Ohio Supreme Court, 1980

Central Realty Co. v. Clutter

Ohio Supreme Court · Decided June 25, 1980 · Brown, Celebrezze, Herbert, Holmes, Locher, Sweeney

62 Ohio St. 2d 411; 406 N.E.2d 515; 16 Ohio Op. 3d 441; 1980 Ohio LEXIS 785

Cases that cite this one

81 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. White (Ohio 2009)
Disalle Real Estate Co. v. Howell (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc. (6th Cir. 2008)
Winters v. Hart (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
Logsdon v. Fifth Third Bank of Toledo (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
Sulphur Springs Realty, Inc. v. Blackstone (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)
Carow v. Girton (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
United Ohio Ins. Co. v. Brooks (Ohio Ct. App. 2012)
Oberst v. Oberst, 08-Ca-34 (1-5-2009) (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)
Bremer v. Bremer, 08-Ca-64 (1-12-2009) (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)
Water Works Supplies v. Grooms Constr., Unpublished Decision (3-14-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
Water Works Supplies v. Grooms Constr., Unpublished Decision (3-14-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
Troiano v. Steitz, Unpublished Decision (9-10-2004) (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
Klug v. Klug, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2003) (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
Westfield Insurance v. Galatis (Ohio 2003)
Blankenship v. Crt Tree, Unpublished Decision (10-3-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
Edelman v. Kohut, Unpublished Decision (12-24-2001) (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
Vrabel v. Williams, Unpublished Decision (12-6-2001) (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. Cox (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
McClorey v. Hamilton County Board of Elections (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)
Lelux v. Chernick (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Worthington Custom Plastics, Inc. (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
Graham v. Drydock Coal Co. (Ohio 1996)
Graham v. Drydock Coal Co. (Ohio 1996)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Dissenting Opinion

Holmes, J.,

dissenting. I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision herein in that simple contract law would dictate an opposite determination by this court.

Whether or not one looks upon exclusive real estate listing contracts with favor, they are not unlawful or against public policy in this state. Here there was a lawful real estate exclusive listing contract in effect at the time of the sale of this property.

The trial court and the majority herein go off on the tangential theory that the exclusive listing contract is ambiguous in that it did not spell out with specificity that the exclusiveness of the contract would be lost in the event of a sale through another broker.

To limit this exclusive provision to only the instance of a *414sale by the owner during the contract period is an unreasonable distortion of the ordinary meaning of these types of contracts.

However inequitable it may finally appear where the owner is required to pay two commissions, the terms of the agreement are clear and were bargained for by the parties.

P. Brown, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam.

The question posed before this court is whether appellant is bound by the terms of the extension clause to pay appellee a six-percent commission. This clause states: “or is sold within three months after the period 0f this listing to anyone with whom you [broker] have negotiated with respect to a sale during the period of -this listing and of whom I have notice, I agree to pay you a commission of 6%***.”

In reviewing this clause, the trial judge found that appellee’s evidence established that appellee had “negotiated” with Y. E. Merillat, and that the farm was sold within three months after the expiration of the August 4th listing. On the issue of whether the clause was supposed to have effect if a sale was made by another broker or only by appellant, the judge found the clause to be ambiguous. We agree with the trial judge when he stated: “***There is a doubt which the broker could have prevented by more explicit phraseology. *413The extension clause simply states ‘or is sold’ but it does not say by whom. More explicit wording would have stated ‘or is sold by me alone or through another broker.’' The ambiguity and doubt is to be resolved against the plaintiff.”3

If the appellee wished to protect itself from the possibility of a sale by another broker, it could have explicitly provided for such an event. Without specific reference to such a possibility, the clause is ambiguous. The age-old maxim of ambiguitas contra stipulatorem est (an ambiguity is resolved against the stipulator) applies to the instant cause. See Franck v. Railway Exp. Agency (1953), 159 Ohio St. 343, 345-346, and O’Neill v. German (1951), 154 Ohio St. 565, 571.

For the foregoing reason, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Celebrezze, C. J., W. Brown, Sweeney and Locher, JJ., concur. Herbert, P. Brown and Holmes, JJ., dissent.

Wording such as “sold by you, or by any other agent or person, including myself’ would clarify the matter.

Dissenting Opinion

Herbert, J.,

dissenting. Since I do not find this contract to be ambiguous, I must respectfully dissent.

P. Brown, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.