Burt v. Kentucky Trust Co. Bank
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff is a bill-holder of the Kentucky Trust Company Bank, a corporation created by the legislature of another State, and there transacting its business, at the time the bills were issued. The defendant objects to a recovery, by the plaintiff, upon all bills below the denomination of $10, claiming that the act to prohibit the
The evidence in the case, establishes the following facts: The bills were, for the most part, purchased after the 1st of October, 1854, when the law referred to went into operation. Some were borrowed, but afterward paid for. They were generally bought at a large discount, and at the time of purchase, the bank had suspended, refused to redeem its notes, and had gone into liquidation.
That the bills were all received by the present holder, either to be sued upon, or returned for redemption at some future period. There is no proof that they were received to be circulated as the representatives of money, or that the plaintiff’ has attempted to “pass, transfer, or circulate” them; nor is it in evidence, the bills were not in actual circulation, in Ohio, when the statute took effect.
The largest amount of the bills are of the denomination of $10 and upward; of course, there can be no objection to judgment in the several cases, for the various sums represented by those notes. As to the residue of those bills, we are asked to apply the prohibition, already referred to, and it will aid, very essentially, the proper construction of the various provisions of the statute, if we, in the first place, ascertain the object of its enactment.
The title, which may be regarded as in some measure expressing the intention of the law-makers, though we admit that it does not always give a very clear indication of the purposes they contemplated, is here very plainly set forth: “ An act to prohibit the circulation of foreign bank bills of a less denomination than ten dollars.” The circulation, then, of such bills, was prohibited. If the bills were in circulation at the time the law took effect, they certainly might have been withdrawn and remitted for redemption, or kept on hand by the holder. They were not confiscated, as contraband, or declared of no value in the possession of the bona fide holder; and no such power could be claimed to
Wc think, then, that the end the statute was designed to accomplish, was, to keep out of circulation foreign bills, and thereby substitute our own, for all commercial purposes. The end sought to be thus attained, can not require a more liberal exposition of the law, and certainly ought not to demand such a construction of its provisions as would
The view we have thus taken is consistent with the former legislation of our State, on the subject of banks and banking.
For several years, statutes have been in force involving the same principles, and intended to secure the same object. The only difference between those, that existed when the present law was passed, and this law, was in the denomination of the bills prohibited — not in the mode in which the circulation of the foreign notes is forbidden.
By section 63 of the -law incorporating the State Bank of Ohio, Swan 100, February 24, 1845; §§5, 6, Swan 108, previous to the passage of these statutes, the 23d section of the law passed January 28, 1824, was repealed March 23, 1840. See Swan 108, 117; law of January 22, 1846, §§1-4, and the provision in §2, Swan 111; Laws, February 24, 1848, 'Swan 112, §§1-3. Laws, 1845, March 12, §§1-2, expressly authorize suits, Laws, March 8,1845, Swan 114; of 1851, January 25, Swan 115, as to proceedings; Laws, 1851, Swan 116, §26.
These laws were all in force, when the statute, which it is contended prohibits a recovery in these actions, was passed. They are not expressly repealed, or modified; and but for the general clause, which declares all laws inconsistent with it to be repealed, there would be no intimation how far it was intended to refer to previous statutes.
The law now in force, has a different title from any of the preceding, and though we feel bound to give it all the effect to which it is entitled, we must, nevertheless, construe it in
■ If we compare the provisions in section 1, of the law of 1854, with those of section 2 of the law of 1846, and section 3 of that of 1848, we find it could not have been the object of the legislature to include, within their prohibition, cases like the present. The purpose was to prevent the circulation of foreign bills below certain denominations — not to declare them worthless, as articles of property, when not intended to be circulated, or when so depreciated in value that they could not be circulated. A different construction would operate as a legal sequestration, destroying the property of the bill-holder, if he attempted to convert it into its present value, and thereby forever release the foreign bank from the redemption' of its bills.
¥e can not permit such a result to follow. The institution that issued these notes, is bound to discharge them at their full value. They were valid in their original creation — they are still valid for all the purposes of collection, and as evidences of debt.
If the bank that created this currency is unable or unwilling to redeem it, we are bound to aid the holder of the bills, if he seeks, by action in our courts, to subject its property to their payment.
We shall then administer justice to all parties, and prevent a great wrong. "We shall ever hold ourselves to be subject to the penal laws of our State, whenever they are clearly defined, and their meaning and object can be ascertained by those principles of exposition that we must apply to all other enactments ; claiming, at all times, that it is our duty to hold the law-makers within those limits to which the right of individuals, and the constitution, must confine all legislative bodies. We will not presume any wrong was intended by the legislature, and we will so interpret its enactments that none shall be done. When we find a prohibition to do an act, we will not require that there should be a penalty, also, to
It is our duty, in all cases, to sustain and give effect to the prohibition, by denying the remedy, but never to permit the prohibition to be extended beyond its legitimate meaning, or for a purpose that would'be palpably unjust.
We have given a very careful attention to the consideration of these cases, and attentively examined the arguments of the ■able counsel, who have addressed us orally, and upon brief, and, on the whole case, our clear conviction is, that all thé plaintiffs are entitled to judgment upon all the notes they have ■offered in evidence.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.