[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




                MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MOGUL.
          [Cite as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Mogul, 

.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—One-year suspension with nine months of the
        suspension stayed on conditions—Failing to withdraw from employment
        after being discharged by client—Neglect of an entrusted legal matter.
      (No. 96-1996—Submitted March 5, 1997—Decided August 13, 1997.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
                     Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-63.
                                  __________________
        {¶ 1} On January 12, 1996, the Mahoning County Bar Association, relator,
filed an amended complaint charging in Count One that respondent, Michael L.
Mogul of Youngstown, Ohio, Attorney 

 violated DR 2-
110(B)(4) (failing to withdraw from employment after being discharged by a client)
and in Count Two that he violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting a legal matter
entrusted to him).
        {¶ 2} At a hearing on April 26, 1996 before a panel of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) the
following evidence was presented with respect to Count One. In March or April
1990, Lornic Corporation, through its president and chief executive officer, Robert
Frank, retained respondent as counsel.           In May 1990 respondent entered an
appearance for Lornic and for Frank personally in two lawsuits pending in the
common pleas court.          By letter dated January 12, 1994, Frank discharged
respondent as attorney for himself and for Lornic. Respondent failed to withdraw
from the cases in a reasonable time and failed to return the case files promptly.
        {¶ 3} With respect to Count Two the record indicates that in June 1990
respondent filed a case for Frank in federal district court. Respondent filed no
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response on behalf of Frank to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment even
though respondent had received an extension of time to plead. The district court
sustained the summary judgment motions against Frank. Respondent then filed
several postjudgment motions and an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed
the district court’s judgment.
        {¶ 4} The panel concluded that respondent’s failure to withdraw from his
employment violated DR 2-110(B)(4) and that his failure to respond to the motions
for summary judgment violated DR 6-101(A)(3).
        {¶ 5} By way of mitigation, respondent argued that he had spent an
enormous amount of time on the cases for which he had not been compensated, that
he was engaged in a fee dispute with Frank, that Frank was difficult to deal with,
that to withdraw from the common pleas court case would have prejudiced Lornic
and Frank, that the clients suffered no harm as a result of respondent’s failure to
act, and that respondent was unable to respond fully to the summary judgment
motions because of Frank’s lack of cooperation and because the district court cut
off discovery prematurely.
        {¶ 6} The panel found that if there was a fee dispute, respondent should
have resolved it and surrendered the client’s files, that the evidence was
inconclusive about whether the clients suffered economic harm, and that regardless
of respondent’s views, once the motion for summary judgment had been filed, he
had a responsibility to his clients to protect their interests.
        {¶ 7} As a result of respondent’s testimony and demeanor at the hearing,
the panel ordered a psychiatric assessment of respondent. Respondent was also
granted the right to choose a psychiatrist for an independent assessment. While
neither report indicated mental illness by clear and convincing evidence, the panel
concluded that further examination and treatment were warranted.
        {¶ 8} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. However, all but the first ninety days of the suspension



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would be stayed upon the condition that respondent “seek immediate psychiatric
evaluation and treatment with a psychiatrist for ongoing evaluation, possible
medication, treatment, and psychotherapeutic interventions [and] thorough
physical examination and medical evaluation.” The panel further recommended
that upon completion of the evaluation and treatment a determination be made as
to whether respondent is capable of continuing the practice of law. The panel also
stated that should respondent not comply with the conditions, he should serve the
entire one-year suspension.
       {¶ 9} The board adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations of
the panel.
                              ___________________
       Manchester, Bennett, Powers & Ullman and C. Scott Lanz; and Paul J.
Gains, for relator.
       Michael L. Mogul, pro se.
                              ___________________
       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 10} We accept the board’s findings of fact and its conclusion that
respondent violated DR 2-110(B)(4) and 6-101(A)(3).            It is undisputed that
respondent did not withdraw as counsel for eighteen months after the client fired
him. Respondent also failed to file a response to the summary judgment motions
in the federal district court. These failures to act as a responsible attorney warrant
suspension.
       {¶ 11} Among matters offered in mitigation, respondent blamed his failure
to respond to the summary judgment motions on the district court’s failure to extend
discovery. However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals said that “it is
abundantly clear that Frank has had sufficient time. Furthermore, he has been so
outrageously dilatory in using the time he has been granted that there is no reason
to believe giving him more will yield anything but interminable requests for more




