UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

JASON D. MONACO, : Case No. 2:25-cv-378 : Plaintiff, : : District Judge Douglas R. Cole vs. : Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson :

EDWARD PERKINS, et al., : : Defendants. : :

OPINION & ORDER Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay. (Doc. 32). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion. Specifically, the dispositive motion deadline is STAYED, and discovery is STAYED in part. The parties are ORDERED to file discovery status reports on or before November 21, 2025; December 12, 2025; and January 9, 2026. Defendants are ORDERED to file a status report discussing the continued prudence of the partial stay on or before January 16, 2026. I. BACKGROUND As the Court recently explained, Plaintiff Jason Monaco, who is incarcerated at Noble Correctional Institution (“NCI”), joins the ranks of numerous plaintiffs in Ohio challenging the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections’ mail policies.1 (Doc. 5). Briefly, his pro se Complaint alleges that in February 2022, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections

1 “The following is a list of known cases that include a claim, or claims, relating to the Legal Mail Policy: 3:21-cv- 0035, 2:22-cv-0021, 2:22-cv-2469, 2:22-cv-3236, 2:22-cv-3604, 1:22-cv-0170, 2:23-cv-2809, 2:23-cv-3147, 2:24-cv- 0393, 2:24-cv-0676, 2:24-cv-0764, 2:25-cv-0143, 2:25-cv[-]0378, 1:25-cv-0501. In addition, there are numerous other cases pending wherein plaintiffs have filed a motion asking for a control number or an order directing ODRC not to open legal mail. Finally, a class action complaint has been filed challenging another variance to the Legal Mail Policy. See Ohio Justice and Policy Center v. Chambers-Smith et al, 1:25-cv-0291.” Williams v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:24-cv-393 (S.D. Ohio), Doc. 36. (“ODRC”) Director Chambers-Smith “signed and approved” a new legal mail policy, 75-MAL- 03. (Doc. 5 at 2, 7). As this Court previously summarized, “[t]he policy requires senders of ‘legal mail,’ including courts, attorneys, and legal organizations, to obtain a ‘control number’ from the prisoner’s correctional institution. If the sender does not, the prison may treat the mail as ‘regular mail’ and copy and inspect it outside of the prisoner’s presence.” Warner v. Chambers-Smith, No.

2:24-CV-1565,

, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 10, 2025); see

- 9-17(B)(2). Since 75-MAL-03’s implementation, alleges Plaintiff, his mail from courts has been opened outside of his presence, read, and copied by NCI mailroom employees on numerous occasions. (Doc. 5 at 1–8). Plaintiff also alleges that on at least one occasion, mail from a federal court was withheld without his knowledge and then returned to sender. (Id. at 3). All this occurred despite Plaintiff telling NCI mailroom supervisor Edward Perkins in both November 2022 and February 2023 that he wanted “all legal mail from the courts to be opened in front of [him] and signed for by [him].” (Id. at 1–2). Yet, Perkins allegedly “continue[d] to instruct . . . his mailroom

staff to open, read[,] inspect and copy [Plaintiff’s] legal mail from the Federal Courts outside [his] presence.” (Id. at 6; see also

at 3–5 (listing instances between December 2022 and February 2025 when Plaintiff’s mail from this Court and the Northern District was opened outside of his presence)). The Court previously construed Plaintiff’s Complaint as raising the following claims against Defendants in their individual capacities: violation of his First Amendment right to receive legal mail; violation of his First Amendment right to access the courts; violation of the stipulated legal mail order in Allah v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-21-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio) (Doc. 91); and civil conspiracy under Section 1983. (Doc. 6; see generally Doc. 5). Over the last several months, the parties have exchanged discovery. (See, e.g., Doc. 38). As the case schedule currently stands, discovery must be completed by January 14, 2026, and dispositive motions are due February 16. (Doc. 15). Now, though, Defendants seek to stay all proceedings pending resolution of Shine-Johnson, et al. v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:22-cv- 3236 (S.D. Ohio) (“Shine-Johnson”). (Doc. 32; see also Doc. 43). Plaintiff opposes the stay.

(Doc. 40). This matter is ready for consideration. II. STANDARD “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co.,

(1936). The proponent of a stay must “show that there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order.” Ohio Env’t Council v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,

, 396 (6th Cir. 1977). And while the “most important factor is the balance of the hardships,” the Court must “also consider whether granting the stay will further the interest in economical use of judicial

time and resources.” Poffenbarger v. Kendall, No. 3:22-CV-1,

, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2022) (quoting F.T.C. v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc.,

, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2014)) (citation modified). III. DISCUSSION Defendants seek an order staying this case during the pendency of Shine-Johnson. (Doc. 32). They purport that the similarities between this case and Shine-Johnson implicate judicial economy concerns. (Id. at 3). They also note the Court’s order appointing the plaintiffs in Shine- Johnson counsel and the upcoming dispositive motion deadline in that case. (Id.); but see Shine- Johnson, Doc. 101 (granted joint motion to stay the discovery and the dispositive motions deadlines pending a decision on plaintiffs’ upcoming motion to amend the complaint)). Ultimately, the Court finds that only a partial stay is justified here. Up front, this Court has stayed several other cases challenging aspects of ODRC’s mail policies until a decision is rendered in Shine-Johnson. See, e.g., Williams v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:24-cv-393; Holmes v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, et. al., No.

