Compton v. Railway Co.
Opinion of the Court
The principal grounds upon which the plaintiff asserts his right to relief are — (l)the provisions of the statute under which the proceedings in consolidation were had; (2) the stipulation in the agreement forming the basis of the consolidation; and (3) the mortgage executed by the new company in 1867, known as the consolidated mortgage.
I. The bonds owned by the plaintiff, amounting at their face value to $150,000, were issued by the Toledo & Wabash Railway Company in 1862, were unsecured by mortgage on the property of the company, and the entire series, of which they were part, were denominated convertible equipment bonds, and amounted to $600,000, payable in 1883, bearing interest at the rate of seven per cent., payable semi-annually, with the usual coupons attached. The company had been formed by the consolidation of the road of a ’company in Ohio with
The consolidation was had under the laws of the several states -in which the constituent roads were located, the statute in this state applicable to the transaction being the act of April 10, 1856. (1 S. & C. 327.) The act required that an agreement forming the basis of the consolidation should be presented to the stockholders of the respective companies at separate meetings called for that purpose upon due notice; and then provided that upon its adoption by a vote of two-thirds of the stockholders, the filing of the agreement with the requisite certificate of its adoption, by the secretary of each company, in the office of the secretary of state, and the election of directors by the stockholders of the new company, the consolidation should be deemed complete, and that all the rights, privileges and franchises and all the property of every description “of each of the corporations, parties to the same * * * shall be deemed to be transferred and vested in such new corporation without further act or deed,” with this express proviso, “ that all rights of creditors, and all liens upon the property of either of said corporations, shall be preserved unimpaired, and the respective corporations may be deemed to be in existence to preserve the same; and all debts, liabilities and duties of either of said companies, shall thenceforth attach to said new corporation and be enforced against it to the same extent, as if said debts, liabilities and duties, had been contracted by it.” Whilst the Indiana statute is not so definite in its provisions as to the rights of creditors of the constituent companies as our own, yet an effect has been given it by the construction of its courts, that is substantially the same. McMahan v. Morrison, 16 Ind. 172; Indianapolis, C. & L. R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Ind. 465.
What, then, is the sum of the rights of creditors that, as against proceedings had under it, are to be preserved unim
But the question presented here is not general, but special: It is, what are the rights of unsecured creditors of an incorporated railway company whose entire road and property have been transferred to a new company, formed by its consolidation with other roads under the laws of this state ? The general doctrine that all the property of a corporation is a trust fund for its creditors, and that upon its dissolution they, have the right to require that it be applied in payment of their claims, is not controverted by the defendants. There seems to be no conflict in the authorities as to this, and that the right gives rise to an equitable lien upon the property in favor of the creditor, that is superior to the claims of every one but purchasers for value without notice. Story Eq. Juris, sec.
Nor can there be much question but that by consolidation the prior companies are extinguished for all purposes except to preserve the rights of their creditors, for which purpose they “ may,” in the language of the law, “be deemed to to be in existence.” The observation of Mr. Justice Swayne, in construing this statute in Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, that, “it was a condition precedent to the existence of the new corporation that the old ones should first surrender their vitality and submit to dissolution ” is quite accurate.
It is, however, claimed by the defendants that no new rights are conferred by the statute upon creditors; that if they were unsecured before, they remain such after, the consolidation; and that the new company may deal with the property — may sell or mortgage it — as could have been done, and with like effect, by the former company had it continued the owner thereof. This argument is placed upon two grounds, (1) the assumption that the transaction is analogous to a sale, and, (2) that such is the effect of the statute upon all contract made subsequent to its passage. We will consider them seriatim.
1. The first is, as we think, certainly erroneotts. Whilst the transaction has some of the features, it is wanting in the essential elements of a sale. A sale implies a vendor and a vendee, and by it the former sells and transfers a thing that he owns to the latter for a price paid or to be paid to himself. The vendor parts with nothing but his property, and for it receives a quidpro quo. Such is not the case where companies are consolidated under this statute. It is true that the owner of each constituent road parts with its property. But it does much more; it not only parts with its property, but ceases to be a juristical entity, capable of owning or acquiring property. It does not, and could not receive any consideration for the transfer, because it is extinguished and dissolved by the act of its stockholders in assenting to the proposed agreement. It is futile to urge that the consideration is received by the stockholders. They are not the corporation, nor do they represent
In all these cases the point most to be observed, is the extreme care of the law to secure the rights of creditors. The case of an inheritance is familiar and needs little or no comment — the creditors of the deceased are regarded as having a lien upon the property of the deceased, and this is secured to them through the methods of administration; and so in the case df those regarded as being civilly dead, for example in the case of a monk, the • individual, in anticipation of becoming a “ monk professed,” could make a will and appoint his own executor, but if he did not, administration was awarded by the ordinary as upon the estate of one in fact deceased. 1 Bl. Com. 132. For some reason, not well understood, neither the adrogator nor the husband in a marriage by coemption was, by the ancient civil law, liable to creditors for the debts of the person thus reduced to his power. But a remedy was provided at an early period through an action given by the praetor, in which, by a fiction, the former status of the debtor was deemed to continue, and this, like all fictions introduced to favor the remedy, could not be disputed, and preserved the rights of the creditor as against the property of his debtor. Poste’s Gaius Inst. bk. 3, § 84; Id. bk. 4, § 38, and comments by Poste, p. 521; Just. Inst. bk. 3, tit. 10, §§ 1—3 ; and Hunter Rom. Law ( 2 ed.), 741. And it is worthy of note in this connection that our statute regulating proceed
2. The claim is, however, that such is the effect of the statute under which the consolidation was had, and having been in force at the time the equipment bonds were issued, entered into the contract and became a part of it. It is difficult to perceive how this claim can be maintained in the face of the language of the statute heretofore quoted, “ that all rights of creditors * * of either of said corporations shall be preserved unimpaired.” There is no question but that every statute enters into and forms part of any contract to which it is applicable as a part of the law of the land; but it is not perceived how, in the application of this rule, a contract may be impaired, or in any way affected, by proceedings had under a statute, which by its terms excludes any such effect. The proposition involves a contradiction in terms. The only question that can be raised in such case is, whether a particular effect claimed for a proceeding had under the statute will or will not, impair the contract of a creditor, and an answer to the question in the affirmative, must be fatal to the claim. No reason is perceived why a different intention should be imputed to the legislature in the enactment of this law. The object of the legislature in authorizing the consolidation of railway companies was, as we apprehend, not to enable the new company to obtain credit by impairing the security of existing creditors of either of the former roads, but to enable existing companies to unite and form a continuous line of railway under one corporate management, between widely separated points of trade and commerce; and as this may be attained without impairing the rights of creditors of the constituent roads, a court might well hesitate to so construe the statute, if its provisions were silent on the subject. It would seem to be quite as consistent with a wise public policy to preserve the foundations of commercial credit, as to promote the formation of great lines of inter-state, commerce • both may be necessary to the interests of commerce, but the one not more than the other.
The former decisions of this court do not affect the question as to the rights of creditors. They are simply to the effect that the statute becomes a part of all subscriptions to the capital stock of a company made subsequent to its passage, so that the same may be recovered iir a suit by the consolidated company brought for that purpose. Mansfield, Caldw. & L. M. R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Ohio St. 223. The rights of a stockholder are preserved by giving him an election to become one in the new company, or of declining, and being paid the highest market value of his stock at any time within the six months next preceding the making of the agreement, but unless he does so previous to
II. The plaintiff does not, however, base his claim to relief solely upon the provisions of the statute, but likewise, upon the effect of the stipulation in the agreement forming the basis upon which the consolidation was had, that the class of bonds owned by him should be protected, both as to interest and principal, as the same should mature, by the new company. The principle upon which this claim is based is, that where property is transferred upon the condition that the grantee shall pay some third person a debt or sum of money, the latter acquires an equitable lien on the property to the extent of the debt or sum of money to be paid him. This principle is well recognized and has been applied in a great variety of cases. A masterly treatment of the doctrine by Ranney, J., will be found in Clyde v. Simpson, 4 Ohio St. 445. See also, Story Eq. Juris., § 1244-6; Pom. Eq. Juris., § 166 and § 1234; Montgomery & West Point R. Co. v. Branch, 59 Ala. 139; Hamilton v. Gilbert, 2 Hiesk. 680; Vanmeter v. Vanmeter, 3 Grat. 148.
It is true that most of the instances in which this lien has been recognized is where property had been devised charged with the payment of debts or legacies to others, and for the plain reason that the most frequent occasions for its application will arise in such instances, and not because the principle is in its nature inapplicable to other transfers of property; for, as is said by Ranney, J., in Clyde v. Simpson, supra, a “doctrine resting upon the broad foundations of justice and conscience ” cannot be made “ to depend upon the manner in which the title is derived.” No such limitation has been placed upon the doctrine by the courts or text writers. Story Eq. Juris., § 1246. In Vanmeter v. Vanmeter, supra, it appears that a grantor had made a conveyance of all his real estate in consideration of one dollar and the agreement of the grantees to pay his debts
It seems, therefore, unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the security known as the consolidated mortgage, executed by the Toledo, Wabash & Western Eailway Company, in 1867, for the purpose of retiring its bonded indebtedness. This has been constantly refused the holders of these equipment bonds; and as they are now due, the plaintiff is entitled to a finding of the amount duo upon the bonds held by him, and an order for the sale of so much of the road as is within the jurisdiction of the court, unless paid in a short time to be named.
The conclusion here reached finds direct support in the cases of the Montgomery & West Point R. Co. v. Branch, 59 Ala. 139, and Tysen v. Wabash Ry. Co. 15 Fed. Repr. 763 and in the text of section 809 of Morawetz on Corporations. In a note by the reporter to Tysen v. Wabash Ry. Co., it is said that a motion for a rehearing was overruled by Justices Wood and Harlan. An effort has been made to distinguish the Alabama case on the suggestion that in it the indebtedness may have been contracted before the passage of the statute under which the consolidation had taken place. But this is not correct, as
Judgment for the plaintiff, finding the amount due him and order of sale.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. In the case of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Ham, 114 U. S. 587, which was an appeal from a decree in equity of the circuit court for the district of Indiana, declaring certain bonds to be a lien upon the property formerly owned by the Toledo & Wabash Bail way Company, the same questions were made that are presented in this case and upon precisely the same state of facts. The bonds adjudged by the circuit court to be a lien, and those held by Compton, the plaintiff in this case, are of the same issue of equipment bonds of the Toledo & Wabash Bail-way Company, and the lien is here asserted against the identical property involved in that suit, and upon exactly the same grounds on which it was there sought to be maintained. Every consideration here urged in behalf of the plaintiff, was presented to the supreme court of the United States in support of the decree of the circuit court declaring the lien, but the decree was reversed. The decision of that case was a final adjudication against the right of lien here contended for, to the extent, at least, of the bonds held by parties.to the suit, and for obvious reasons should be followed, unless it clearly appear to be founded in mistake. It does not appear to me to be so. On the contrary, I regard the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Gray as entirely sound, while the construction given to the statute providing for the consolidation of railroad companies,
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.