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extensions. He has let deadlines pass without action of any sort. He has not
completed the depositions he has noticed. He complained in his brief that appellees
were obstructionist but he did not raise that issue before the trial court, nor ask for
orders to compel, nor ask for sanctions. * * * He misunderstands the law.” Frank
v. D’Ambrosi (C.A. 6, 1993), 

. In light of these findings and the
facts as found by the board, we conclude, as did the board, that respondent has not
justified his failure to respond to the summary judgment motions.
        {¶ 12} The panel was concerned about the ability of the respondent “to
represent anyone in a competent and careful manner” and concluded that “as a
result of [his] testimony at the hearing, his ability and fitness to practice law became
suspect.” We too are concerned about respondent’s ability to practice and, like the
federal court of appeals, we question his understanding of the law. We note, for
example, that in his answer to relator’s complaint respondent denied that the
appellate court found him “outrageously dilatory.” “On the contrary,” asserts
respondent, “it was Robert A. Frank who was found dilatory.”
        {¶ 13} Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(7)(C), if mental illness (as defined in R.C.
5122.01[A]) is alleged in a complaint or answer, or is otherwise “placed in issue,”
the panel can order a medical or psychiatric evaluation of an attorney. If the board
concludes that the attorney suffers from mental illness, this court may suspend the
attorney. In this case the board proceeded under the “placed in issue” portion of
the rule and referred respondent for psychiatric evaluations. Both evaluating
psychiatrists agreed that respondent is not currently fit to practice law and is in need
of further evaluation and treatment.
        {¶ 14} Because the board did not find that respondent was mentally ill, we
do not suspend him on that basis.         However, respondent’s violations of the
Disciplinary Rules do warrant a suspension, especially in light of the Sixth Circuit’s
observations. We also agree with the board that the suspension can be stayed on




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condition that respondent seek psychiatric treatment. There are no limits on this
court’s authority to prescribe conditions for probation. See Gov.Bar R. V(6)(B)(4).
        {¶ 15} Considering respondent’s mental state as a mitigating factor, we
adopt the board’s recommendation and suspend respondent from the practice of law
for one year, during the entire period of which he shall be on probation. Pursuant
to Gov.Bar R. V(9)(A)(3) the relator shall appoint a monitoring attorney who, in
addition to the duties prescribed in Gov.Bar R. V(9)(B), shall assist respondent in
inventorying his files and shall observe his practice should the respondent be
allowed to resume the practice of law during the probationary period.
        {¶ 16} The final nine months of respondent’s one-year suspension shall be
stayed if he meets the following conditions. First, within twenty days of the date
of this order respondent shall begin psychiatric evaluation and treatment by a
physician approved by the board. Second, within sixty days of the date of this
order, respondent shall file with the board and relator a report of the treating
physician, which shall specifically indicate whether, in the view of the treating
physician, respondent will be fit to resume the practice of law upon completion of
three months of the suspension period and what, if any, type of additional treatment
is necessary during the remainder of the suspension period. The board shall
immediately evaluate the report, taking into account whatever additional evidence
it deems necessary, and shall recommend to this court whether it deems respondent
capable of resuming the practice of law and whether it believes respondent requires
additional treatment. The third condition is that this court, after considering the
recommendation of the board, find that respondent is capable of resuming the
practice of law.
        {¶ 17} Should respondent not begin treatment within twenty days of this
order, or not file the report of the treating physician within sixty days of this order,
or should the court not find respondent capable of resuming the practice of law,
respondent will serve the entire one-year suspension.




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       {¶ 18} The conditions of respondent’s reinstatement and termination of
probation at the conclusion of his one-year suspension are the following. First,
respondent shall have complied with the duties of an attorney on probation set out
in Gov.Bar R. V(9)(C).      Second, when respondent files his applications for
termination of probation and reinstatement, he shall at the same time file with both
the board and relator a report of the treating physician, which, based on a one-year
observation of respondent, shall indicate whether the treating physician believes
respondent is fit to continue or resume the practice of law. Third, based on the
report of the treating physician and other evidence, including a report of the
monitoring attorney, the board shall file with this court a recommendation as to
respondent’s fitness to continue or resume practice. Fourth, this court shall find
respondent fit to continue or resume the practice of law. Costs are taxed to
respondent.
                                                            Judgment accordingly.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
                              __________________




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