[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




                       CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. FARR.
              [Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farr, 

.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension—Engaging in conduct
        prejudicial to the administration of justice—Engaging in conduct that
        adversely reflects on fitness to practice law—Practicing in violation of
        professional regulations requiring registration and continuing legal
        education—Neglecting an entrusted legal matter—Failing to carry out
        contract for employment—Failing to keep client's funds separate from
        attorneys funds.
      (No. 94-2663—Submitted February 7, 1995—Decided May 24, 1995.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
                     Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 93-26.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} In an amended complaint filed on August 23, 1993, relator, Cincinnati
Bar Association, charged respondent, Richard Reagan Farr of Cincinnati, Ohio,
Attorney 

 with five counts of misconduct involving
violations of DR 3-101(B) (practicing in violation of professional regulations
requiring registration and continuing legal education), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an
entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(2) (failing to carry out contract for employment),
9-102(A)(2) (failing to keep client's funds separate from attorney's funds), and 1-
102(A)(5) and (6) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the adminstration of justice
and that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law). A panel of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court ("board")
heard the matter on October 28, 1994.
        {¶ 2} Respondent did not formally answer the amended complaint, but he
appeared at the hearing and admitted his record of professional discipline,
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




including, among others, a sanction and subsequent suspension as of June 18, 1993
for his failure to comply with continuing legal education ("CLE") requirements and
a fine for failing to register as an attorney for the 1991-1993 biennium. Respondent
has since complied or otherwise resolved his noncompliance with the registration
and CLE requirements, and his suspension was vacated in August 1994.
           {¶ 3} Respondent also admitted most of the facts and some of the
misconduct alleged in the amended complaint. First, he conceded that he accepted
final payment of fees and costs for a dissolution of marriage for Anthony and Diane
Hensley in March 1992, and that Mr. Hensley filed a grievance with relator when
he could no longer reach respondent by telephone. Respondent could not recall
whether he falsely represented to Mr. Hensley in June 1992 that he had filed the
dissolution papers; however, respondent acknowledged that he did not file the
papers until February 18, 1993, after he received notice of the grievance.
           {¶ 4} Second, respondent admitted that, in January 1993, Leslie Moutoux-
Barnhill paid him four hundred fifty dollars in advance to handle her divorce. She
also filed a grievance with relator when she could no longer reach him by telephone.
Respondent had been paid in full, but he did not file the necessary papers in court,
and he did not arrange for another attorney to do so until his client complained to
relator.
           {¶ 5} Third, respondent admitted that between September 1, 1991 and his
suspension on June 18, 1993, he continued to practice law, although he had not
complied with CLE and registration requirements. He had no office during this
time and his personal telephone was disconnected on more than one occasion.
Respondent did not have then and still has no malpractice insurance, and he
regularly combined and continues to combine his personal funds with those of his
clients. As of April 1, 1993, respondent did not know the balance of the account in
which he had deposited his clients' funds because an acqaintance had withdrawn
money with checks stolen from respondent.




                                          2
                                  January Term, 1995




        {¶ 6} Fourth, respondent admitted that he failed to cooperate in the
investigation of the Hensley grievance. He ignored a subpoena for his appearance
at a deposition, he did not respond in writing to the grievance, as requested, and he
cancelled meetings he had previously agreed to attend.
        {¶ 7} Fifth, respondent admitted that he considers himself an alcoholic and
has had this problem at least since 1973. He has been hospitalized several times
for this disease, most recently in July and August 1993. Respondent's attributes
much of his delay in the Hensley and Moutoux-Barnhill cases to his alcoholism,
and he claims it also impeded his resolve to comply with attorney registration and
CLE requirements.
        {¶ 8} With respect to misconduct, respondent admitted that he had violated
DR 3-101(B), as charged in Count I of the amended complaint; that he had violated
DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2) in the course of representing Moutoux-Barnhill,
as charged in Count III; and that his alcoholism had prejudiced his clients' interests
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5), as charged in Count V. The panel accordingly
found that these violations had occurred. It also concluded that respondent had
violated DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2), in failing to file the Hensley dissolution
papers, as charged in Count II, and that he had violated DR 9-102(A)(2) in failing
to preserve the identity of his clients' funds and to establish the interest-bearing trust
account required by R.C. 4705.09, as charged in Count IV.
        {¶ 9} Finally, the panel found that respondent's alcoholism had caused
violations of DR 1-102(A)(6) in connection with the Hensley and Moutoux-
Barnhill cases, as further charged in Count V. This determination resulted from
respondent's testimony about his years of alcohol abuse, which he described as
"going down the highway in low gear." During the events at issue, he was evicted
from at least one residence and spent several periods attempting to "dry-out" in
various health care facilities. Respondent described himself as a maintenance
alcoholic who drank all day long. Each day during 1992 and 1993, he would drink




                                            3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




around eighteen beers, three liters of wine, or a bottle of diluted vodka, if he could
afford it. Despite this consumption, he claimed that he could usually organize
himself enough to make court appearances; however, he conceded he could not get
other things accomplished, such as filing the papers his clients requested.
       {¶ 10} In recommending a sanction for respondent's misconduct, the panel
considered that in August 1993, respondent had successfully completed a four-
week substance abuse program at Cincinnati Veterans Medical Center. Respondent
represented that he had been sober for the year or so since that time and that he had
attended Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") meetings on a fairly regular basis. The
panel was troubled, however, that he had drunk around five or six beers during his
most recent recovery period and that he had represented that he had been abstinent
in order to obtain a disability exemption for his 1989-1993 CLE requirements.
Moreover, respondent had not spoken to his AA sponsor in several weeks and had
not established contact with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, Inc. ("OLAP").
       {¶ 11} The panel was additionally concerned about respondent's complete
lack of understanding of the importance of establishing a client trust account and
keeping client funds separate from his own.
       {¶ 12} However, the panel was also impressed with respondent's
completion of the substance abuse program, his current and continuing severe
financial problems, and his determination to regain his good standing to practice
law and to find employment. Further, the panel noted the lack of demonstrable
prejudice to either of respondent's clients—he eventually filed the Hensley
dissolution petition and Moutoux-Barnhill's divorce was filed by another attorney.
The panel thus accepted, with some modification, relator's recommendation that
respondent be issued a two-year suspension, and that the suspension to be
suspended on conditions mainly designed to monitor and ensure respondent's
abstemious practice of law. The board adopted the panel's findings of misconduct
and its recommendation.




                                          4
                                January Term, 1995




                               __________________
       Richard H. Johnson, Stephen M. Nechemias, and Ann Lugbill, for relator.
       Richard Reagan Farr, pro se.
                               __________________
       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 13} We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), 3-
101(B), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2), and 9-102(A)(2), as found by the board.
However, we cannot allow respondent's immediate return to to practice law, even
under the comprehensive conditions the board has recommended.
       {¶ 14} Respondent has attempted rehabilitation on several occasions,
including one time in 1990, in which he claims to have abstained from alcohol for
ten months. This history manifests his propensity to relapse, and we see no
convincing evidence in the record that he will not do so again.
       {¶ 15} At the time of the hearing, respondent was not under the care of a
physician or counselor, he did not zealously participate in A.A. or participate at all
in OLAP, and, most unfortunately, he continued to consume alcohol. With the
exception of the quanitity of alcohol consumed, these had also been respondent's
circumstances prior to his most recent admission to a substance abuse program.
Similarly, respondent continues to have no permanent address or sustaining
income, both of which foster relapse.
       {¶ 16} We realize that withholding respondent's license to practice law may
exacerbate his economic situation and, correspondingly, reduce his chances for
recovery. However, our primary obligation here is to protect the public. In
furtherance of this duty, we order that respondent be indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to respondent.
                                                              Judgment accordingly.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and
COOK, JJ., concur.




                                          5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




 __________________




          6