2:23-cv-3147; Swain v. Chambers-Smith, et al., No. 2:23-cv-2809. In each, the Court found that judicial economy justified the stay.

That judicial economy concern extends here because aspects of this case overlap with aspects of Shine-Johnson. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by treating mail from courts as regular mail rather than as legal mail. (Doc. 5 at 4–6). He, in large part, ties the alleged constitutional violations to Chambers-Smith’s enactment of 75-MAL-03. (Id. at 7 (citing Sallier v. Brooks,

(6th Cir. 2003)). These issues mirror issues raised in Shine-Johnson. See Shine-Johnson, Doc. 47 at 11–13 (alleging Chambers-Smith “made changes” to 75-MAL-03 that allow prisons to open legal mail outside of the presence of inmates in violation of constitutional rights), 15 (alleging mailroom

defendants, acting under the policy, impermissibly opened legal mail from courts)). Plaintiff acknowledges these “parallel issues” between his case and Shine-Johnson. (Doc. 40 at 2 (specifically identifying the “constitutionality of the legal mail policy 75-MAL-03 and its associated 5120-9-l 7(B)(2) Administrative Rule”)). Nonetheless, he submits that his case is different. (Id. (citing Smith v. S.E.C.,

, 361 (6th Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff points to his individual claims—including that Defendant Perkins impermissibly opened or held legal mail— as being too different from anything alleged in Shine-Johnson to warrant slowing his case. (Id. at 2–3). He argues that a stay will only delay discovery he needs to litigate all his individualized claims. (Id.). While Plaintiff attempts to minimize Shine-Johnson’s similarity to this matter, the constitutionality of 75-MAL-03 and how ODRC defines legal mail are central to both cases. Accordingly, judicial economy favors staying at least part of this matter while the Court considers Shine-Johnson. See Poffenbarger,

, at *2; Williams, No. 2:24-cv-393; Holmes, No. 2:23-cv-3147; Swain, No. 2:23-cv-2809. Still, Plaintiff’s concerns about discovery are not

unfounded. As he states, there are parts of this case that are particular to him. It follows that Plaintiff should still be allowed to probe those matters now. This outcome sufficiently balances the burden of a stay on Plaintiff while also preserving judicial economy. Accordingly, the Court PARTIALLY STAYS this case. Specifically, the Court STAYS the dispositive motions deadline. The Court also STAYS discovery related to ODRC’s mail policies at large and ODRC’s general treatment of legal mail. The parties may proceed on discovery concerning Plaintiff’s individualized claims. Namely, Plaintiff may seek discovery related to his allegations that his mail was impermissibly opened and copied outside of his presence; and related to his allegations that his mail was impermissibly held or returned to sender.

To facilitate the continued exchange of this discovery, the parties are ORDERED to confer on a discovery plan. The Court observes that the parties previously did some of this work. (Doc. 38 (joint status report describing some discovery Plaintiff intends to seek)). But they are required to confer again and collaboratively decide (1) which of Plaintiff’s pending or upcoming discovery requests fall within the scope of discovery allowed to proceed under this Order; and (2) what individualized discovery Plaintiff still requires. The Court expects both sides to approach this conference in good faith. The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report on or before November 21, 2025. The report should provide an update on the conference, detail what discovery has been completed thus far, and describe the parties’ plan to complete the remaining discovery for Plaintiff’s individual claims. In that same vein, the discovery deadline in this case is currently January 14, 2026. (Doc. 15). The Court will maintain this deadline for the discovery permitted to continue under this Order. The parties are ORDERED to file two more joint status reports detailing their progress. The first

is due on or before December 12, 2025. And the second is due on or before January 9, 2026. Lastly, Defendants are ORDERED to file another status report, updating the Court on the continued advisability of the partial stay in light of developments in Shine-Johnson. This report is due on or before January 16, 2026. The Court notes that should the disposition of Shine- Johnson be continually postponed, the Court may entertain lifting the stay in this case. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Stay. (Doc. 32). The dispositive motion deadline is STAYED, and, as explained above, discovery is STAYED in part. The parties are ORDERED to file discovery status reports on or

before November 21, 2025; December 12, 2025; and January 9, 2026. Defendants are ORDERED to file a status report discussing the continued prudence of the partial stay on or before January 16, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: November 7, 2025 s/ Kimberly A. Jolson KIMBERLY A. JOLSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE