OPINION & ORDER [Resolving Doc. 810]

This is a case about minimum wage and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)1 and overtime pay under the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (“Ohio Wage Act”).2 Plaintiffs are door-to-door workers who solicited residential customers for the Defendants’ energy services.

Following a trial on the merits, a jury found Defendants liable for violations of the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act.3 Defendants now renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law they made at trial. In the alternative, Defendants move for a new trial, or to certify an interlocutory appeal of the liability phase of the trial. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for judgment as a matter of law, DENIES the motion for a new trial, and DENIES the motion to certify an interlocutory appeal.

I. Background

The Court has previously issued an opinion detailing the factual background of this case and incorporates that background by *687reference.4 In short, Defendants sell electricity and natural gas to residential and commercial customers in the United States and Canada. Under Defendant’s selling scheme, Plaintiffs would go door to door to obtain applications from potential customers. An application could then become final contract after a verification call between the customer and a third-party verifier and after the Defendant found the customer’s credit satisfactory. Plaintiffs were paid commission for every finalized contract; if an application was rejected for any reason before the contract became final, the- employee would not be paid.

Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging this commission-based compensation system deprived them of minimum wage and overtime. Two classes were certified: a nationwide FLSA collective action seeking minimum wage and overtime under federal law, and a Rule 23 class action seeking overtime under Ohio law. Against these claims, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs were exempt from overtime and minimum wage requirements because of the “outside salesperson” exemption.

The Court held a trial on Defendants’ liability from September 29, 2014, to October 6, 2014.5

At the close of Plaintiffs’ case, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law6 on two grounds. First, Defendants argued that the Ohio “Badge Never Used” (“BNU”) group of employees — those who attended at least one day of training but never obtained a completed application from a customer — had not established that any member of the group had worked more than forty hours in a week, and thus had failed to prove their claim for overtime wages.7 Second, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ evidence established that Plaintiffs were exempt outside salespeople.8 The Court denied both motions, finding there was sufficient evidence for both issues to go to the jury.

At the close of Defendants’ case, Defendants and Plaintiffs cross-moved for judgment as a matter of law regarding the application of the outside salesperson exemption.9 The Court denied both motions.

Defendants also raised several objections to the jury instructions. Relevant to this motion, they argued that the Court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider whether the applications obtained by Plaintiffs were binding commitments in deciding whether the transactions were “sales” for purposes of the FLSA.10

Finally, Defendants also object to the Court twice instructing the jury during the trial that an employment contract cannot waive FLSA minimum wage and overtime requirements if those requirements would otherwise apply.11

*688II. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendants renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law. They raise three issues, which will be addressed in turn. First, that there was insufficient evidence that the Plaintiffs qualified for the outside salesperson exemption. Second, that no evidence supports the inference that any BNU group member worked more than 40 hours in any week. And third, that the Court’s instruction to the jury that the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA cannot be waived prejudiced their case. All three arguments lose.

Before moving on to the merits of this motion, the Court pauses to chastise both sides for their complete and utter failure to cite to the trial record or admitted exhibits in their briefing.12 Judge Easter-brook once wrote, regarding summary judgment, that, “[district judges are not archaeologists. They need not excavate masses of papers in search of revealing tidbits — not only because the rules of procedure place the burden on litigants, but also because their time is scarce.”13 The same goes for post-trial motions. When the issues all relate to what happened at trial, the parties should point to specific evidence that appears in the record to support their positions, rather than relying on generalized statements and their own (occasionally faulty) memories as they did here. In the future, both parties and their counsel would do well to respect the Court’s limited resources and not force it to do their jobs for them.

A. Legal Standard

A motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) requires the trial court to decide “whether there was sufficient evidence presented to raise a material issue of fact for the jury.”14 The Court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.”15 “ ‘[Sufficient evidence’ will be found unless, when viewed in the light of those inferences most favorable to the nonmov-ant, there is either a complete absence of proof on the issues or no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable persons could differ.”16 The Court neither weighs the evidence, evaluates the credibility of the witnesses, nor substitutes its judgment for that of the jury.17

B. Analysis

1. Outside Sales Exemption

Defendants first argue that they should receive judgment as a matter of law because Defendants established, and Plaintiffs failed to rebut, that Plaintiffs meet the definition of outside salespeople.18 While Defendants’ motion largely objects to the contents of the jury instructions themselves, which is discussed in more detail below, Defendants also raise arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evi-*689denee that are properly considered on motion for judgment as a matter of law.19

Generally, the FLSA requires employers to pay employees a minimum wage, as well as time-and-a-half overtime pay when the employee works more than forty hours in a week.20 Not all employees, however, are protected by this requirement. One exception is that “any employee employed ... in the capacity of outside salesman” is not entitled to minimum wage or overtime.21 An outside salesperson is “any employee ... whose primary duty is ... making sales ... and ... who is customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such primary duty.”22 A “sale,” in turn, is defined as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”23 This “inelude[s] the transfer of title to tangible property....”24 The parties stipulated that Plaintiffs in this case were customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place of business.25 This left for trial only the question of whether Plaintiffs had the primary duty of making sales.

