Gyuricza v. Hershey
Gyuricza v. Hershey
Opinion of the Court
The legal question involved herein is whether the Probate Court, in a proceeding under Section 2115.16, Revised Code, is required to conduct an accounting between an exceptor to an inventory and the executor of a decedent’s estate.
Section 2115.16, Revised Code, reads in part as follows:
“Exceptions to the inventory * * * may be filed * # * by any person interested in the estate or in any of the property included in the inventory.”
Concededly, the exceptor herein has no interest “in the estate” either as heir or as legatee. Her status as an exceptor must, therefore, be by virtue of her interest, if any, “in any of the property included in the inventory.”
Exceptor herein relies upon the following words of Judge Williams in the Bolles case as authority for the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
“There is no statutory provision which limits or denies to that court [Probate Court] power to hear and determine fully and completely all questions raised by exceptions to an inventory of the assets of a decedent’s estate.” (Emphasis added.)
It must be remembered that in the Bolles case, although the property upon which the engrafting of a trust was sought consisted of corporate stocks, notes and bonds, all that property was in a safety deposit box at the time of the decedent’s death and from a short time after his death was in the possession of the executor.
If the shares of stock involved herein had been in the possession of the decedent at the time of his death and thereupon had passed into the possession of his executors and been inventoried by them, there is no question that the Probate Court could and should upon exceptions to the inventory have determined exceptor’s ownership as to part of them.
Do the facts in this case, however, bring it under the rule of the Bolles casei In determining that question, it is necessary to examine the procedure provided by Section 2115.16, Eevised Code.
That section provides that upon the filing of exceptions the executor or administrator shall be notified thereof and a hearing shall be conducted at which the executor or administrator and any witness may. be examined, and that the finding of the court shall be entered on the journal. There is no provision in
The exceptor herein seeks only the delivery to her of 100 shares of stock. Were these shares in the possession of the executors, the Probate Court could have summarily ordered them delivered to exceptor upon its finding that she is the owner thereof. But these shares are not in their possession. In fact, the registered title to these shares of stock is in the broker. The brokerage firm is not a party to this proceeding and any order of the Probate Court directing it to turn over any shares to the exceptor would have been a vain one. All that the decedent owned, so far as these stocks were concerned, was a chose in action and that chose only was listed in the inventory. Similarly, exceptor has a chose in action against the estate of the decedent.
The ultimate determination of the rights of the exceptor involves the questions of title to the stocks, the redemption of the equity in the margin account and the subsequent transfer of legal title to the stock to the rightful owners. These questions obviously can not be determined without the brokerage firm being a party to a proceeding for such determination. In such a situation, the summary procedure under Section-2115.16 is at least inappropriate if not inadequate.
Courts generally have frowned upon the exercise of summary jurisdiction. In 83 Corpus Juris Secundum, 792, Section 4, it is said:
“It has been held that courts as a rule are not hospitable to summary proceedings, and that it is always a question of discretion whether a court will entertain such a proceeding or will relegate the moving party to a plenary suit. ’ ’
This rule has been followed in Ohio by the Probate Courts. In a well' reasoned opinion, the Probate Court of Cuyahoga
The Probate Court was of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the summary procedure would not give the litigants an opportunity to present fully their respective sides of the controversy. With that conclusion we agree. A court ought not to be compelled to exercise summary jurisdiction where full and complete relief can be granted only in a plenary action.
Section 2115.16, Revised Code, does not expressly provide for the impressing of a resulting or implied trust, or for an accounting. Such jurisdiction ought not to be implied, particularly where the property involved is not in the possession of the executor and can not come into his possession prior to a determination of the rights between him and the legal owners of the property.
In Goodrich, Admr., v. Anderson, 136 Ohio St., 509, 26 N. E. (2d), 1016, this court held that the summary proceeding to discover concealed assets is special and designed to facilitate the administration of estates, but that it can not be used primarily as a substitute for a civil action for a money judgment, wherein pleadings are required to properly define the issues.
In the case of In re Estate of Black, 145 Ohio St., 405, 62 N. E. (2d), 90, the court held that the summary proceeding to discover concealed assets may not be used to collect a debt, obtain an accounting or adjudicate rights under a contract. See, also, In re Estate of Butler, 137 Ohio St., 115, 28 N. E. (2d), 196; In re Estate of Leiby, 157 Ohio St., 374, 105 N. E. (2d), 583.
The Goodrich, Black and Leiby cases were decided under Section 10506-67 et seq., General Code (Section 2109.50, Revised Code), relating to the concealment of assets. This statute has been held to provide for a summary inquisitorial proceeding to recover specific property or the proceeds thereof belonging to a trust estate. In re Estate of Leiby, supra. Section 2115.16,
The exceptor herein did not file a petition for an accounting or to impress a trust on the margin account. By filing exceptions to the inventory she did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to compel her to account to the decedent’s estate. And the executors were in court only on exceptions to the inventory; they were not in court on any unasserted claim for an accounting.
The case of In re Estate of Morrison, 159 Ohio St.,’ 285, 112 N. E. (2d), 13, cited by the exceptor, does not militate against this decision. That case, unlike the instant case, was a plenary action for a declaratory judgment. Issues were made by pleadings, and all necessary parties were made defendants and were served with summonses. It was in no sense a summary proceeding.
The case of In re Estate of Hatch, 154 Ohio St., 149, 93 N. E. (2d), 585, although not cited by any party herein, requires some discussion. In that case a savings account was listed in the inventory of a decedent’s estate. Upon exceptions filed thereto, the Probate Court determined that an agreement between the decedent and another had established a valid joint and survivorship account and that the account was improperly included in the inventory.
Certainly the listing of the savings account was the listing of a chose in action against the bank just as the listing of the margin account was the listing of a chose in action against the brokerage firm. But the rights of the parties thereto are determinable in a different fashion. In the Hatch case, the account was established by a written agreement between two depositors and the bank. The only question decided by the Probate Court was whether the agreement was legally sufficient to constitute a joint and survivorship account. The bank, by virtue of its
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Probate Court affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.