State ex rel. Scioto-Sandusky Conservancy District v. Samson
State ex rel. Scioto-Sandusky Conservancy District v. Samson
Opinion of the Court
When the “conservancy court” made its order in 1934 apportioning the preliminary or organizational expense of the district to the several counties in the district, the pertinent part of the applicable statute (Section 6828-43, General Code), in force at that time, was as follows:
“Upon the organization of the district, the court shall make an order indicating a preliminary division of the preliminary,expenses between the counties included in the district in approximately the proportions of interest of the various counties as may be estimated by said court. And the court shall issue an order to the auditor of each county to issue his warrant upon the treasurer of his county to reimburse the county having paid the total cost.
“As soon as any district shall have been organized under this act, and a board of directors shall have been appointed and qualified, such board of directors shall have the power and authority to levy upon the property of the district not to exceed three-tenths of a mill on the assessed valuation thereof as a level rate to be used for the purpose of paying expenses of organisation, for surveys and plans, and for other incidental expenses which may be necessary up to the time money is received from the sale of bonds or otherwise. This tax shall be certified to the auditors of the various counties and by them to the respective treasurers of their counties. If such items of expense have already been paid in whole or in part from other sources, they may be repaid from the receipts of such levy, and such levy may be made although the work proposed may have been found impracticable or for other reasons is abandoned. The collection of such tax levy shall conform in all matters to the collection of taxes and assessments for the district outlined in this act, and the same provisions concerning the nonpayment of taxes shall apply. The board may borrow money in any manner provided for in this act, and may pledge the receipts from such taxes for its repay
In 1937, this statute was amended and thereafter has been, so far as pertinent, as follows:
“Upon the organisation of the district, the court shall malee an order indicating a preliminary division of the preliminary expenses between the counties included in the district in approximately the proportions of interest of the various counties as may be estimated by said court. And the court shall issue an order to the auditor of each county to issue his warrant upon the treasurer of his county to reimburse the county having paid the total cost.
“As soon as any district shall have been organised under this chapter, and a board of directors shall have been appointed and qualified,, such board of directors shall have the power and authority to levy upon the property of the district in each of not more than two years a preliminary tax of not to exceed three-tenths of a mill on the assessed valuation thereof at a level rate to be used for the purpose of paying expenses of organisation, for surveys and plans, and for other incidental expenses lohich may be necessary up to the time money is received from the sale of bonds or otherwise. This tax shall be certified to the auditors of the various counties and by them to the respective treasurers of their counties. If such items of expense have already been paid in whole or in part from other sources, they may be repaid from the receipts of such levy, and such levy may be made although the work proposed may have been found impracticable or for other reasons is abandoned. The collection of such tax levy shall conform in all matters to the provisions
It is claimed by the respondents and conceded by the relator that under the statute, as in force in 1934 and at the time of the apportionment of preliminary expenses by the court among the counties, the counties were entitled to reimbursement, for any contributions to such expense fund, from the funds provided by the district assessment. But relator claims that under the amended statute the matter of repayment of such contributions to the counties was no longer made mandatory but permissive only on the part of the conservancy district. To support this contention relator relies upon the clause located near the middle portion of the present statute, that “if such items of expense have already been paid in whole or in part from other sources, they may be repaid from the receipts of such levy. ’ ’
We are of the opinion that the claim of the relator is based upon a misinterpretation of the statute. The present statute as well as the former statute gives the conservancy board the power not only to levy assessments but to borrow money with which to carry on its projects and to pledge tax receipts for its repayment. The present statute still specifically provides that “upon the organization of the district, the court shall make an order indicating a preliminary division
It is interesting also to note that the last paragraph of the present statute, including the quoted clause in
Assuming that such reimbursement is permissive under the present statute, we are of the opinion that the district is for another reason still indebted to the counties for the preliminary expense alloted to them when the district was organized. The counties in question advanced the money in 1934 and 1935, and under the statute then prevailing it became the duty of the board of directors immediately to levy a tax on the property of the district for the reimbursement of the counties. The conservancy district should not now be permitted to take advantage of its own delay in observing the clear requirement of the statute. The rights of the county had already accrued before any amendment of the statute. If the instant action had been brought before the amendment of the statute, the respondents would have been entitled to prevail for the same reasons other relators, under similar circumstances, prevailed in State, ex rel. Franklin County Conservancy Dist., v. Valentine, Aud., 94 Ohio St., 440, 114 N. E., 947, wherein it was held:
“The board of directors of a conservancy district has no authority or discretion to delay the reimbursement of the general funds of the county or counties constituting such district, for money advanced to the preliminary fund, after the receipt of funds by the district from any source provided by the statute for the raising of revenues for the use and purposes of a conservancy district. ’ ’
In the course of his opinion in that case, Donahue, J., appropriately observed:
‘ ‘ The fund arising from this levy, together with ad
The writs are denied.
Writs denied.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.