dissenting. Hardened by some of the results obtained of late in this class of cases, I am merely puzzled by the outcome in this matter. However, I would suspect that the Industrial Commission’s posture will be a bit stronger than a sense of bewilderment.

In State ex rel. Didiano v. Beshara (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 256, 602 N.E.2d 1157 (“Didiano I”), this court unanimously granted a writ of mandamus indicating that a peremptory discontinuation of this claimant’s permanent total disability benefits without a finding that “claimant was not permanently and totally disabled” was an abuse of discretion.

In Didiano I, we stated that R.C. 4123.58 “establishes a claimant’s right to uninterrupted compensation once permanent total disability is found.” Id. at 257, 602 N.E.2d at 1157. However, we indicated without reservation that such a finding “may be changed under the commission’s continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52,” id., citing State ex rel. Brewer v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 23, 12 OBR 20, 465 N.E.2d 389. Brewer, as stated in Didiano I, involved an order very similar to the one in this case. In Brewer, the commission had originally determined that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled, but limited the award to a specific time period. The commission subsequently issued an order finding the claimant was no longer permanently and totally disabled and terminated compensation. We upheld the commission’s action, finding, inter alia, that the second order constituted a proper exercise of continuing jurisdiction because the limited award clearly indicated that the commission’s order was provisional and subject to change and clearly evinced the commission’s intent to review further the appellant’s claim. Id. at 25, 12 OBR at 21, 465 N.E.2d at 390.

In this ease, the commission’s original order awarding permanent total disability compensation also was expressly limited to a specific time period, thus indicating the provisional nature of its award. In Didiano I, we appropriately returned the cause for further proceedings, per Brewer. These proceedings most certainly took place. Didiano was reexamined by Drs. Gary I. Katz and Joseph A. DiDomenico, both of whom made clear-cut findings that claimant’s back condition did not preclude sustained remunerative employment. Dr. Katz found no objective symptoms to support Didiano’s subjective complaints and determined that claimant could return to his former position of employment. The commission, considering the previous findings of Drs. Moorstein, Steurer, and Vamvas, along with those of Drs. Katz and DiDomenico, discontinued permanent *258total disability benefits for Didiano.1 Citing State ex rel. Zamora v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 17, 543 N.E.2d 87; the majority states that the reports of Drs. Moorstein, Vamvas, and Steurer cannot constitute “some evidence” to support the denial of a permanent total disability award. However, the Zamora case simply does not apply to the circumstances of this case.2 We have held repeatedly that the commission has continuing jurisdiction in cases such as the one before us. We ordered the commission to make a finding similar in character to the one before us. Surely the findings of Dr. Katz and his colleague constitute “some evidence” to support the commission’s decision. State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936, syllabus. The commission exercised its expertise and granted an appropriate amount of permanent total disability compensation in this matter, and the commission’s decision in this matter surely should be affirmed.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

In Didiano I, we prevented the commission from stopping permanent total disability compensation without a finding that claimant was no longer permanently and totally disabled. The commission has since made such a finding. Among the objections to that determination is claimant’s assertion that the finding is unsupported by “some evidence.” Upon review, we concur.

Claimant’s cessation of permanent total disability compensation was premised on the reports of five physicians. Because the commission relied on the reports of Drs. Moorstein, Vamvas and Steurer in support of its original permanent total disability award, those three reports cannot now be “some evidence” supporting its denial of further benefits. State ex rel. Zamora v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 17, 543 N.E.2d 87.

With the removal of these three reports, only the reports of Drs. Katz and DiDomenico remain. These two doctors, however, limited their opinions to claimant’s orthopedic conditions. There is no indication that the commission factored in claimant’s serious psychiatric condition before disallowing permanent total disability compensation. Because the commission cannot discontinue permanent total disability compensation without considering all allowed conditions, the commission erred in stopping permanent total disability benefits.

Accordingly, the writ of mandamus is allowed.

Writ allowed.