State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.

Ohio Supreme Court
State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 2002 Ohio 4905 (Ohio 2002)
96 Ohio St. 3d 379

State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.

Opinion

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 
96 Ohio St.3d 379
.]




   THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL.
         [Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 
2002-Ohio-4905
.]
Motion for reconsideration granted in part and judgment modified in part.
      (No. 2001-1325—Submitted June 4, 2002—Decided October 2, 2002.)
                                      IN MANDAMUS.
                          ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
                                  __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶1} On April 10, 2002, we granted a writ of mandamus to relators, co-
owners as trustees of land located in the city of Mayfield Heights, Ohio, to compel
respondents, the city and its mayor, city council, and planning commission, to
commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of the city’s
temporary taking of relators’ property. State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002),
95 Ohio St.3d 59
, 
765 N.E.2d 345
. We held that relators established a compensable
taking of their property because the city’s application of U-1(1) and U-2-A single-
family residential zoning classifications to their property was unconstitutional in
that the application of these classifications did not substantially advance legitimate
state interests. Id. at 64, 
765 N.E.2d 345
. We further held that relators had
established the period of the compensable taking as being from March 19, 1992,
the date they claimed as the beginning date of the taking, i.e., when they first filed
a declaratory judgment action challenging the application of U-1(1) zoning, until
April 2001, when the U-2-A zoning classification was invalidated. Id. at 69, 
765 N.E.2d 345
.
        {¶2} On April 22, 2002, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.
        {¶3} On April 23, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002), 535
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




U.S. ___, 
122 S.Ct. 1465
, 
152 L.Ed.2d 517
. In Tahoe-Sierra, the court held that
moratoriums, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake Tahoe Basin did not
constitute a compensable taking although the moratoriums temporarily deprived
affected landowners of all economically viable use of their property.
       {¶4} On April 29, 2002, relators filed a brief in opposition to respondents’
motion for reconsideration.
                              Motion for Reconsideration
       {¶5} We have used our reconsideration authority under S.Ct.Prac.R. XI to
“ ‘correct decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in error.’
” Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 
82 Ohio St.3d 539, 541
, 
697 N.E.2d 181
, quoting State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council
(1995), 
75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383
, 
662 N.E.2d 339
. For the following reasons, we
grant respondents’ motion in part and shorten the period in which a compensable
taking was found, but otherwise deny the motion.
            Compensation for Application of Invalid Zoning Ordinance
       {¶6} Respondents raise three claims in support of reconsideration. In their
first claim, they assert that Shemo sub silentio overruled established Ohio law, i.e.,
Superior Uptown, Inc. v. Cleveland (1974), 
39 Ohio St.2d 36
, 
68 O.O.2d 21
, 
313 N.E.2d 820
. In Superior Uptown, at the syllabus, we held, “A cause of action for
money damages can not be maintained against a municipality for losses sustained
as the result of the adoption of a rezoning ordinance which is subsequently declared
invalid.”
       {¶7} Respondents’ claim lacks merit. Shemo does not overrule Superior
Uptown. Superior Uptown involved a direct action for money damages against a
municipality and was based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. By contrast,
this case involves a mandamus claim to compel public authorities to institute
appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property was
alleged and ultimately proven by relators.




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                                January Term, 2002




                                  Takings Analysis
       {¶8} Respondents next contend that reconsideration is warranted because
we did not apply in our takings determination the analysis set forth in Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York (1978), 
438 U.S. 104
, 
98 S.Ct. 2646
, 
57 L.Ed.2d 631
. In
Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court held that, in general, the
determination of whether a land-use regulation constitutes a compensable taking is
an ad hoc, factual inquiry that depends upon several factors, including the economic
effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action. 
Id. at 124
, 
98 S.Ct. 2646
, 
57 L.Ed.2d 631
; see, also, Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island (2001), 
533 U.S. 606, 617
, 
121 S.Ct. 2448
, 
150 L.Ed.2d 592
. For the
following reasons, respondents’ contention does not warrant reconsideration.
       {¶9} First, respondents’ attempted reargument of this contention is not
authorized by our Rules of Practice. “A motion for reconsideration shall be
confined strictly to the grounds urged for reconsideration [and] shall not constitute
a reargument of the case * * *.” S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A). Respondents previously
asserted the applicability of the Penn Cent. inquiry in their merit brief.
       {¶10} Second, it is not evident that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis
applies to this case, in which the land-use regulations at issue were held to be
unconstitutional as applied to the property, i.e., the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning
classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Shemo, 95
Ohio St.3d at 64, 
765 N.E.2d 345
. Neither Penn Cent. nor Palazzolo involved a
claim that the applicable legislation did not substantially advance legitimate state
interests. And in Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the
landowners did not contest that New York City’s objective in enacting the
challenged landmark-preservation legislation was a permissible governmental goal
or that the restrictions imposed on their land were appropriate means to secure that
objective. 
Id.,
 
438 U.S. at 129
, 
98 S.Ct. 2646
, 
57 L.Ed.2d 631
.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶11} Third, even assuming that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis applies,
a finding of a compensable taking is still warranted. Restricting relators’ land to
residential use on property that was held to be unsuitable for residential use had an
obvious adverse economic impact on relators, which necessarily interfered with
their reasonable investment-backed expectations when they requested that the
property be rezoned for retail development. Further, the city’s application of
residential classifications to their property did not substantially advance any
legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of Mayfield Heights. Shemo, 95 Ohio
St.3d at 64, 
765 N.E.2d 345
; cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles (1989), 
210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1372
, 
258 Cal.Rptr. 893
,
where a California appellate court, on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, held that there was no compensable regulatory taking, while observing that
“[t]he complaint does not allege * * * that it was unreasonable for the County to
conclude these limitations would contribute substantially to the public safety.” In
addition, the duration of the challenged restrictions was much lengthier here than
the challenged restrictions in Tahoe-Sierra, which totaled 32 months. 
Id.
 at ___,
122 S.Ct. 1465
, 
152 L.Ed.2d 517
 (“the duration of the restriction is one of the
important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings
claims”).
       {¶12} Therefore, respondents’ reliance on Penn Cent. and Palazzolo in
support of reconsideration is misplaced.
                                   Tahoe-Sierra
       {¶13} Respondents’ reconsideration motion could not rely on Tahoe-Sierra
because that case was decided one day after their motion. The court therefore sua
sponte considers whether Tahoe-Sierra requires a modification of our decision in
Shemo. Upon consideration, Tahoe-Sierra does not warrant vacation of our April
10 judgment.




                                           4
                                  January Term, 2002




          {¶14} As relators correctly note, unlike this case, Tahoe-Sierra did not
involve the first prong of the regulatory takings test set forth in Agins v. Tiburon
(1980), 
447 U.S. 255, 260
, 
100 S.Ct. 2138
, 
65 L.Ed.2d 106
 (application of land-use
regulations to property constitutes a compensable taking “if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests * * * or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land”). In fact, in Tahoe-Sierra, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that the landowners challenging the temporary
environmental moratoriums did not argue, as relators did in this case, that the
moratoriums did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 
Id.
 at ___,
122 S.Ct. 1465
, 
152 L.Ed.2d 517
 (“recovery on * * * a theory that the state interests
were insubstantial is foreclosed by the District Court’s unchallenged findings of
fact”).
          {¶15} Moreover, to the extent that Tahoe-Sierra could be construed as an
abandonment of most per se or categorical rules in regulatory takings cases,
application of the Penn Cent./Palazzolo ad hoc, factual inquiry here does not, as
previously discussed, require a different holding.
          {¶16} Therefore, Tahoe-Sierra does not demand a vacation of our judgment
here.
                                  Period of the Taking
          {¶17} Respondents finally contend that we should reconsider the length of
the period for the compensable taking.
          {¶18} In this case, relators requested that the period of the taking begin on
March 19, 1992, when they first challenged the application of the U-1(1) single-
family residential zoning classification to their property. We granted their request.
Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 69, 
765 N.E.2d 345
.
          {¶19} The date of a regulatory taking may begin on the date the challenged
regulation was either enacted or applied to the subject property. See, generally, 8A
Rohan & Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d Ed. 2001) 24-36, Section




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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




24.04[3], fn. 34; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles (1987), 
482 U.S. 304, 319
, 
107 S.Ct. 2378
, 
96 L.Ed.2d 250
.
        {¶20} The date that the first of the challenged zoning classifications was
adopted and applied to relators’ property preceded the date that relators requested
for the commencement of the taking, i.e., the date they first challenged the validity
of the classification as applied to their property.
        {¶21} But upon reflection, we deem this period to start in June 1995, when
relators refiled their action for declaratory judgment, and shorten the period of the
temporary taking.      In this regard, although relators initially challenged the
application of the U-1(1) classification to their property by a declaratory judgment
action filed on March 19, 1992, they voluntarily dismissed this action in June 1995.
Moreover, until they refiled their declaratory judgment action in that same month,
they never requested that their property be rezoned to permit retail use, instead
choosing to request that it be rezoned to permit multifamily residential
development. Therefore, they were not harmed by the application of the challenged
regulations to their property, which was ultimately found unsuitable for residential
use, during the period from March 1992 to June 1995 when they did not seek to use
their property for a nonresidential use. The appropriate starting date for the taking
is consequently June 1995, when they specifically requested in their refiled
declaratory judgment action that the property be rezoned to permit retail and
warehouse development.
        {¶22} Respondents assert that the period of the taking should be further
shortened because any delay was due to the court’s change in precedent, relators’
delay in preparing to build an access drive, the relatively late resolution of the issue
concerning the paper streets that the city claimed it owned, and the R.C. 2744.04
statute of limitations.    Respondents’ additional assertions lack merit for the
following reasons.




                                           6
                                January Term, 2002




       {¶23} Neither Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 
70 Ohio St.3d 223
, 
638 N.E.2d 533
, nor Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City Council (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 207
, 
690 N.E.2d 510
, the two cases cited by respondents in their
reconsideration motion, involved takings claims. Hence, respondents could not
justifiably rely on them to support their unconstitutional application of residential
zoning classifications to relators’ property. Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 
765 N.E.2d 345
.
       {¶24} In addition, respondents’ arguments concerning relators’ alleged
delay in preparing to make access road improvements and the further delay
concerning the resolution of the paper-streets issue were both raised in their initial
brief; they cannot reargue them now. S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A). And as we held in
Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 68, 
765 N.E.2d 345
, “Any delays by relators did not
contribute to respondents’ delay in finally rezoning the property to U-4 [retail and
wholesale use].” Further, “relators owned the property consisting of the ‘paper
streets’ at the time the temporary taking occurred because the city had abandoned
the property.” 
Id.
       {¶25} Finally, respondents waived their R.C. 2744.04 contention by failing
to raise this affirmative defense in their pleadings. See State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v.
Suster (1998), 
84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75
, 
701 N.E.2d 1002
 (“A statute of limitations is
an affirmative defense that is waived unless pled in a timely manner”).
                                     Conclusion
       {¶26} Based on the foregoing, we grant respondents’ motion for
reconsideration in part and shorten the period of the temporary taking from March
19, 1992 through April 2001 to June 1995 through April 2001. In all other respects,
we deny respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
                                                              Judgment accordingly.
       MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG
STRATTON, JJ., concur.




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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
                              __________________
       COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
       {¶27} I would deny the motion for reconsideration in its entirety.
       PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
                              __________________
       Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Sheldon Berns, Benjamin J. Ockner
and Jordan Berns, for relators.
       Leonard F. Carr and L. Bryan Carr; Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos Co.,
L.P.A., Anthony J. Coyne, Bruce G. Rinker and Eli Manos, for respondents.
                              __________________




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Reference

Cited By
27 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
Motion for reconsideration granted in part and judgment modified in part.