It is by now firmly established in this state that entitlement to the extraordinary writ of mandamus is contingent upon a finding that “relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.” State, ex rel. Heller, v. Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 6 [15 O.O.3d 3], paragraph one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Westchester, v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 42 [15 O.O.3d 53]; State, ex rel. Berger, v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 28, 29, certiorari denied (1983),_U.S._, 78 L. Ed. 2d 723. Respondents contend relator has failed to satisfy the necessary conditions precedent to the issuance of the writ. We agree and for the reasons which follow hereby deny the writ.

Initially, relator has failed to identify its clear legal right to be issued a new motor vehicle dealer’s license as well as respondents’ clear legal duty to issue the license. An examination of the pertinent portions of R.C. Chapter 4517 demonstrates that any right relator may have possessed to obtain the dealership license was first contingent upon the approval of Ford’s franchise proposal.

Pursuant to R.C. 4517.50,2 when a franchisor (in this case Ford) *393desires to establish an additional dealership, notice must be forwarded to the Dealers Board and to each franchisee or dealership marketing the same line of vehicles in the relevant market area. Ford complied with this statutory requirement and, after three Lincoln-Mercury dealers filed protests, a hearing was conducted as required by R.C. 4517.57. Ultimately, the Dealers Board denied Ford’s franchise proposal, thus prohibiting Ford from establishing a new Lincoln-Mercury dealership in the proposed market area pending further review. See R.C. 4517.50(C).

When the Registrar received notification of the denial of Ford’s franchise proposal, he was, in effect, legally precluded from issuing a dealership license to relator pursuant to R.C. 4517.12(I).3 That section imposes on the Registrar a duty to deny an application for a motor vehicle dealership license if the applicant “[h]as no established place of business that * * * will be used for the purpose of selling * * * motor vehicles at the location for which application is made.” Thus, pending appeal, the denial of *394Ford’s franchise proposal by the Dealers Board effectively extinguished any clear legal duty owed to relator by the Registrar to issue a dealership license. Stated somewhat differently, relator’s clear legal right to a dealership license was contingent upon Ford’s having first secured franchise approval from the Dealers Board. When Ford failed to succeed in its effort, R.C. 4517.12(1) mandated that the Registrar deny relator a dealership license. Accordingly, if the Registrar was under any clear legal duty, it was to deny relator the license.4

We therefore conclude that in the absence of a showing by relator of a clear legal right to the relief sought or respondents’ clear legal duty to perform the requested act the writ prayed for must be denied. Cf. State, ex rel. Taxpayers League of North Ridgeville, v. Noll (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 190; State, ex rel. Sheppard, v. Koblentz (1962), 174 Ohio St. 120 [21 O.O.2d 384]. Moreover, relator’s complaint is, in reality, a collateral attack upon the decision ,of the Dealers Board denying Ford’s franchise proposal, which asserts as grounds for the issuance of the writ two of the precise errors assigned by Ford in its appeal to the court of common pleas.5 It is well-settled, however, that such collateral attacks cannot be maintained by an action in mandamus. Accord State, ex rel. Stanley, v. Cook (1946), 146 Ohio St. 348 [32 O.O. 419]; State, ex rel. Holland, v. Struble (1937), 132 Ohio St. 431 [8 O.O. 281].

For the foregoing reasons, relator’s request for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is denied.

Writ denied.

concurring in judgment only. I concur in today’s result, but deem it appropriate to add the following observations concerning an issue raised in this action but not fully addressed in the majority opinion.

In support of its complaint, relator alleges misconduct, bias, prejudice and possibly a financial stake in the outcome by one of the members of the dealer’s board (David Mainwaring) who cast a vote against franchisor Ford’s proposal.6

Relator contends that Ford may be barred from raising the issue of Mainwaring’s prejudice in its R.C. Chapter 119 appeal as it involves facts and assertions outside the record. Relator points out that appellees in the R.C. Chapter 119 appeal are vigorously asserting that no issues of prejudice may be heard in that forum since R.C. Chapter 119 appeals are limited by statute to the record of the protest proceeding below. Relator therefore argues that the instant action provides the only certain forum where Mainwaring’s alleged bias may be considered.

It is a fundamental due-process requisite that administrative adjudications must be fair and open. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1937), 301 U.S. 292. Fraud, collusion and mistake have all been recognized as grounds for reversal of an administrative decision on appeal. Powell v. Young (1947), 148 Ohio St. 342, 353 [35 O.O. 322]; Brannon v. Bd. of Edn. (1919), 99 Ohio St. 369, paragraph three of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Gongwer, v. Graves (1914), 90 Ohio St. 311, paragraph three of the syllabus. The right to a fair and impartial decision-maker is one of the most fundamental rights of a party in a proceeding and it is well-settled that the adjudicator may not have a financial stake in the outcome. Gibson v. Berryhill (1973), 411 U.S. 564; Ward v. Village of Monroeville (1972), 409 U.S. 57; State, ex rel. Basista, v. Melcher (1963), 118 Ohio App. 37, at *39647. See, also, Tumey v. Ohio (1927), 273 U.S. 510. In light of the above precedent, it would appear that if relator, in an appropriate setting, could prove the alleged prejudice due to a stake in the outcome of member Main-waring, the decision by the dealers board would be voidable. The resulting issue is therefore whether the allegations presented herein are sufficient to consider the merits of the mandamus complaint or whether the statutorily prescribed legal remedies concerning Ford’s appeal are sufficient to protect relator’s interest.

In this regard, it has been held that review of an administrative decision does not proceed as a trial de novo, Lies v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 204, 207, and can not ordinarily and automatically consider matters not part of the record, City Products Corp. v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1958), 106 Ohio App. 494, 496; and is limited to a decision as to whether the order is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and not whether a gross abuse of discretion is present. In re Hennis (App. 1977), 7 O.O. 3d 170.

However, R.C. 119.12 grants the court discretion to admit new evidence outside the record. The “new” evidence does not refer to events subsequent to the hearing but rather additional evidence which is “newly discovered and could not * * * have been ascertained prior to the hearing * * *.” R.C. 119.12; In re Lane Nursing Home (C.P. 1976), 5 O.O. 3d 146, 148. Additionally, the scope of review for the court of common pleas includes a mandate to determine if the order “* * * is in accordance with law.” R.C. 119.12. As noted above, it is settled that a hearing which does not comport with fundamental due process is unconstitutional. Accordingly, it would not be “in accordance with the law.” While abuse of discretion may not be within the scope of review under R.C. 119.12, certainly the issue as to whether the agency had properly conducted an unbiased proceeding would be. See, also, Gibraltar Mausoleum Corp. v. Cincinnati (1981), 1 Ohio App. 3d 107, at 110; State, ex rel. Helsel, v. Bd. of County Commrs. (1948), 83 Ohio App. 388, 392 [38 O.O. 347].

The courts in the pending R.C. Chapter 119 appeal may find that the evidence of prejudice is not newly discovered or does not rise to a level whereby the hearing was not conducted in accordance with law. Nevertheless, the potential for such an adverse outcome is an insufficient basis to support relator’s contention that the court of common pleas is not the appropriate forum to entertain an appeal from an administrative order pursuant to R.C. 119.12. It is possible that the courts will ultimately find in favor of Ford on other grounds, grant the relief requested, or address the issues herein presented on the merits. In any event, Ford’s R.C. Chapter 119 appeal is the appropriate vehicle to raise a challenge to the board’s reconsideration and order.