of intention, but conclusive evidence that
Again, the corporation could not redeem this stock by calling in portions of it to suit its convenience. No part less than the whole could be redeemed. No more preferred stock could be issued, nor could the company’s property be mortgaged without their consent. In the event of liquidation, they had first lien on remaining assets. They took no chances. The common stock took all the chances of financial panics, falling markets, and the squeezing, crushing force of industrial competition.
"We must presume that both parties fully comprehended and understood this situation and its possibilities, and that the agreement and understanding was, that the preferred stock should receive the dividend provided in the certificate,-and that only.
Aside from this phase of the case, we believe the contract, as expressed on the face of the certificate, does limit the rights of the preferred stock to a 6 per cent, dividend. These certificates provide for a fixed,' preferential, cumulative dividend at a reasonable rate; and this, in common fairness, should, if it actually does not, negative any right to further participate in profits. The preferred shareholder contracts for a dividend
It will be noticed that these authorities, if they may be so termed, are, with but one exception, text-writers. The weight of authority and reason, however, is that preferred stockholders are limited in the distribution of dividends to the amount specified in the stock certificate. See Niles v. Valve Co., 196 Fed. Rep., 994, affirmed, Niles v. Valve Co., 202 Fed. Rep., 141. See also, Palmer, Precedents, p. 814; Will v. Plantation Co., 107 Law T. Rep., 360; affirmed in the House of Lords,. 109 Law T. Rep., 754. This latter ease, decided finally October, 1913, seems to be the latest utterance upon the subject, and presents by far the most illuminative and conclusive reasoning. There are no Ohio authorities upon the subject, and we think for the
For the reasons given, the prayer of the petition will be denied and the petition dismissed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.