dissenting. Once again a majority of this court confirms a company-oriented assault on the test-year concept. See, e.g., Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 405, 410 (No. 83-1428) (Locher, J., dissenting); Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 412, 415 (No. 82-1461) (Locher, J., dissenting). Therefore, I must dissent.

In Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, we refused to allow the utility to pass on the cost of cancelled nuclear plants to consumers. “It is our opinion that R.C. 4909.15 (A)(4) is designed to take into account the normal, recurring expenses incurred by utilities in the course of rendering service to the public for the test period. * * *

“The extraordinary loss sustained by CEI in connection with the terminated nuclear plants cannot be transformed into an ordinary operating expense pursuant to R.C. 4909.15 (A)(4) by commission fiat. The commission’s statement that ‘[c]ancellation does not create a past loss, but gives rise to a current cost’ is unpersuasive. Under this rationale we question whether there could ever be a ‘past loss’ the return of which would not be recoverable in future ratemaking proceedings notwithstanding the commission’s assertion to the contrary.” 67 Ohio St. 2d, at 164.

Quarto resembles those cancelled nuclear plants in many ways. CAPCO invested heavily in a power source which was intended to yield lower rates in the future, but the market changed. Furthermore, the regulatory environment changed. Now, CAPCO wants to amortize that excessive past cost over market by charging current and future ratepayers.

CAPCO also exacerbated the situation by agreeing to provisions in the mining contract which encouraged sub-optimal production. This should be no surprise in that the facts, as summarized by the majority, leave little doubt that the entire Quarto project was not a completely arm’s-length transaction.

For these reasons, the imposition of past losses on current and future ratepayers is not “fair, just, and reasonable.” R.C. 4909.191 (C). Likewise, CAPCO has exhibited “imprudent * * * [and] unreasonable fuel procurement policies and practices.” R.C. 4909.191 (D)(2). Although the commission is empowered to require electric power suppliers to meet the market, it refuses to do so.

Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the commission.

R.C. 4905.301 mandates a semiannual hearing to review the fuel component of public utility rate schedules. R.C. 4909.191 (C)5 requires *472the utility to demonstrate at the hearing that its acquisition costs6 and delivery costs7 were fair, just and reasonable. Conversely, R.C. 4909.191 (D)8 requires the commission to readjust its rates when the commission finds that a utility has engaged in imprudent fuel procurement practices.

The appellant argues that the commission’s order, substituting the “modified 115% method” for the “125% rule,” was not based upon a demonstration that Ohio Edison’s acquisition costs were fair, just and reasonable, but, rather, that these costs result from imprudent and unreasonable acquisition policies. The appellant does not argue that the commission was without jurisdiction to enter the present order. Rather, appellant argues that to do so was against the manifest weight of the evidence before the commission. We disagree.

In the recent case of Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St. 3d 35, we discussed our role in reviewing the commission’s factual determinations made in R.C. 4905.301 proceedings. At pages 36-37, we said: “This court may disturb factual conclusions only when they are unreasonable or unlawful. R.C. 4903.13. In Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 449, 453 [12 O.O.3d 378], the court said:

« <* * * pjp0n review of * * * factual conclusions, a finding of the commission will not be reversed unless it appears from the record that it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence or is so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or a willful disregard of duty.’ ” See, also, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 403 [71 O.O.2d 393],

Here, the commission’s factual conclusion is not “so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or a willful disregard of duty.”

*473The commission based its decision to replace the “125% rule” with the “modified 115% method” on staff testimony.9 The staff recommended the “modified 115% method” should be adopted because circumstances had changed since the adoption of the “125% rule.” First, less Quarto coal was being used at the Mansfield units.10 Therefore, Quarto and other coal would be used at the Mansfield units. Because other than Quarto coal is used at Mansfield, the “modified 115% method” will provide Ohio Edison and the other CAPCO companies with an incentive to secure inexpensive coal so that actual Quarto costs can be recovered. Second, the staff testified, and the commission held, that the further accumulation of deferred costs would overly burden future ratepayers. Lastly, it was recognized that the ability of Ohio Edison to enter capital markets was becoming impaired as a result of the increasing deferred costs it was carrying.

Based on these factors and that the commission has had an extensive history of overseeing the Quarto project, we are unwilling to say that its deci-. sion was unreasonable.

In the alternative, appellant argues that the commission’s order must be reversed because it violates R.C. 4905.01 (F). In pertinent part, R.C. 4905.01 (F) provides:

“* * * In the case of a coal supply owned or controlled in whole or in part by the company such term shall not exceed a price that is, in the judgment of the public utilities commission, reasonable when compared to the average cost per million British thermal units of similar quality coal purchased from all independent like mining operations under similar term contracts during the same period.”

The appellant argues that because of the relationship between the development of the Quarto mines and CAPCO, Quarto coal was controlled, in part, by Ohio Edison. Hence, the commission erred in allowing Ohio Edison to recover more than the cost of similar, i.e., average, market price.

We disagree. As the commission stated in its opinion, even assuming CAPCO controlled Quarto, in part, R.C. 4905.01 (F) was not necessarily violated. In this case, we agree with the commission’s analysis of R.C. 4905.01 (F), that:

“* * * Section 4905.01(F) does not reduce the comparison to a simple dollar comparison but rather includes other considerations such as long-term trends, long-term dependability, and long-term cost and supply interests. These matters have all been considered in the Commission’s determination to *474permit the CAPCO companies to pass through certain portions of Quarto coal costs and accumulated deferrals.”

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the commission.

Order affirmed.