Mandamus will lie only if a relator can establish that he has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law. State, ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc., v. Bacon, (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 42, 15 O.O. 3d 53, 399 N.E. 2d 81.

R.C. 124.501 is the statutory basis *66for reinstatement of a policeman after separation due to an injury or following a resignation. If the separation was due to an injury incurred in the performance of duty, the applicant must be reinstated immediately to the position formerly held, after passing a physical examination showing recovery from the injury, provided written application is made within five years from the date of separation. If separation resulted from an injury incurred other than in the performance of duty, the applicant may be reinstated subject to the same conditions.

On the other hand, if the applicant resigned from the position formerly held, he may be reinstated upon written application filed within one year of the resignation, subject to his passing an examination which discloses that the applicant is physically fit to perform the duties of the position.

The seminal question is whether relator was separated or resigned.

“Separation” means “termination of a contractual relationship (as employment or military service).” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1984) 1073. On the other hand, “to resign” is to “give up deliberately; esp: to renounce (as a right or position) by a formal act.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1984) 1003.

A “separation” is an ending of a status. For relator it was the cessation of his position with the police department. “Resignation,” in accordance with the foregoing definition and in the context of R.C. 124.50, is a more radical change in circumstances connoting the relinquishment of current as well as future opportunities. In view of all the ramifications of the agreement we must decide whether relator was separated from his position or formally waived his rights as delineated in the release. If the former, there would be little reason for the city to ¿ay relator $41,000 and make the other concessions. It is clear that relator consciously surrendered his rights in payment of a consideration; this was more than the last step in his police career.

Although the court of appeals determined that relator’s injury was incurred in the performance of duty, it also determined that relator had resigned. One of relator’s reasons for termination of employment was the in-service injury, but there were other reasons, as the court of appeals found.

Relator must sustain the burden of showing that he has a clear legal right *67to the relief sought. In this effort, he has failed. State, ex rel. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., v. Indus. Comm. (1954), 162 Ohio St. 302, 55 O.O. 176, 123 N.E. 2d 23.

While the city has discretion to grant an application for reinstatement following a resignation, it has no duty to do so. Further, regarding resignations, written application must be filed within one year following the resignation. Relator resigned on October 21, 1983, and applied for reinstatement on February 9, 1987. Thus, relator’s application for reinstatement was untimely.

Moreover, relator is bound by the terms of the release executed on October 24,1983. This release, inter alia, released the respondent from all “* * * claims and demands of any kind or description whatsoever, whether arising out of contracts or otherwise, in law or equity, which I [relator] now have * * * or which I * * * may have arising out of any matter whatever to the date hereof including without limitation on the foregoing, any action, cause of action, suit, debt, sum of money, claim and demand of any kind or description * * *.”

Having accepted a consideration for the release upon which the city relied, relator cannot now deny his commitment to give up any rights he had to pursue a claim for reinstatement to his former position with the police department. State, ex rel. Wright, v. Weyandt (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 194, 4 O.O. 3d 383, 363 N.E. 2d 1387. Therefore, relator cannot contend that the release should not bar his rights under R.C. 124.50 on the basis that he did not understand the impact of his release of rights. Connelly v. United States Steel Co.(1954), 161 Ohio St. 448, 456, 53 O.O. 350, 354, 119 N.E. 2d 843, 847-848.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.