Ohio Supreme Court, 2000

Hubbard v. Canton City School Board of Education

Ohio Supreme Court · Decided February 9, 2000 · Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney

88 Ohio St. 3d 14; 722 N.E.2d 1025

Cases that cite this one

10 later published cases cite this decision.

Stevens v. Ackman (Ohio 2001)
Tignor v. Franklin County B. of Commrs., Unpublished Decision (4-27-2000) (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
Klein v. Portage County (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
Stevens v. Ackman (Ohio 2001)
Hubbard v. Canton City School Board of Education (Ohio 2002)
Maxwell v. Cincinnati Met. Hsg. Auth., Unpublished Decision (3-29-2000) (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn. (Ohio 2002)
Beck v. Adam Wholesalers of Toledo, Unpublished Decision (9-28-2001) (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
Shane v. Tracy, Unpublished Decision (8-24-2000) (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn. (Ohio 2000)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

*15The opinion of the court of appeals is vacated for the reason that the court of appeals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for lack of a final appealable order. See, e.g., Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 718 N.E.2d 912; Estate of Weitzel v. Cuyahoga Falls (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 200, 718 N.E.2d 921; Braden v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 206, 718 N.E.2d 924.

Therefore, the cause is remanded to the trial court for determination of plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur. Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissent.

Dissenting Opinion

Cook, J.,

dissenting. I would not dismiss this case as improvidently allowed. Our Rules of Practice provide that one of two conditions should be met prior to this court’s sua sponte dismissal of an appeal on the basis that it was improvidently allowed. S.Ct.Prac.R. XII. Before taking this step we should find either (1) that there is no substantial constitutional question or question of public or great general interest, or (2) that the same question has been raised and passed upon in a prior appeal. Id. Neither of these conditions is met here. Instead, the majority initiates this dismissal, finding that the order appealed from is not final.

Whether the judgment of the trial court denying immunity is final and appealable depends on whether R.C. 2744.02(C) was validly reenacted by the General Assembly in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, given that R.C. 2744.02(C) was declared unconstitutional as being part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350. That is, if Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215 validly reenacted this section, then the trial court’s decision denying immunity to the board of education would be final, and the jurisdiction of the court of appeals would not be questioned by this court.

I thus would not dismiss the case sua sponte, but rather would have the parties brief the jurisdictional issue.

Lundberg Stratton, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.