State ex rel. General American Transportation Corp. v. Industrial Commission
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- State ex rel. B.O.C. v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 1991)
- State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 1993)
- State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 1993)
- State ex rel. Carpenter v. Cleveland Chief of Police (Ohio 1993)
- State ex rel. Durant v. Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. (Ohio 1994)
- State ex rel. Durant v. Superior's Brand Meats, Inc. (Ohio 1994)
- State ex rel. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 1992)
- State ex rel. Thompson Elec., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Ct. App. 2017)
- State ex rel. Cook v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)
- State ex rel. Montevideo v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)
- Arrow International v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (1-25-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
- State Ex Rel. Core Mold v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (5-25-2004) (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
- State Ex Rel. Belivanakis v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (8-7-2003) (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
We are again asked to review the commission’s order for “some evidence” supporting its award of temporary total disability compensation. For the following reasons, however, we find that evidentiary review cannot proceed at this time.
First, the commission failed to address the key question before it. Temporary-total-compensation eligibility is established where a claimant’s allowed conditions cause a temporary disability that prevents a return to his former position of employment. State, ex rel. Ramirez, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 630, 23 O.O. 3d 518, 433 N.E. 2d 586. In the present case, all agree that claimant is unable to return to his former job. The key question is whether this inability is due to the claimant’s allowed conditions or to his other medical problems.
The commission’s order does not address this critical issue. It merely confirms that a work-prohibitive disability exists. Without a clear commission statement on causal relationship, evidentiary review is impossible.
Second, our review is limited to that evidence specifically relied on by the commission. State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1984), 6 Ohio St. 3d 481, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E. 2d 721. Under Mitchell, the commission must “specifically state which evidence and only that evidence which has been relied upon to reach [its] conclusion * * *.” Id. at 483-484, 6 OBR at 534, 453 N.E. 2d at 724. Here, the commission appears to have listed all the evidence considered, instead of narrowing its citation to the evidence on which it relied. This conclusion is suggested by the order’s language and by simple logic — the commission could not have relied on both Dr. Sparks and Dr. Urban in concluding that claimant was temporarily and totally disabled due to the allowed conditions. It is thus unclear which of the doctors’ reports are properly before us.
Judgment reversed and limited writ allowed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.