[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
v. Macklin, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

            THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MACKLIN, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
      may be cited as State v. Macklin, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Court of appeals’ judgment reversed on the authority of State v. Williams and State
        v. Taylor and cause remanded.
     (No. 2023-0539―Submitted February 7, 2024―Decided July 17, 2024.)
              APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
                              No. 111117, 

.
                                   __________________
        The below judgment entry of the court was joined by FISCHER, DONNELLY,
STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in judgment only in part
and dissented in part, with an opinion joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ.


        {¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on the authority of
State v. Williams, 

, and State v. Taylor, 

. The
cause is remanded to the court of appeals for that court to analyze appellee
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Dimitrius Macklin’s first assignment of error in accordance with this court’s
analysis in State v. Burns, 

.
                                _________________
       KENNEDY, C.J., joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ., concurring in
judgment only in part and dissenting in part.
       {¶ 2} The question in this case is whether the Eighth District Court of
Appeals correctly held that the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to convict appellee, Dimitrius Macklin, of
conspiracy. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Eighth District’s
judgment must be reversed, but I would not remand this matter for application of
this court’s analysis in State v. Burns, 

. Instead, I would apply the
plain language of the bindover statutes that were in effect at the time of the bindover
in Macklin’s case and hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment
of conviction for conspiracy.
       {¶ 3} Under a mandatory bindover, a juvenile who is alleged to have
committed a qualifying offense and who meets certain age requirements is
transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the common pleas court
(“adult court”) for prosecution. And under the bindover statutes in effect prior to
their amendment in 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, once a case was bound over, the
adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine the case and
convict the juvenile of the offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case and
to convict the juvenile of any other offense that was different from the offense
charged in the complaint filed in juvenile court. See former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2019
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166.
       {¶ 4} But this court in State v. Smith, 

, and in Burns, grafted
new limits onto the straightforward language of the bindover statutes that were
enacted through 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166, which were also in effect when
Macklin’s case was transferred to adult court. In Smith, this court held that an adult


                                          2
                                January Term, 2024




court lacked jurisdiction over charged offenses when the juvenile court found no
probable cause to believe the juvenile had committed those offenses. Smith at ¶ 44.
And in Burns, this court said that an adult court did have jurisdiction over charges
that were not alleged in a juvenile complaint but only if the new charges in adult
court were “rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.”

.
       {¶ 5} Neither of these limitations on an adult court’s jurisdiction appear in
the plain language of former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166. That
statute stated that when a case was transferred from a juvenile court to adult court
for prosecution, the adult court had “jurisdiction . . . to enter a judgment of
conviction . . . against the child for the commission of the offense that was the basis
of the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the conviction [was]
for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the commission
of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another offense that [was]
different from the offense charged.” (Emphasis added.) An adult court was
therefore not deprived of jurisdiction over a charge when the juvenile court had
found no probable cause to believe that the child had committed the charged act.
Nor was an adult court’s jurisdiction limited to charges that were either transferred
by the juvenile court or rooted in the acts alleged in the juvenile complaint. Because
the holdings in Smith and Burns contradict the language enacted by the General
Assembly in 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166, I would overrule those decisions today.
       {¶ 6} Once Macklin’s case was transferred from juvenile court to adult
court, the adult court had jurisdiction to convict him of conspiracy even though that
offense was not charged in the juvenile complaint. Consequently, the court of
appeals erred in holding that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict Macklin
of conspiracy.
       {¶ 7} Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Eighth District and
remand this case to that court with instructions that it affirm the judgment of the


                                          3
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




adult court. For these reasons, I concur in judgment only in part and dissent in part
from the court’s decision today.
                           I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 8} On August 3, 2017, 17-year-old Macklin shot and killed his victim
during an armed robbery that he had planned with three accomplices. Macklin and
his accomplices had lured the victim to the scene by offering on a social-media
website to trade a vehicle.
        {¶ 9} The state filed a complaint in juvenile court charging Macklin with
one count each of aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and having
weapons while under a disability and two counts of aggravated robbery. The
juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Macklin had committed murder,
aggravated robbery, and felonious assault, but it found no probable cause to believe
that he had committed aggravated murder or had had a weapon while under a
disability. It transferred the case to adult court for prosecution.
        {¶ 10} A grand jury indicted Macklin on one count each of aggravated
murder, murder, and felonious assault and two counts of aggravated robbery. It
also charged him with one count of conspiracy, an offense that was not alleged in
the juvenile complaint. The jury acquitted Macklin of aggravated murder and one
count of aggravated robbery but found him guilty of murder, conspiracy, felonious
assault, and the remaining count of aggravated robbery. After merging allied
offenses of similar import, the adult court imposed an aggregate sentence of 25
years to life in prison.
        {¶ 11} The Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part,
vacated it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 

(8th Dist.). Relevant here, applying this court’s holding in Smith, 

,
the court of appeals held that the adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict Macklin
of conspiracy, because the juvenile court had not found probable cause to believe
that Macklin committed that offense. 

 (8th Dist.).