Defendants say they “presented evidence that showed Plaintiffs were engaged to make sales as defined by the statutes and regulations.”26 But there was still sufficient evidence for the jury to reach the opposite conclusion, even without the disputed instruction regarding the door-to-door workers’ ability to enter into a binding contract with a customer. When considering whether Plaintiffs bore the “external indicia” of outside salespeople — a list of non-exhaustive factors that the jury could consider as part of the totality of the circumstances — the evidence could easily support the jury’s verdict.27

Much of the evidence suggested that Plaintiffs were not actually outside salespeople. Plaintiffs were hired without regard to their prior sales experience.28 Plaintiffs also presented evidence that Defendants closely controlled the work sched*690ules and locations of the vast majority of their door-to-door workers.29 Witnesses testified that workers would be driven to residential neighborhoods by supervisors,30 told which blocks to canvas,31 and told how many doors to knock on per day.32 Many workers did not control their own schedules — once a group of door-to-door workers was taken to the field by a supervisor, they were limited in when they could take breaks33 and had to keep working until the supervisor collected them at the end of the day.34 And while working in the field, *691Plaintiffs were required to wear clothing or a pin bearing Defendants’ brand name.35

Some of the external indicia pointed the other way as well. Notably, Plaintiffs acknowledge that they were paid on a commission basis, a factor that supports Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs were outside salespeople.36

In the end, though, most indicia could have supported a verdict for either party. Plaintiffs were given detailed scripts to follow when making a pitch to a potential customer, and practiced those scripts at length.37 While the jury could also have *692counted this in Defendants’ favor as “specialized sales training” that would support application of the outside sales exemption,38 this evidence somewhat points both ways, as it also indicates their task was not truly independent selling. Similarly, Plaintiffs were, by the very nature of their jobs, required to solicit new customers, which suggests they could have been outside salespeople.39 But on the other hand, Plaintiffs did not independently generate their own leads or follow up on their sales, which suggests the opposite.40 Instead, they would knock on the doors of the houses they were assigned to, and were prohibited from returning once the initial and introductory interaction with the customer was complete.41

Beyond evaluating these indicia, evidence that Plaintiffs obtained only nonbinding applications from customers also supports the jury’s decision.42 Defendants assert that “it is not disputed in the evi-dentiary record that binding agreements were signed by customers.”43 In fact, this point was very much disputed at trial. Evidence showed that Defendants retained “sole discretion” to accept or reject a customer’s application.44 The applications obtained by Plaintiffs were merely proposals until Defendants accepted them. This factor suggests that Plaintiffs were not actu*693ally making sales.45

Further, this situation is unlike the hypothetical the Supreme Court offered in Christopher of “a manufacturer’s representative who takes an order from a retailer but then transfers the order to a jobber’s employee to be filled.”46 The Supreme Court said that, in such a situation, it would be the manufacturer’s representative, not the jobber, who had made the sale.47 Here, by contrast, Defendants were not just filling orders obtained by Plaintiffs. Rather, after receiving a completed application, Defendants still had to determine whether or not to accept it. This is far more of an active role in completing the sale than the straightforward task of fulfilling an otherwise finalized order.

In short, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found either way on the outside sales exemption. Thus, Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on this issue loses.

2. BNU Claims

Defendants’ second ground in moving for judgment as a matter of law pertains to one particular group: BNUs (i.e., those employees who attended at least one day of training, but never received a completed application from a customer) who have claims for overtime wages as part of the Rule 23 class.48 Defendants argue that there is no evidence that anyone from this group worked more than 40 hours in a week, and thus that Plaintiffs failed to prove their case that the BNUs are entitled to overtime wages under Ohio law.49

Defendants made this motion at trial, and the Court denied it.50 Then, as now, there was some evidence from which the jury could infer that some members of this' group worked enough days to have racked up 40 hours or more in a week.51 There was certainly evidence from which the jury could have reached the opposite conclusion as well.52 But either conclusion was reasonable.

Furthermore, the Court has not certified a sub-class of BNUs. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to prove liability on a classwide basis — namely, that Defendants did not pay their door-to-door workers minimum wage or overtime and that Plaintiffs were not exempt outside salespeople. From the time the class was certified, the Court has recognized that while liability can be determined on a classwide basis in this case, damages will more likely need to be done on an individualized basis.53 Some members of the liability class will likely be unable to establish that they worked enough hours to qualify for overtime. Defendants will have ample opportunities to *694challenge the individual damages claims of BNUs during the damages phase.

Defendants recognize as much, but argue that because the parties’ damages experts considered the BNUs to be a distinct group separate from the rest of the class, the Court should treat them separately and order judgment against them.54 Defendants’ reliance on the damages experts’ opinions, however, only supports Plaintiffs’ position that sub-class certification is an issue for the damages phase of this case, not the liability phase.

3. Prejudice

Defendants also request judgment as a matter of law because the Court instructed the jury that employees cannot waive their rights under the FLSA.55 The merits of this argument are discussed below as they relate to Defendants’ motion for a new trial. For the purposes of Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, it is sufficient to note that Defendants never based their Rule 50(a) motions at trial on this ground.56 A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law merely renews a prior motion, and thus “can be granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict [Rule 50(a) ] motion.”57 To the extent this argument is even cognizable as part of a Rule 50 motion-which is doubtful, as it does not involve any questions that the jury could have resolved-Defendants have forfeited it. ,

III. New Trial

In the alternative to judgment as a matter of law, Defendants move for a new trial on two grounds. First, that the jury instructions erred by including language about the authority of a salesperson to create a binding contract. And second, that the Court erred by instructing the jury that the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA cannot be waived. Both arguments lose.

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), “[a] new trial may be granted ... in an action in which, there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.”

Generally courts have interpreted this language to mean that a new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a ‘seriously erroneous result’ as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias.58

B. Analysis

1. Binding Sales and State Regulations

Defendants’ primary objection in this motion is that the jury instructions regarding what constitutes a “sale” for purposes of the FLSA were incorrect.59 Jury instructions must “adequately inform the jury of relevant considerations and provide a basis in law for aiding the jury to reach its decision.”60 Jury instructions *695that, when “viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial” require a new trial.61 But mere error in the jury instructions does not itself require a new trial if the error is harmless.62

At the close of the trial, the Court instructed the jury that Plaintiffs would be exempt outside salespeople if they had a primary duty of making sales. The Court explained:

Within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, “sale” or “sell” includes an “sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition,” as well as “the transfer of title to tangible property.” In this case, both parties agree that natural gas and electricity are tangible property. Your decision should be a functional, rather than formal, inquiry, one that views an employee’s responsibilities in the context of the particular industry in which the employee works.

In determining whether a particular transaction qualifies as a sale for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, you are required to consider the extent to which the employee has the authority to bind the company to the transaction at issue. However, when governmental regulatory requirements limit an employee’s ability to bind his employer, compliance with those governmental regulatory requirements do not disqualify the transaction from constituting a sale for purposes of the outside salesperson exemption.

The various laws of the states where Plaintiffs worked, among other things, require retail electric and gas services establish reasonable and non-discriminatory creditworthiness standards and allows retail electric and gas services to require a deposit or other reasonable demonstration of creditworthiness from a customer as a condition of providing service. However, none of the laws of any of these states require retail electric and/or gas services to conduct a credit check.

On the other hand, if the employer retains and/or exercises discretion to accept and/or reject any transaction for reasons that are unrelated to regulatory requirements applicable to the industry, the transaction should not be- considered a sale for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

You may, but are not required to, also consider certain factors or indicia that tend to suggest that Plaintiffs were primarily engaged in making sales. The touchstone for making a sale is obtaining and giving a commitment to provide the gas or electricity. No single one of these factors is dispositive, nor is this an exhaustive list of factors you may consider. You should look at these, or other, factors together and ask whether, under the totality of the circumstances, they suggest Plaintiffs were actually engaged in making sales.

Factors you may consider include:

(1) The extent to which the job was advertised as a sales position and the employee was recruited based on sales experience and abilities.

(2) The extent to which the employee received specialized sales training.

(3) The extent to which the employee is compensated based wholly or in significant part on commissions.

*696(4) The extent to which the employee has the responsibility of independently soliciting new business.

(5) The extent to which the employee is directly supervised in carrying our his or her job duties.

