UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION Dai Juan Taikain Taylor, ) CASE NO. 1:25 CV 00007 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN ) v. ) ) Mark Zuckerberg, et al., ) Memorandum of Opinion and Order ) Defendants. ) Pro se Plaintiff Dai Juan Taikain Taylor filed this action against Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, and Sundar Pichai, CEO of Gmail (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). The motion is granted. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s complaint is very brief. It states only that “there has been a conspiracy to commit murder and several other crimes like illegal electronic surveillance being posted on my social media accounts, Facebook and Gmail.” (Id. at PageID #4). On the Civil Cover Sheet attached to the complaint, Plaintiff identifies “social media” as the cause of action. (Doc. No. 1- 1 at PageID # 7). Plaintiff requests the Court order Defendants to “produce the transcripts of my page to assist with prosecution.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #4). STANDARD OF REVIEW Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall,

,

,

(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner,

,

,

(1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under

(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,

,

,

(1989); Lawler v. Marshall,

(6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville,

(6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

. A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

,

,

(2007). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

,

,

(2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly,

. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal,

. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard.

The court is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,

,

,

(1986). In reviewing a complaint, the court must construe the pleading in the light most -2- favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 1998). DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the complaint consists only of bare, conclusory assertions, providing

no facts upon which a court could find Defendants engaged in any wrongdoing. The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop,

(6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield,

(6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading requirements.” Wells v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton,

(4th Cir. 1985)

(District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence fragments. To do so would “require ... [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff. . . [and] would ... transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the Defendants fair

notice of what the legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n,

(6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain either direct -3- or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff's complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading standard, as his pleading fails to set forth ‘‘a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing that [Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiffs complaint is almost completely devoid of facts, and it fails to assert a cognizable claim based on recognized legal authority. It contains one conclusory allegation that “there has been a conspiracy to commit murder and ... electronic surveillance.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID # 4). The complaint fails to connect any alleged occurrence to a specific injury, and Plaintiff fails coherently to identify how each Defendant has harmed him. Plaintiff's pleading is nothing more than a mere “unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Jgbal,

. Without any indication of sufficient facts to determine the factual basis for his complaint, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8, and his complaint must be dismissed on this basis.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and DISMISSES the action pursuant to

(e). Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to

(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be made in good faith. IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN Dated: 3/18/25 United States District Judge -4.