UNITSETDA TDEISS TRICCOTU RT NORTHEDRINS TROIFCO TH IO EASTEDRNI VISION

) CASNEO . 5:19-CV-00597 CHRISTOPHHIELRL , ) ) Petitioner, ) JUDGDEO NALCD.N UGENT ) v. ) ) BERNADETTE MASON, ) ) ORDEARD OPTIRNEGP ORT Respondent. ) ANDR ECOMMENDATION ) Thmiastt ceorm ebse fotrheCe ourt upotnhR ee poanrtdR ecommenodfMa atgtiirosant e JudDgaev Ai.Rd u iPezt.i tiCohrniesrt,Ho ip(l"hlMe rHr.i lplr"so)efi , l aep de titaiwr oiontf for habecaosrp unudse 2r8U . S.§C2 .2 5o4nM ar1c8h2, 10 9M.r H.ialsls etrthreegder oufonrd s reliihnei pfse ti(tEiC#oF1n M).r. H.ialrlg tuhe(ad1t h):it sr cioaulnwsa iesenlff ectfoirv e inadeqaudavtiheislmityn po gl e gauditlhoat vyi anw ge a pwoheniu lnddeirs abbeiclaiaut sye hammeirns o itn clausadw eeda pond iusnadb(e2i)rhl i itstr ycio;au lnw saeisln effefocrt ive inadeqaudavtiheislmityn po gl egaudit lhoat vyi anw ge apoinlu enw dhdeirs abbeicleaih iutssy counfsaeiltl eoxepdal itnh aet unorfte ho eff e nansdte herhe edfoirndeoh atv neo tiocfwe h ahe t wabsei gna ksdet aod maidnt (;)3h e wadse ndiueepd r osco fel sabwyw aoyf prose cutorial miscobnecdausu ceDtN At esetsitnagb hilaiscs thiuennoadcle n(EcCe#F.)1 . M rH.i arlgleu s th taehste gruondfosrr elrniedeehfir gs u iplltyev aiosd . OnJ anu1ary8 2 ,022M,a gtirsJautdeRg ueii zs sauR eepdo anrtd Recomm (eEnCdFa tion #23He) r.ceo mmendetdh MartH. i lple'tsib teDi IoSnM ISMSaEgDi.sJ turdRaguteifoe zu n dta ht thtehr eger oufonrrd eslr iaeibfsyM e rdH. i wlelrn eever r aiosnde idctr a eppeanadla sar elts u he is barred from raising them in his habeas petition. In addition, Magistrate Judge Ruiz concluded that Mr. Hill’s right to withdraw his guilty plea is a state law issue that is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. See e.g., Xie v. Edwards, No. 93-43 85,

(6th Cir. 1994). Even if Mr. Hill’s claims were cognizable on habeas review, Magistrate Judge Ruiz determined that Mr. Hill’s filing was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (““AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, actions arising under

have a one-year statute of limitations that begins to run when all direct criminal appeals in the state system are concluded, followed by either completion or denial of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, or the expiration of time allowed for filing for certiorari. Watkins v. Warden, No. 17-1388,

, at *1 (6th Cir. 2017); Clay v. United States,

, 528 n.3 (2003). For reasons articulated in his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Ruiz found that the statute of limitations began running on November 11, 2015, the day after the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over Mr. Hill’s appeal of the judgment dismissing his petition to vacate or set aside judgment. Nothing Mr. Hill filed after this point operated to toll the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired on November 9, 2016. Mr. Hill’s petition, filed on March 18, 2019, is undeniably outside the one-year statute of limitations. Magistrate Judge Ruiz also considered whether equitable tolling applied. A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show that: “(1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

(2005). Magistrate Judge Ruiz found that Mr. Hill failed to identify any extraordinary circumstance. As a result, he concluded that equitable tolling is not appropriate.

Lastly, actual innocence, if proved, may overcome the expiration of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins,

(2013). Actual innocence is proved if “new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [him].’” Jd. at 399 (quoting Schlup v. Delo,

(1995)). Magistrate Judge Ruiz found that Mr. Hill had not identified any new, reliable evidence that demonstrated actual innocence. No objections were filed to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) addresses the standard of review when objections have been made to a magistrate judge’s report but does not indicate the appropriate standard of review when no objections have been made. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has stated that “[w]hen no timely objection is filed, the court only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Gray v. Kelly, No. 1:10CV1103,

, at *9-10 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory Committee’s notes). The Court has reviewed the record and the Report and Recommendation (ECF #23) and has found no error. Certificate of Appealability Pursuant to

, the Court must determine whether to grant a certificate of appealability as to any of the claims presented in the Petition.

provides, in part, as follows:

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from -- (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2A)c ertiofifac papteea lmaabiyis lsuiuntedpy ear ra gr(a1op)nh il tfyh aep plhiacsant madase u bstsahnotwoiiftan hldge e noifaac lo nstitutional right. (3T)hcee rtifiocfaa ptpee aluanbdpiealrri atg(yr1 sa)hp aihln ld iwchaistcpehe ciisfiscu e ori sssuaetsti hssefyh owrienqgub iypr areadg raph (2). Ino rdtemorak e" subssthaonwtioinftag hld"e e noifaac los ntiturtiigaoh srntea,ql u ired unde2r8U .S§.2 C2.5c )5 ((a2 h )a,b peraises mrou nsdetm ornas"tttehr aeta sojnruaicbsoltdues l debawthee t.h. te.hrpee t isthioounl bde erhnea svoeil anvd eidff emranenneotrrt htahtie s sue

presweenrt'eea dd etqdoue asteeer nvoceu ragteopm reonctfue retdh Selra.c"Mk'cv D.a n52i 9el, U. 4S7.132,S0 .C t1.5 9154,L6 .E d2.d5 4(22 0(0q0u)o tBianrgev f.Eo sotte4 l6Ul3.e 8S,8. 0 , 839n 4.1,0 S3.C . t3 38737L, .E d2.d1 009( 1983).) Wheard ei stcroiuhcratrts e jethcect oends tictluatoiintmho semn earlti htpese ,t itioner musdte monstornatlthyrea e ta sojnruaiwbsoltuesfil nd td hdei sctoruiractst's se sosftm heen t constictaluitmdiseo bnaaotlrwa rbolS nelg a.5c2kU9,. aS4t.8 F4o.tr hr ee assotnaastob evde , thCeo ucrotn cltuhMdaretH.s i hlalfas i ltemoda kase u sbtantshioawlio n ftghd eei naol fa cosntiturtiigaohnnttdah lei rnseo r easobnaasubiplsowe nh hit cdoe batth eCi osurptr'osc edural ruliAncgcso.r dtihCneog ulderyct,l tiions essacu eer ctaeiot fifa ppealability. TheC ourth arse vitehwReee pdo anrtdR ecommieo nannddha atcosn siadleolr ft ehde

pleadmiontgisano,d nfi lsi,no gfts hp eart ieMsa.g isJturdRaguteihe za c osr trledeyct ermined thMartH . ill'pest ibtedi eonniT ehde.r etfohRreeeo p,ra tdn R ecommen(dECa F#t 2ii3os)n herAeDbOyTP EDA.c cordMirH n.igllplyei',tts ii DsoI n SMI S SED. ITIS SO ORDERED.

Donald C. Nugent United States District Judge

DATED: Av.J 13, Low