(6) Other factors that have been discussed in this case as circumstantial evidence that the employees were or were not engaged in making sales.63

Specifically, Defendants say the Court erred in telling the jury that, when deciding whether Plaintiffs were making “sales,” the jury should consider the extent of the employee’s ability to bind the company to the transaction and whether any government regulations prohibited the employee from making a final sale.64 Defendants also say the Court’s summary of Ohio law was incorrect, because they view the regulations as requiring credit checks of potential customers before finalizing contracts.65

In its summary judgment opinion, the Court explained in detail that the nonbinding nature of the applications Plaintiffs obtained from customers is relevant to whether Plaintiffs were making sales within the meaning of the FLSA.66 The Court also explained at trial its conclusion that Ohio law does not require Defendants to do credit checks that would have prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining binding contracts.67

In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Supreme Court found that pharmaceutical representatives were exempt outside salespeople even though they did not actually accomplish “sales” of drugs to patients.68 Because Congress meant to define sales broadly to “accommodate industry-by-industry variations in methods of selling commodities,”69 the Supreme Court said that courts should consider the impact of regulatory requirements as to whether certain transactions “are tantamount, in a particular industry, to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity.”70 Thus, because federal regulations prevented the pharmaceutical representatives from engaging in the actual sale of drugs to the patient, the Supreme Court found it was enough that the representatives “promoted” sales to doctors who in turn made “nonbinding commitments” to prescribe the drugs to their patients.71

Other courts that have considered situations where employees obtained only nonbinding commitments have concluded that the employees were not necessarily making sales. In Clements v. Serco, the Tenth Circuit held that Army recruiters were not exempt outside salespeople in part because they lacked the authority to enlist a recruit; instead, they were merely “cultivating] a list of persons who seemed receptive to the idea of joining the Army,” and the Army retained discretion as to whether or not to actually accept the appli*697cant.72 Similarly, in Wirtz v. Keystone Readers, the Fifth Circuit held- that “student salesmen” who “obtain[ed] orders” for magazine subscriptions by door-to-door solicitation were not making sales because, once again, they effectively only gathered lists of interested customers, and no contract became final until the employer verified the order and the customer’s qualifications.73 In Burling v. Real Stone Source, LLC, the District of Idaho concluded that even an employee who negotiated and drafted sales proposals with customers, as well as conducting other promotional activities designed to facilitate sales, was not making sales because the employer retained the final discretion to approve or reject any given proposal.74 And unlike the situation in Nielsen v. Devry, Inc., where the Western District of Michigan found that “field representatives” who guided applicants through the process of being admitted and matriculating to DeV-ry University were engaged in sales, the interactions between Plaintiffs and potential customers in this case ended before the transaction was “consummated,” and Plaintiffs were prohibited from following up with customers to ensure the sales were completed.75

The distinguishing characteristic in Christopher was that the pharmaceutical representatives were legally prohibited from actually selling drugs to patients. Because of the regulatory scheme, the best the pharmaceutical representatives could do was to promote drugs to doctors, who would in turn prescribe them to patients. Thus, while making a salé for the purposes of the FLSA does not necessarily require a transfer of title, the alleged selling activity must be viewed in the context of the particular industry at issue — including whether the industry is subject to a “unique regulatory environment” — and the jury must determine whether' within that particular industry, the employee has the job of making “arrangements that are tantamount ... to a paradigmatic sale of a commodity.”76 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recently distinguished Christopher on just this issue, finding that Christopher is not necessarily controlling outside of a situation where obtaining only a “nonbinding commitment” is the result of a “unique regulatory environment.”77

Unlike the pharmaceutical representatives in Christopher, the Plaintiffs in this case were not prohibited from completing a contract by state or ■ federal regulations. Ohio law did not require Defendants to retain unlimited rejection authority. Ohio regulations also do not require an energy supplier to conduct a credit check, only for it to “establish reasonable and nondiscriminatory creditworthiness standards.”78 By contrast, the energy supplier only “may require a deposit or other reasonable demonstration *698of creditworthiness from a customer as a condition of providing service.”79 The regulations contemplate that an energy-supplier could require a satisfactory credit check before initiating service, but is not required to do so. It could use some other method, such as accepting a deposit.

The jury instructions on this point say nothing different. The Court explained to the jury that state laws required Defendants to establish reasonable and non-discriminatory creditworthiness standards, but that they did not require Defendants to conduct a credit check.80 This instruction is entirely consistent with the statutory language. It was then up to the jury to decide, based on the evidence presented, how this regulatory environment impacted whether Plaintiffs were “making sales.”

