[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Ohio
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                          NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

   OHIO PATROLMAN’S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT, v. CITY OF
                                 CLEVELAND, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion
                                  No. 

.]

Civil law—Arbitration Act—R.C. 2711.01 et seq.—To initiate proceedings to vacate
        an arbitration award under R.C. 2711.13, a party must file a motion, not a
        complaint, in court of common pleas and serve motion on either the party
        adverse to the award or that party’s counsel—Judgment reversed in part
        and affirmed in part.
       (No. 2022-0724—Submitted April 05, 2023—Decided July 16, 2024.)
              APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
                              No. 110816, 

.
                                  __________________
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       DONNELLY, J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER and
STEWART, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with
an opinion joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ. BRUNNER, J., concurred in part and
dissented in part, with an opinion.


       DONNELLY, J.
       {¶ 1} To obtain an order vacating an arbitration award under the Ohio
Arbitration Act, R.C. 2711.01 et seq., a party must file an application in the court
of common pleas and serve notice of that application on the adverse party or its
attorneys. In this case, the party seeking vacatur filed an application in the form of
a complaint and served the adverse party but not the attorneys who had represented
that party in the arbitration proceedings. The question in this discretionary appeal
is whether those actions met the statutory requirements for initiating vacatur
proceedings.
                                  I. Background
       {¶ 2} This case arises from a labor dispute between the city of Cleveland
and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association—the union that represents
dispatch supervisors in the Cleveland Division of Police Communications Center—
concerning the scheduling of overtime. Because this appeal does not involve the
merits of the union’s grievance or the arbitration award resolving it, there’s no need
to rehash the facts of that dispute here. In line with the collective-bargaining
agreement between the union and the city, the parties submitted their dispute to
arbitration, and the arbitrator ultimately denied the union’s grievance. Relevant
here is the fact that the city was represented by outside counsel in the arbitration
proceedings.
       {¶ 3} Following the denial of its grievance, the union sought to vacate the
arbitration award under R.C. 2711.13. The union captioned its filing with the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court as “Complaint: Application to Vacate




                                          2
                                 January Term, 2024




Arbitration Award,” and the filing’s contents included numbered paragraphs
identifying the parties, a jurisdictional statement, the facts, the cause of action, and
a prayer for relief. The filing also included the subheading “Motion to Vacate” on
its second page. Through a process server obtained by the clerk of courts, the union
served its application to vacate the arbitration award on the city’s law department,
but it did not serve the attorneys who had represented the city in the arbitration
proceedings.
        {¶ 4} The city responded by filing an “Application to Confirm Arbitration
Award” under R.C. 2711.09, along with a motion to dismiss or strike the union’s
complaint. In support of its motion, the city alleged that the common pleas court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the union’s application because the union had not
complied with the statutes and rules governing the initiation of vacatur proceedings.
After holding a hearing, the common pleas court denied the city’s motion,
concluding that the union had properly filed and served an application to vacate the
arbitration award. The trial court then set a supplemental briefing schedule to
consider the merits of the union’s application.
        {¶ 5} While the parties’ briefing in the common pleas court was pending,
however, the Eighth District Court of Appeals issued a decision in a different case,
refuting one of the legal bases that the common pleas court had relied on in denying
the city’s motion to dismiss. See Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Assn. v. Cleveland,

, ¶ 14-15 (8th Dist.) (holding that a party’s failure to serve an
application to vacate an arbitration award on the outside counsel who represented
the prevailing party in arbitration did not meet the service requirements under R.C.
2711.13 and Civ.R. 5(B), thereby depriving the common pleas court of jurisdiction
to consider the application). Armed with this new precedent, the city asked the
common pleas court to reconsider its denial of the city’s motion to dismiss. And
the city prevailed.




                                           3
                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         {¶ 6} Acknowledging that it was required to follow the precedent
established by the Eighth District, the common pleas court found that the union’s
failure to serve its application to vacate on the outside counsel that represented the
city in the arbitration proceedings before the deadline set out in R.C. 2711.13
deprived the common pleas court of jurisdiction to consider the application. As a
result, it denied the union’s application to vacate the arbitration award. The
common pleas court also determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the city’s
application to confirm the arbitration award because that application had been
properly filed and served within the statutory deadline set out in R.C. 2711.09. And
because there was no longer a valid application to vacate the arbitration award, the
common pleas court concluded that it was required under R.C. 2711.09 to grant the
city’s application to confirm the arbitration award.
         {¶ 7} The Eighth District affirmed the common pleas court’s judgment
denying the union’s application to vacate the arbitration award and granting the
city’s application to confirm the award. In a unanimous opinion, the court of
appeals concluded that the union’s application contained two defects: First, the
application did not meet the statutory requirements for initiating a vacatur action,
because it was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion. 

 (8th Dist.).1 Second, because the union did not serve its application to vacate
on the outside counsel that represented the city in the arbitration proceedings, it did
not initiate the vacatur proceedings within the statutory deadline. Id. at ¶ 24. The
appellate court concluded that together, these defects deprived the common pleas
court of jurisdiction over the union’s application to vacate the arbitration award and
supported the common pleas court’s denial of that application. Id. at ¶ 26. This



1. We note that the Eighth District concluded that the court of common pleas should have granted
the city’s motion to strike the union’s application on this basis. See 

 (8th
Dist.). But despite recognizing this error, the court of appeals affirmed the court of common pleas’
judgment denying the union’s motion to vacate the arbitration award. Id. at ¶ 28.




                                                  4
                                January Term, 2024




outcome, in turn, left the common pleas court “no choice” but to grant the city’s
application to confirm the arbitration award. Id. at ¶ 27.
       {¶ 8} The union timely appealed to this court.            We accepted the
discretionary appeal to resolve (1) whom a party must serve when seeking to vacate
an arbitration award in the court of common pleas and (2) what form the filing
initiating that proceeding must take. See 

.
                                  II. Discussion
       {¶ 9} The procedure that parties must follow when requesting that a court
of common pleas vacate an arbitration award is set out in statute. R.C. 2711.13;
see Galion v. Am. Fedn. of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Ohio Council 8, AFL-CIO,

 (1995). As a result, the issues here find their
resolution in the interpretation of the relevant statutes. And, as with all questions
of statutory interpretation, they are questions of law that we review de novo. See
BST Ohio Corp. v. Wolgang, 

, citing State v. Pettus, 2020-
Ohio-4836, ¶ 10.
       {¶ 10} When interpreting statutory provisions, our goal is to give effect to
the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute—an intent we discern by reading the
statutory language in context and according to the rules of grammar and common
usage. Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 

,
citing State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 

, ¶ 21. And in doing so, we
“neither add to nor delete from the statutory language.” 

 citing Columbia Gas
Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 

, ¶ 19.
  A. R.C. 2711.13 allows a party seeking the vacatur of an arbitration award to
              serve either the opposing party or that party’s counsel
       {¶ 11} Once an award has been made in an arbitration proceeding, any party
to the arbitration may request the appropriate court of common pleas to either
vacate or modify the award for one of the reasons set out in R.C. 2711.10 and
2711.11, respectively. To initiate this process, the party seeking review must file a



                                          5
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




motion in the court of common pleas requesting “an order vacating, modifying, or
correcting” the arbitration award. R.C. 2711.13. That party must also serve notice
of the motion “upon the adverse party or [that party’s] attorney within three months
after the award is delivered to the parties in interest, as prescribed by law for service
of a notice of a motion in an action.” 

 The first question presented here is
whether this statutory provision required the union, as the party seeking the vacatur
of an arbitration award in the common pleas court, to serve notice of that action to
the counsel that represented the city in the arbitration proceeding. Contrary to the
court of appeals’ holding, we believe the statute does not impose this requirement.
        {¶ 12} To understand why, we begin with the statutory text. R.C. 2711.13
states that once a party applies for vacatur of an arbitration award in the court of
common pleas, it must serve notice of that filing “upon the adverse party or [that
party’s] attorney.” (Emphasis added.) In its common meaning and usage, “or” sets
off alternatives or choices. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(2002) (defining “or”). Consider the classic after-dinner question, “Coffee or tea?”
The average English speaker presented with this query would understand that she
could order coffee, she could order tea, or (if she was in especial need of
caffeination) she could order both. See Garner, Garner’s Modern English Usage
(4th Ed. 2016) (entry on use of “and/or”).          So too here.      The language in
R.C. 2711.13 sets out three alternatives by which a party can comply with the
statute’s mandatory-service requirement: by serving the adverse party, by serving
the adverse party’s attorney, or by serving both. This interpretation of the statutory
text follows our ordinary understanding and usage of “or.”
        {¶ 13} R.C. 2711.13 does not consist solely of the alternatives regarding to
whom a party must serve notice of its application to vacate an arbitration award.
The statute also requires that service of the notice be completed “as prescribed by
law for service of notice of a motion in an action.” In the past, this court has
interpreted the “prescribed by law” language used in R.C. 2711.13 as making the




                                           6
                                 January Term, 2024




requirements for service of notice of an application to vacate an arbitration award
subject to the service requirements for motions set out in Civ.R. 5(B). Cox v.
Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 

. Indeed, the Eighth
District relied on this court’s decision in Cox when concluding that the procedures
set out in R.C. 2711.13 are subject to Civ.R. 5(B)(1)’s requirement that when a party
is represented by counsel, service must be made on that party’s attorney. 2022-
Ohio-1403 at ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.).
       {¶ 14} But Cox does little to help resolve the question here. In Cox, an
arbitrator found that the Dayton Public Schools Board of Education had just cause
to terminate Cox’s employment as an intervention specialist with the public school
system. 

. Cox sought modification of the arbitration award by filing a
motion in the court of common pleas. That same day, the clerk of courts sent a
copy of the motion to the board by certified mail. And the next day, Cox sent a
copy of the motion to the board’s attorney, also by certified mail. Id. at ¶ 4. While
the copies of the motion were sent within the three-month deadline set out in R.C.
2711.13, the board alleged that it had not received notice of the motion before the
statutory three-month deadline passed. 

. Thus, the operative question
before this court was whether an adverse party had to receive notice of an
application to vacate an arbitration award within the three-month period for service
set out in R.C. 2711.13. See 

. That question was not resolved by an
express provision of the statutory text. Rather, it fell under the part of the statutory
language stating that service of the notice of an application to vacate an arbitration
award must be made “as provided by law,” R.C. 2711.13. And so, this court looked
to the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that the relevant provisions
defined service by mail or by a commercial carrier as being complete when the
relevant filing is mailed or delivered to the carrier. 

, citing Civ.R.
5(B)(2)(c) and (d). To be sure, our decision in Cox also mentioned in passing Civ.R.
5(B)(1)’s requirement that service be made on a represented party’s attorney, see



                                           7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

, but application of that provision was not intrinsic to this court’s
reasoning or necessary to its conclusions.
       {¶ 15} By contrast, the question here deals with a possible contradiction
between the statutory provision and the Civil Rules regarding on whom a party
initiating proceedings to vacate an arbitration award needs to serve notice. The
plain text of R.C. 2711.13 permits service on either the adverse party or that party’s
attorney, seemingly regardless of whether the adverse party is represented; the plain
text of Civ.R. 5(B)(1) requires service on a represented party’s counsel. Generally,
when a statutory provision conflicts with the Civil Rules, the rule controls
procedural issues and the statute controls matters of substantive law. Ferguson v.
State, 

, citing Boyer v. Boyer, 

 (1976)
and Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). But the Civil Rules do not always preempt
statutory law, even on procedural matters. Under Civ.R. 1(C), the Civil Rules do
not apply to special statutory proceedings in which the procedure set out in the
statute would render the civil rule clearly inapplicable.
       {¶ 16} It is undisputed that a court of common pleas’ ability to confirm,
modify, or vacate an arbitration award is a special statutory proceeding. See, e.g.,
Corrado v. Lowe, 

, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.); Brookdale Senior Living v.
Johnson-Wylie, 

, ¶ 7 (8th Dist); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Anthony,

 (5th Dist.). So the question becomes whether the statutory
requirements of R.C. 2711.13 regarding service of notice make the requirements of
Civ.R. 5(B)(1) clearly inapplicable. They do.
       {¶ 17} A civil rule is clearly inapplicable to a special statutory proceeding
when its “‘use will alter the basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure
was originally provided in the special statutory action.’ ” Price v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 

 (1982), quoting State ex rel. Millington v. Weir,

 (10th Dist. 1978). As discussed earlier, a party complies
with the service requirements set out in R.C. 2711.13 by serving notice of its




                                          8
                                January Term, 2024




application to vacate an arbitration award on either the adverse party or that party’s
counsel. While the notice must be served “as prescribed by law for service of notice
of a motion in an action,” R.C. 2711.13, there is nothing in the statutory language
to suggest that the Civil Rules are incorporated in their entirety into the statutory
requirements. Indeed, this interpretation is bolstered by R.C. 2711.05, which states
that applications to the court of common pleas to vacate arbitration awards shall be
made “in the manner provided by law for the making * * * of motions, except as
otherwise provided” in the relevant sections of Ohio’s Arbitration Act. Read
together, R.C. 2711.05 and 2711.13 reveal the General Assembly’s underlying
intention: the Civil Rules guide the way in which notice of an application to vacate
an arbitration award is to be served but do not supersede express provisions set out
in those particular statutes.
        {¶ 18} The statutory interpretation that the Eighth District used in its
analysis and that the city advocates for here would undermine that intention. If we
were to adopt the reading of R.C. 2711.13 advocated by the city, Civ.R. 5(B)(1)
would limit R.C. 2711.13—which contains the more expansive service provision—
by requiring a party initiating vacatur proceedings to serve the attorneys that
represented the adverse party in the arbitration proceedings. This would make the
language in R.C. 2711.13 instructing the applicant to serve notice of its application
for vacatur on a party or the party’s counsel a dead letter. Unlike our reasoning in
Cox—a case in which the Civil Rules augmented the process set out in the statute
and in which we relied on the Civil Rules to answer a question that was not
answered by the statutory text—applying Civ.R. 5(B)(1) here would contradict an
express term of the statute and frustrate any purpose or intent the General Assembly
had in enacting R.C. 2711.13.
        {¶ 19} In sum, R.C. 2711.13 does not require a party requesting the court of
common pleas to vacate an arbitration award to serve the counsel that represented
the adverse party in the arbitration proceedings. Under the statutory language, it is



                                          9
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




enough for the party initiating the vacatur action to serve either the adverse party
or that party’s counsel. In reaching this resolution, we recognize that common sense
suggests that the party initiating vacatur proceedings should serve both the adverse
party and any counsel that represented the adverse party in the arbitration
proceedings. But the law doesn’t compel common sense. And here, following the
letter of the law is enough to satisfy its requirements.
       {¶ 20} Resolution of this first question, however, does not resolve this
appeal. Even if the union satisfied the requirements of R.C. 2711.13 by serving its
application to vacate the arbitration award on the city but not on the counsel that
represented the city in the arbitration proceedings, the question whether the form
of the union’s application met the statutory requirements of R.C. 2711.13 remains.
And it is to that question that we now turn.
B. An application to vacate an arbitration award that is in the form of a pleading
       does not meet the requirements under R.C. 2711.05 and R.C. 2711.13
       {¶ 21} Just as with the first question in this appeal, our consideration of the
proper form of the filing that initiates an action to vacate an arbitration award in the
court of common pleas begins with the statutory text of R.C. 2711.05 and 2711.13.
We’ve seen both of these statutes before. The first is the more general provision.
Under R.C. 2711.05, “[a]ny application to the court of common pleas under sections
2711.01 to 2711.15, inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall be made and heard in the
manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise
expressly provided in such sections.” The second is R.C. 2711.13, which allows
“any party to an arbitration [to] file a motion in the court of common pleas for an
order vacating * * * the [arbitration] award as prescribed in section[ ] 2711.10 * * *
of the Revised Code.”
       {¶ 22} When read together the provisions are straightforward.              Both
provisions unambiguously state that when a party applies to vacate an arbitration
award in the court of common pleas, the application must be in the form of a motion.




                                          10
                                 January Term, 2024




R.C. 2711.05 and 2711.13. Likewise, the statutory language directs the court of
common pleas to consider an application to vacate an arbitration award “in the
manner provided by law” for considering motions. R.C. 2711.05. The text is clear,
and there is no reason to apply it other than as written.
       {¶ 23} Despite the clear language of these provisions, the union asks us to
hold that its filing in the court of common pleas—which was in the form of a
pleading and titled as a complaint—nevertheless satisfied these statutory
requirements. This we decline to do.
       {¶ 24} A motion is not a pleading, nor is a pleading a motion. A motion is
an application by a litigant to a court for a specific order. Civ.R. 7(B)(1); see also
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) (defining “motion” as “[a] written or oral
application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order”). Under the Civil
Rules, a motion must set out the order that the litigant is asking the court to enter
or the relief that the litigant is asking the court to provide. Civ.R. 7(B)(1). The
motion must also “state with particularity the grounds” supporting the litigant’s
request. 

 Under these definitions, a motion acts as a sort of “catchall” filing
during litigation: if a litigant needs a court to do something, he or she files a motion
asking the court to do it. The responsibility for service of a motion falls on the
party filing the motion, who must provide a signed proof of service with the motion
stating the “date and manner” of service. Civ.R. 5(B)(4). Indeed, failure to include
proof of service denies the court its ability to consider the motion. 

       {¶ 25} By contrast, a pleading is a far more limited type of filing. A
pleading is generally defined as “[a] formal document in which a party to a legal
proceeding (esp. a civil lawsuit) sets forth or responds to allegations, claims,
denials, or defenses.” Black’s. The Civil Rules do not provide their own definition
of “pleading,” but their requirements for pleadings largely incorporate the general
definition. Pleadings that include a claim for relief must also include a statement
asserting that the party filing the pleading is entitled to that relief and a demand for



                                          11
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




judgment on that claim. Civ.R. 8(A). Similarly, a responsive pleading must include
all defenses to any claims asserted by the opposing party, denials of any facts on
which those claims rest, and an assertion of any affirmative defenses on which the
party might rely. Civ.R. 8(B) and (C).
        {¶ 26} The Civil Rules identify only seven types of filings as pleadings: a
complaint, an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a crossclaim, a third-
party complaint, a third-party answer, and a reply to a third-party answer if ordered
by the court. Civ.R. 7(A). A complaint is the pleading that initiates a civil action
under the rules. Civ.R. 3(A); see also Black’s (defining “complaint” as “[t]he initial
pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, the
basis for the * * * claim, and the demand for relief”). The clerk of courts is
responsible for issuing and serving both a summons and a copy of the complaint to
the defendants named in the complaint, Civ.R. 4(A) and (B). All other pleadings
identified in the Civil Rules are subject to the service requirements set out in Civ.R.
5, which governs service of pleadings and other documents filed after the initial
complaint.
        {¶ 27} To be sure, a motion and a pleading are similar—they are both papers
filed in a court during litigation to try to achieve a desired outcome. But they are
not synonymous. As illustrated by the discussion above, a pleading (especially a
complaint) is meant to initiate a legal action; a motion is meant to resolve a legal
question arising during that action or even resolve the action itself. Considering
these differences, the General Assembly’s decision to require a party seeking
vacatur of an arbitration award to initiate those proceedings by filing a motion
makes sense. If a court of common pleas decides to vacate an arbitration award for
one of the reasons listed in R.C. 2711.10(A) through (D), it does so by entering an
order. Therefore, a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award would do so by
making a request to the court to enter an order—in other words, by filing a motion.
In this way, proceedings to vacate an arbitration award are not akin to the initiation




                                           12
                                 January Term, 2024




of a civil action with the filing of a pleading and issuance of a summons. See R.C.
2307.01 (defining “action” as an “ordinary proceeding in a court of justice,
involving process, pleadings, and ending in a judgment or decree, by which a party
prosecutes another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal right, or
the punishment of a public offense”). Instead, under the plain language of the
statutes setting out the procedure for vacating an arbitration award in the court of
common pleas, that special proceeding must be initiated through the filing and
service of a motion.
       {¶ 28} Applying these principles to the facts here, the union’s filing to
initiate vacatur proceedings did not meet the statutory requirements of R.C.
2711.13. First, the filing’s form was that of a pleading and not a motion. In its
filing titled “Complaint: Application to Vacate Arbitration Award,” the union set
out in numbered paragraphs the identification of the parties, the court of common
pleas’ jurisdiction, an extensive statement of facts, a cause of action, and a prayer
for relief. Put another way, the union’s filing contains the component parts of a
pleading as understood in Civ.R. 8(A) and meets the general definition of
“pleading.” Second, the filing’s content falls well below what is expected in a
motion. Even though the union included in its filing a subheading titled “Motion
to Vacate,” simply calling a document a motion does not make it so. Civ.R. 7(B)(1)
provides that a motion must state “with particularity the grounds” that support the
court’s granting the relief or order requested. To be sure, the union’s filing asserts
that the arbitrator committed misconduct during the arbitration process—one of the
statutory bases set forth in R.C. 2711.10 for vacating an arbitration award—and it
provides brute assertions to support that claim. But it provides little else to explain
why the court of common pleas should enter the desired order. In particular, the
union’s filing does not contain citations to any legal authority, apart from its
invocation of the statute, nor does it provide any analysis applying the law to the
facts here and explaining why the court should vacate the arbitration award. What



                                          13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




is more, the union’s filing does not include a certificate of service as required for
motions under Civ.R. (5)(B)(4). Rather, it appears the clerk of courts served a
summons on the city through a process server—the form of service that follows the
filing of a complaint initiating a civil action, see Civ.R. 4(A) and 4.1(B)(1).
       {¶ 29} Were this an ordinary proceeding in which an initial pleading would
be followed by the trappings of “process, pleadings, and ending in judgment,”
R.C. 2307.01, then perhaps the union’s perfunctory filing would have been enough.
But under the statutory provisions for these types of special proceedings, a court of
common pleas vacates an arbitration award by issuing an order. R.C. 2711.10. A
party requests that order by filing a motion. R.C. 2711.13. And a motion must
provide with particularity the grounds for the court’s granting the motion rather
than simply make allegations such as those contained in a pleading. Compare
Civ.R. 7(B)(1) (providing directions for filing a motion) with Civ.R. 7(A)
(identifying the types of pleadings in a civil action) and Civ.R. 8 (setting out what
information must be included in a pleading). Indeed, the union’s own actions here
show that its initial filing failed to meet the requirements of a motion. After its
initial filing and the common pleas court’s denial of the city’s motion to dismiss,
the union filed a “supplemental motion” to vacate the arbitration award well outside
the three-month deadline set out in R.C. 2711.13. In that filing, the union provided
factual citations to the record, it referenced legal authorities beyond a conclusory
invocation of statutory provisions, and it provided the common pleas court with a
legal analysis explaining why it was entitled to the order it requested. The
supplemental motion was not so much an enhancement of the union’s original filing
but was a replacement for it. If the union’s initial filing had met the requirements
of a motion by setting forth the grounds for the requested order, then a supplemental
motion would not have been needed.
       {¶ 30} Nor is the deficiency with the union’s initial filing remedied by the
union’s attaching to that filing the documents required for an application to vacate




                                          14
                                 January Term, 2024




an arbitration award under R.C. 2711.14. Under that statute’s text, a party asking
for an order vacating an arbitration award must file the papers listed in the statute
on top of—not in place of—its application.          And as discussed already, the
application to vacate the arbitration award must be made in the form of a motion.
See R.C. 2711.13. Regardless of what documents accompanied the union’s initial
filing, the union still needed to ensure that the filing itself met the statutory
requirements. And it did not.
       {¶ 31} In reaching these conclusions, we are mindful that, as a rule, courts
should assess filings based on their content rather than their form, thereby ensuring
cases are resolved on the merits rather than a party’s compliance with technicalities.
See Peterson v. Teodosio, 

 (1973) (“The spirit of the Civil
Rules is the resolution of cases upon their merits, not upon pleading deficiencies.”).
But in this case, form dictates content. Unlike a pleading that initiates an action, a
motion seeking to vacate an arbitration award is one step in an already ongoing
proceeding. It comes after the parties have completed an underlying arbitration
process, and—consistent with the statutory requirements and the nature of
motions—it needs to identify the alleged errors with the arbitration award and
explain why those errors warrant the court of common pleas’ entering an order
vacating that award. Simply providing notice of a party’s claim that an arbitration
award should be vacated, in the manner of factual recitations and conclusory
assertions of law, not only fails to meet the formal requirements of R.C. 2711.13,
but it does not give the court of common pleas adequate content on which to decide
whether to enter the requested order. Similarly, a motion with a proper legal and
factual analysis provides the adverse party with notice that the upcoming
proceedings are not just another ordinary proceeding subject to the requirements of
the Civil Rules. Rather, the filing of a motion distinguishes the application to vacate
the arbitration award for what it is—a special proceeding governed by unique
statutory requirements.



                                          15
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                                  III. Conclusion
       {¶ 32} For these reasons, we agree with the union that a party filing an
application in the court of common pleas to vacate an arbitration award satisfies the
service requirements of R.C. 2711.13 when it serves either the adverse party to the
award or that party’s counsel. And, consistent with that conclusion, we reverse that
part of the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ decision that reaches a contrary
conclusion.
       {¶ 33} But even if the union met R.C. 2711.13’s service requirements, the
union’s filing did not meet the statute’s requirement that an application to vacate an
arbitration award be made in the form and manner of a motion. In short, even if
the union served the proper entity, what it served did not meet the statutory
requirements for initiating the special proceeding for vacating an arbitration award
in the court of common pleas. And so we affirm the Eighth District Court of
Appeals’ judgment on that issue, thereby leaving intact its affirmance of the court
of common pleas’ denial of the union’s application to vacate the arbitration award.
                                                           Judgment reversed in part
                                                                and affirmed in part.
                               _________________
       KENNEDY, C.J., joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
       {¶ 34} I agree with the majority’s holding that when a party disputes an
arbitration award by motion, R.C. 2711.13 controls the methods by which the
motion must be served and that service of the motion on either the adverse party to
the award or that party’s counsel meets the statutory service requirements.
       {¶ 35} But, in my view, the majority errs by holding that the filing by
appellant, the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (“the union”), did not meet
the statutory requirement that a filing in which a party asks a court of common pleas
to vacate an arbitration award be made in the form and manner of a motion. The




                                         16
                                  January Term, 2024




majority reaches this conclusion by setting out the form and contents of the union’s
filing and then deciding whether that filing is a pleading or a motion. However,
with this approach, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion. Rather, the way to
determine whether the union’s filing met the statutory requirements and complied
with the rules for filing motions is by a straightforward application of the Ohio
Arbitration Act, R.C. 2711.01 et seq., and the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. There
is no need to decide whether the union’s filing is more like a pleading or a motion;
instead, the question is whether the union followed the Civil Rules that govern the
filing of motions.
        {¶ 36} Because the majority goes beyond the Civil Rules and dictates the
type of content that is required for a filing to be considered a motion and does not
simply follow the Arbitration Act and the Civil Rules, I dissent.
        {¶ 37} The union’s filing in this case meets the requirements of R.C.
2711.13 and the requirements for a motion as outlined by the Civil Rules. The Civil
Rules overlay the requirements of R.C. 2711.13, and applying the rules to the facts
of this case demonstrates that the form and substance of the union’s filing are that
of a motion that is also an initial filing.
        {¶ 38} The union’s filing was captioned “Complaint: Application to Vacate
Arbitration Award.” However, the union’s filing also included the subheading
“Motion to Vacate.” Additionally, in its filing, the union (1) included the statutory
basis on which it argued that the arbitration award should be vacated, (2) alleged
facts that supported that basis, (3) included the documents that are statutorily
required to accompany a motion to vacate an arbitration award, and (4) set forth a
request for specific relief—conforming with the requirements for a motion to vacate
an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act and the Civil Rules.
          I. Requirements of an R.C. 2711.13 Motion and Civ.R. 7(B)
        {¶ 39} Before discussing the requirements of an R.C. 2711.13 motion to
vacate an arbitration award, we clarify the interchangeable use of the terms



                                              17
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




“application” and “motion” as used in the Arbitration Act. The process by which a
party to an arbitration may seek to either dispute or confirm the arbitration award
is done by application. See R.C. 2711.05, 2711.09 through 2711.11, and 2711.14.
However, R.C. 2711.13 unambiguously requires the application for an order to
vacate, modify, or correct an arbitration award to be made by motion. Therefore,
the terms “application” and “motion” may be used interchangeably in this context.
R.C. 2711.05 states that an R.C. 2711.13 application must be made “in the manner
provided by law for the making and hearing of motions”—i.e., the application must
be made in accordance with the Civil Rules.
       {¶ 40} Civ.R. 7(B) is the only section of the Civil Rules that applies
exclusively to motions and provides requirements for the filing of a motion.
Civ.R. 7(B) has four subsections that set out a total of six requirements for the filing
of a motion. Civ.R. 7(B)(1) sets out the first four requirements: a motion must
(1) be made in writing (when not made during a trial or hearing), (2) state with
particularity the grounds therefor, (3) set forth the relief or order sought, and (4) be
served according to Civ.R. 5 (unless it is to be heard ex parte). Civ.R. 7(B)(2)
addresses the courts’ ability to decide motions with or without holding oral
hearings. Civ.R. 7(B)(3) contains the fifth requirement for the filing of a motion:
the motion must follow the rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters
of form of pleading. And Civ.R. 7(B)(4) contains the sixth requirement for
motions: a motion must be signed in accordance with Civ.R. 11.
       {¶ 41} Therefore, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the Civil Rules do not
require that motions contain any legal authority beyond statutory citations, nor do
the rules require that a motion contain an analysis applying the law to the facts at
issue. See majority opinion, ¶ 28. These requirements that the majority states must
be present for a filing to constitute a motion are matters of content that are not
required by the Arbitration Act or the Civil Rules. In fact, “[n]o technical forms of
pleading or motions are required.” (Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 8(E)(1).




                                          18
                                 January Term, 2024




        {¶ 42} Where there is substantive variation between what is generally found
in a motion and what the union filed in this case, the Civil Rules that apply to an
initial filing explain the variance.
        II. The Initial Filing in an Action Is, By Definition, a Complaint
        {¶ 43} The only way to commence a civil action is by filing a complaint
with the court. See Civ.R. 3(A). The majority recognizes this fact. See majority
opinion at ¶ 26 (“A complaint is the pleading that initiates a civil action under the
rules. Civ.R. 3(A).”). However, despite the fact that the union’s application was
the initial filing before the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court in this matter,
the majority takes issue with the union’s captioning its filing a “Complaint:
Application to Vacate Arbitration Award.”
        {¶ 44} The union’s filing also included the identification of the parties, and
a statement of the court’s jurisdiction, and it was served with a summons. In
practice, a party’s initial filing provides the court with information that identifies
the parties, and it states whether the parties have standing and under which statute
or rules the court may exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
This information is key for courts to determine whether the issue and the parties are
properly before it.     However, the majority finds that the inclusion of this
information in an application to vacate an arbitration award filed under R.C.
2711.13 does not allow the filing to be classified as a motion. See majority opinion
at ¶ 28. Moreover, the issuance of a summons and the service of process properly
place the parties under the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. See Lincoln
Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 

, 64 (1956) (“It is axiomatic that for a court
to acquire jurisdiction there must be a proper service of summons or an entry of
appearance . . . .”).
        {¶ 45} Following the majority’s approach, serving an R.C. 2711.13 motion
under Civ.R. 5 (i.e., serving the motion without a court-issued summons) leaves
open the question whether the party being served is subject to the jurisdiction of the



                                          19
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




court without having made an appearance. The better approach is for service of
such a motion to include a summons, be completed using a method set forth in
Civ.R. 5, and be docketed. This would ensure compliance with the Civil Rules’
requirements for the filing of a motion while also taking into consideration the
jurisdictional requirements of the court when a party seeks to have a court review
an arbitration award.
       {¶ 46} In short, when a party makes its initial filing under R.C. 2711.13, the
procedural components for the filing of a pleading should be allowed (e.g., by
serving the filing with a summons), because the requirements for filing a motion
under the Civil Rules do not account for the process of bringing the matter and the
parties before a common pleas court. Regardless, the Civil Rule that instructs
courts to assess filings based on their content rather than their form should be
followed. See Civ.R. 8(E)(1). Form does not dictate content beyond what the Civil
Rules require.
          III. The Union’s Filing Met the Requirements for a Motion
                                     A. Civ.R. 7(B)(1)
       {¶ 47} Applying the first four requirements for filing a motion to the facts
here demonstrates that the union’s filing complied with Civ.R. 7(B)(1): the union’s
filing (1) was in writing; (2) stated the statutory basis on which the union sought to
have the arbitration award vacated and the alleged facts that would allow the court
to grant an order to vacate, telling the court precisely why the award should be
vacated under R.C. 2711.10; (3) specifically requested an order vacating the
arbitration award; and (4) was served on the adverse party by a process server, with
proof of service separately filed.
       {¶ 48} Because the union’s application was successfully served on the
adverse party and proof of service was docketed, the union’s filing was compliant
with Civ.R. 5(B). The plain language of Civ.R. 5(B)(4) does not require that a




                                            20
                                   January Term, 2024




certificate of service be filed contemporaneously with a motion; instead, proof of
service may be filed separately.
        {¶ 49} As noted by the majority, this court previously stated in Cox v.
Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn., 

, that Civ.R. 5(B) applies to
service requirements for an R.C. 2711.13 motion. See majority opinion at ¶ 13.
While the decision in Cox is not dispositive of either proposition presently before
this court, it should be considered instructive, especially with respect to how we
interpret requirements for the service of an application filed under R.C. 2711.13.
        {¶ 50} In Cox, the party disputing the arbitration award filed a motion in
common pleas court and gave the clerk instructions for serving the motion. This
court declined to consider the proposition of law “which raised the issue of [the
disputing party]’s failure to comply with Civ.R. 5(B)(4).” 

. However,
we recognized that “Civ.R. 5(B)(4) states simply that motions ‘shall not be
considered until proof of service is endorsed thereon or separately filed.’ ” 

. Additionally, we noted that the trial court’s docket showed that the clerk had
sent a copy of the motion to the adverse party and that service had been successful.

        {¶ 51} Here, the union’s filing was served by a process server, along with a
summons. Service was docketed as successful. This service met Civ.R. 5’s
requirements for service of a motion, and there is nothing about the process
undertaken by the union in this case that prevents its filing from being a motion.
Nothing in the Civil Rules states that a motion may not be served with a summons
when it is the initial filing in a civil action.
                                    B. Civ.R. 7(B)(3)
        {¶ 52} Notably, the fifth requirement for filing a motion, which is set forth
in Civ.R. (7)(B)(3)—a subsection that the majority conspicuously fails to discuss—
states, “The rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form of
pleading apply to all motions and other papers provided for by these rules.” So



                                             21
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




with regard to matters of form, the Civil Rules that apply to the filing of pleadings
also apply to the filing of motions.
       {¶ 53} Applying Civ.R. 7(B)(3) to the union’s filing shows the union
followed the rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form for
pleadings. The filing’s caption followed Civ.R. 10(A), which addresses the form
of captions for pleadings. The caption included the names and address of all the
parties; set forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the case number;
and was labeled a “complaint”—denoting it as the initial filing before the common
pleas court. Notably, Civ.R. 7(B)(3) indirectly incorporates Civ.R. 10(A).
       {¶ 54} The majority’s assertion that because the union’s filing is captioned
as a complaint it is therefore a pleading and not a motion does not logically follow
from an application of the Civil Rules. With respect to whether the filing’s
designation as a “complaint” prohibited the court from considering the filing to be
a motion, Civ.R. 7(B)(3) controls, allowing such a caption to be used for a motion
filed under R.C. 2711.13.
       {¶ 55} Lastly, motions are not required to have a strict form, as
demonstrated by Civ.R. 7(B)(3)’s directive that the rules applicable to all “other
matters of form of pleading” are also applicable to motions.
                                  C. Civ.R. 7(B)(4)
       {¶ 56} Regarding the sixth and final requirement for the filing of motions,
Civ.R. 7(B)(3) and (4) overlap—both require the filing to be signed in accordance
with Civ.R. 11. And the union’s filing complied with that requirement.
                                  IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 57} When a party that seeks to dispute or confirm an arbitration award
files an application with a court of common pleas, it does so by motion as statutorily
required. However, the Civil Rules provide broad requirements for the filing of
motions, and in this instance, although the union’s filing requesting review of an
arbitration award did not match perfectly with those rules, it should be read in a




                                          22
                                 January Term, 2024




manner that achieves its substantive purpose—here, challenging the arbitration
award on statutorily defined grounds.
       {¶ 58} As discussed above, the union’s filing, however inartful, met the
statutory requirements of the Arbitration Act and conformed with the Civil Rules.
For these reasons, while I concur in the majority’s holding on the first proposition
of law, I dissent from the majority’s holding on the second proposition of law. I
would reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals in its entirety.
                                _________________
       BRUNNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
       {¶ 59} I agree with the majority opinion’s resolution of the second
proposition of law raised by appellant, the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association (“the union”). I disagree, however, with the majority’s resolution of
the union’s first proposition of law.
       {¶ 60} R.C. 2711.13 provides that after an award is made in an arbitration
proceeding, any party to the arbitration may file a motion in a court of common
pleas seeking to vacate, modify, or correct the award. That statute requires the
movant to serve the motion as follows:


               Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award
       must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three
       months after the award is delivered to the parties in interest, as
       prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action.


(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2711.13. The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure may be
considered to be “as prescribed by law” because the Ohio Constitution invests this
court with the duty of prescribing “rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B). When this court carries out its constitutional



                                         23
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




duty and prescribes or amends the Rules of Civil Procedure, we must, “not later
than the fifteenth day of January,” file such rules and amendments “with the clerk
of each house of the general assembly during a regular session thereof” and file
“amendments to any such proposed rules * * * not later than the first day of May
in that session.” Id. Proposed rules and amendments become effective “on the
following first day of July, unless prior to such day the general assembly adopts a
concurrent resolution of disapproval.” Id. Further, “[a]ll laws in conflict with such
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” Id. It
is not difficult to discern how the Rules of Civil Procedure, having been prescribed
by this court in accordance with Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution, are
“provided by law” as that phrase is used in R.C. 2711.13.
        {¶ 61} Moreover, Civ.R. 5, by its terms, is consistent with the procedure set
out in the final clause of R.C. 2711.13. Civ.R. 5(B)(1) provides:


        Whenever a party is not represented by an attorney, service under
        this rule shall be made upon the party. If a party is represented by
        an attorney, service under this rule shall be made on the attorney
        unless the court orders service on the party.


        {¶ 62} The majority questionably holds that the union did not need to
comply with Civ.R. 5(B)(1) when it sought to vacate an arbitration award. It
ultimately bases its decision on the conclusion that applying Civ.R. 5(B)(1) here
would contradict the express terms of R.C. 2711.13 that permit the movant to serve
“the adverse party or his attorney.” See majority opinion, ¶ 18. That conclusion is
inconsistent with the state Constitution and with what is prescribed by law “for
service of notice of a motion in an action,” R.C. 2711.13. Note that the last sentence
of Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have




                                          24
                                 January Term, 2024




taken effect.” Thus, a party filing a motion under R.C. 2711.13, which was most
recently amended effective August 31, 1976, see H.B. No. 143, 136 Ohio Laws,
Part I, 1585, 1585-1586, is deemed under our state Constitution to be subject to the
requirements of Civ.R. 5(B)(1), the latter having been most recently amended
effective July 1, 2022, see 

.
        {¶ 63} Even more troubling, the majority reaches its conclusion about the
union’s first proposition of law by minimizing the importance of notice and by
likening a party and his or her attorney’s service of a motion filed under R.C.
2711.13 to “the classic after-dinner question, ‘Coffee or tea?,’ ” majority opinion at
¶ 12. Little could be more antithetical to an orderly legal system that guarantees
the substantive right of procedural due process. When the majority reads R.C.
2711.13 as giving the movant a choice of whom to serve, despite later-adopted
Rules of Civil Procedure that provide otherwise and constitutionally survive a
perceived conflict with existing law, the majority ignores the requirements of the
foundational document of Ohio’s government—the Ohio Constitution.                  That
document is the core of this court’s existence and our rules for operation. And
trivializing this grave departure by likening it to the question of a dinner guest being
offered an after-dinner beverage is a disappointing approach for the majority to
take. If a rule that is adopted after a statute is enacted or amended conflicts with
the statute, the statute “shall be of no further force or effect after such rule[] ha[s]
taken effect.” Ohio Const., art. IV, § 5(B).
        {¶ 64} Finally, R.C. 2711.13 does not give the movant an open-ended
choice about whom it must serve. Rather, it creates a duty or an obligation on the
part of the movant to ensure proper service: the movant must serve notice of its
motion “upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award
is delivered to the parties in interest,” R.C. 2711.13. The statute then points to
additional rules that address how the movant’s duty should be carried out: notice
must be given “as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action,”



                                          25
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




R.C. 2711.13.
          {¶ 65} Staying with the example of what to serve after dinner, the following
is a more apropos analogy than that used in the majority opinion: The owner of a
catering company, while training a new employee, instructs the employee as
follows, “As a matter of practice, after serving dinner at an event, you must serve
guests coffee or brandy at least 30 minutes before the end of the event, as prescribed
by the client.” The employee then works at an event where the client tells her, “My
guests can’t drink alcohol for health reasons, so don’t serve brandy.” In that
situation, the average English speaker would understand that the employee could
serve coffee but that if she serves brandy, she will likely be fired.
          {¶ 66} In the above example, the word “or” in the employer’s instruction
permits two alternatives for the employee’s after-dinner service while still allowing
for the possibility that one of those alternatives may not be feasible in a particular
situation, e.g., when the client prescribes that it is not an option. Clearly, the owner
of the catering company was not prescribing to the employee that either choice
would be acceptable to every client. Neither does R.C. 2711.13 prescribe that a
person filing a motion under that statute has the right to choose whether to serve
“the adverse party or his attorney,” especially when that choice is subject to what
is “prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action,” R.C. 2711.13.
Instead, the employee in the analogy and the movant in this matter are both given
an instruction and then told to comply with additional rules when following the
instruction.    In neither situation does the “as prescribed by” issue cause a
contradiction of the initial instruction when by its terms it channels the actor’s
conduct toward a particular alternative (service of coffee, and similarly, service of
notice of a motion on a party’s attorney). It is ludicrous for this court in its
governing role over the professional conduct of attorneys to err in favor of a free-
for-all    for litigation-document service, thereby hindering            the   efficient
administration of justice and fostering “gotcha” scenarios that suborn a lack of fair




                                           26
                                January Term, 2024




process.
       {¶ 67} Civ.R. 5(B)(1) must be observed and followed by a party filing a
motion under R.C. 2711.13. The union’s failure to do so before the deadline set
forth in R.C. 2711.13 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority as it pertains to the resolution
of the union’s first proposition of law and would affirm the judgment of the Eighth
District Court of Appeals for the reasons stated in this dissent.
                                _________________
       Danielle M. Chaffin and Dominic D. Saturday, for appellant.
       Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., George S. Crisci, and Scott H. DeHart, for
appellee.
                                _________________




                                          27