Ziehm v. Vale
Opinion of the Court
If there was a violation of legal duty owing by the defendant to the infant child under the circumstances detailed, it would be actionable negligence. In the present case the feature of in
The trial court refused to apply the principle of nonliability as requested, but imposed upon the defendant the obligation to use ordinary care, if the circumstances would apprise the defendant, as an ordinarily prudent man, that a child of four and one-half years, acting under childish impulses, would renew his attempt to get upon the running board of the automobile. The court of appeals reversed the judgment on the authority of W. & L. E. Rd. Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St., 235, and in its opinion says: “We think that when the plaintiff left the street for the purposes of travel and got upon the defendant’s automobile without invitation, he was not rightfully there and brought himself fairly within the reason of the rule in the Harvey case and is to be governed by its principles.”
This case is clearly distinguishable from the reported case cited. In that case there was neither knowledge of the presence of the infant nor any active force employed which caused its injury.
The distinction between the legal duty due uninvited persons, in cases arising from the construction of the premises and in those arising from their negligent operation, is clearly made and discussed in C., H. & D. Rd. Co. v. Aller, 64 Ohio St., 183. On page 193, Shauck, J., in discussing the case of Harriman v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St., 11, said of that case: “The injury was not occasioned by any real or alleged defect in the construction of the road. The injury there resulted from the operation of the road.”
The petition sufficiently pleaded facts imposing the duty of ordinary care covered by the general charge. It contained an allegation of negligence, charging that the defendant saw and knew that the child was on the running board, or “by the exercise of ordinary care, would have seen that said plaintiff was on the running board of said car.”
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and that. of the common pleas affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
Whenever a court undertakes to distinguish or differentiate one case from another, a strong presumption arises that the court approves such other case, the judgment, and the course of reasoning through which such judgment was reached.
I desire here and now to register my protest against the judgment of that case. It was an astonisher to the profession and the public at the time it was rendered, in 1907, and indicates the high-water mark of the supreme court of that time in its effort to magnify property right and minimize personal right — the right to life, limb, health and safety — especially when applied to a child four and a half years of age.
The opinion notes more than a hundred cases pro and con, and reviews many of them touching the subject-matter of that case. Concurring in the judgment were Judges Shauck, Crew, Davis and Summers. Judges Spear and Price did not concur.
The supreme court of the United States in Sioux City & Pac. Rd. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall., 657, decided in 1873, laid down the doctrine that entitled Harvey to a verdict in that case.
The opinion in the Harvey case laments the fact that: “The multitude of circumstances under which the owner of property would be liable for injuries to children, and the very serious burden that was, in consequence, being placed upon the owners of property, were very probably not foreseen in the Stout case.”
Many cases no doubt sustain the Harvey case, but an equal number of cases may be found in the books sustaining witchcraft, slavery, and other inhumanities and infamies, in the light of present-day civilization and jurisprudence.
I desire to especially commend the late lamented Judges Price and Spear for their refusal to concur in the doctrine announced in the Harvey case.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.