The instructions did not require the jury to find for either side. The instructions merely listed numerous factors that the jury could consider to decide whether Plaintiffs had the primary duty of making sales, and among those factors were whether Plaintiffs obtained binding contracts and whether any regulatory environment prevented them from doing so. The instructions also specified other factors that the jury could consider in order to reach a conclusion based on the totality of the circumstances.81 Given the relevant statutes, regulations, and case law, the jury instructions on these issues “adequately inform[ed] the jury of relevant considerations and provide[d] a basis in law for aiding the jury to reach its decision.” 82

2. Waiver of FLSA Rights

Defendants also request a new trial because the Court instructed the jury that employees cannot waive their rights under the FLSA.83 “In a trial by jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law....”84 When counsel for either party makes an argument that is improper, the trial judge may step in to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.85 However, conduct by a judge that shows “outright bias or belittling of counsel,” or a trial that is “infected with the appearance of partiality” can require a new trial.86

The jury in this case was instructed at the close of trial:

The right to receive minimum wage and overtime compensation under the [FLSA] cannot be waived. In other words, any agreement between a worker and his employer that the worker shall not be paid minimum wage or overtime is not enforceable if the worker is otherwise entitled to minimum wage or overtime under the law. However, if a worker is an exempt outside salesper*699son, that worker is not entitled to minimum wage and is not entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours.87

Defendants admit that this is a correct statement of law.88 They argue, however, that the Court prejudiced their case by giving the jury this instruction twice during trial as well as at the close.

The two times the Court had to instruct the jury on this issue were prompted by statements by defense counsel. The first time was during Defendants’ opening statement. Defense counsel referred to advertisements for Plaintiffs’ positions that “fully disclosed and described ... exactly how [the salespeople] were going to get paid,” emphasizing the commission system and that Plaintiffs had entered into contracts agreeing to this method of payment.89 At side-bar, the Court noted its concern with Defendants’ implication that Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the commission structure could have some bearing on whether there was an FLSA violation.90 Finding that Defendants’ argument was irrelevant and potentially confusing, at the request of Plaintiffs, the Court advised the jury that “an employee cannot waive the rights to FLSA overtime or minimum wage.”91

Later on the first day of trial, in response to defense counsel’s questioning a witness about the terms of the Plaintiffs’ employment contracts, the Court once again warned Defendants at a sidebar to avoid implying that Plaintiffs had somehow waived their FLSA rights simply because they had agreed to a commission-based compensation structure.92 The Court expressed continuing concern that Defendants were introducing irrelevant evidence for this purpose.93

The second time the Court instructed the jury on the non-waivability of the FLSA came during the playback of a video deposition. During this playback, the witness — Peter Potje, a door-to-door salesman — testified in response to a question from defense counsel that he understood the lawsuit to be about “whether someone who has [signed independent contractor agreements] might still get paid minimum wage for time spent.”94 Plaintiffs objected to this testimony.95 Finding Potje’s statements to be not only improper testimony on a matter of law, but also an incorrect statement of the law, the Court made a corrective instruction that an employee cannot agree to waive his rights under the FLSA to minimum wage and overtime pay.96

Cases where a trial judge has been found to have engaged in conduct that requires a new trial have typically involved a great number of comments that amount to berating of one party or its counsel.97 Here, there is no allegation by *700Defendants that the Court’s tone or demeanor expressed bias against Defendants’ position. The allegation is that the Court gave correct instructions of law. It did so in order to cure improper or incorrect statements, one made by defense counsel and one made by a witness.98 The Court finds no support for Defendants’ argument that a correct statement of the law can prejudice a party’s case. Instead, the cases support the position that the Court may comment to “ensure that the issues [are] not obscured, to ensure that testimony [is] not misunderstood, and to move the case along.”99 In this case, the Court’s brief instructions were well within its discretion to determine a question of law, ensure the integrity of the proceedings, avoid confusion of the issues, and keep the trial moving at a reasonable pace.

Defendants also assert that the Court made statements to the jury about the lack of a fraud claim by the Plaintiffs, thereby implanting the term “fraud” in their heads and biasing the jury against Defendants.100 A review of the record, however, shows that the Court only twice referred to fraud. The first time the Court mentioned fraud was during a sidebar,101 which could not possibly have caused any prejudice to Defendants as it was done outside the presence of the jury.102 The second time was in response to Defendants’ repeated questioning of door-to-door workers about their knowledge of the commission-based compensation agreements, which the Court had ruled irrelevant and instructed Defendants to stay away from. At this time, the Court instructed the jury that Plaintiffs “[did] not make a claim that the Defendants] defrauded the Plaintiffs.” 103 The Court’s comment was thus in effect invited by Defendant by continuing to delve into matters the Court had ruled irrelevant and possibly confusing to the jury. Further, if anything, this brief curative instruction would have helped Defendants, as it instructed the jury not to believe that Defendants had engaged in fraud. As such, the Court fails to see how this comment could have prejudiced Defendants’ case.

