Stivens v. Summers
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Fifth Third Nat. Bank v. Johnson (6th Cir. 1915)
- Northwestern National Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Cross-Appellee v. Marillyn Cox Joslyn Robert Bruce Joslyn and Bruce W. Cox (6th Cir. 1995)
- In re Taubman (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio 1993)
- Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co. (District Court, S.D. Ohio 1986)
- Squire, Supt. of Banks v. Cramer (Ohio Ct. App. 1940)
- Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin (W. Va. 1939)
- Smith v. Edwards (Utah 1932)
- Stellwagen v. Clum (6th Cir. 1914)
- Health Admin. Amer. v. American Med. Sec., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2001) (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
- Hanes v. Giambrone (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)
- City of Kettering v. Berger (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
- Bush v. Cole (Ohio Ct. App. 1913)
- Mitchell v. Long (Williams County Court of Common Pleas 1909)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The record does mot suggest that the circuit court was unmindful of the doctrine of Jamison v. McNally et al, 31 Ohio St., 395, since its conclusion of law concedes that under our statute a deed may, at the suit of a creditor of the grantor, be set aside for constructive as well as for -actual fraud, and that these deeds were constructively fraudulent. Upon that point the briefs of counsel are in accord.
The proposition by which the judgment of the circuit court must be tested is stated by it in its conclusion of law: “That the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.” The pertinent provision of the statute is in Section 4983, wMch defines the actions which may he brought within four years, that lastly stated being “'an action for relief on the ground of fraud, hut the cause -of action in such case shall not be deemed to have
Hor is the conclusion of the circuit court justified by its finding that these deeds were -only constructively fraudulent. Usually, and in these cases always, the consequences of fraud are not determined by its character. In order that an act be constructively fraudulent it is essential that it would, either in the- particular case or in common experience, lead to consequences equivalent to those following actual fraud. By the act' of the debtor these lands h'ad been placed beyond the reach of an execution at law. The creditor’s resort to equity being thus made necessary, neither the principles nor the statutory provisions involved suggest that-his rights may he affected by -considering whether the act of the debtor proceeded from evil design or from am innocent mistake respecting his financial condition when the deed of gift was made. The language of the limiting section of the statute and of the saving clause obviously comprehends- constructive- as well as actual fraud. If being admitted that constructive frau-d is included in the provisions of the statute by which the- right of action is defined -amid) in that by which it is limited, an exception should not
Judgment reversed and judgment for plaintiff.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.