Hammond v. Dallman
Cases that cite this one
55 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen (Ohio 2023)
- Gaskins v. Shiplevy (Ohio 1996)
- State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen (Slip Opinion) (Ohio 2022)
- State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (Ohio 1995)
- State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul (Ohio 1995)
- McIntyre v. Hooks (Slip Opinion) (Ohio 2020)
- Turner v. Hooks (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)
- Beach v. Khante, Unpublished Decision (3-8-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
- Sargent v. Leis (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
- Brown v. Haviland, Unpublished Decision (5-7-2004) (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
- Hardy v. McFaul (Ohio 2004)
- State ex rel. Carrion v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority (Ohio 1998)
- State ex rel. Carrion v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (Ohio 1998)
- Wright v. Ghee (Ohio 1996)
- Swiger v. Seidner (Ohio 1996)
- State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (Ohio 1996)
- Adkins v. McFaul (Ohio 1996)
- State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner (Ohio 1996)
- Gaskins v. Shiplevy (Ohio 1996)
- Adkins v. McFaul (Ohio 1996)
- State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (Ohio 1996)
- State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner (Ohio 1996)
- Swiger v. Seidner (Ohio 1996)
- Wright v. Ghee (Ohio 1996)
- Barnebey v. Zschach (Ohio 1995)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
For the following reasons, we grant the writ, but deny relief and remand petitioner to custody.
In Lippert v. Engle (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 281, 3 O.O.3d 434, 361 N.E.2d 239, we held that to withstand a motion to dismiss, a petition in habeas corpus must conform to R.C. 2725.04
Normally, the granting of the writ would cause us to order respondent to make a return pursuant to R.C. 2725.12 and 2725.14.
The return, supported by the proper authenticated documents, establishes the jurisdiction of the trial court to have sentenced petitioner, notwithstanding his attack on the indictment in his motion for summary judgment. In State v. Wozniak (1961), 172 Ohio St. 517, at 522-523, 18 O.O.2d 58, at 61, 178 N.E.2d 800, at 804, we held that an indictment cannot be collaterally attacked after a judgment of conviction “because the judgment of conviction necessarily binds
Moreover, had petitioner disclosed his claim with particularity, the writ would not have been granted under R.C. 2725.06 because it would not have appeared from the petition that the writ ought to issue. Accordingly, we hold, consistent with other recent decisions,
Accordingly, we remand the petitioner to custody.
Writ allowed; petitioner remanded to custody.
. R.C. 2725.04 states:
“(A) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned, or restrained of his liberty;
“(B) The officer, or name of the person by whom the prisoner is so confined or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be described by an assumed appellation and the person who is served with the writ is deemed the person intended;
“(C) The place where the prisoner is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
“(D) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person shall be exhibited, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment or detention is without legal authority, such fact must appear.”
. R.C. 2725.06 states:
“When a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is presented, if it appears that the writ ought to issue, a court or judge authorized to grant the writ must grant it forthwith.”
. R.C. 2725.12 states:
“The officer or person to whom a writ of habeas corpus is directed shall convey the person imprisoned or detained, and named in the writ, before the judge granting the writ, or, in case of his absence or disability, before some other judge of the same court, on the day specified in the writ. Said officer or person shall make due return of the writ, together with the day and the cause of the caption and detention of such person, according to its command.”
R.C. 2725.14 states:
“When the person to be produced under a writ of habeas corpus is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing, to the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocally:
“(A) Whether or not he has the prisoner in his custody or power or under restraint.
“(B) If the prisoner is in his custody or power or under restraint, he shall set forth, at large, the authority, and the true and whole cause, of such imprisonment and restraint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, or other process upon which the prisoner is detained.
“(C) If such prisoner was in his custody or power or under restraint, and such custody or restraint was transferred to another, he shall state particularly to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such transfer was made.”
. See, also, State, ex rel. Hadlock, v. McMackin (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 433, 575 N.E.2d 184.
. See Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584, and Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753. In Mitchell, we stated that “[u]nsupported conclusions that appellant committed an intentional tort are not taken as admitted by a motion to dismiss and are not sufficient to withstand such a motion. * * * ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 193, 532 N.E.2d at 756.
. See R.C. 2725.05.
. We note that granting the writ merely means to order a return and hold a hearing. See In re Gentry (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 143, 146, 7 OBR 187, 189-190, 454 N.E.2d 987, 990, at fn. 1.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.