IY. Interlocutory Appeal

In the alternative, Defendants seek the Court’s leave to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in order to challenge the correctness of the jury instructions regarding the' outside sales exemption.104

A. Legal Standard

Litigants are generally not entitled to appellate review of court orders prior to a final judgment on the merits.105 In “exceptional cases,” however, district *701courts may grant parties leave to take interlocutory appeals.106 To appeal under § 1292(b), a party must show: (1) the issue concerns a controlling question of law; (2) substantial ground for difference of opinion on that issue exist; and (3) immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.107 “The burden of showing exceptional circumstances justifying an interlocutory appeal rests with the party seeking review.” 108

B. Analysis

1. Controlling Legal Issue

“A legal issue is controlling if it could materially affect the outcome of the ease,”109 “such as when ‘reversal of the District Court’s Order would terminate the action.’ ”110 Here, Defendants say that the application of Christopher to the FLSA’s outside salesperson exemption presents a controlling issue of law in this case.111

A resolution of an interlocutory appeal in Defendants’ favor, however, would not resolve this case. The question of the outside salesperson exemption’s applicability is not purely legal and requires factual findings. Further, with this motion Defendants challenge only one of the numerous non-dispositive factors that the jury was able to consider when determining whether the exemption applies. Even if Defendants’ appeal were successful, the remedy would likely be a retrial. Thus, this factor weighs against granting the interlocutory appeal.

' 2. Substantial Grounds for Different Opinion

The second factor requires that the Court determine whether substantial grounds exist for different opinion on the issue. Substantial grounds for a difference of opinion exist when “(1) the question is difficult, novel and either a question on which there is little precedent or one whose correct resolution is not substantially guided by previous decisions; (2) the question is difficult and of first impression; (3) a difference of opinion exists within the controlling circuit; or (4) the circuits are split on the question.”112

Here, Defendants seek to appeal whether the jury instructions correctly related what factors the jury could, consider in determining whether the outside sales exemption applies. The Court recognizes that Christopher is a relatively recent decision that has caused some uncertainty in FLSA litigation. Nevertheless, the jury instructions were not written on a blank slate. As already discussed, the Court’s instructions were based on and consistent with numerous other cases. And the Sixth Circuit itself has recently distinguished Christopher based on its unique facts and circumstances, and determined that it should not necessarily control other FLSA cases.113

*702The legal issues here are not particularly difficult, nor is there a clear split of authority. Some disagreement will almost always exist on any given legal issue, but in this case, the disagreement is not so substantial as to require an immediate decision from the Sixth Circuit to resolve it. Thus, this factor weighs against granting the interlocutory appeal.

3. Material Advancement of Ultimate Termination of the Litigation

Finally, the Court must consider whether an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Such circumstances exist where appellate review could “appreciably shorten the time, effort, and expense exhausted between the filing of a lawsuit and its termination.”114

The highly fact-intensive nature of the inquiry required to apply the outside salesperson exemption almost guarantees that a ruling from the Sixth Circuit in Defendants’ favor would not terminate this case; at most, a new trial on liability would have to be held. The risk that the Court will be reversed at a later date, rather than immediately, is not unique to this case. Nor is it unique to this case that Defendants could possibly win on retrial, thereby making further proceedings in the district court unnecessary.

This factor works somewhat in Defendants’ favor, however, since the upcoming damages phase will require some form of individualized proof of the number of under-compensated hours worked by each class member. The Court would not stay the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Thus, if the Court were to allow the interlocutory appeal as to the liability phase issues while the damages phase is ongoing, it could somewhat shorten this litigation overall.

Nevertheless, the resolution of the jury instruction issues on appeal would not “substantially alter the course of the district court proceedings.”115 Even if the appeal were granted, the damages phase would continue unabated. The only change to come from an interlocutory appeal would be to require any retrial on liability to be held sooner rather than later. The Court therefore finds that this factor also weighs against granting the interlocutory appeal.

Y. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, DENIES Defendants’ motion for a new trial, and DENIES Defendant’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.