Rani v. Rivera

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION GEETA RANI, et al., : Plaintiffs,

Case No. 2:23-CV-3986 v. Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison Magistrate Judge Chelsey Vascura

OSCAR A. RIVERA, et al., : Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 35.) In their Motion, Plaintiffs seek judgment as a matter of law on two issues: (1) that Oscar Rivera was negligent, and; (2) that Veeco Holdings, LLC d/b/a Veeco Services is liable for Rivera’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for decision.1 (ECF Nos. 40, 41.)

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Undisputed Facts This case arises from a car accident that occurred on April 2, 2023. On that day, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Geeta Rani was driving a rental vehicle westbound on Interstate 70 in the right lane in Muskingum County, Ohio; Rishipal Singh and Mithlesh Mithlesh were Rani’s passengers. (Rani Aff., ECF No. 35-1, PAGEID # 494; Rani Dep., ECF No. 34, PAGEID # 373–79.) Rivera was behind Rani’s car, also traveling westbound on I-70—he was driving a tractor-trailer and was in the scope of his employment with Veeco Holdings. (Rivera Dep., ECF No. 31, PAGEID # 116, 127; ECF No. 35-1, PAGEID # 500.) Rivera testified that he saw Rani’s vehicle ahead of him before the accident. (Rivera Dep., PAGEID # 127–28, 131, 135.)

The accident occurred when the front end of Rivera’s vehicle struck the rear- end of Rani’s car. (Id., PAGEID # 133.) At the time of the accident, the conditions were clear, and the sun was setting. Rivera had his sun visor down and was wearing prescription glasses to correct his vision; he was not wearing sunglasses. (Id., PAGEID # 117–18, 127, 147.)

Rivera was cited for failure to maintain an assured clear distance pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.21(A). (Lt. Henry Dep., ECF No. 32, PAGEID # 191.) He paid the associated fine without disputing the citation. (Rivera Dep., PAGEID # 138–39.)

B. Disputed Facts Rivera saw that the roadway in front of Rani’s car was free and clear of traffic. (Rivera Dep., PAGEID # 131.) He testified that he and Rani were both traveling around 70 miles per hour (the posted speed limit for this part of I-70).2 (Id., PAGEID # 128.) Plaintiffs retained an accident reconstruction specialist, Charles Scales, who estimates that, at the time of impact, Rivera’s speed was just under 70 miles per hour, and Rani’s speed was within 24 miles per hour or less of Rivera’s speed. (Scales Dep., ECF No. 39, PAGEID # 560–61.)

According to Rivera, Rani “all of a sudden” applied her brakes to slow down. (Rivera Dep., PAGEID # 127, 131.) At the time, “the distance was too short [for Rivera] to brake, to avoid from touching the car in front of [him].” (Id., PAGEID # 128.)

Katherine Smith was driving in the left lane and witnessed the accident. She saw Rivera’s truck behind Rani’s vehicle; at the time, Rani was “driving slowly[.]” (Smith Dep., ECF No. 33, PAGEID # 330.) Smith saw Rivera hit his brakes “[m]aybe two or three seconds” before impact. (Id., PAGEID # 332.) “The truck appeared to try to turn to the left to avoid hitting the car” but “there wasn’t enough space or enough time.” (Id., PAGEID # 333.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir. 1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact to find for the non-moving party).

III. ANALYSIS A. Whether Rivera Was Negligent Plaintiffs’ first claim alleges that Rivera negligently operated his tractor- trailer. The elements of a claim for negligence are: “(1) the existence of a legal duty, (2) the defendant’s breach of that duty, and (3) injury that is the proximate cause of the defendant’s breach.” Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Com., 2002-Ohio-4210, ¶ 22, citing Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318 (1989).

Ohio law prohibits anyone driving a “motor vehicle … in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed than will permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.21(A). A driver violates this statute when “there is evidence that the driver collided with an object which (1) was ahead of him in his path of travel, (2) was stationary or moving in the same direction as the driver, (3) did not suddenly appear in the driver’s path, and (4) was reasonably discernible.” Pond v. Leslein, 72 Ohio St.3d 50, 52 (1995), quoting Blair v. Goff–Kirby Co., 49 Ohio St.2d 5, 7 (1976).

Rivera violated Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.21(A). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ car was ahead of Rivera in Rivera’s path of travel, that Plaintiffs were moving in the same direction as Rivera, that Plaintiffs did not suddenly appear in Rivera’s path, and that Rivera actually saw Plaintiffs’ car ahead of him before the collision.

It also is undisputed that the road conditions were clear, and the sun was setting.

Rivera suggests that the setting sun might have bothered Rani, but he does not claim that the sun interfered with his ability to see Plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Rivera Dep., PAGEID # 127.)

Violation of Ohio’s assured clear distance statute constitutes negligence per se. Pond at 53, citing Skinner v. Pennsylvania RR. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69 (1933), syllabus; Transp. Corp. of Indiana v. Lenox Trucking, Inc., 15 Ohio St.2d 1 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus; Blair at 7. Thus, as a matter of law, Rivera was negligent per se in the accident when he failed to maintain assured clear distance from Rani’s car.3 Pond at 52–53.

But this legal conclusion resolves only the first two elements of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim; it does not resolve the issues of causation or damages. Id.; see also Kinzer v. Serv. Trucking, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-675, 2020 WL 815665, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2020) (Morrison, J.); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 15 Ohio St.3d 316, 318 (1984) (“Negligence per se does not equal liability per se.”). And here, there are genuine disputes of material fact on both causation and damages.

Plaintiffs provide neither evidence nor argument on damages.

As to causation, Defendants argue that Rani was a contributory cause of the accident because she failed to operate her vehicle at a speed that was reasonable and proper for the conditions that day. (Defs.’ Resp., PAGEID # 665–66.)

Defendants have presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Rani

B. Whether Veeco Holdings is Vicariously Liable Veeco Holdings does not dispute that Rivera was its employee or that he was acting in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. (Defs.’

Resp., PAGEID # 671.) As such, Veeco Holdings is vicariously liable to Plaintiffs if Rivera is found to be liable and owes damages for the accident. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 2009-Ohio-3601, ¶ 20 (holding that an employer is generally vicariously liable for the torts of its employees). But Rivera’s liability must be decided by a jury.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED to the extent that it asks the Court to find that Veeco Holdings, LLC d/b/a Veeco Services is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 35) is GRANTED to the extent that the Court finds as a matter of law that Rivera was negligent per se in failing to maintain assured clear distance ahead. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.

The Court will set a trial on the remaining issues by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT