UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES W.D. WILLIAMS, IV,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:22-cv-3440 v. Judge Sarah D. Morrison Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura WRIGHT PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, James W.D. Williams, IV, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against Wright Patterson Air Force Base and John & Jane Does #1–100, alleging that Defendants have stalked, harassed, and attempted to kill him. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis under

(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee.

(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $40.82 in his prison account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee. Pursuant to

(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts at Greene County Adult Detention Center is DIRECTED to submit to the

Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only

when the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court.

(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks should be sent to: Prisoner Accounts Receivable 260 U.S. Courthouse 85 Marconi Boulevard Columbus, Ohio 43215 The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office.

The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted

, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive

lawsuits.’”

at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which provides in pertinent part as follows: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * *

(B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton,

. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is

frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

(6th Cir. 2013). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.”

(cleaned up). Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

(cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

“The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank,

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner,

(1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff’s ten-page handwritten Complaint names Wright Patterson Air

Force Base and John and Jane Does as Defendants, but also contains wide-ranging allegations against the Beaver Creek Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Postal Service, his wireless carrier, and his bank. As a sample of Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff alleges that, for more than two years, Defendant Wright Patterson Air Force Base’s personnel has stalked, harassed, and attempted to kill him. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PAGEID #1–2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s personnel have created tunnels into his home, used drones to follow him, and placed surveillance equipment inside his home. (Id. at PAGEID #2–3.) Plaintiff alleges that “a foot [fell] through [the] ceiling/attic into his bedroom” and

that at a later date, someone “dropped a cigarette butt through said foot hole” which caused a piece of cardboard (which Plaintiff was using to block drone laser lights from shining through his windows) to ignite, causing the window curtains and blinds to catch fire. (Id. at PAGEID #3–4.) The allegations Plaintiff sets forth in his Complaint are so implausible as to render his Complaint frivolous. A claim is frivolous if it lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989). The former

occurs when “indisputably meritless” legal theories underlie the complaint, and the latter when it relies on “fantastic or delusional” allegations.

at 327–28. This Court is not required to accept the factual allegations set forth in a complaint as true when such factual allegations are “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer,

, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992)). Because Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on allegations that

rise to the level of being “irrational or wholly incredible” and “fantastic or delusional,” his Complaint fails to meet the facial plausibility standard such that it is legally frivolous. Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore DISMISSED pursuant to

(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. III. DISPOSITION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under

(a)(1) and (2) (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. As a result, Plaintiff’s remaining pending motions (ECF Nos. 8–12) are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office and to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

SARAH D. MORRISON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE