Andrews v. Johns
Andrews v. Johns
Opinion of the Court
The legal question for this court to decide is this: Is an assignee, under an assign
It is contended by plaintiff in error that an assignee is entitled to such commission because the statute awards it, and if the language of the statute does not in terms allow it, yet fairness and justice to the assignee require such construction be given the statute, for otherwise the assignee is denied compensation for services which the law compels him to render and which inure to the benefit of the mortgagee.
Sections of the Revised Statutes bearing upon the subject are 6350 to 6350c, 6351,6352, 6356 and 6357. These sections provide that the assignee shall proceed at once to convert all the assets received by him into money and to sell the real and personal property assigned to him, either for cash or upon such other terms as the court [the probate court] may order, of which sale due return shall be made to the court, and such sale shall be set aside or confirmed as the court may order; and if confirmed the court shall order the assignee to make a deed to the purchaser for the real estate sold.
The court shall order the payment of all incumbrances and liens upon any of the property sold,, or right or credits collected, out of the proceeds, thereof according to priority; provided that the* assignee may in all cases where the real estate .to be sold is incumbered with liens, or where any questions in regard to the title, or the dower estate of the wife or widow of the assignor require a decree to settle the same, commence a civil
Whenever on settlement the same shall show a balance remaining in the hands of the assignee, subject to distribution among the general creditors, a dividend shall be declared by the probate judge payable out of such balance equally among all the creditors entitled, in proportion to the amount of their respective claims against the assignor, of the making of which dividend and of the time of payment thereof notice shall be given. Before any dividend is declared, the assignee may be allowed the following commission upon the amount of the personal estate collected and accounted for by him, and of the proceeds of the real estate sold under an order of court for the payment of debts; which shall be received in full compensation for all his ordinary services, that is to say : For the first thousand dollars at the rate of six per centum ; for all above that sum and not exceeding five thousand dollars at the rate of four per centum;
It will be observed that the provision is, where the land sold is incumbered, that the incumbrance be satisfied. The court shall order payment of all incumbrances and liens out of the proceeds, is the language, but the ultimate object sought is the satisfaction of the liens; payment, if proceeds arise from the sale, but in any event satisfaction and cancellation in order that the assigned estate may be settled. The term “proceeds” when used in connection with sale, as the lexicographers seem to agree (see Webster, the Standard, Rapalje and Bouvier), means a sum of money derived from the sale of property. If money be derived from the sale, then it has yielded “proceeds,” and an order distributing such “proceeds” may follow; if none have been so derived then there are no funds in
If no “proceeds,” within the fair construction of the statute, arise from the sale, then it would seem to follow, necessarily, that there can be no percentage commission. This form of compensation is analogous to that provided for administrators, and is, primarily, for the risk, responsibility and
The cases of Ingham, v. Lindemann, 37 Ohio St., 218, and of McLain v. Simington, same volume, 660, are cited in support of the plaintiff’s contention. We think they do not sustain it. The case first named does not touch upon the point of percentage at all, while in the other the commissions referred to. do not appear certainly to have been percentage on money collected, although probably they were, but if they were such, it still does not appear that the mortgaged property was bid in by the mortgagee. In the absence of such showing the presumption is that it was not, for we can hardly think that the court would have omitted mention of so important a circumstance, had it been the fact.
A case more nearly analogous to the one at bar is that of Stone v. Sttong, 42 Ohio St., 53. The controversy in this court arose upon the record of a proceeding by an administrator in the probate court to sell land to pay debts, where the land which was incumbered by mortgage and judgment Hens, was bid in at the sale of the administrator by the owner of the mortgage, which was the first lien. After holding that, where proceedings for such sale are properly instituted, the executor or administrator, under section 6165, Revised Statutes,
The two sections referred to are as follows:
Section 6165. “The money arising from the sale of real estate shall be applied in the following order: First — To discharge the costs and expenses of the sale, and the per centum and charges of the executor or administrator thereon, for his administration of the same. Second — To the payment of mortgages and judgments against the deceased, according to their respective priorities of lien, so far as the same operate as a lien on the estate of the deceased at the time of his death; which shall be apportioned and determined by the court, on reference to a master or otherwise. Third — To the discharge of claims and debts, in the order mentioned in this title.”
Section 6188. “Executors and administrators may be allowed the following commissions upon the amount of the personal estate collected and accounted for by them, and of the proceeds of the real estate sold under an order of court for the payment of debts, * * * which shall be received in full compensation for all their ordinary services, that is to say,” etc., etc.
It will be noted that this provision for compensation is identical with that provided for assignees
But it is contended that this decision was induced by the term “money arising from the sale of real estate,” found in section 6165, and but for that the court would have placed a different construction upon section 6188, where the term “proceeds” is used. With this assumption we cannot agree. We have already found that when applied to sales the term ‘ ‘ proceeds ’ ’ means money arising from the sale, and we are to conclude that the legislature used the terms in the two sections as synonymous, which, in proper terminology, they are. Nor is there any expression in the opinion which gives color to the claim of counsel. Says Johnson, J., onpag-e 57: “His per centum is to be computed on the money arising from the sale for his administration of the same. Where no money arises to be administered there is nothing on which to compute commissions. This percentage was intended to compensate for the trouble and responsibility of collecting and paying out the money. * * * Here the mortgagee is the purchaser, and so far as the purchase money was applicable to her liens, it operated as a satisfaction of her mortgagees. ”
It is further contended that in the case of an assignee the sale of real estate is peremptory, while with an administrator it is optional. We know of no such distinction. The statute, section 6136, does not seem to countenance it, and no decision is cited in its support. We do not believe any can be found. The administrator has no occasion to resort to the real estate unless he ascertains that the
Upon the proposition that by the construction of the sections affecting assignments here made, an injustice results to the assignee in that he is denied compensation for labor which he is required to perform, it would seem sufficient to say, as suggested by counsel, that the hardship is not greater than in the case of a second mortgagee who forecloses his mortgage only to see the first mortgagee take all the proceeds, leaving his expenses to be borne without any results; or the case of an administrator, as in Stone v. Strong, where the first mortgagee is the purchaser. Besides, the assignee is not compelled to perform the services. He accepts the trust voluntarily and with whatever risk may attend its performance. If he finds it burdensome, or unremunerative, he may at any time resign. In response to this the suggestion is offered that the situation in respect to the question of compensation would not be altered by a resignation, for it would then become the duty of the court to appoint a trustee who would be entitled to compensation upon the same basis. Of course such trustee would be entitled to whatever compensation the law gives, as well as an assignee. In the administration of the estates of deceased persons the statute permits, under certain circumstances, that administration be committed to one of the principal creditors, and the practice to so appoint is not uncommon. Possibly practical difficulties might stand in the way of the appointment of a mortgage creditor as trustee of an insolvent estate, but every consideration of fairness would
It is not necessary to a decision of this case to refer to the order of distribution made by the probate court, but, nevertheless, comment upon it seems pertinent. It orders the assignee to make distribution of $5,900, being proceeds of the real
Whether or not the assignee was entitled to a commission on the costs and taxes paid by the mortgagee, purchaser, we need not inquire as no cross-petition has been filed complaining of the order in that respect.
We think the circuit court was not in error in affirming, the judgment of the common pleas to the effect that, as against the first mortgagee, purchaser, the assignee was not entitled to percentage compensation, and the judgment will be
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.