Travis Johnny Smith v. AT&T Corporation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO Travis Johnny Smith, ) CASE NO. 5: 25 CV 2733 ) Plaintiff, ) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS ) v. ) ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AT&T Corporation, ) AND ORDER ) Defendant. ) Background Pro se Plaintiff Travis Johnny Smith, who is incarcerated in Kentucky, has filed an in forma pauperis civil complaint in this matter against AT&T Corporation. (Doc. No. 1.)

His complaint does not allege any specific legal claim or cause of action; he merely indicates he seeks to assert federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. (Id. at ¶ II.) Nor does his complaint set forth clear factual allegations. The Statement of Claim set forth in his complaint, in its entirety, is that: AT&T took my business numbers and never paid transfer from Tmobile, along with putting it on Katie plamentera person credit. (Id. at ¶ III.)

He asks for “9.4 million dollars for the miscommunications for [his] business.” (Id. at ¶ II.B.3.)

Standard of Review and Discussion Although the standard of review for pro se pleadings is liberal, Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), “the lenient treatment generally accorded pro se litigants has limits.”

Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations or construct claims on their behalf. See Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). Federal district courts are expressly required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen all in forma pauperis complaints brought in federal court, and to dismiss before service any such action that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs in determining whether a complaint is sufficient to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The allegations in the pleading “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Furthermore, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must set forth allegations sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's legal claims are, as well as the factual grounds upon which they rest. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). Courts do “not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants summary dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Even liberally construed, it fails to meet basic federal notice pleading requirements or set forth allegations sufficient to state a plausible civil claim against Defendant upon which he may be granted relief. See Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that conclusory allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983).

Although federal pleading requirements do “not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ” they demand more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[,]” which is the most Plaintiff's complaint suggests here. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Conclusion Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is granted, and his complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 11, 2026 /s/ John R. Adams JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE