[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 

.]




                                     IN RE BONFIELD.
                      [Cite as In re Bonfield, 

.]
Custody—Motion for reconsideration or amendment granted—Pursuant to its
        authority under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), a juvenile court may determine
        whether a shared custody agreement between parties in a same-sex
        relationship is in the best interest of the children.
  (No. 2001-0625—Submitted March 13, 2002—Decided December 13, 2002.)
 APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-000436 and C-
                                          000437.
                ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR AMENDMENT.
                                  __________________
        MOYER, C.J.
        {¶1} Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration or amendment pursuant
to S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A)(4) after announcement of our decision and opinion in In
re Bonfield, 

, 

, 

. The motion
requested the court to delete the following language from its opinion:
        {¶2} “However, because second parent adoption is not available in Ohio,
Shelly cannot adopt the children. Instead, if Shelly were to adopt the children
herself, the effect would be to terminate Teri [Bonfield]’s rights and responsibilities
as an adoptive parent. See R.C. 3107.15(A). Therefore, because Teri wishes to
retain her rights as a parent, adoption of the children by Shelly is not a viable
option.”
        {¶3} The motion for reconsideration or amendment is sustained, and the
following opinion shall replace the opinion in In re Bonfield, 

,

, 

.
                              January Term, 2002



       {¶4} Appellants, Teri J. Bonfield and Shelly M. Zachritz, have lived
together since 1987 as partners in a same-sex relationship. During that time, Teri
has adopted two children, Joseph, born in 1993, and Jacob, born in 1995. Shelly
participated equally with Teri in the decision to adopt the boys.
       {¶5} Teri has also given birth to three children, a son born in 1996, and
twins born in 1998, each of whom was conceived through anonymous artificial
insemination. Shelly actively participated in the planning and births of the children,
assisted with Teri’s artificial insemination, and was present throughout Teri’s
doctor’s visits during the pregnancies and actual births. According to Teri and
Shelly, since the children’s respective adoptions and births Shelly has acted as their
primary caregiver and has come to be seen by them as their parent in the same way
as has Teri.
       {¶6} Appellants’ description of their family is echoed by Dr. Leslie Swift,
a licensed clinical psychologist, who testified that appellants operate jointly in
caring for the children, and have created a loving and committed home. Dr. Swift
identified Shelly as the children’s primary caretaker, as she is responsible for the
day-to-day care of the children. Dr. Swift found that both Teri and Shelly function
as parents, and that the children are bonded to each of them and “go to each for
similar things and also for different needs.” Finally, Dr. Swift testified that should
the children be separated from Shelly, their primary caregiver, it could be
devastating to them.
       {¶7} Notwithstanding her role as the primary caregiver for their children,
Shelly has no legally recognized rights with regard to Joseph, Jacob, Nicholas,
Matthew, or Samantha. Lacking such legal rights, she does not have equal access
to the children’s medical or school records, and is unable to authorize medical care
or obtain medical insurance coverage for the children.
       {¶8} An option in some states would be for Shelly to pursue a “second
parent adoption.” M. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:




                                          2
                               January Term, 2002



Adjudicating Maternity for Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents (2002), 50 Buff.L.Rev.
341, 345, fn. 15. Second parent adoption is a process by which a partner in a
cohabiting and nonmarital relationship may adopt his or her partner’s biological or
adoptive child, without requiring the parent to relinquish any parental rights. E.
Zuckerman, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parental Families: Legal
Recognition of the Other Mother (1986), 19 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 729, 731, fn. 8.
        {¶9} Concerned that Shelly’s lack of legally recognized rights is contrary
to the children’s best interests both currently and in the future, appellants filed their
Petition for Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities in the Common Pleas
Court of Hamilton County, Juvenile Division. They sought to “confirm their
commitment that they will both continue to raise the children regardless of what
happens to their relationship.” In addition to concerns about Shelly’s status with
respect to the children in the event that Teri and Shelly separate, appellants seek to
secure Shelly’s legal rights to the children in the event of Teri’s death. For instance,
if Teri were to die, Shelly’s care and physical custody of the children could be
interrupted for a time or even terminated, should a relative of Teri decide to petition
the court for custody.
        {¶10} Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate, the juvenile court
found that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the petition because Shelly is not a
parent within the meaning of R.C. 3109.04. The record reveals that the trial court
questioned why appellants did not apply for joint custody, since custody is a much
broader term than shared parenting and “the award of joint custody does not divest
any party of their [own] custody.” The trial court suggested that the better approach
would be a shared custody arrangement and declined to “circumvent the laws of
Ohio by torturing the shared parenting agreement [law] where there is no
parentage.” The court stated that custody of the children in a shared custody
arrangement “would not be a fiction [but] a reality, [whereas] parenting is a bit of
fiction in this situation.” The court then invited appellants to petition for a joint




                                           3
                               January Term, 2002



custodial arrangement, without reference to “shared parenting.” The record does
not indicate that appellants acted upon the advice offered by the trial court.
       {¶11} Upon appeal of the trial court’s order denying shared parenting, the
court of appeals held that pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the custody of any child who is not a
ward of a court. As none of the Bonfield children is a ward of a court, the court of
appeals concluded that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to hear the petition.
However, the court held that the juvenile court must exercise its jurisdiction in child
custody matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04. Although R.C. 3109.04 does not
define “parent,” the court applied the definition of “parent and child relationship”
in R.C. 3111.01(A) to define “parent” in R.C. 3109.04, and concluded that a
juvenile court has no authority to award to a person who is not a biological or
adoptive parent parental rights or shared parenting. Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ petition.
       {¶12} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a
discretionary appeal.
       {¶13} R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) provides:
       {¶14} “If at least one parent files a pleading or motion in accordance with
division (G) of this section and a plan for shared parenting pursuant to that division
and if a plan for shared parenting is in the best interest of the children and is
approved by the court in accordance with division (D)(1) of this section, the court
may allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children to
both parents and issue a shared parenting order requiring the parents to share all or
some of the aspects of the physical and legal care of the children in accordance with
the approved plan for shared parenting.”
       {¶15} The specific issue is whether Shelly is a “parent” for purposes of R.C.
3109.04(A)(2).




                                           4
                               January Term, 2002



                          Analysis of R.C. 3109.04(A)(2)
       {¶16} R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) provides that a court may, upon determining that
a proposed shared parenting plan is in the best interest of the children, allocate
parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children to both “parents.”
“Parent” is not defined in this section.
       {¶17} The legal concept of “shared parenting” is relatively new in Ohio law
and refers to an agreement between parents regarding the care of their children that
was previously termed “joint custody.” Ohio Legislative Service Commission,
Analysis of 1990 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3, at 20. In 1990, the General Assembly
adopted recommendations of the Domestic Relations Task Force established by the
116th General Assembly to change “[c]hild custody and visitation laws [to] reflect
a shared parenting concept where both divorcing parties remain important to their
children’s development.” Domestic Relations Task Force Report, 116th General
Assembly, 1990, at 40.
       {¶18} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 3 replaced references to “joint custody” in
domestic relations-related statutes with “shared parenting.” See, e.g., former R.C.
3109.04(D)(1)(a)(i), (E)(2)(c), and 3113.215(B)(6), 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 116,
121, 187. “Party,” in this context, was replaced with “parent.” See former R.C.
3109.05(A)(3), 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 128. However, the act did not replace all
references to “custody” of a child, or “parent, legal guardian,” or “custodian,”
leaving intact those references where the context and scope of the statutory
language did not warrant change. For example, R.C. 2151.06 was not amended,
and it provides that “a child has the same residence or legal settlement as his
parents, legal guardian of his person, or his custodian who stands in the relation of
loco parentis.”
       {¶19} Appellants argue that the doctrine of in loco parentis applies to the
definition of “parent” in R.C. 3109.04(A)(2), and urge the court to find that Shelly
stands in loco parentis to Teri’s children for purposes of that statute. They rely on




                                           5
                               January Term, 2002



State v. Noggle, which held that a “person in loco parentis has assumed the same
duties as a guardian or custodian, only not through a legal proceeding.” State v.
Noggle (1993), 

, 

. However, the court’s
determination in Noggle was based on an analysis of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), which
specifically provides:
        {¶20} “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the
spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply:
        {¶21} “* * *
        {¶22} “(5) The offender is the other person’s natural or adoptive parent, or
stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis.”
        {¶23} Thus, in contrast to R.C. 3109.04(A)(2), which uses only the word
“parent” in the context of a shared parenting agreement, R.C. 2907.03(A)(5)
expressly includes a person in loco parentis in defining a sexual offender. The
General Assembly could have provided juvenile courts with the authority to
allocate parental rights and responsibilities not only to parents but also to guardians,
custodians, and others who stand in loco parentis. That the statute refers to “parent”
reflects legislative intent to exclude from the benefits of R.C. 3109.04 guardians or
custodians in loco parentis.
        {¶24} The court of appeals applied R.C. 3111.01(A) to 3109.04(A)(2),
finding that Shelly is not a “parent” within the meaning of R.C. 3111.01(A). R.C.
3111.01(A) provides:
        {¶25} “As used in sections 3111.01 to 3111.85 of the Revised Code, ‘parent
and child relationship’ means the legal relationship that exists between a child and
the child’s natural or adoptive parents and upon which those sections and any other
provision of the Revised Code confer or impose rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations. The ‘parent and child relationship’ includes the mother and child
relationship and the father and child relationship.”




                                           6
                               January Term, 2002



       {¶26} “(B) The parent and child relationship extends equally to all children
and all parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”
       {¶27} Appellants argue that by its terms R.C. 3111.01(A) applies only to
“sections 3111.01 to 3111.85 of the Revised Code.” Therefore, it applies only for
purposes of the Parentage Act, R.C. Chapter 3111, and should not be used to define
the term “parent” in R.C. 3109.04. We disagree.
       {¶28} Since there is no definition of “parent” in R.C. 3109.04, it is
appropriate to search related sections of the Revised Code for a definition. A plain
reading of R.C. 3111.01 indicates that there are three ways a “parent and child
relationship” can be established: by natural parenthood, by adoption, or by other
legal means in the Revised Code that confer or impose rights, privileges, and duties
upon certain individuals.
       {¶29} Appellants argue that the domestic relations code contains other
means by which parenthood is recognized beyond simply being a “natural or
adoptive parent.” They point to R.C. 3111.95(A), which accords the consenting
husband of a woman inseminated through nonspousal artificial insemination the
status of father of the child so conceived, even though the husband has no natural
or adoptive relationship to the child. They also observe that R.C. 3111.95(B)
provides that a sperm donor for a nonspousal artificial insemination “shall not be
treated in law or regarded as the natural father” of any child resulting from such a
procedure, despite having a biological relationship with the child.
       {¶30} Accordingly, appellants argue that a “psychological” or “second”
parent should be treated as a parent under R.C. 3109.04 for purposes of entering a
shared parenting agreement. Appellants advocate a four-part test to determine
whether a person is a “psychological” or “second” parent. Under this test, the court
considers (1) whether the legal parent consents to and fosters the relationship
between the “psychological” or “second” parent and the child, (2) whether the
“psychological” or “second” parent has lived with the child, (3) whether the




                                           7
                              January Term, 2002



“psychological” or “second” parent performs parental functions for the child to a
significant degree, and (4) whether a parent-child bond has been forged between
the “second” parent and the child.
       {¶31} This four-part test has been used in other states to determine whether
a psychological or second parent may be awarded custody. See V.C. v. M.J.B.
(2000), 

, 

 (test provides good framework for
determining psychological parenthood in cases where petitioner has lived for a
substantial period of time with child); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. (1995), 

, 

 (court may determine whether visitation is
appropriate where nonparent petitioner first proves petitioner’s parent-like
relationship with child using four-part test, and a significant triggering event
justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship with biological or adoptive
parent).
       {¶32} Ohio has adopted a similar test in the context of a wrongful death
action. R.C. 2125.02(A)(1), the statute at issue in Lawson v. Atwood (1989), 

, 

, provides that “an action for wrongful death shall
be brought in the name of the personal representative of the decedent for the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the
decedent.” We held that such an action could be brought by a nonparent for his
own exclusive benefit only when the nonparent could prove by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) the natural parents of the child have disclaimed or
abandoned parental rights to the child, (2) the person claiming the status of parent
has performed the obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of time, (3) the
child and the alleged parent have held themselves out to be parent and child for a
substantial period of time, and (4) the relationship between the child and the alleged
parent has been publicly recognized. 

 at syllabus.
       {¶33} The existence of such a test in a wrongful death action is not
dispositive of the case at issue. A difference between Lawson and the case at issue




                                          8
                              January Term, 2002



is the absence of a statutory definition of “parent” in R.C. 2125.02, and the
definition of “parent and child relationship” in R.C. 3111.01(A). Additionally, in
Lawson we emphasized that there is a significant distinction between the wrongful
death action at issue and a dispute between parties competing for custody or the
privileges and obligations of parenthood with respect to the child. 

, 

. Moreover, R.C. 2125.02 is a remedial law, and must
be construed to compensate those who have been deprived of a relationship. 

, 

. In contrast, R.C. 3109.04(A)(2) focuses on the best interests
of the child. Finally, in Lawson, prior to the child’s death, the person claiming to
be the child’s parent had been awarded legal custody of the child. 

, 

.
       {¶34} Therefore, as R.C. 3109.04 specifically uses the term “parent” and
this term is defined in R.C. 3111.01, we find it inappropriate to adopt appellants’
four-part test to broaden the narrow class of persons who are statutorily defined as
parents for purposes of entering a shared parenting agreement.
       {¶35} Appellants argue that a biological or adoptive parent has the
fundamental constitutional right, which may not be restricted by statute, to
voluntarily enter into a court-approved shared parenting plan with a
“psychological” or “second” parent. The fundamental due process right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of one’s children has been
upheld in Troxel v. Granville (2000), 

, 

, 

. However, this right does not embrace the right to have all decisions recognized
or approved in law. In other words, although Teri’s decision to co-parent her
children with Shelly may be protected from interference by the state, Teri is not
entitled to the benefit of statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a familial
arrangement.
       {¶36} Although we have concluded that Shelly does not qualify as a parent
pursuant to R.C. 3109.04, we, like the court of appeals, “do not intend to discredit




                                         9
                                January Term, 2002



[appellants’] goal of providing a stable environment for the children’s growth.” We
note that although appellants urged the trial court to find that “both Petitioners have
equal standing to parent the minor children,” their brief filed in this court contains
repeated references to “custody,” and concludes with a plea for the court to
recognize that they are “equal custodial parents.” Similarly, although their petition
to the trial court is ostensibly for the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
of minor children, the petition clearly states that appellants request that the court
award them “the legal status of co-custodians [of] the children.” Accordingly, we
have examined their claim for shared parenting in the custody context, and conclude
that the juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine whether a petition for shared
custody is appropriate.
        {¶37} R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides:
        {¶38} “(A) The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the
Revised Code as follows:
        {¶39} “* * *
        {¶40} “(2) Subject to division (V) of section 2301.03 of the Revised Code,
to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.”
        {¶41} The court of appeals held that the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to determine the custody of the Bonfield children under R.C.
2151.23(A)(2), but that the court must exercise this jurisdiction in accordance with
R.C. 3109.04. R.C. 2151.23(F)(1). The court concluded that R.C. 3109.04 limits
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction in allocating parental rights and responsibilities to
“parents,” and that Shelly is not a parent.
        {¶42} The juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody of any
child not a ward of another court, even though the court has not first found the child
to be delinquent, neglected, or dependent. In re Torok (1954), 

,

, 

, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. This
exclusive responsibility “to determine the custody of any child not a ward of




                                            10
                                January Term, 2002



another court of this state” cannot be avoided merely because the petitioner is not
a “parent” under R.C. 3109.04.
        {¶43} It is well settled under Ohio law that a juvenile court may adjudicate
custodial claims brought by the persons considered nonparents at law.                   For
example, In re Perales (1977), 

, 

, 

,
concerned a child whose biological mother had placed her from infancy in the care
of a nonparent. The child lived with the nonparent for two years. In the ensuing
custody dispute between the parent and the nonparent, Perales relied on R.C.
2151.23(A)(2) rather than R.C. 3109.04, since the child at issue was not a ward of
another court.
        {¶44} In contrast, this court has held that in a case where custody of children
had already been determined by a domestic relations court in a divorce decree, and
where the children are later determined to be abused, neglected, or dependent, the
juvenile court has jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) to make a custody
determination, but must do so in accordance with R.C. 3109.04. In re Poling
(1992), 

, 

, paragraph two of the syllabus.1
        {¶45} However, the court in Poling limited its holding to cases where the
juvenile court has obtained jurisdiction over a child under R.C. 2151.353 on the
basis that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent. The court did not consider
whether all custody cases arising under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) must be decided under
R.C. 3109.04, nor could such an interpretation of Poling be reconciled with Ohio’s
long-standing precedent that a juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine custody
claims brought by nonparents. Therefore, we distinguish Poling and hold that the




1.      {¶a} R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) provides:
        {¶b} “The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody matters in
accordance with sections 3109.04, 3109.21 to 3109.36, and 5103.20 to 5103.28 of the Revised
Code.”




                                            11
                                January Term, 2002



juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the custody of the Bonfield children
pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) without reference to R.C. 3109.04.
       {¶46} We next elucidate the standard the juvenile court should use in
disposing of appellants’ petition. In Perales, we found that in the custody dispute
between a parent and a nonparent, the juvenile court may not award custody to the
nonparent without first making a finding of parental unsuitability. In re Perales, 

, 

, 

, syllabus. This is because custody
proceedings between a parent and a nonparent, unlike those between two parents,
pose the possibility of terminating a parent’s rights in favor of one who is not a
parent. 

