Extension of the Lower River Road Co. v. Incorporated Village
Opinion of the Court
Section 34 of the act passed May 1, 1852, entitled “ an act to provide for the creation and regulation of incorpoi-ated companies in the State of Ohio,” contains the following provision: “ Provided, that no company or association of individuals, which has been or may hereafter be incorporated for the purpose of making any turnpike or plank-road, shall be authorized to erect or keep up any toll-gate or receive tolls within the corporate limits of any incorporated city, town, or village, or within eighty rods of such limits.”
The village of Riverside, situate in Hamilton county, was
Upon the record before us two questions arise: 1. Can the proviso in section 84 be enforced by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error ? 2. Does this proviso apply at all to the extension of the Lower River road company?
1. It is contended, on behalf of the company, that this provision was not intended to apply in a case where a-turnpike road has been or may be constructed, and a toll-gate erected thereon at a point outside and eighty rods or more from the limits of an incorporated city, town, or village, and where, by a subsequent incorporation of a city, town, or village, or by an extension of its corporate limits, the toll-gate so erected is brought within such limits or prohibited distance. And it is also contended that if this provision was intended to be applied in such case, such application would be an unwarranted infringement upon the rights of private property, and therefore repugnant to the constitution of the state.
Without stopping here to discuss these propositions, it must suffice to say that neither of them can be maintained. The former is entirely unsound, and the latter, to say the least, is stated too broadly.
2. In view, however, of the history of this turnpike road, and of the constitution of the plaintiff in error, we think it quite clear that the proviso in said section 34 has no application in the case.
This turnpike road was originally a county road, known as the extension of the Lower River road, which the commissioners of Hamilton county converted into a turnpike in
Upon the completion of the road, a toll-gate was erected by the commissioners at a point within the present limits of the village of Riverside, which has been maintained and tolls collected thereat ever since.
Under the provisions of this statute the commissioners borrowed money and issued bonds therefor, to the amount of $11,000 and upward, pledging irrevocably the tolls of
The management of the road was continued under the control of the commissioners until the year 1859.
On the 15th of April, 1857, the general assembly passed an act authorizing the commissioners of Hamilton county, on certain conditions, to surrender the Lower River road, and the extension thereof, to the bondholders and creditors, and on the 25th of February, 1859, this act was so amended as to authorize the surrender of the extension alone to its creditors and bondholders, provided a majority in amount would assent thereto. In pursuance of these acts, the extension of the Lower River road was surrendered to its bondholders and creditors upon the conditions prescribed. The parties to whom the surrender was thus made were authorized by the act to become incorporated under the provisions of the act of May 1,1852, above referred to, subject to be regulated by the provisions of this act — to wit, the act of April 15, 1857. One of the provisions of this act was, that each bondholder or creditor should be entitled to one share of stock for each fifty dollars in amount of his bond or credit. ("We do not understand, however, that the bonds or credits of the road were to be canceled or merged in the stock. The bond or credit remained intact, whether the bondholder or creditor did or did not become a corporator.) After the surrender, a majority of the bondholders (if it were competent under this species of legislation for them to do so) became a corporation, by the name of “ The Extension . of the Lower River Road Company ” — to wit, the plaintiff in error.
This statute further provided that a company so formed should not at any time pay a greater interest or make a larger dividend than six per cent, per annum upon their indebtedness or the stock of the company; and that after keeping the road in repair and making such improvements upon the same as the company might think necessary and proper, and the payments of the debts and stock with six per cent, interest thereon, the tolls upon the road should be
Such is the constitution of the plaintiff in error. We-think it is not an incorporated turnpike company within the meaning of the proviso in said section 34. Most certainly it is not “ a company or association of individuals- . . . incorporated for the purpose of making a turnpike or plank-road.” While we may admit that the language of this proviso should not be taken in its strict or literal meaning, still we think the intention of the legislature would be' departed from, if the statute were held to embrace corporations other than those who make or otherwise become possessed of roads as proprietors. If the right to control this road had remained in the commissioners exclusively, it could not be successfully contended that the-power expressly confei’red «upon them, “ to erect one or more toll-gates on the road at such point or points as may be deemed advisable by them, and collect tolls from all persons traveling on said road or any part of the same,” was-modified by the restriction imposed upon incorporated turnpike companies by this proviso. It appears to us that, the plaintiff in error, in the management of this road, stands-in place of the commissioners, and is a mere agent or trustee controlling the road for the benefit of the bondholders and creditors, and for the general public, without having any property in the road itself, or any beneficial interest in the tolls; therefore, the keeping of a toll-gate on this road and collecting of tolls thereon, within the corporate limits of the defendant in error, by the plaintiff in error, is not a violation of this proviso in section 34 of the act of May 1, 1852 Motion granted, and judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.