                                           4
                                  January Term, 2024




The Eighth District’s decision does not include remand instructions, but
presumably, the court of appeals remanded the case to the adult court for
resentencing without the conspiracy count.
II. Jurisdiction of Juvenile and Adult Courts over Cases Involving Juveniles
        {¶ 12} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory
power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper,

, ¶ 23.        “‘A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined
without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular
case.’ ” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

, ¶ 19. “Rather,
the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id.
“‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the
parties to it, “. . . the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the decision of every
question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred
. . . .”‘ ” (Ellipses added in Pizza.) Pratts v. Hurley, 

, ¶ 12, quoting
State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 

 (1992), quoting Sheldon’s
Lessee v. Newton, 

, 499 (1854).
        {¶ 13} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he
courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction
over all justiciable matters . . . as may be provided by law.” We have recognized
that the General Assembly has “exclusive authority . . . to allocate certain subject
matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of
common pleas.” State v. Aalim, 

.
        {¶ 14} The General Assembly exercised that authority when it vested in the
juvenile courts “exclusive original jurisdiction,” R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), over cases in
which minors are alleged to be delinquent for committing any act that would be a
criminal offense if committed by an adult, see In re M.P., 

.
However, the legislature created “‘a narrow exception to the general rule that
juvenile courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case involving a


                                            5
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




child.’ ” Aalim at ¶ 2, quoting State v. Wilson, 

 (1995). If a
child is at least 14 but less than 18 years old at the time of the delinquent act and is
alleged to have committed what would be an offense if committed by an adult, the
case may, and sometimes must, be transferred to adult court for prosecution. See
R.C. 2151.23(H), 2152.10, and 2152.12.
        {¶ 15} Effective April 6, 2023, the General Assembly amended the statutes
providing for discretionary and mandatory bindovers to adult court. See 2022
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288. Those amendments do not impact the bindover in this case,
which occurred more than two and a half years earlier, in September 2020.
        {¶ 16} Relevant here, the applicable version of R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i)
provided as follows:


                After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a
        delinquent child for committing an act that would be aggravated
        murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder
        if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer
        the case if . . . [t]he child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at
        the time of the act charged and there is probable cause to believe
        that the child committed the act charged.


(Emphasis added.) 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158.
        {¶ 17} Former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166, stated that
except as provided in R.C. 2152.121, after a case was transferred to adult court for
criminal prosecution, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
or determine the case. Instead, under the former statute, “[t]he court to which the
case [was] transferred for criminal prosecution . . . [had] jurisdiction subsequent to
the transfer to hear and determine the case in the same manner as if the case
originally had been commenced in that court.” 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166.


                                           6
                                 January Term, 2024




Former R.C. 2151.23(H) also specified that the adult court had subject-matter
jurisdiction to accept a plea or a verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction
against the juvenile “for the commission of the offense that was the basis of the
transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the conviction [was] for the
same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the commission of a
lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another offense that [was]
different from the offense charged.” 

        {¶ 18} So once a juvenile’s case was transferred to adult court, the adult
court was the proper forum for the case, and it therefore had subject-matter
jurisdiction over that case, including over offenses that were not initially charged
in the juvenile complaint. Any error in the adult court’s adjudication of the case
after the transfer involved an error in the exercise of jurisdiction over that particular
case, not a defect in the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
                                III. Smith and Burns
        {¶ 19} In Smith, 

, and Burns, 

, we
addressed the application of the bindover statutes that were in effect prior to the
2023 amendments. In Smith, this court stated that “a juvenile court [could] transfer
a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court’s jurisdiction [was] limited to
the acts charged for which probable cause was found.” Smith at ¶ 29. This court
held that “[i]n the absence of a juvenile court’s finding probable cause . . . , no adult
court [had] jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the
juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 44.
        {¶ 20} But in Burns, this court backtracked and clarified that under the
former bindover statutes, “an adult court [was] not necessarily limited to
considering only the specific acts bound over from the juvenile court.” 

. Rather, the court stated that “a case transferred from a juvenile court [could]
result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges [were] rooted
in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically


                                           7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




named in the individual acts transferred.” Id. at ¶ 13. The court in Burns concluded
that the absence of a probable-cause finding in the juvenile court did not preclude
the adult court from exercising jurisdiction over charges based on conduct alleged
in the juvenile complaint, id.; however, this court held that an adult court could not
exercise jurisdiction over charges if the same charges were also included in the
juvenile complaint but found by the juvenile court not to be supported by probable
cause, id. at ¶ 9-10.
        {¶ 21} The problem is that this court departed from the plain language of
the then-applicable bindover statutes when it held in Smith and reiterated in Burns
that a juvenile court’s finding of no probable cause for an offense charged in a
juvenile complaint was a jurisdictional bar to prosecution of the juvenile in adult
court on that charge. See Smith at ¶ 44; 

. And in Burns, this court
added words to former R.C. 2151.23(H) when it held that a juvenile’s indictment
on new charges in adult court was permitted “when the new charges [were] rooted
in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint.” (Emphasis added.)

.
        {¶ 22} This court misstated the law when it held in Smith that an adult court
lacked jurisdiction over charges for which the juvenile court found no probable
cause. Former R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a), 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158, made clear that
what was transferred from a juvenile court to adult court through bindover was “the
case”—not just the charges for which the juvenile court had found probable cause.
Former R.C. 2152.12(I), 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158, further provided that the
following occurred “[u]pon the transfer of a case”:


        The transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect
        to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, and, upon the
        transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall
        be discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be


                                          8
                                 January Term, 2024




       within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred as
       described in [R.C. 2152.23(H)].


(Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166, stated
that “[t]he court to which the case [was] transferred for criminal prosecution
pursuant to [R.C. 2152.12] ha[d] jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and
determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been
commenced in that court.” (Emphasis added.) It is the case that was the focus of
the bindover statutes.
       {¶ 23} A “case” includes a “criminal proceeding, action, suit, or
controversy at law.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019). Additionally,


       [t]he word “action” has typically been understood to refer to the
       entire legal proceeding, regardless of how many claims or charges
       are included in the proceeding. This understanding is consistent
       with common parlance. When we say that someone pursued a legal
       action, we are talking about the entire proceeding, not some discrete
       part of the proceeding.


(Citations omitted.) State v. Craig, 

. In common parlance, a
criminal “case” refers to all the charges that arose from a series of related events.
Therefore, the “case” referred to in former R.C. 2151.23, 2019 Am.Sub.H.B.
No. 166, included all the acts that were charged in the juvenile complaint and the
acts for which the juvenile court made a finding of no probable cause.
       {¶ 24} Contrary to this court’s contention in Smith, 

, former
R.C. 2152.12(I), 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158, did not say that the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court abates only as to the acts charged for which probable cause was
found. Instead, that version of the statute provided that the jurisdiction of a juvenile


                                           9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




court abates regarding all the delinquent acts alleged in the juvenile complaint. And
former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166, clarified that after a
bindover, the juvenile could be charged with and convicted of any offense—even
one that was different from the offense charged in the complaint filed in juvenile
court. That statutory division stated that an adult court’s jurisdiction “includ[ed],
but [was] not limited to, jurisdiction to . . . enter a judgment of conviction . . . ,
whether the conviction [was] for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense
charged, for the commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission of
another offense that [was] different from the offense charged.” (Emphasis added.)
       {¶ 25} This court’s holding in Smith, which was reaffirmed in Burns, 2022-
Ohio-4606—that an adult court may not exercise jurisdiction over charges for
which a juvenile court made a finding of no probable cause—is simply wrong, and
because it is wrong, it should be overruled.
       {¶ 26} This court rewrote the law in Burns by stating that “a case transferred
from a juvenile court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when
the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint
but were not specifically named in the individual acts transferred,” 

.
Although the court in Burns purported to rely on former R.C. 2151.23(H), that
provision did not contain any language limiting new indicted charges to those that
were “rooted in” the acts alleged in the juvenile complaint.
       {¶ 27} Rather, former R.C. 2151.23(H) provided that when a case was
transferred to adult court for prosecution, the adult court had subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case and to convict the juvenile “of the
offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case” or “another offense that [was]
different from the offense charged.” 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 166. By the plain
words of the statute, then, the adult court had the authority to enter a conviction for
an offense that was different from the offense that was the basis of the case’s
transfer to adult court, including an offense that was not rooted in the acts that were


                                          10
                                January Term, 2024




the subject of the juvenile complaint. Burns’s “rooted in” standard is inconsistent
with the language of former—and current—R.C. 2151.23(H) and should be
overruled as well.
           IV. Applying the Correct Law to the Facts of This Case
       {¶ 28} Applying former R.C. 2151.23(H) here demonstrates that the Eighth
District erred in determining that the adult court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
to convict Macklin of conspiracy. The state filed a complaint in juvenile court
alleging that Macklin was a delinquent child for murdering and assaulting his
victim during an aggravated burglary, and the juvenile court found probable cause
to believe that Macklin had committed those offenses. When the juvenile court
transferred the case to adult court and the grand jury indicted Macklin for
aggravated murder, murder, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and conspiracy,
the adult court had jurisdiction to convict him of each of those offenses. That the
state did not allege in the juvenile complaint that Macklin was a delinquent child
for committing conspiracy is of no import, because former R.C. 2151.23(H)
permitted the adult court to convict Macklin of offenses that were different from
those specifically charged in the juvenile complaint.
       {¶ 29} Consequently, the court of appeals erred in holding that the adult
court lacked jurisdiction to convict Macklin of conspiracy.
                                  V. Conclusion
       {¶ 30} Under the bindover statutes in effect prior to the amendments in
2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, when a juvenile’s case was transferred from juvenile
court to adult court for prosecution, the adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction
to convict the juvenile of the offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case
and any other offense that was different from the offense charged in the juvenile
complaint. So although Macklin was not charged with conspiracy in the juvenile
complaint, the adult court had jurisdiction to convict Macklin of that offense.




                                         11
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶ 31} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Eighth
District Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court with instructions to
affirm the judgment of the adult court.
                               _________________
        Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel
T. Van and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
        Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Francis Cavallo,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
        Dave Yost, Attorney General, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Michael
J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Zachery P. Keller, Deputy
Solicitor General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General Dave
Yost.
                               _________________




                                           12