City of Toledo v. Converse
Opinion of the Court
This case is here on appeal. It was submitted to Judge Hull and myself, Judge Haynes declining to sit in the case because of some interest he had had, years ago, as a lawyer, in a controversy respecting some of the lines of the property in question: This action is brought by the city of Toledo against Converse and others to restrain them from excavating on a certain triangular piece of land lying between what was Smith street, now Empire street, and Adams street in the city, of Toledo, which the defendants claim to own and which the city claims was formally dedicated to and accepted by the city for street purposes. On the trial of the case certain facts were admitted, and the following is a statement of a part of those facts:
“It is admitted by and between the plaintiff and the defendants herein that there is a regular chain of title from the general government down to Francis J. King and Charles B. Philipps, and that the title to the premises here involved was in the said Francis J. King and Charles B. Philipps, and that under the legal title thereto, on the 17th day of September, 1855, a plat thereof was made and signed which was recorded in 1855. It is conceded by the defendants that on the 17th day of September, 1855, Francis J. King and Charles B. Philipps signed a certain plat of certain property in the city of Toledo,including the premises herein, recorded in volume 2 of Plats, on page 31, wherein said King and Philipps platted certain premises, and therein dedicated to public use certain streets and*241 alleys. It is admitted that the statements made by Mr. A. E. Wilson in his abstract as to the existence or non-existence of ordinances, is what said Wilson would swear to if he were sworn and testified as a witness, and it is agreed that said abstract shall have the same force and effect as the testimony of said Wilson if he were sworn and testified to the same. It is admitted by all parties hereto that since the dedication of said property, or, rather since the signing of the plat by Francis J. King and Charles B, Philipps, that no taxes have been paid by said Philipps and King or any parties claiming to own under them, on this property in question. It is also admitted that* neither Philipps or King,or any parties claiming under them,have paid for any of the improvements made around said premises on either Adams street,or Vermont avenue, or Empire street — formerly Smith street; it is admitted that no general taxes or special assessments have been paid on this property, and that improvements hav.e been made from time to time; that Adams street has been paved twice in the meantime, and Vermont Avenue has been paved, and sidewalks have been built on Vermont avenue, Adams street and Empire street by the city of Toledo. It is admitted that in 1879 an assessment was confirmed for paving Adams street with cedar blocks, said pavement passing the premises in question, and that no special assessment was made against the property in question; that the same was confirmed August 29, 1879. It is also admitted that there was an assessment for the Adams street pavement confirmed in October, 1879, the present stone paving, which pavement passed the premises in question, which assessment is found in volume 1 of Paving Assessments, page 192,of the city records,and that an assessment of $69.56 was levied against the premises in question,but that the same has never been paid — June 1st, 1891. It is admitted that no claim for damages for the opening of Vermont avenue was ever filed with the city of Toledo.”
There are some other admissions to which I may make reference farther along.
The tract of land in controversy consists of an irregular piece 13.52 feet on Adams street, 24.52 feet on Vermont avenue, 32.76 feet on Empire street, and having
From the plat introduced it appears that the tract consisted of about ten acres which was divided into lots, streets and alleys, one of the streets being an extension of Adams street, and one being Smith street. The plat sets forth that the streets, other than Adams street, have a width of sixty feet. This would include Smith street, and on that street is marked a width of sixty feet. This triangular piece, however, was colored upon the map the same as the streets; it was not numbered as a tract or lot, but the lots which were numbered lying immediately adjacent to it and running towards the east, begin with lot 21, and then follows 20, and so on.
•It is conceded in argument that the only positive or affirmative act on the part of the persons who laid out this tract and dedicated the streets and alleys, indicating a purpose to dedicate this triangular piece as a part of the streets, was this act of making out the plat in this form with this coloring of the triangular part in question the same as the street. This, it will be observed, is not at all consistent with the width of the street as given upon the map, though it is said that in cases of that kind the indication given by the coloring of the map would control the width of the street, especially since no numbering as a lot is given to the triangular piece.
It is conceded that the council of the city has never, by any resolution or ordinance, accepted this whole plat or the streets as dedicated. Some seven years, I think, after the plat had been recorded the council, by resolution or ordinance, accepted such part as had been dedicated for streets and alleys lying to the south of Adams street —■ perhaps to the south of the north line of Adams street; but there has been no farther
It is conceded that the defendants have all the title of the original proprietors.
It seems to us that the evidence of intent to dedicate is not quite clear. I have mentioned that the width of Smith street is given as sixty feet, and the width of Adams as sixty-six feet, and that would leave just such a triangular point of land not within either street — 'that is, not a)j part of either or both streets.
A case has been brought to our attention since the argument of this case, that in many respects in its facts is like it. I refer to the case of Steinauer v. The City of Tell City et al., 146 Indiana Sup. Ct. Rep., 490. I shall not read from this to any great extent, for I assume that counsel here are reasonably familiar with the authorities handed up. In that case the controversy was about a triangular tract ■of land left between two streets, and upon the subject of the evidence of the purpose or intent to dedicate, the court has this to say:
“In order to constitute a^complete^and valid dedication*244 of land to the public, it must be shown that the owner of the land clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or acts to dedicate the same, and there must also be an acceptance thereof by the public.”
The words ‘‘an intent” are necessary to complete the sense in this syllabus, but it so appears in the body of the opinion. On page 499 the court say:
‘‘Under all the circumstances, we do not think this is sufficient to reasonably raise the presumption that the society intended to dedicate it to the public. There is no express finding by the court showing that the society intended to dedicate this ground for any purpose. Evidentiary facts tending to prove an intended dedication, or from which the same might possibly be presumed, are not of themselves such intended dedication.”
There is something more in the opinion upon the subject of acceptance of a dedication, to which I may refer further along. But, assuming that a purpose to dedicate should be found and is sufficiently clear and unequivocal, let us look for a moment to the evidence as to the acceptance. It seems to us that it cannot be said fairly that there is such evidence of acceptance by. occupation and use on the part of the city as would perfect a dedication, and shift the responsibility for the proper care of this piece of land onto the city, and relieve the original proprietors or their grantees therefrom. The statute requiring that there should be an acceptance of a dedication is for the protection of the city, as is held in the case of Wisby v. Bonte, et al., 19 Ohio St., 238:
‘‘Section 63 of the municipal corporation act is not intended as a limitation upon the general powers of the corporation for opening and improving streets, but as a restriction to prevent proprietors, who may lay out grounds into lots within the limits of the corporation, from vesting in the corporation the title to streets and alleys, and thus charging the corporation, without its consent, with the duty of keeping them open and in repair.”
Of course,that is a very important matter to a city,because if the property which th& proprietor undertakes to dedicate for a street or alley is not kept in proper condition of repair, a traveller may be injured and the city may be re
But the city might accept it and use it for street purposes though it did not pave it, and although there was no flagging laid upon it for side walks — It might use it as a little triangular park along the side of the street lying between these two streets. And it is said that this was done.
According to the evidence, as we understand it, along about 1884, some of the proprietors of lots near to this point of land, desiring to have it fixed up and improved because it was unsightly, and in order to add to the attractiveness of their own property, or so that their own property might not be detracted from in consequence of this unsightly piece lying near by, made up a subscrip
Theretofore the city had not levied any assessment upon any part of this point of land for,any of these street improvements, nor had the point of land been upon the tax duplicate for taxation. That seems to have been in consequence of the authorities losing sight of it, as the proprietors seem to have done. It was not very valuable at the time it was laid off, and in consequence of this map being in the condition that I have described, both the proprietors and the public taxing authorities seem to have lost track of it; but when Vermont avenue was-laid out, the city seems to have discovered that here was a tract of land that they did not care to take into Vermont avenue, The city did not undertake to assume control of it or declare ownership of it, but proceeded to assess a part of the cost of the Vermont avenue improvement upon this particular disputed tract of land. Now that, we think, was such an unequivocal declaration of the purposes of the city of Toledo to not accept or claim this tract, as that we must give the action its legitimate effect as evidence.
It is said that the proprietors are to be regarded as estopped because they have not paid the assessments on account of the paving and the laying of the sidewalks upon Adams street and Empire street; but we do not understand that the circumstances were such as to give rise to an estoppel. They were not asked to pay anything, If there had been any assessment levied upon this lot, and they had then declined to pay upon the ground that they were not the owners and had dedicated it to public use, if anything of that kind had occurred,of course it would have presented quite a different case; but here the authorities seem to have lost track of it and made no assessment upon it, and we are of the opinion that it was not necessary, to escape the effect of estoppel, for the proprietors to hunt up the city authorities and say to them, “We own a piece of property here, and there has been an improvement made alongside of it, and we think we ought to pay something on account of it, and therefore we make a tender of what we think is justly and fairly due to the city on account of that improvement.’’ We do not think that was necessary.
Some testimony tended to show that this point had been driven over,and that foot passengers had gone over it for a number of years, and that such use not only indicated an acceptance for street purposes by the public, but that it amounted to such an adverse occupation and use as to have cut off the title of the original proprietors.
In view of what the city had done in locating the streets and setting the curbs as I have described, we do not think that the fact that persons may have driven outside of the lines of the street on to this property amounts to such conduct on the part of the public, with the knowledge and approval of the authorities, as would bind the city so that it should be said that the city has accepted the dedication as a common law
I believe, I have covered substantially all the points necessary to be mentioned in the case. We are not satisfied that there was an intention to dedicate this particular triangle; but, assuming that there was such an intent, there has not been an acceptance of such intended dedication by the city. There is no estoppel, and there has been no ad
“This strip has not been in any way improved as a street, neither has it been traveled nor used to any extent, as the finding discloses. There being an absence of user sufficient to constitute an acceptance, there must be proof of an acceptance on the part of the public authorities of Tell City by some formal act of theirs, showing an unmistakable intention to accept the land dedicated, and for the purposes for which it was intended by the dedicator to be used, etc.” Citing People v. Underhill, 144 N. Y., 316.
It is not necessary to say that the city cannot hold his part of the triangle for any other purposes than for street purposes,' and what I have said makes it unnecessary to discuss whether or not the purposes for which they propose to improve it would amount to a holding of it for street purposes. The finding and decree will be for the defendants, and they will be quieted in their title, and the costs will be adjudged against the city,and the injunction will be dissolved.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.