, 

, 

.
       {¶47} However, Perales involved an actual dispute between parties
competing for custody. This is not the case here. In fact, appellants’ petition was
unopposed at the trial level and remains unopposed. In the petition, Teri voluntarily
seeks to relinquish her right to sole custody of the children in favor of shared
custodial rights with Shelly.
       {¶48} Parents may waive their right to custody of their children and are
bound by an agreement to do so. Masitto v. Masitto (1986), 

,
22 OBR 81, 

. The parents’ agreement to grant custody to a third
party is enforceable subject only to a judicial determination that the custodian is a
proper person to assume the care, training, and education of the child. 

,
22 OBR 81, 

.
       {¶49} Upon remand the trial court shall exercise its discretion in giving due
consideration to all known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the
children. In re Adoption of Charles B. (1990), 

, 

,
paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶50} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to its authority under
R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court may determine whether a shared custody
agreement between Teri and Shelly is in the best interests of the children.




                                         12
                                January Term, 2002



Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reverse it
in part, and remand to the juvenile court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                                                          Judgment reversed in part,
                                                                     affirmed in part
                                                                and cause remanded.
       DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ.,
concur.
       COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
                                __________________
          COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
          {¶51} The majority holds that “pursuant to its authority under R.C.
2151.23(A)(2), the juvenile court may determine whether a shared custody
agreement between Teri and Shelly is in the best interests of the children.” In
deciding this, the majority states that “the juvenile court has jurisdiction to
determine the custody of the Bonfield children pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(2)
without reference to R.C. 3109.04.” (Emphasis added.) I cannot agree.
          {¶52} As the majority correctly notes, R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) provides that the
juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under the Revised Code “to
determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state.” This
statutory provision merely empowers a juvenile court to entertain custody
determination actions; it does not, however, provide the enabling mechanism by
which such actions come before the juvenile court. Instead, R.C. 2151.23(F)(1)
dictates how a party invokes the juvenile court’s R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) jurisdiction:
          {¶53} “The juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody
matters in accordance with sections 3109.04, 3109.21 to 3109.36, and 5103.20 to
5103.28 of the Revised Code.”




                                          13
                              January Term, 2002



       {¶54} Thus, it is R.C. 2151.23(F)(1), not (A)(2), that targets procedures by
which a party can properly invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Under the
majority’s reading of the statutory scheme, anyone could file for custody of any
child simply by filing an “R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) motion.” Yet the Revised Code
generally limits the consideration of issues of custody/parenting of children to (1)
circumstances of abuse, dependency, or neglect, see, generally, R.C. Chapter 2151;
and (2) circumstances surrounding changes in the legal relationship of parents, such
as divorce, legal separation, or annulment, R.C. 3109.04(A). By legislative choice,
there must be a statutory trigger to invoke R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) jurisdiction.
       {¶55} Here, the appellants sought to invoke the juvenile court’s R.C.
2151.23(A) jurisdiction by way of R.C. 3109.04. Although this statute is a proper
vehicle by which a party can invoke the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the party must
be a parent of a minor child from a marriage. R.C. 3109.04(A) provides that “in
any proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
for the care of a child, * * * the court shall allocate the parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage.” (Emphasis
added.) The statute then goes on to provide for ways in which the court may
allocate parental rights and responsibilities. In this case, the R.C. 3109.04(A)
marriage requirement forecloses reaching determinations under the remaining
portions of R.C. 3109.04, such as whether Shelly is a “parent” under R.C.
3109.04(G). Because the General Assembly does not permit same-sex marriages,
see R.C. 3101.01, Teri and Shelly are not married, the children are not “of the
marriage,” and R.C. 3109.04(A) is inapplicable. The juvenile court thus did not err
in denying a grant of custody under R.C. 3109.04.
       {¶56} Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s judgment only insofar as it
affirms at least in part the judgment of the court of appeals. As to the majority’s
reasoning and the remainder of the judgment, I respectfully dissent.
                              __________________




                                         14
                             January Term, 2002



       Sallee Fry Waterman, for appellants.
       Susan J. Becker, urging reversal for amici curiae National Association of
Social Workers, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
American Counseling Association, American Public Health Association, and Ohio
Psychological Association.
       Patricia M. Longue, urging reversal for amici curiae Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc., National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Ohio Human
Rights Bar Association.
       David R. Langdon; Keating, Muething & Klekamp and Joseph L. Trauth,
urging affirmance for amici curiae the Honorable Thomas E. Brinkman Jr., Larry
L. Flowers, Timothy J. Grendell, Jim Jordan, Linda Reidelbach, Twyla Roman,
Michelle G. Schneider, and William J. Seitz III, Members of the Ohio General
Assembly.
       David R. Langdon, urging affirmance for amici curiae American Family
Association of Ohio, Citizens for Community Values, Equal Rights Not Special
Rights, Family First, and National Legal Foundation.
                             __________________




                                       15