State ex rel. Blabac v. Industrial Commission
Cases that cite this one
23 later published cases cite this decision.
- State Ex Rel. Honda v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (9-8-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
- State ex rel. Parma Community General Hospital v. Jankowski (Ohio 2002)
- State Ex Rel. Gyarmati v. George E. Fern, Unpublished Decision (8-22-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
- State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 2002)
- State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 2002)
- State ex rel. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. v. Jankowski (Ohio 2002)
- State ex rel. David's Cemetery v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 2001)
- State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 1999)
- State ex rel.l Williams v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Ct. App. 2018)
- State ex rel. Jones v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
- State Ex Rel. Perry v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (9-13-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
- State Ex Rel. Elking v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 06ap-1104 (9-27-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
- State ex rel. Honda of America Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 2007)
- State Ex Rel. Stettler v. M.A. Canners, Unpublished Decision (10-25-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
- State Ex Rel. Peters v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (2-10-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
- State ex rel. Rollins v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 2005)
- State ex rel. American Standard, Inc. v. Boehler (Ohio 2003)
- State ex rel. Hassan v. Marsh Building Products (Ohio 2003)
- State Ex Rel. Handy v. Conrad, Unpublished Decision (5-16-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
- State Ex Rel. Menough v. Industrial Comm., Unpublished Decision (6-25-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
- State Ex Rel. Standard v. Boehler, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
- State ex rel. David's Cemetery v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 2001)
- State ex rel. Blabac v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 1999)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Temporary total disability compensation compensates for loss of earnings. State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586. Accordingly, TTC is unavailable to one who has returned to work, i.e., is earning wages. Claimant contends that not just any “work” bars TTC but only that which is “substantially gainful employment.” Arguing that his labor was neither “substantial” nor “gainful,” claimant asserts an entitlement to TTC. We find otherwise.
Ramirez, the preeminent TTC case, refers simply to a “return to work,” without any qualification to the word “work.” R.C. 4123.56(A) mirrors this language. Two cases, however, do employ the phrases “sustained gainful employment” or “substantially gainful employment.” Upon review, we find these cases not dispositive.
The first case, State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 639, 614 N.E.2d 1044, cites Ramirez and Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 25 OBR 26, 494 N.E.2d 1125, as supporting “sustained gainful employment” as the standard for TTC termination. Neither Ramirez nor Vulcan Materials, however, uses that language, destroying Peabody’s legal foundation.
“In State ex rel. Nye v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 75, 22 OBR 91, 488 N.E.2d 867, we held that ‘work’ as used in Ramirez referred to any ‘substantially gainful employment,’ not merely the former position of employment.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 600, 575 N.E.2d at 839.
Claimant’s interpretation of Johnson is too broad as an examination of Nye will illustrate. Critical to an understanding of Nye is that in that case there was never a question as to the character of claimant’s work. Nye was clearly engaged in substantially gainful work as a full-time reupholsterer. The issue was whether substantially gainful work other than the former position of employment could be used to terminate TTC.
We held in the affirmative, reasoning that:
“[A contrary decision] would permit the payment of temporary total disability benefits to a claimant who has chosen to return to full-time work at a job other than his former employment. In such a case, the claimant is no longer suffering the loss of earnings for which temporary total disability benefits are intended to compensate. * * *
“In the case at bar, the commission determined that appellee had returned to ‘substantially gainful remunerative employment,’ i.e., full-time work.” 22 Ohio St.3d at 77-78, 22 OBR at 93, 488 N.E.2d at 870.
Nye merely confirmed that substantially gainful employment barred TTC. It did not, as claimant represents, create two categories of employment whereby only substantially gainful employment terminated TTC and more sporadic employment did not. Again, Ramirez states that a “return to work” bars TTC. In this case, claimant does not dispute that his paid scuba diving instruction constitutes “work.”
The more appropriate method of compensating claimants who are unable to return to their former position of employment and are earning less elsewhere is through wage-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.56(B). Claimant appears to be seeking payment of wage-loss compensation from January 6, 1993 through May 2, 1993. R.C. 4123.52, however, forbids the payment of benefits more than two years prior to the request for compensation. Here, wage-loss compensation was requested on May 3, 1995. The commission did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying wage-loss compensation prior to May 3, 1993.
We note finally that the court of appeals returned the cause to the commission to consider claimant’s wage-loss-compensation eligibility “for any period from two years prior to May 3, 1995.” Claimant, however, neither requested, nor alleged an entitlement to, wage-loss compensation after August 18, 1993. Since the
Accordingly, claimant’s request for a writ of mandamus is denied. The judgment of the court of appeals denying claimant’s request for TTC is affirmed, and the remainder of the judgment is reversed.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and unit denied.
dissenting. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in toto.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.