State v. Commissioners
State v. Commissioners
Opinion of the Court
If the defendants have power to provide for the payment of relators’ claim by taxation, their duty to do so is not questioned. Nor is the power of the commissioners to provide, by taxation, for the payment of the debts of the county, disputed. The principal contention, therefore, is, does the claim of relators constitute a debt of the county ?
The form of the bond, if that alone were to be considered, would clearly indicate an obligation on the part of the county. The following is a copy:
“ No. 131. State of Ohio, $500.00.
County of Fayette.
“ Be it known that the County of Fayette, in the State of Ohio, hereby acknowledges to owe Grove & Coffman, or bearer, the sum of Five Hundred Dollars, payable at the office of the Treasurer of said Fayette County, on the first day of March, 1871, with interest at the rate of seven per centum per annum, from the first day of September, 1868, payable semi-annually at said Treasurer’s office on the 1st day of March and September in each year, on the surrender of each coupon hereto annexed—attested by the Auditor of said county. ,
“ This bond is issued in pursuance of and according to an act of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, entitled*529 £An act to authorize the County Commissioners to construct roads on petition of a majority of the'resident land-owners along and adjacent to the lino of said road, and repeal an act therein named,’ passed March 29, 1867, and the acts amendatory and supplementary to said act, passed March 31, 1868, and May 16, 1868, respectively.
“ In testimony whereof, The Commissioners of said County of Fayette, and as such Commissioners have hereunto set our hands and names, and affixed the seal of said County, this 4th day of November, 1869.
“A. MoOandless, Allen TIegler, ) Commissioners Auditor of Wm. Clark, j- of said Fayette Fayette County, O. Enos Reeder, ) County, Ohio. Registered Nov. 4, 1869.”
The question of the power of the commissioners to obligate the county, is, however, raised on the statutes to which reference is made in the bond. The holder of the bond is notified by its face, that the power assumed by the commissioners is to be found in these statutes. Section 7 of the statute provides, ££ That for the purpose of raising money necessary to meet the expenses of such improvement, the commissioners of the county are hereby authorized to issue the bonds of the eountij, payable in installments, or at intervals not exceeding in all five years, bearing interest at the rate not to exceed seven per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually, which bonds shall not be sold for less than their par value.” From the language of the statute here quoted, perhaps no one would deny that the debt evidenced by the authorized bonds is the debt of the county in its quasi corporate capacity—indeed, the language is not susceptible of any other méaning : but, inasmuch as the same section provides for an assessment upon the lands specially benefited and lying within two miles of the improvement, to meet the payment of the interest and principal of the bonds, it is contended that no other mode or manner of taxation can be resorted to for the purpose of paying the bonds. However plausible this contention may be, we think it cannot be maintained. That the legislature might have so provided, we do
Again, although the question is not raised by the pleadings in this case, it is suggested that, inasmuch as the power of the commissioners to make improvements, under the act of March 29, 1867, and its amendments, depends on the fact that the petition for the improvement be subscribed by a majority of the resident land-holders whose lands were reported benefited thereby, which fact did not exist in the case before us, as was adjudged in the case of Hays v. Jones, 27 Ohio St. 218, therefore the-bonds in question were unauthorized and void. True, it was found in that case that the jurisdictional fact named was. wanting, and therefore it was adjudged, that the defendants, parties in that case, be forever restrained from enforcing the collection of the special assessment against the property of the plaintiffs in that action. Rut the relators, or their intestate, though he purchased the bonds during the pendency of that action, were not parties to it or bound by its result.
“ During said proceedings, and before the final order, a majority of the land-holders resident in said Fayette county whose lands had been reported for assessment, as aforesaid, had signed said petition for said improvement.
“ That in the month of July, 1868, the said report of said viewers and surveyor came on to be heard before the said board of county commissioners, at which time a number of said petitioners presented a remonstrance to said board asking that said improvement be not made, yet the said commissioners decided that a majority of the land-holders whose lands had been reported for assessment had signed the petition, and then made the final order for said improvement on the-day of July, a. d. 1868, and such further proceedings were had that the contract for making such improvement was awarded to' Grove & Coffman, to be paid for in the bonds of said Fayette county, of which the said bonds mentioned in the plaintiff’s petition constituted a part, and said improvement completed in the year 1870, according to the contract and specifications therefor.”
The rights of the relators, as we conceive, do not depend upon the fact whether or not a majority of the land-holders had subscribed the petition for the improvement. That their intestate purchased the bonds before maturity, for a valuable consideration, and without actual knowledge of any defect in their execution,' is -conceded. Of .coqrse, to the extent he was bound to inquire as to the regularity of their execution, he is chargeable with any information which reasonable diligence would have revealed. Fie was bound to know that the bonds were issued under the authority of certain statutes. The face of the bond gaVe him this information. It was certified in the bond that it was “ issued in pursuance of and according to ” the statute; and there are authorities which hold that an indorsee may rely on such recital, without further inquiry as to the regularity of the issue. State ex rel. v. Robertson, 27 Ohio St. 96; Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96.
But conceding that such recital does not relieve the pur
Peremptory writ awarded.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.