[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

 THE STATE EX REL . PETERSON, APPELLANT , v. MIDAY, JUDGE, APPELLEE .
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday, Slip Opinion No.
                                     

.]
Prohibition—Res judicata was not an appropriate basis to dismiss petition on motion
        to dismiss—Trial-court judge did not patently and unambiguously lack
        jurisdiction over petitioner’s criminal case, and petitioner has or had
        adequate remedies in ordinary course of law to pursue his claims—Court
        of appeals did not abuse its discretion in declaring petitioner to be vexatious
        litigator under its local rules—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.
       (No. 2023-1152—Submitted April 9, 2024—Decided July 18, 2024.)
              APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
                              No. 112792, 

.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ.
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Damien L. Peterson, appeals the Eighth District Court of
Appeals’ judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of prohibition against appellee,
Judge Sherrie Miday of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The
appellate court found that Peterson’s claims were barred by res judicata. It also
denied Peterson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and declared him to be a
vexatious litigator under its local rules.
        {¶ 2} We affirm the Eighth District’s judgment, but for reasons different
from those of the Eighth District. We also affirm its decisions denying Peterson’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings and declaring him to be a vexatious litigator
under that court’s local rules.
                    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 3} Peterson was convicted of multiple felonies in November 2019.
According to the Eighth District, the convictions stemmed from four armed
robberies that were committed in the Cleveland area in March and April 2019. See
State v. Peterson, 

 (8th Dist.) (Peterson’s direct appeal from
those convictions). In April 2019, Peterson was arrested by Shaker Heights Police
Department officers and charged in the Shaker Heights Municipal Court with one
count of aggravated robbery. He was subsequently indicted by a grand jury, and
his case was transferred to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.
Following a bench trial, Peterson was convicted and sentenced to a prison term of
39 to 41.5 years.
        {¶ 4} In May 2023, Peterson petitioned the Eighth District for a writ of
prohibition. Peterson amended his petition, alleging that Judge Miday never
obtained jurisdiction over his case because:
    •   The Shaker Heights Municipal Court never held a preliminary hearing;




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                                January Term, 2024




   •   The Shaker Heights Municipal Court never issued a bindover order
transferring his case to Judge Miday;
   •   The Shaker Heights Municipal Court retained jurisdiction over his case
under the jurisdictional-priority rule; and
   •   Peterson was arrested “without an active arrest warrant.”
       {¶ 5} Based on those allegations, Peterson argued that Judge Miday
patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over his case. Peterson asked the
appellate court to issue the writ to prevent Judge Miday from exercising any
jurisdiction over his criminal case, and he asked the court to “[c]orrect and vacate”
the judge’s orders finding him guilty and imposing his sentence and to dismiss the
“invalid indictment” against him.
       {¶ 6} Judge Miday filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, arguing
that she had jurisdiction over Peterson’s case. She also argued that Peterson’s
claims concerning his arrest, the municipal court’s failure to hold a preliminary
hearing, and the lack of a bindover order either lacked merit or could not be raised
in a petition for an extraordinary writ because he had adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of the law through appeal. Regarding Peterson’s jurisdictional-
priority-rule claim, Judge Miday argued that the rule was inapplicable to Peterson’s
case because the municipal court had dismissed the charges against him.
       {¶ 7} In response to the judge’s motion, Peterson filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, citing Civ.R. 12(C) and (H)(2). Peterson argued in that
motion that because Judge Miday’s motion to dismiss did not specifically present
any argument under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) through (7), she had failed to state a legal
defense. Peterson also contended that he was entitled to judgment in his favor
because the judge’s motion to dismiss conceded that the municipal court never
bound him over to the court of common pleas.
       {¶ 8} In August 2023, the Eighth District issued a decision granting Judge
Miday’s motion to dismiss. 

, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). The appellate court



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                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




found that Peterson’s prohibition claims were barred by res judicata because
“[e]ach of the four claims raised by Peterson, in support of his complaint for
prohibition, [were] previously raised [in that] court and found to be without any
merit.” Id. at ¶ 4. The appellate court also rejected Peterson’s claim that Judge
Miday lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case. Id. at ¶ 6. Finally, based on
Peterson’s repeating the same arguments to the appellate court, the court sua sponte
declared him to be a vexatious litigator under its local rules, setting conditions for
his pursuit of any further original actions in that court. Id. at ¶ 7. The court
summarily denied Peterson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a separate
order.
         {¶ 9} Peterson filed this appeal as of right.
                                    II. ANALYSIS
                                A. Writ of prohibition
         {¶ 10} This court reviews the Eighth District’s judgment of dismissal de
novo. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 

. Dismissal of a
complaint “is appropriate if, after all factual allegations of the complaint are
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor, it appears
beyond doubt that relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief.” Clark v.
Connor, 

 (1998).
         {¶ 11} Three elements must be met for a writ of prohibition to issue: (1) the
exercise of judicial power, (2) the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and
(3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.
Elder v. Camplese, 

. However, if the absence of the lower
court’s jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the petitioner need not establish the
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Sapp v.
Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 

, ¶ 15.




                                            4
                                   January Term, 2024




B. The Eighth District’s conclusion that res judicata barred Peterson’s claims was
                                       erroneous
         {¶ 12} Under his first proposition of law, Peterson argues that the Eighth
District erred by dismissing his petition based on res judicata. This argument has
merit.
         {¶ 13} The appellate court dismissed Peterson’s petition in granting Judge
Miday’s motion to dismiss. 

 at ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). This court has held
that it is generally inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss based on res judicata,
because it is an affirmative defense. State ex rel. West v. McDonnell, 2014-Ohio-
1562, ¶ 16. As such, res judicata was not an appropriate basis to dismiss Peterson’s
petition on a motion to dismiss.
         {¶ 14} Even though Peterson is correct that the Eighth District’s rationale for
dismissing his petition was incorrect, “a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse
a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis
thereof,” State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle, 

 (1998). As discussed
below, Peterson has failed to show that Judge Miday patently and unambiguously
lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case. He also has or had adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of the law to pursue his claims.
   C. Judge Miday does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over
   Peterson’s criminal case, and Peterson has or had adequate remedies in the
                    ordinary course of the law to pursue his claims
         {¶ 15} The central premise of Peterson’s prohibition petition is that Judge
Miday patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case.
Peterson seems to argue that any of the errors alleged in his petition completely
divest Judge Miday of jurisdiction over his criminal case, obviating his burden to
show that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
         {¶ 16} This court has held that “the court of common pleas is a court of
general jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all matters at



                                           5
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




law and in equity that are not denied to it.’ ” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-
Ohio-4275, ¶ 20, quoting Saxton v. Seiberling, 

, 558-559 (1891).
R.C. 2931.03 grants the courts of common pleas “original jurisdiction of all crimes
and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which
is vested in courts inferior to the court[s] of common pleas.” “[W]hen [this court
has] found that a court of common pleas patently and unambiguously lacks
jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly removed that
jurisdiction.” Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 

(citing cases).
          {¶ 17} Here, Peterson cites no statute or other authority that explicitly
removes Judge Miday’s jurisdiction over his criminal case. Both his amended
petition and his brief in this court cite R.C. 1901.20(B), which grants the municipal
courts “jurisdiction to hear felony cases committed within [their] territor[ies].”
However, nothing in that statute explicitly (or even implicitly) removes jurisdiction
over such cases from the courts of common pleas. More to the point, the statute
grants the municipal courts limited jurisdiction over felony cases, stating:


          In all felony cases, the [municipal] court may conduct preliminary
          hearings and other necessary hearings prior to the indictment of the
          defendant or prior to the court’s finding that there is probable and
          reasonable cause to hold or recognize the defendant to appear before
          a court of common pleas and may discharge, recognize, or commit
          the defendant.


Id.; see also Independence v. Ismail, 

 (8th Dist.) (noting that
under R.C. 1901.20(B), the municipal courts have limited jurisdiction over felony
cases).




                                           6
                                  January Term, 2024




        {¶ 18} Peterson also invokes the jurisdictional-priority rule to question
Judge Miday’s jurisdiction.       See State ex rel. Consortium for Economic &
Community Dev. for Hough Ward 7 v. Russo, 

 (under certain
circumstances, writ of prohibition is an available remedy to enforce the
jurisdictional-priority rule). But his argument still fails because the Shaker Heights
Municipal Court and the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas are not courts
of concurrent jurisdiction.
        {¶ 19} The jurisdictional-priority rule provides, “‘As between [state] courts
of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the
institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other
tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the
parties.’ ” (Bracketed text added in Dunlap.) State ex rel. Dunlap v. Sarko, 2013-
Ohio-67, ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar, 

 (1977),
syllabus. “[T]he jurisdictional priority rule does not apply when ‘the conflict of
jurisdiction is between a court of general jurisdiction and one whose limited powers
are inadequate to afford full relief to the parties.’ ” Kinzel v. Ebner, 2020-Ohio-
4165, ¶ 86 (6th Dist.), quoting Scott v. Dohse, 

 (2d Dist.). “It
is well established that municipal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and their
jurisdictional limitations are set by statute.” Cleveland Hous. Renewal Project, Inc.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 

, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).
        {¶ 20} Because the Shaker Heights Municipal Court is a court of limited
jurisdiction, the kind of jurisdictional conflict that the jurisdictional-priority rule is
designed to address never existed in this case. And because there was never a
jurisdictional conflict between the municipal court and the court of common pleas,
the jurisdictional-conflict rule provides no basis to find that Judge Miday patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.
        {¶ 21} Peterson raised three other claims challenging his convictions: (1) he
was arrested without a warrant, (2) the municipal court did not conduct a



                                            7
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




preliminary hearing, and (3) he was not bound over to the court of common pleas.
Unlike the jurisdictional-priority rule, none of these claims implicates Judge
Miday’s general jurisdiction. Regarding Peterson’s claims that he never received
a preliminary hearing and that there was no bindover order, those are procedural
issues, not jurisdictional. See State ex rel. Barnette v. Hill, 

.
His alleged warrantless arrest also would not affect Judge Miday’s jurisdiction. See
State ex rel. Davis v. Sloan, 

 (11th Dist.).
          {¶ 22} Because Judge Miday does not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction over Peterson’s criminal case, a writ of prohibition will not issue unless
Peterson can show that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. See Elder, 

. “An appeal is considered an adequate
remedy that will preclude a writ of prohibition.” State ex rel. Huntington Natl.
Bank v. Kontos, 

. Each of Peterson’s remaining claims can
be raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 

 (warrantless
arrest); State v. Coleman, 

 (12th Dist.) (failure to conduct
a preliminary hearing); State v. Parker, 

 (2d Dist.) (challenge
to bindover process); State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove, 

, ¶ 5 (“In the
absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal”).
          {¶ 23} Peterson has failed to show that Judge Miday patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case. Further, he has or had
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law through appeal to address his
claims.
 D. The Eighth District correctly denied Peterson’s motion for judgment on the
                                      pleadings
          {¶ 24} Under his second proposition of law, Peterson argues that the Eighth
District erred by denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings. But since we



                                           8
                                  January Term, 2024




affirm the Eighth District’s judgment because Peterson failed to show that he is
entitled to a writ of prohibition, we need not address the ruling on Peterson’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
  E. The Eighth District did not abuse its discretion by declaring Peterson to be a
                        vexatious litigator under its local rules
        {¶ 25} Peterson also appeals the Eighth District’s sua sponte decision
declaring him to be a vexatious litigator under that court’s local rules. The appellate
court found that Peterson had “persistently and without any legal basis attempted to
litigate the claims of improper bindover, trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
a preliminary hearing . . . .” 

 at ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). This was based on
two appeals that Peterson had filed in the Eighth District, an application to reopen his
direct appeal that Peterson had filed in the Eighth District, a procedendo petition that
Peterson had filed against Judge Miday in the Eighth District, and a habeas corpus
petition that Peterson had filed in the Ninth District Court of Appeals. 

 at ¶ 4-5
and fn. 1. Peterson is now required to seek the Eighth District’s leave before filing
an original action in that court. Id. at ¶ 7.
        {¶ 26} Under Eighth Dist.Loc.R. 23(B), “[i]f a party habitually, persistently,
and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct under division (A) of this
rule, the Eighth District Court of Appeals may, sua sponte or on motion by a party,
find the party to be a vexatious litigator.” “An appeal, original action, or motion shall
be considered frivolous if it is not reasonably well-grounded in fact, or warranted by
existing law, or by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.” Eighth Dist.Loc.R. 23(A). This court reviews “a vexatious-
litigator determination for an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Newell v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 

, citing State ex rel. Lisboa v.
Fuerst, 

.
        {¶ 27} Although the appellate court’s decision was based on only five
previous cases that Peterson filed over three years, we have held that “our



                                                9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




assessment of a litigant’s vexatiousness is not based solely on the number of cases
he has filed but also on the repetitiveness of the arguments raised,” State ex rel.
Johnson v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 

. The appellate
court accurately noted that Peterson’s claims in this case reiterated claims he made
in prior unsuccessful appeals and original actions. See Peterson, 

 (8th Dist.) (appeal alleging defective criminal complaint and improper
denial of preliminary hearing); State v. Peterson, 

 (8th Dist.)
(application to reopen direct appeal alleging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failure to raise issues of defective preliminary hearing and lack of
jurisdiction of the court of common pleas); State v. Peterson, 

(8th Dist.) (appeal alleging the court of common pleas lacks jurisdiction because
there was no bindover from the municipal court); State ex rel. Peterson v. Miday,

 (8th Dist.) (procedendo action alleging multiple defects in
criminal complaint, resulting in lack of jurisdiction of the court of common pleas,
and the municipal court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing); Peterson v.
Foley, 

 (9th Dist.) (habeas corpus action alleging, among other
things, improper bindover to the court of common pleas).
       {¶ 28} On the facts in this case, we cannot say that the Eighth District
abused its discretion in declaring Peterson to be a vexatious litigator under its local
rules. See AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 

 (1990) (for purposes of finding abuse of discretion,
“[i]t is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo,
would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of
countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result”). The
Eighth District found that the common thread in Peterson’s litigation history is his
contention that the transfer of his case from the municipal court to the court of
common pleas was flawed and deprived Judge Miday of jurisdiction over the case
and voided his convictions. Courts have consistently rejected his arguments, but



                                          10
                               January Term, 2024




Peterson has continued to present them in appeals and original actions. Although
Peterson’s arguments may have originally been made in good faith, they have been
rendered frivolous by the courts’ repeated rejection of them. As such, we hold that
the Eighth District did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Peterson,
through his repeated filings, habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause
engaged in frivolous conduct, and we affirm the Eighth District’s decision declaring
Peterson to be a vexatious litigator under Eighth Dist.Loc.R. 23(B).
                              III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Eight District Court of
Appeals’ judgment dismissing Peterson’s petition for a writ of prohibition, but we
do so on the bases that Judge Miday does not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction over Peterson’s criminal case and Peterson has or had adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of the law to pursue his claims. We also affirm the
appellate court’s denial of Peterson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and its
decision declaring him to be a vexatious litigator under Eighth Dist.Loc.R. 23(B).
                                                                Judgment affirmed.
                               _________________
       Damien L. Peterson, pro se.
       Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James
E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                               _________________




                                        11