State ex rel. Cobb v. Industrial Commission
Cases that cite this one
12 later published cases cite this decision.
- State ex rel. Cordell v. Pallet Cos., Inc. (Slip Opinion) (Ohio 2016)
- Ebersole v. Industrial Commission, Unpublished Decision (6-30-2006) (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
- Heffernan v. Melrose Capital, Unpublished Decision (12-4-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
- State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc. (Ohio 2002)
- State ex rel. Crim v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (Ohio 2001)
- State ex rel. Baker v. Industrial Commission (Ohio 2000)
- State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 2000)
- Roddy v. Industrial Comm., Unpublished Decision (3-9-2006) (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
- State Ex Rel. Springfield v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (6-28-2002) (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)
- State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc. (Ohio 2002)
- State ex rel. Crim v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (Ohio 2001)
- State ex rel. Cobb v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio 2000)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Voluntary abandonment of the former position of employment can preclude temporary total disability compensation. State ex rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 531 N.E.2d 678. “Firing can constitute a voluntary abandonment of the former position of employment. Although not generally consented to, discharge, like incarceration, is often a consequence of behavior that the claimant willingly undertook, and may thus take on a voluntary character.” State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202, 1204.
We elaborated on Watts in State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 403, 650 N.E.2d 469, 471-472, where we characterized as “voluntary” a firing “generated by the claimant’s violation of a written work rule or policy that (1) clearly defined the prohibited conduct, (2) had been previously identified by the employer as a dischargeable offense, and (3) was known or should have been known to the employee.”
In this case, OWT’s drug-use policy clearly defined the prohibited conduct. It also identified violation of that conduct as a potentially dischargeable offense of which claimant was admittedly aware. Claimant attempts to distinguish his situation from that in Louisiana-Pacific by asserting that here termination was
Claimant last argues that to uphold the commission is to encourage employers to fire employees as a means of avoiding the employers’ compensation obligations. Louisiana-Pacific, however, responds to this concern by setting forth criteria that guard against firings without cause for the purpose of evading compensation responsibilities. Claimant’s firing in this case was not without cause and could have been avoided by a decision to refrain from drug use.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.