City of Toledo v. Grasser
Opinion of the Court
Joseph Grasser brought an action in the court of common pleas of this county and recovered a judgment for the sum of $833.71 against the city, and this proceeding is to reverse that judgment, for errors assigned in the'admission of testimony offered by the plaintiff below and admitted by the court, and for errors assigned in the charge of the court and in giving the requests asked by the plaintiff below.
The plaintiff claimed in his petition that he owned a lot on the corner of Ottawa and Lafayette streets in Toledo, on which was constructed at the time named a brick building two stories high, and with its two outside walls running along upon the lines of Ottawa and Lafayette streets, respectively, and that Lafayette street crossed Swan creek about ninety feet from Ottawa street; that the plaintiff’s lot extended back from Ottawa street a distance of ninety feet which would bring it, according to the photographs given, to the bank of Swan creek; that the city of Toledo had constructed across Swan creek and upon Lafayette street a bridge somewhat higher than the ordinary level of the territory at that point, and had filled in the street between the abutment of the bridge on the side of the creek
These allegations of negligence are denied in the answer and it is averred that the citjj- had no notice or knowledge of any of said' defects, if they existed, and that any injury sustained by the plaintiff was occasioned by the plaintiff’s own negligence.
There was no reply to this. Probably none was necessary, as the principal-question in issue was raised fairly by the petition and the answer.
On the trial of the case it appeared in evidence that Grasser at a certain time-had employed a man to take down the walls of.his building, and rebuild it from the foundation up to the second story, or second floor; that is, a portion of the-
“From your experience and observation, what do you say was the value of the work and labor done and material furnished in the taking down and putting back ■Of that building in its former condition ? ”
There was some discussion back and forth between the counsel and the court about that question, but it was modified to include what it would be reasonably worth. The stenographer made this notation : ‘This addition was made, to-wit: ‘What do you say it would be reasonably worth ?’ ” So that A it. question would read: “What do you say it would be reasonably worth, from your experience and observation, to perform the wrork and labor and furnish tnc material in the taking down and putting back that building as in its former condition ?” The witness answered that it would be worth $1,200. Soon after that the plaintiff was called, and after testifying generally about the matters in controversy, he was asked this question:
You may state, if you know, to what extent you wore put to expense — suffered damage and put to expense — for the repair of that building, as the result of these cracks in it?” (Objected to; overruled; defendant excepted.) A. Well, $1,033. ' '
There were one or two other questions relating to the same subject; and on cross-examination he repeated the fact that he paid out $1,033 to rebuild these walls.
That is all the evidence tnere is in the record as to the damages sustained by the plaintiff. All those questions are objected to, and exceptions taken to the ruling of the court. So that it fairly appears that all the evidence that the plaintiff offered below in the trial cf this case to show the damage to his building, and the injury which he had sustained in consequence of the negligence of tne city in maintaining its sewer, was this, the .reasonable worth of building these walls .and putting these repairs on the building; and the amount which he had actually paid for rebuilding the walls as he did rebuild them. That was the effect of the evidence which was offered in the case. And it seems to the court that these questions were objectionable. They did not call the attention of the witnesses, nor did they convey to the jury, any information upon the question which they were to try, which finally was, how much less valuable was the plaintiff’s property in consequence of the injuries to his building from the water that had flowed into it through this defective sewer? Of course that would be limited also by the question of the knowledge of the city and the negligence of the city, affecting the amount which might be recovered against it. But that was the measure of damages to be considered by the jury and to be inquired of from the witnesses ; or the difference between the value of the building in the condition that it was before it was injured from this water, and its value immediately after this injury had happened to it. That could have been gotten at in either one of those two ways. But it has been well settled the attention of witnesses must be -drawn directly to the loss or damage or injury sustained to the property, and it becomes wholly a mattter of opinion, to be governed by such investigation of the subject, and such experience of such subjects, as the witnesses can have.
With that being the only evidence that there was in the case, the court charged the jury upon that subject as follows, and this is all that it said, bearing upon that particular subject:
“But for damages, if you find damages to have accrued to plaintiff as charged, from water carried and discharged against or near to the building and premises •of the plaintiff, to his injury, whatever injury he sustained by reasor. of that, mot before, but after the city had notice, either express or notice in fact, or was*785 •chargeable with notice by way of implication, as we have heretofore described— after that, and after a sufficient time to enable the city to do its duty and make repairs, whatever damage after that time shall elapse you find the plaintiff to have sustained to his building by reason of water coming through his sewer, for such an amount it would be your duty to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. And if you find a verdict for plaintiff, gentlemen, you will find in such amount as in your judgment will compensate the plaintiff fully for .the damages which by reason of the waters discharged from this sewer, after the city has had notice and was chargeable with notice, and should have made repairs — for such •damages, and such damages only, you may estimate a proper compensation to the plaintiff.”
That is excepted to. That in and of itself is not erroneous, although there is not a particle of evidence in this record upon which the jury could apply that •charge, because there is no evidence of that kind of damage shown by the plaintiff. In addition, at the request of plaintiff, the court gave certain charges, which were objected to and excepted to by the city. They are as follows:
“ 3. When a drain has been constructed by a city it is its duty to keep the same in repair, and the city is liable for any damages caused by its neglect to do so.
“ 5. The whole duty of the city is not discharged by repairing breaks in such a drain, of which it had actual notice. Beyond this it must exercise reasonable care to prevent their occurrence, by reasonable inspection.
“6. If you find for the plaintiff you must add interest upon the amount you find him to have been damaged, computing the same from the time the expense to correct the injuries was necessarily incurred by him.
“7. If you find that there were evidences that something was wrong in the street from the effects upon the street, the pier and the buildings, and that the same were caused by the breaks in the sewer, and that that condition continued long enough for the city with ordinary diligence to have found it out, it was the duty of the city to ascertain the cause of the effects without unnecessary delay, and if it failed to find such cause when it could have done so with reasonable diligence, and to correct the same, it failed to perform a duty imposed upon it by law; and if the plaintiff was injured by such failure, your verdict must be in his favor.”
To the third and fifth requests as given by the court there is no particular objection, although the whole duty of the city is not stated in those requests. The sixth is erroneous, for the reason that it authorizes the jury to find a particular and substantial amount of damages, and to compute interest upon that amount, as a part of their verdict, and to compute it from the time when the expense to correct the injuries was necessarily incurred by the plaintiff. If interest is proper in a case 'of this kind, the time that the court fixed from which it should be computed indicates clearly that the court had in its mind the same thing that it had in the admission of this testimony, to-wit: that the expense which the plaintiff had paid out for rebuilding these walls was the material thing which the jury should pass upon; and when he had paid out so much money, he had a.right to bring his bill; and sue upon it to recover the money expended; which as we have said is not correct. We think it is not erroneous to say that interest may be included by the jury, but if included it should be on account of delay in paying the claim which was made by the plaintiff, as a part of the damages, and not distinguishable separately as interest. It should be considered by the jury in estimating the amount of damages which the plaintiff had sustained, but that it should be computed from the time when the plaintiff paid out this money is not true. If computed at all, it should be from the time the plaintiff had suffered the injury, which caused the depreciation of the value of the property.
The seventh request includes a part only of the facts in issue, and says to the jury, if they find these facts to be true, they must find a verdict in favor of
For admitting that testimony, and giving the requests which were given by the court to the jury bearing upon the question of damages and as to the right of the plaintiff to recover, we think this judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded to the court of common pleas for a new trial; and that will be the order.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.