[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




 ERIE-HURON COUNTIES JOINT CERTIFIED GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. MILES.
   [Cite as Erie-Huron Counties Joint Certified Grievance Commt. v. Miles,
                                     

.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—One-year suspension from date of announcement
        of order—Failing to maintain complete records of all funds and properties
        of client coming into attorney’s possession—Failing to promptly pay or
        deliver funds, securities, or other properties in attorney’s possession
        which client is entitled to receive—Commingling client and office funds in
        attorney’s escrow account and failing to return funds when requested, or
        not accounting for funds retained in a businesslike fashion.
       (No. 96-917—Submitted June 25, 1996—Decided October 2, 1996.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
                     Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-61.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} On October 23, 1995, relator, Erie -Huron Counties Joint Certified
Grievance Committee, filed a six-count amended complaint charging respondent,
Gaye Harris Miles of Sandusky, Ohio, Attorney 

 with
violations of DR 9-102(B)(3) (failing to maintain complete records of all funds and
properties of a client coming into possession of an attorney) and 9-102(B)(4)(failing
to promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities
or other properties in possession of an attorney which the client is entitled to
receive). The respondent filed an answer, and a hearing was held on January 19,
1996 before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
of the Supreme Court (“board”).
        {¶ 2} The evidence adduced at the hearing and stipulations before the panel
were as follows: Carrie Shaw retained respondent in 1989 to pursue a personal
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injury claim. Respondent settled the matter for $7,500 and assured Shaw that she
would pay Shaw’s chiropractor’s fee of $1,377 from the proceeds. Respondent
remitted $4,052 to Shaw but failed to pay the chiropractor. Two years later, the
chiropractor sued Shaw and recovered $243 from Shaw’s bank account. In 1994,
after Shaw complained to relator, respondent paid the chiropractor. During its
investigation, relator discovered that respondent’s trust account was in disarray,
repeatedly overdrawn, and was frequently used to pay respondent’s office
expenses.
       {¶ 3} In February 1991, two of respondent’s close friends, Valerie and
Tutse Tonwe, were arrested in Delaware and contacted respondent.              After
respondent flew to Delaware, the Tonwes gave her blank checks on their accounts
and powers of attorney, and turned over their automobiles to her. Respondent
reported to the Tonwes that she had found $16,500 in their bank accounts, which
she placed in her trust account. Respondent then transferred the vehicles to her own
name, and moved some of the Tonwes’ furniture from their offices to an airport
storage unit and some to her own office.
       {¶ 4} The Tonwes said that they gave possession of these assets to
respondent with the intention that she use them to set up a trust account for the
Tonwes’ children. Respondent had a different understanding.          Although the
Tonwes had retained a Dan Lyons as their attorney, respondent believed that she
had been retained by the Tonwes and that these assets were to cover her legal fees.
       {¶ 5} In April 1991, the Tonwes found that they were running out of money,
respondent having used the funds to coordinate the Tonwes’ criminal defense. At
that point the Tonwes demanded a return of the automobiles, cash and other
property. Respondent returned some cash and one vehicle, but retained one
automobile as security for her fees in representing the Tonwes, which she claimed
was at an agreed-upon rate of $200 per hour.




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                                 January Term, 1996




        {¶ 6} After federal authorities confiscated the car which respondent had
retained, respondent sued the Tonwes for her fees and the Tonwes counterclaimed.
The papers she filed with her lawsuit constituted the first detailed accounting
respondent provided to the Tonwes with respect to their property.           Shortly
thereafter, respondent filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that
respondent’s debt to the Tonwes was nondischargeable, but that the Tonwes owed
fees for legal services to respondent. The net result, as the bankruptcy court found
in In re Harris-Miles (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1995), 

, was that
respondent owed the Tonwes $2,595.
        {¶ 7} The panel found that respondent had violated DR 9-102(B)(3) and 9-
102(B)(4) in her representation of Shaw, and DR 9-102(A), 9-102 (B)(3), and 9-
102(B)(4) in her handling of the Tonwes’ funds by commingling client and office
funds in her escrow account and failing to return funds when requested, or not
accounting for funds retained in a businesslike fashion.
        {¶ 8} In mitigation, respondent produced several character witnesses,
including an assistant prosecuting attorney and an attorney in private practice, who
testified to her being a decent and honorable person. The panel found that this was
respondent’s first offense and she had made restitution in the Shaw matter and will
do so in the Tonwes matter. The panel recommended that respondent be suspended
for one year with the entire suspension stayed, provided that during one year stayed
suspension, she pay the bankruptcy court judgment, complete all continuing legal
education requirements, complete one year of monitored probation after the period
of suspension, and work with an accountant or an attorney familiar with law office
management to assure that she implements appropriate practices and controls with
respect to her client trust accounts.
        {¶ 9} The board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendation of
the panel.
                                __________________




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       Dennis E. Murray, Jr., for relator.
       Geoffrey L. Oglesby, for respondent.
                              __________________
       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 10} Canon 9 of our Code of Professional Responsibility requires the
separation of client funds from those of the lawyer, not only to protect the client,
but also to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In the Shaw case the lawyer
mingled the client’s funds with her own and in both the Shaw and Tonwes cases
she failed to maintain complete records relating to her clients’ funds. Moreover,
respondent did not turn over funds to the Tonwes promptly when requested nor did
she promptly and accurately account to either Shaw or the Tonwes for their funds
and property in her possession.
       {¶ 11} It is possible that neither client suffered monetary damage as a result
of respondent’s lax attitude toward the client money in her control. Shaw’s
physician was eventually paid, the Tonwes’ property was eventually returned, and
the respondent was subjected to a judgment in favor of the Tonwes for the $2,595
she owed to them. But the chiropractor was paid only after Shaw underwent the
tribulation of an unnecessary lawsuit and complained to relator about respondent,
and the Tonwes obtained a judgment against respondent only after a trial in the
bankruptcy court.
       {¶ 12} The imposition on these clients was damage enough. But even if
there were no damage caused by respondent’s actions, we would be disinclined to
relax our standards to the extent of imposing the one-year stayed suspension
proposed by the board. We hold it of the utmost importance that attorneys maintain
their personal and office accounts separate from their clients’ accounts and that the
violation of that rule warrants a substantial sanction whether or not the client has
been harmed. To find otherwise would be to encourage speculation with clients’
accounts.



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                                January Term, 1996




        {¶ 13} We therefore adopt the findings and conclusions of the board, but
direct that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one
year from the date of the announcement of this order. Costs taxed to respondent.
                                                             Judgment accordingly.
        MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and STRATTON,
JJ., concur.
        COOK, J., dissents.
                                __________________
        COOK, J., dissenting.
        {¶ 14} According to the hearing panel, Miles secreted assets of convicted
criminals; was reprimanded by a federal court for commiting “defalcation while
acting in a fiduciary capacity”; lied to the panel about paying Dr. Heilman, claiming
that a basement flood destroyed the cancelled check; and refused to return the
Lincoln Continental, arguing that it was payment for “legal fees,” although the
services she rendered were non-legal. Moreover, Miles denied any wrongdoing
other than a few bookkeeping errors.
        {¶ 15} I question whether the minimal sanction recommended by the panel
members resulted from their troubling conclusion that “[t]his panel was not as
impressed with the Respondent’s veracity as they were with her emotions.” The
appropriately severe sanction is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
                                __________________




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