IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

TOLULOPE ADEGUNJU,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-0841 vs. Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

DHI MORTGAGE COMPANY, LTD., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s second Request for Issuance of Summons. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff again failed to provide service copies of the Complaint for each Defendant and properly completed summons and U.S. Marshal service forms. (Id.) The summons is not directed to the proper defendants. The proper defendants are persons named as defendants in the caption of the complaint. If the person to be served is someone other than a named defendant, such as in a case where the United States or an officer or agency of the United States is the named defendant, you must put the named defendant’s name after “To:” followed by the name and address of the person to be served, preferably preceded by the designation “c/o.” Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit, within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of the date of this Order, a completed summons, U.S. Marshal service form, and a copy of the Complaint for service upon each Defendant. If Plaintiff does not comply with this Order, the Court may dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for want of prosecution. This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Compl., ECF No. 1-1) under

(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2), 1915A. For the reasons below, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) be DISMISSED in part. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted

, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez,

(1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’”

at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- * * * (B) the action or appeal-- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton,

. Thus, Section 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

1 Formerly

(d). “A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law.” Brown v. Kruse, No. 1:15-CV-526,

, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-526,

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2015). “An action has no arguable legal basis when the . . . plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest

which clearly does not exist. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.”

(citations and quotations omitted). The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastical or delusional.

(citations and quotations omitted). To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin,

, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

(6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

(quoting Twombly,

). The Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978,

, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner,

(1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits: “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,

, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown,

(6th Cir. 1989)).

In addition, when it is evident from the face of the complaint that a court lacks federal jurisdiction, the court may dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both

(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urban Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153,

, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams,

,

, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants DHI Mortgage Company, Ltd. (“DHI”) and Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Lakeview”), asserting twelve “Cause[s] of Action.” (Compl. at PageID 5, 9–29.) In the relief section of his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks ownership of the property subject to the mortgage at issue; economic, punitive, and treble damages; a

declaration that Defendants “violated multiple [Supreme] Court Mandates/Case Laws”; several Orders relating to Defendants’ ability to conduct business; an Order removing information on Plaintiff’s credit report; and an award of costs. (Id. at PageID 30.) A. Claims That May Proceed for Further Development The Undersigned recommends that several of Plaintiff’s claims be allowed to proceed for further development. Plaintiff alleges he “closed on/executed a Mortgage” with Defendant DHI and signed a promissory note. (Id. at PageID 6.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant DHI breached a contract related to the mortgage and/or promissory note and violated Ohio Revised Code § 1322.40 and

(e). (Id. at PageID 16–20.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Lakeview breached a contract related to the mortgage and/or promissory note and violated

(e). (Id. at PageID 17–19.) At this stage of the case, without the benefit of briefing, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a breach of contract claim and violations of O.R.C. § 1322.40 and 15 § U.S.C. 1692(e) against Defendant DHI, and a breach of contract claim and violation of 15 § U.S.C. 1692(e) against Defendant Lakeview. To be clear,

the Undersigned issues no opinion on the merits of this case. Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that “Cause of Action” 2, 3, and 4 be allowed to PROCEED for further development. B. Claims That Should be Dismissed The Undersigned recommends that the remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. First, Plaintiff’s “Cause of Action” 1 should be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that there is not a valid contract between himself and Defendant DHI, and Defendant DHI, therefore, cannot commence foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff. (Compl. at PageID 9–10.) Plaintiff contends that he “was deceived into entering an Unconscionable Contract” and “the mortgage was executed under Fraudulent

Pretenses and representations.” (Id. at PageID 15.) Plaintiff asserts that he “is entitled to Relief.” (Id. at PageID 12.) Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here appears to have been a Contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants . . . .” (Id. at PageID 16.) Even liberally construing the Complaint, the Undersigned cannot conclude that Plaintiff states a claim. Frengler, 482 F. App’x at 976–77 (“courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted”) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint offers no more than conclusory statements that are plainly insufficient. See Iqbal,

. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims only “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”

(quoting Twombly,

). There are no facts supporting the assertions Plaintiff makes that he “was deceived into entering an Unconscionable Contract” and “the mortgage was executed under Fraudulent Pretenses and representations.” (Compl. at PageID 15.) Standing alone, these statements are insufficient to show that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Cause of Action 1 be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.

Second, Plaintiff’s “Cause of Action” 5 should be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants” and “the Defendant(s)” violated O.R.C. § 2913.01. (Id. at PageID 21.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to specify how each Defendant harmed him such that his claim is subject to dismissal. Jefferson v. Fenech, No. 18-12811,

, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2020) (“[I]n the Sixth Circuit, grouping all defendants together collectively and providing no factual basis to distinguish each defendants’ conduct does not satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal fair notice pleading standard.”) Even putting aside Plaintiff’s failure to attribute specific conduct to each Defendant, O.R.C. § 2913.01 only provides definitions and does not provide a specific cause of action available to individual parties. O.R.C. § 2913.01.

Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to O.R.C. § 2913.01 be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Third, Plaintiff’s “Cause of Action” 6–12 should be dismissed. Plaintiff lists several causes of actions for violations of

, 1343, 1344, 1952, 1956, 1957, and 1961 and claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to certain statutes without alleging any private right of action.1 (Compl. at PageID 22–29.) The Undersigned finds no private right of action for enforcement of these criminal statutes. In addition,

provides only definitions,

1 The Undersigned notes that Plaintiff does not consistently identify which Defendant violated a particular statute in “Cause of Action” 6–12 which further calls for the dismissal of the claims. (Compl. at PageID 22–29.) See Jefferson,

, at *4. not a private right of action.

. Plaintiff includes a “Preliminary Note regarding Private Right of Action on Federal Crimes” (Compl. at PageID 22), which in essence recognizes that “[a]bsent a private right of action, a plaintiff cannot recover civilly for violation of a criminal statute.” Milam v. Southaven Police Dep’t, No. 15-CV-02029,

, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 13, 2015), aff’d (Aug. 21, 2015). Plaintiff instructs that the alleged violations

“should be viewed more so as a supporting reference arguments” if they lack a private right of action. (Compl. at PageID 22.) In the interest of clarity and efficiency, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that “Cause of Action” 6–12 be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) be PARTIALLY DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to

(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that “Cause of Action” 2, 3, and 4 be allowed to PROCEED for further development. The Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that “Cause of Action” 1 and 5–12 be DISMISSED.

It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to

(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

(6th Cir. 1997). PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within 14 DAYS, file and serve on all parties any objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in question, as well as the basis for objection.

(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Responses to objections must be filed within 14 DAYS after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson,

(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation omitted)). IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers DATED: August 11, 2025 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE