The determinative question presented is whether the Public Utilities Commission may authorize a public utility to levy a monetary penalty against its consumers.

The commission’s position is stated in the following portion of an order , which denied a rehearing to Dayton Flexible Prpducts Division of Baxter Laboratories in the instant matter:

• “* * * While that statute [R. C. 4909.161] does not specifically state that.the commission shall have the authority to levy penalties for consumption overruns or to delegate that authority* it seems repugnant to the. spirit and purpose of that provision to’ allow the commission to declare an- emergency and yet not be able, to take whatever reasonable measures it deems necessary in order to alleviate that emergency* Applicant does not argue, that enforcement provisions are not reasonably necessary to make the plan ef: fective. * * * It merely asserts that penalties,; per se, are unlawful; and unreasonable. * * * It is important to note that the end sought here is the conservation of gas, a reasonable governmental purpose; the commission is of the opinion that penalty imposition will serve that end. Contrary *217to. what some of the. intervening .parties contended, there is no intent to provide some form of civil or criminal punishment similar in nature to that provided by Sections 4905.54-56, ■ 4909.41-99 Revised Code. A plan without adequate enforcement provisions would be meaningless.”

The basic function of the commission is to ‘ ‘ supervise and regulate public utilities and railroads.” R. C. 4905.04. “The jurisdiction, supervision, powers, and duties, of the Public Utilities Commission extend to every public utility and railroad * * *.” R. C. 4905.05. R. C. 4905.54 through 4905.57 impose monetary penalties (“forfeitures”) against “every public utility or railroad” which violates a commission edict, and authorize the Attorney General to enforce such penalties.

Although the foregoing regulatory powers are broad, the General Assembly has granted no such power to the commission for the regulation of consumers.

Despite the fact that the commission possesses no power or authority except that conferred and vested in it by ¡statute2 and no statute authorizes the commission to delegate to a public utility the power to . penalize a consumer, appellees urge this court to affirm the subject order.

We must reverse the order even though the FPC has allegedly authorized Columbia to penalize Dayton Power if its consumers use more gas than allocated to Dayton Power. Such considerations have little to do with whether the order is unreasonable or unlawful, especially where .the system of monetary penalties on the federal level has not been authoritatively endorsed.3

*218Having resolved that the subject order is unlawful, we need not consider the remaining questions presented.

Order reversed.