UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION DWAYNE HOWARD ST. THOMAS, ) CASE NO. 4:23 CV 2344 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER ) vs. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) AND ORDER PJ & A, et al, ) ) ) Defendants. ) Pro se plaintiff Dwayne Howard St. Thomas filed this civil rights action against PJ&A and Jeffrey Hubbard. (Doc. No. 1). Accompanying the complaint is Plaintiff’s application to proceed in this action in forma pauperis. (See Doc. No. 2). The Court grants Plaintiff’s application. I. Background Plaintiff’s complaint is very brief. In the civil cover sheet attached to the complaint, Plaintiff identifies the cause of action as a “data breach.” (Doc. No. 1-1). As the basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiff states, “personal injury medical malpractice, violations of HIPAA, due to data breach, which caused PJ&A to be on a breach of trust.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). In the statement of his claim, Plaintiff states “a clear and undeniable fact of breach of trust.” And in a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated “HIPAA.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff seeks compensatory relief, and he asks the Court to “make PJ&A remove any information they may

have on file.” (Id. at 5, 6). II. Standard of Review Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall,

,

,

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner,

,

,

(1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under

(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

,

,

(1989); Lawler v. Marshall,

(6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,

(6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

,

,

(2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

,

,

(2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly,

. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal,

. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a -2- simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard.

The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Papasan v. Allain,

,

,

(1986). In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 1998). III. Discussion The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop,

(6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield,

(6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n,

(6th Cir. 2008) (District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence fragments. To do so would “require . . . [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would . . . transform the

district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. Id.; see -3- also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff's complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Twombly and Jgbal standard as his pleading fails to set forth “ta short and plain statement of [any] claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief].]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rather, Plaintiff's complaint is composed entirely of conclusory allegations, sentence fragments, and unconnected legal terms. The complaint fails to include any discernible factual allegations, and it fails to assert a cognizable claim based on recognized legal authority. This Court and Defendants are left to guess at basic elements of Plaintiff's purported claim. The complaint does not satisfy the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8 and is therefore dismissed on this basis. IV. Conclusion The Court grants Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). And for the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses this action pursuant to

(e)(2). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to

(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. IT IS SO ORDERED. 2G esses DAN AARON POLSTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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