UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES VINCENT ASHFORD, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-148 Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura STATE OF OHIO, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, Charles Vincent Ashford, Jr., an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, sues the State of Ohio and several municipal, state, and federal agencies under

, alleging he was assaulted by prison staff and placed in uninhabitable housing. This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under

(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under

(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee.

(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $4.96 in his prison account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee. Pursuant to

(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts (Inmate ID Number A766322) at the Ross Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to

the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court.

(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to: Prisoner Accounts Receivable 260 U.S. Courthouse 85 Marconi Boulevard Columbus, Ohio 43215 The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check. It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress enacted

, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’”

at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e): (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton,

. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

(6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.”

(cleaned up). Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

(cleaned up). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

“The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank,

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner,

(1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1989)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to endure uninhabitable living conditions at Ross Correctional Institution, including being placed in rooms infested with vermin, being forced to walk shoeless through flood water containing feces, being denied his medically prescribed shoes, and being forced to share a cell with another inmate who sexually harassed him. Plaintiff alleges that when he refused to allow his cellmate to reenter their shared cell, Plaintiff was sprayed with a chemical agent. Plaintiff further alleges that he was physically and sexually assaulted by unspecified prison staff while unspecified medical staff stood by without intervening. (Compl.

5A–5B, ECF No. 1-1.) As Defendants, Plaintiff names the State of Ohio, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Ross Correctional Institution (“RCI”), RCI Mental Health Department, RCI Medical Department, Ohio State Patrol, Ohio National Guard, Ross County Sheriff’s Department, and U.S. National Guard. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks $3.5 trillion in damages and a variety of injunctive relief, ranging from awarding Plaintiff “authority to enforce the law,” to having the U.S. Government “recognize [Plaintiff] in a positive manner,” to early release from prison. (Id. at 4, 6.) All of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. First, Plaintiff’s claims against the State of

Ohio, ODRC, RCI and its medical and mental health departments, the Ohio State Patrol, and the Ohio National Guard must be dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

(1983); Lawson v. Shelby Cty.,

, 334 (6th Cir. 2000). “There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state has waived immunity by consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young,

,

,

(1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley,

(6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). None of these exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity in federal court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio,

(6th Cir. 1999). Second, “Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler,

(citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff brings “claims for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent

future federal constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler,

. Plaintiff’s claims seek redress for past harms, not the prevention of future harms, and therefore fall outside the scope of Ex Parte Young. Accordingly, all claims against the State of Ohio and its instrumentalities (i.e., ODRC, RCI and its departments, the Ohio State Patrol, and the Ohio National Guard) must be dismissed. The only two remaining Defendants are the Ross County Sheriff’s Department and the U.S. National Guard, and Plaintiff’s allegations do not directly or indirectly implicate either agency. Although the events underlying Plaintiff’s Complaint occurred in Ross County, Plaintiff does not allege that the County, the Sheriff’s Department, or any of its employees contributed to

the injuries Plaintiff suffered. Nor is there any connection between Plaintiff’s allegations and the U.S. National Guard. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against the two remaining Defendants “that is plausible on its face” as required by Iqbal. Plaintiff’s claims against the Ross County Sheriff’s Department and the U.S. National Guard must therefore be dismissed. See

. III. DISPOSITION Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. For the reasons above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.

(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,

(1985); United States v. Walters,

(6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE