[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Snodgrass v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                            NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                           SLIP OPINION NO. 

SNODGRASS, AUD., APPELLANT, v. HARRIS,1 TAX COMMR., ET AL., APPELLEES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as Snodgrass v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Taxation—Public-utility property—R.C. 5703.05(C), read in pari materia with
         R.C. 5717.02(A), precludes the right of a county auditor to appeal tax
         commissioner’s final determination setting forth values agreed on in
         settlement agreement but does not preclude county auditor’s right to appeal
         whether settlement agreement constitutes a valid legal settlement—Board
         of Tax Appeals’ decision dismissing county auditor’s appeal affirmed.
   (No. 2023-0354—Submitted October 24, 2023—Decided August 20, 2024.)
     APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2022-1247 and 2022-1296.
                                    _________________




1. When this case was filed, Sarah O’Leary was the interim tax commissioner. Patricia Harris is the
current tax commissioner, and we have automatically substituted her for O’Leary as an appellee in
this case. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B) and Civ.R. 25(D)(1).
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       DEWINE, J., authored the opinion of the court, which DONNELLY, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., dissented, with an opinion joined by
KENNEDY, C.J., and STEWART, J.


       DEWINE, J.
       {¶ 1} This case involves the tax valuation of a pipeline that runs through 13
Ohio counties. After the Ohio Tax Commissioner established a valuation for the
pipeline, the pipeline’s owner exercised its right to appeal that valuation to the
Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). That appeal was resolved through a settlement
agreement between the tax commissioner and the pipeline’s owner. The tax
commissioner issued a final determination setting forth the valuation of the pipeline
that had been agreed on in the settlement. The auditor of one of the counties in the
pipeline’s territory, Lorain County, was dissatisfied with the settlement and
appealed the tax commissioner’s final determination to the BTA. The gist of the
county auditor’s argument on appeal was that the tax commissioner had failed to
follow the appropriate statutory criteria in rendering the valuation of the property.
       {¶ 2} In the proceeding below, the BTA dismissed the county auditor’s
appeal on the basis that the matter had been resolved through the settlement
agreement. The county auditor now appeals the BTA’s decision to this court.
       {¶ 3} To resolve this case, we must reconcile two statutes. R.C. 5703.05(C)
(“the tax-commissioner-settlement statute”) empowers the tax commissioner to
compromise a tax dispute. R.C. 5717.02 (“the tax-appeal statute”) authorizes an
appeal of a final determination of the tax commissioner by the county auditors of
the counties to which the revenues from a tax would primarily accrue. So, the
question here is what happens when the tax commissioner settles a claim but then
a county auditor attempts to undo that settlement through an appeal?
       {¶ 4} We answer this question by applying the familiar rule of statutory
construction that statutes in pari materia—that is, statutes relating to the same




                                          2
                                       January Term, 2024




subject matter—should be construed together. Thus, a county auditor may appeal
a result that has been reached through a settlement, but that appeal is subject to the
tax commissioner’s authority to compromise a tax claim. In other words, a county
auditor may not challenge on appeal the substance of the compromise that has been
reached by the tax commissioner. Here, this means that we affirm the decision of
the BTA.
                                   The Proceedings Below
         {¶ 5} Nexus Gas Transmission, L.L.C., owns and operates a gas-
transmission pipeline that stretches across northern Ohio. The tax commissioner
issued a final determination assigning a true value of $1,620,358,699 to the pipeline
for tax year 2019. Nexus filed an appeal to the BTA. Nexus argued that the tax
commissioner erred by failing to make certain downward adjustments to the value
of the property and that its true value for 2019 was $615,695,340. Nexus and the
tax commissioner engaged in discovery and obtained experts to support their
proposed valuations. But ultimately rather than litigate the appeal to resolution, the
tax commissioner and Nexus entered into a settlement agreement, which
established a 2019 true value of $950,000,000 and also resolved their ongoing
dispute about the valuation for tax years 2020 and 2021. To implement the
settlement, the tax commissioner issued a new final determination setting forth the
values in the settlement agreement.
         {¶ 6} J. Craig Snodgrass, the auditor of Lorain County, filed an appeal.2
The auditor in his notice of appeal asked the BTA to reinstate the tax
commissioner’s pre-settlement determination of a $1,620,358,699 true value. He
asserted that the tax commissioner had committed various errors in applying the
statutory criteria set forth in R.C. 5727.11(A) for determining the valuation of a


2. The auditors of eight other counties in the pipeline’s territory, along with two affected school
districts, have filed an amicus brief with this court asking us to affirm the BTA’s decision and uphold
the settlement agreement reached by the tax commissioner and Nexus.




                                                  3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




public utility’s property. That division provides that, except as otherwise provided,
“the true value of all taxable property . . . shall be determined by a method of
valuation using cost as capitalized on the public utility’s books and records less
composite annual allowances as prescribed by the commissioner.” 

 But the
provision further provides that “[i]f the commissioner finds that application of this
method will not result in the determination of true value of the public utility’s
taxable property, the commissioner may use another method of valuation.” 

       {¶ 7} The issues that the county auditor raised in his notice of appeal to the
BTA related solely to the tax commissioner’s application of the tax-valuation
statute. In the county auditor’s first two claimed errors, he asserted that the tax
commissioner’s final determination rejected the statutory-based formula for
determining the value of the pipeline; in the third, fourth, and fifth claimed errors,
he argued that the methods used in the final determination were “unreasonable and
unlawful”; in his sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth claimed errors, he contended that
the final determination was erroneous and unreasonable because it relied on
incorrect information and values; and finally, in the tenth and final claimed error,
he asserted that due to the first nine errors, the final determination erroneously
understated the taxable value of Nexus’s Ohio property by roughly $580,000,000
each tax year. In other words, the case that the auditor sought to present on appeal
was that notwithstanding the fact that the commissioner’s final determination was
the product of a settlement, the determination was illegal because it did not comport
with the statutory formulation. The county auditor’s appeal did not allege that the
final determination was inconsistent with the settlement agreement, that the
settlement agreement was invalid, or that the tax commissioner lacked authority to
enter into the agreement. The auditor simply asked the BTA to resolve the case in
the same way that it would have had there been no settlement at all.
       {¶ 8} Nexus moved to dismiss the county auditor’s appeal. Among other
things, Nexus argued that the county auditor’s appeal was moot because the




                                          4
                                January Term, 2024




valuation dispute had been resolved through its settlement agreement with the tax
commissioner. Nexus contended that the county auditor failed to challenge the
settlement contract in his notice of appeal and instead raised claims “exclusively
related to the now-defunct (i.e., moot) valuation dispute.”
       {¶ 9} The BTA granted the motion to dismiss. BTA Nos. 2022-1296 and
2022-1247, 

 (Feb. 9, 2023). It held that although the county
auditor was not expressly bound to the settlement agreement, “that does not
necessarily mean that he can seek an alternative valuation from this Board through
an appeal for those years for which a value was stipulated.” Id. at *4. The tribunal
found that the auditor’s appeal was moot because there was no longer a live issue
or controversy. Id. at *5-6. It explained that the controversy in this case was the
valuation of the pipeline and that the controversy ended when the tax commissioner
entered into the settlement agreement with Nexus and resolved the valuation issue
by issuing a final determination setting forth the agreed values in the settlement
agreement. Id. at *5. The BTA further noted that “there is no argument that the
Commissioner acted beyond her authority” in reaching the settlement. Id. It also
explained that because the county auditor had not participated in Nexus’s appeal of
the tax commissioner’s initial final determination, he could not now complain about
the settlement that resolved the appeal. Id.
                              The Statutory Scheme
       {¶ 10} This case requires that we reconcile two statutory provisions: the
tax-commissioner-settlement statute, which empowers the tax commissioner to
compromise a tax dispute, and the tax-appeal statute, which allows a county auditor
to appeal a final determination of the tax commissioner. So, we begin our analysis
with those two statutes.
       {¶ 11} Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution mandates that all
personal property be taxed according to its “true value in money.” To satisfy this
mandate, the General Assembly granted the tax commissioner the “exclusive power



                                         5
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




to value and assess public utility property.” Toledo Edison Co. v. Galvin, 

 (1974) (construing R.C. Ch. 5727).               This requires the tax
commissioner, under R.C. 5727.10, to annually determine “the true value in money
of all taxable property”—including public utility property—in accordance with
R.C. 5727.06.
        {¶ 12} The General Assembly vests the tax commissioner with “all powers,
duties, and functions of the department of taxation.” R.C. 5703.05. Among these
powers is the authority “to consent[] to the compromise and settlement of tax
claims” on behalf of the State of Ohio. R.C. 5703.05(C). The commissioner “has
authority to compromise and settle a tax claim.” Storey v. Limbach, 

, *16 (7th Dist. Feb. 17, 1995).
        {¶ 13} A county auditor’s right to appeal arises from the tax-appeal statute.
That statute provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, appeals from
final determinations by the tax commissioner” may be taken to the BTA by, among
others, “the county auditors of the counties to the undivided general tax funds of
which the revenues affected by that decision would primarily accrue.” R.C.
5717.02(A).
                          Harmonizing the Two Statutes
        {¶ 14} The question in this case is how we reconcile the tax commissioner’s
authority to value property and compromise tax claims with a county auditor’s
authority to appeal a final determination of the tax commissioner. The county
auditor essentially asserts that his right to appeal is absolute. In the county auditor’s
view, it doesn’t matter that the tax commissioner has entered into a contract on
behalf of the State of Ohio that settles a dispute—a county auditor can challenge
that settlement on appeal and argue that the settlement is improper because it does
not achieve the result that would have been obtained had the matter been fully
litigated. Under this view, an objecting county auditor essentially holds a trump




                                           6
                                 January Term, 2024




card that allows the auditor to undo any settlement entered into by the tax
commissioner.
       {¶ 15} To accept the county auditor’s position would require that we
privilege the auditor’s statutory right to appeal over the commissioner’s statutory
authority to settle claims. By its nature, a settlement agreement prevents future
litigation about the merits of the claims that have been resolved.          See, e.g.,
Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 

 (1996) (“It is axiomatic that a settlement agreement is a
contract designed to terminate a claim by preventing or ending litigation and that
such agreements are valid and enforceable by either party.”).          “A settlement
agreement supersedes and extinguishes all preexisting claims the parties intended
to settle.” 15B Am.Jur.2d, Compromise and Settlement, § 24, at 168 (2021).
       {¶ 16} Adopting the county auditor’s view would effectively read out of the
Revised Code the tax commissioner’s authority to settle claims, at least in situations
where a county auditor objects to the settlement. After all, if the tax commissioner’s
authority to settle claims on behalf of the State is subject to the right of a county
auditor to appeal that settlement, then the tax commissioner does not have the right
to settle claims. To allow an appeal of what has been compromised means that
there is no compromise.
       {¶ 17} Because there is no textual basis in the statutes to support such a
reading, we are hesitant to read the provisions in a manner that would favor the
county auditor’s statutory authority over the tax commissioner’s statutory authority.
The doctrine of in pari materia holds that statutes relating to the same subject matter
should, if possible, be construed harmoniously. State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

 (1995); see Scalia & Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252-255 (2012). We use this doctrine to
reconcile provisions relating to the same subject. See State ex rel. Cordray v.
Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 

. The doctrine assumes that



                                          7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




because a statutory provision is part of an entire body of law, “if possible, [the
provision] should no more be interpreted to clash with the rest of the corpus than it
should be interpreted to clash with other provisions of the same law.” Scalia &
Garner at 252.
        {¶ 18} In this case, we cannot read either statute standing alone because
they point in opposite directions. One statute gives a county auditor the right to
appeal; the other denies a county auditor the right to appeal by allowing the tax
commissioner to settle claims. To read either statute standing alone would negate
the other.
        {¶ 19} Thus, rather than treat this case as an either/or proposition, to
correctly interpret the statutory scheme, we must give effect to both provisions—
that is, to understand the auditor’s right to appeal under the tax-appeal statute in
light of the commissioner’s right to settle claims under the tax-commissioner-
settlement statute. When we do so, this becomes a fairly easy case.
        {¶ 20} When the two statutes are harmonized, the General Assembly’s
statutory design becomes apparent. The tax-appeal statute allows a county auditor
to appeal a final determination to the BTA. The tax-commissioner-settlement
statute empowers the commissioner to resolve a tax dispute through a settlement
agreement. In this case, the tax commissioner adopted the settlement agreement as
a final determination, so the county auditor has the right to appeal that final
determination under the tax-appeal statute. But the scope of that appeal is limited.
        {¶ 21} The county auditor may not appeal the agreed value or the legal
issues compromised through settlement because this would render the tax
commissioner’s power to settle meaningless, undermining the General Assembly’s
statutory design. By its very nature, a settlement precludes what the county auditor
attempts to do here—replace the compromise with a litigated result.           See 1
Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments, § 24 and 27 (1982); see also Walther v.
Walther, 

 (1st Dist. 1995) (“Neither a change of heart nor




                                         8
                                 January Term, 2024




poor legal advice is a ground to set aside a settlement agreement.”); O’Neill v.
Showa Denko K.K., 

 (8th Dist. 1995) (cross-claimant
could not reopen codefendants’ settlement with plaintiff to prove plaintiff’s liability,
because such an act would “defeat the . . . finality of settlement agreements”).
Indeed, a settlement agreement ordinarily may not be challenged apart from claims
of fraud, duress, overreaching, undue influence, or disputes over the meaning or
application of the settlement’s terms. See Richmond v. Evans, 

,
¶ 21-22 (8th Dist.).
       {¶ 22} But that does not mean that a county auditor will never be able to
appeal a settlement. A county auditor may raise issues on appeal that are not
inconsistent with the tax commissioner’s statutory authority to settle claims. For
example, a county auditor might argue on appeal that a settlement agreement is void
because it was entered into as a result of fraud or duress. A county auditor might
argue that the tax commissioner’s final determination did not accurately reflect the
terms of the settlement. Indeed, one can imagine a host of possible issues that might
be raised that do not depend on undoing what was agreed to in the settlement, but
rather assert that the final determination was not the result of a lawful settlement.
       {¶ 23} The dissent misunderstands this point saying that it is logically
inconsistent to allow a county auditor to challenge a settlement based on fraud but
not on the essence of the compromise itself. See dissenting opinion, ¶ 67. What
the dissent misses is that the latter challenges what has been compromised while
the former challenges whether the matter has been legally compromised. See 26
Lord, Williston on Contracts, § 69:1, at 497 (4th Ed. 2019) (“One who has been
fraudulently induced to enter into a contract has not assented to the agreement since
the fraudulent conduct precludes the requisite mutual assent”). It is perfectly
consistent to hold that the tax commissioner’s authority to settle a claim precludes
the right of a county auditor to appeal what has been compromised in the settlement




                                           9
                               SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




agreement while not precluding the right to appeal whether the settlement
agreement constitutes a valid legal settlement.
          {¶ 24} Such a result is in accord with the tax-appeal statute. The statute by
its terms allows the appeal of a “final determination” of the tax commissioner; it
does not allow for an appeal of a tax commissioner’s settlement or a compromise.
Here, the final determination simply recited the compromise that had been agreed
on. Thus, the county auditor could challenge that final determination by arguing
that it did not accurately reflect the compromise or that there had been no
compromise at all because of fraud, duress, or some other such reason. But the
county auditor could not challenge the essence of the compromise itself because to
do so would be inconsistent with the tax commissioner’s authority to settle tax
claims.
          {¶ 25} Harmonizing the two statutes in this manner not only finds support
in the in pari materia doctrine, but also in the language of the tax-appeal statute.
Recall that the tax-appeal statute provides the county auditor a right to appeal
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” R.C. 5717.02(A). The law otherwise
provides that the tax commissioner has the authority to settle claims. The “except
as otherwise provided by law” verbiage recognizes that the county auditor’s right
to appeal is not unlimited but rather subject to limitations, such as the tax
commissioner’s settlement authority.
          {¶ 26} Ignoring the “except as otherwise provided by law” language, the
county auditor and the dissent assert that if the General Assembly intended to limit
a county auditor’s right to appeal settlements that have been reduced to a final
determination by the tax commissioner, it would have said so in the tax-appeal
statute. But that argument proves too much. One could just as easily say that if the
General Assembly intended to make the tax commissioner’s authority to settle
subject to a county auditor’s right to appeal, it would have said so in the tax-




                                           10
                                 January Term, 2024




commissioner-settlement statute. But the General Assembly did not write such
language into either statute. Thus, our duty is to apply the meaning of both statutes.
                       We Affirm the Decision of the BTA
       {¶ 27} The BTA dismissed this case on the theory that the challenges raised
by the auditor of Lorain County were moot because the tax commissioner had
settled the valuation issue. The county auditor argues that the case is not moot
because a live controversy continues to exist regarding the proper valuation of the
pipeline.
       {¶ 28} But regardless of whether this case is technically moot, the BTA
reached the correct result. In his notice of appeal, the only issues that the county
auditor raised concerned the appropriate methodology for valuation of the pipeline.
Because these disputes had been resolved in the tax commissioner’s settlement
agreement with Nexus, they could not be relitigated on appeal. Thus, the BTA
properly dismissed the appeal.
       {¶ 29} We affirm the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision dismissing the county
auditor’s appeal.
                                                                  Decision affirmed.
                               __________________
       FISCHER, J., joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and STEWART, J., dissenting.
       {¶ 30} The majority opinion alleges to resolve this case with an in pari
materia reading of two statutes. Unfortunately, that reading fails in many ways.
       {¶ 31} Appellant, Lorain County Auditor J. Craig Snodgrass, appeals a
decision by the Board of Tax Appeals dismissing his appeal from the final
determination by appellee tax commissioner. That final determination sets forth,
for the purpose of Ohio’s public-utility personal-property tax, see R.C. Ch. 5727,
the taxable value of the personal property of appellee Nexus Gas Transmission,
L.L.C., for the 2019, 2020, and 2021 tax years. This case is rather unusual, and the
resolution set forth in the majority opinion fails to correctly address this important



                                         11
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




factor, i.e., that the final determination did not arise from a contested administrative
proceeding between the tax commissioner and Nexus, but, rather, the tax
commissioner and Nexus negotiated a settlement agreement, parts of which the tax
commissioner then adopted in the final determination.
        {¶ 32} Although Ohio law generally authorizes a county auditor to appeal a
final determination when the tax revenues at issue would primarily accrue to the
county in which the county auditor serves, see R.C. 5717.02(A), the board agreed
with Nexus that the final determination entered by the tax commissioner was not
appealable by Snodgrass. Among other things, the board reasoned that because the
final determination arose from a settlement agreement, a live issue was no longer
presented, thereby rendering Snodgrass’s appeal moot.
        {¶ 33} Snodgrass’s principal argument here is that the board’s decision
effectively nullifies his statutory right to appeal the tax commissioner’s final
determination. I agree. Accordingly, I would reverse the board’s decision and
remand the cause to the board for further proceedings.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                              A. Statutory background
        {¶ 34} Ohio law vests “exclusive power” in the tax commissioner to “value
and assess public utility property.” Toledo Edison Co. v. Galvin, 

 (1974) (construing R.C. Ch. 5727). In doing so, the tax commissioner
must annually determine the “true value in money of all taxable property” of a
public utility in accordance with R.C. 5727.06 and the “total taxable value of such
property” in accordance with R.C. 5727.111. R.C. 5727.10. The tax commissioner
must generally use a cost-capitalization method to determine true value but may
depart from this method if it does “not result in the determination of true value of
the public utility’s taxable property.” R.C. 5727.11(A); see also Texas E. Transm.
Corp. v. Tracy, 

 (1997). In arriving at the taxable value of
a public utility’s property, the tax commissioner applies a specified percentage to




                                          12
                                January Term, 2024




her true-value determination. R.C. 5727.111. In the case of a pipeline company,
the statute prescribes 88 percent as the percentage to apply. R.C. 5727.111(D). For
a public utility whose taxable property is located in one taxing district, the tax
commissioner must “apportion the total taxable value thereof to that taxing
district.” R.C. 5727.15. But when a public utility has taxable property located in
more than one taxing district, the tax commissioner must “apportion the total
taxable value thereof among the taxing districts” according to law. 

       {¶ 35} The tax commissioner must annually assess a public utility’s taxable
property, and this “action . . . shall be evidenced by a preliminary assessment that
reflects the taxable value apportioned to each county and each taxing district in the
county.” R.C. 5727.23. Unless the public utility files a petition for reassessment,
the preliminary assessment becomes final. 

 But if the public utility files a
petition for reassessment under R.C. 5727.47, then “the assessment shall become
final when the tax commissioner issues a final determination.” R.C. 5727.23. The
tax commissioner must serve a copy of her final determination on the public utility
and “the applicable county auditor.” R.C. 5727.47(E). Under Ohio law, “appeals
from final determinations by the tax commissioner . . . may be taken to the board
of tax appeals by the taxpayer . . . or by the county auditors of the counties to the
undivided general tax funds of which the revenues affected by that decision would
primarily accrue.” R.C. 5717.02(A).
                              B. Factual background
       {¶ 36} The facts in this case are undisputed. Nexus owns and operates an
interstate gas-transmission pipeline and qualifies as a public utility under R.C. Ch.
5727. Nexus’s pipeline system consists of approximately 256 miles of 36-inch
diameter pipe and associated equipment. About 83 percent of the pipeline runs
through 13 Ohio counties, including Lorain County, with associated facilities also
located within Ohio.




                                         13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 37} For tax year 2019, the tax commissioner issued a preliminary
assessment determining that Nexus’s property had a true value of $1,620,358,699
and, after applying the 88 percent figure prescribed by R.C. 5727.111(D), a taxable
value of $1,425,915,660. Nexus filed a petition for reassessment, but the tax
commissioner disagreed with the claims advanced by Nexus for adjusting the
assessment and issued a final determination upholding the original calculation.
Nexus appealed the tax commissioner’s final determination to the board.
       {¶ 38} While the matter was pending before the board, the tax
commissioner and Nexus negotiated a settlement agreement. According to that
settlement agreement, the total taxable value of Nexus’s property would be
$836,000,000 for the 2019 tax year, $832,773,620 for the 2020 tax year, and
$822,603,590 for the 2021 tax year.        At the time, Nexus had petitions for
reassessment pending before the tax commissioner for the 2020 and 2021 tax years.
An exhibit to the settlement agreement apportioned the taxable value for each of
the three tax years among the taxing districts through which Nexus’s pipeline runs.
       {¶ 39} To implement the settlement agreement, the tax commissioner and
Nexus filed a joint motion with the board requesting that the board remand the then-
pending matter related to the 2019 tax year to the tax commissioner, whereupon she
would issue a final determination reflecting the agreed-on values. The board
granted the motion and remanded the matter to the tax commissioner for further
proceedings.
       {¶ 40} On remand, the tax commissioner issued a new final determination
setting forth the values reflected in the settlement agreement for the 2019, 2020,
and 2021 tax years. (Unless the context indicates otherwise, all subsequent uses of
the term “final determination” refer to this second final determination.)
       {¶ 41} Both Nexus and Snodgrass appealed the tax commissioner’s second
final determination to the board. Nexus filed its notice of appeal first, anticipating
that Snodgrass would appeal because, according to Nexus, Snodgrass had stated




                                         14
                                January Term, 2024




publicly that he would appeal. In its notice of appeal, Nexus noted that its appeal
was a “protective filing consistent with the terms of, and preserving NEXUS’ rights
set forth in, the settlement agreement.” (Capitalization in original.) Snodgrass filed
his notice of appeal a few days later.
        {¶ 42} Nexus moved to dismiss Snodgrass’s appeal. In reviewing Nexus’s
motion, the board determined that the question whether a county auditor may appeal
a tax commissioner’s final determination memorializing a settlement agreement
with a taxpayer was one of first impression. The board agreed with Nexus that
Snodgrass could not appeal the final determination. The board advanced several
rationales in support of its conclusion, reasoning that (1) the case was moot because
it did not feature a live controversy, (2) the final determination was the product of
a ministerial act, (3) Snodgrass’s failure to appeal the first final determination
foreclosed him from appealing the second final determination, and (4) further
litigation brought on by Snodgrass’s appeal should be avoided because such
litigation would result in a lack of finality for Nexus and the other counties to whom
Nexus’s tax payments would accrue. Snodgrass appealed the board’s decision to
this court.
                                  II. ANALYSIS
        {¶ 43} Snodgrass’s brief presents five propositions of law that each raise
strictly legal questions. This court’s review is accordingly de novo. Stingray
Pressure Pumping, L.L.C. v. Harris, 

, ¶ 18. This court would then
apply the same de novo standard of review to Nexus’s jurisdictional arguments.
See Abraitis v. Testa, 

.
                      A. Nexus’s jurisdictional arguments
        {¶ 44} I begin with Nexus’s jurisdictional arguments. Nexus first argues
that because Snodgrass’s notice of appeal to the board did not attack the settlement
agreement, the board lacked jurisdiction over Snodgrass’s appeal. This argument
hinges on Nexus’s view that the key instrument in this controversy is the settlement



                                         15
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




agreement, not the final determination: “Before litigating the proper application of
tax valuation statutes,” Nexus argues, “the Auditor first must successfully refute
the validity of the Settlement Agreement.”
       {¶ 45} In construing former R.C. 5717.02, this court held that a notice of
appeal that does not meet the requirements of R.C. 5717.02 is insufficient to invoke
the board’s jurisdiction. See Brown v. Levin, 

, ¶ 17, superseded by
statute as stated in Obetz v. McClain, 

. R.C. 5717.02(C) provides
that a “notice of appeal [to the board] shall contain a short and plain statement of
the claimed errors in the determination . . . of the tax commissioner . . . showing
that the appellant is entitled to relief and a demand for the relief to which the
appellant claims to be entitled.” This language from R.C. 5717.02(C), passed by
the General Assembly in 2013, amended an earlier version of the statute in order to
eliminate a “procedural pitfall requiring unwary taxpayers to provide a laundry list
of errors,” 

. By passing the amendment, the General Assembly
“helped to ensure that tax appeals are decided on their merits—not denied because
of a technical defect.” 

       {¶ 46} Here, Nexus’s argument fails, not because it rests on a technical
reading of R.C. 5717.02(C), but because it does not rest on the statute at all. R.C.
5717.02(C) requires that the appellant identify errors contained in the tax
commissioner’s “[final] determination,” not some other instrument such as a
settlement agreement. Because Snodgrass challenged the final determination, as
Nexus concedes, the fact that he failed to challenge the settlement agreement is
inconsequential.
       {¶ 47} Nexus’s second jurisdictional argument claims that the board lacked
jurisdiction over Snodgrass’s appeal because his notice raised “statutory-based
valuation claims of error that were not addressed by the Commissioner[’s]” final
determination. In support, Nexus points to language in DeWeese v. Zaino, 2003-
Ohio-6502, ¶ 21, in which this court observed that “the only issues that can be




                                        16
                               January Term, 2024




appealed to the [board] from a final determination by the Tax Commissioner are
those that were considered by him [or her], as set forth in his [or her] final
determination.” This court further explained that if a county auditor could “go
outside the Tax Commissioner’s final determination and raise issues on appeal that
were not considered by the Tax Commissioner in his [or her] final determination,
the [board] would no longer be reviewing a determination of the Tax
Commissioner.” Id. at ¶ 22. I reject Nexus’s argument.
       {¶ 48} To begin, DeWeese does not control, because, unlike here, this court
did not have a final determination before us in DeWeese that merely memorialized
certain portions of a settlement agreement. Indeed, nothing in DeWeese supports
the view that the tax commissioner may curtail the scope of issues that an appellant
may bring before the board by entering, as here, a perfunctory order that lacks any
meaningful analysis of the relevant law or facts. Holding otherwise renders the tax
commissioner’s final determinations virtually unappealable.
       {¶ 49} But beyond this, Snodgrass has not injected a new issue. The tax
commissioner’s final determination in this case announced a determination of
value. And Snodgrass’s notice of appeal attacked that determination of value with
statutory arguments. Snodgrass can hardly be faulted for doing so because, as a
statutory creation, the tax commissioner must exercise her powers in accordance
with the limits defined by statute. See Talawanda City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.
Testa, 

.
                       B. Snodgrass’s propositions of law
                             1. Proposition of law No. 1
       {¶ 50} Snodgrass’s first proposition of law states: “The tax commissioner
cannot deprive county auditors of their independent right to appeal the
commissioner’s final determination under R.C. 5717.02(A) by entering into a
settlement agreement with the taxpayer.” Snodgrass argues that R.C. 5717.02(A)
unambiguously conferred on him the right to appeal the tax commissioner’s final



                                        17
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




determination even though that determination memorialized the terms of a
settlement agreement between the tax commissioner and Nexus.
        {¶ 51} R.C. 5717.02(A) provides that “appeals from final determinations by
the tax commissioner of . . . valuations . . . may be taken to the board of tax appeals
. . . by the county auditors of the counties to . . . which the revenues . . . primarily
accrue.” In Hatchadorian v. Lindley, 

 (1983), superseded by
statute as stated in French v. Limbach, 

 (1991), on
which Snodgrass relies, this court observed that this language “was meant to
describe a class of persons entitled to appeal” and “[the county auditor] is clearly a
member of that class.”
        {¶ 52} Hatchadorian did not involve an appeal from an entry captioned as
a final determination but, rather, an appeal from the tax commissioner’s certificate
issued under R.C. 5727.23 that certified the value of a public utility’s property
apportioned to each county auditor’s county. 

. Moreover, as
Nexus points out, in 1989, the General Assembly legislatively overruled this court’s
holding in Hatchadorian by amending R.C. 5727.23. See 

,
citing Am.Sub.S.B. No. 156, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 891, 914. Thus, the holding
in Hatchadorian does not directly control here.
        {¶ 53} Even so, this court’s general observation in Hatchadorian regarding
the county auditor’s right to appeal remains true—namely, that R.C. 5717.02(A)
provides that a county auditor is within the class of persons entitled to appeal the
tax commissioner’s final determination of value to the board, provided that the
revenues associated therewith primarily accrue to the county in which the county
auditor serves. No one here disputes that the revenues associated with this case
accrue primarily to Lorain County.
        {¶ 54} As this court explained in Adams v. Testa, 

, to
be appealable under R.C. 5717.02(A), the action in question must be “(1) an
assessment, reassessment, valuation, determination, finding, computation, or order




                                          18
                                  January Term, 2024




made by the tax commissioner; (2) a final determination; and (3) appealed by the
taxpayer, the person to whom notice was required to be given, the director of budget
and management, or a county auditor.”
        {¶ 55} These criteria are met here: (1) the final determination is plainly a
valuation because it sets out the taxable value of Nexus’s personal property; (2) the
tax commissioner’s determination of that value is final “in the sense that it is not
preliminary or tentative,” 

; and (3) the appeal was initiated by
Snodgrass—a county auditor who is within the class of persons authorized to
appeal. The fact that Snodgrass has appealed a final determination of value that
arose from a settlement agreement rather than an adjudication is immaterial—R.C.
5717.02(A) does not draw such a distinction. Id. at ¶ 32 (“nothing in the plain
language of the statute or in our case law limits ‘final determination[s]’ to those
acts resulting from an adjudication” [bracketed text in original]).
        {¶ 56} The board, however, saw things differently, reasoning that were a
county auditor permitted to appeal a final determination that was predicated on a
settlement, the settling parties’ interest in finality would be lost, thus undermining
the very purpose for entering into the settlement agreement in the first place.
        {¶ 57} It is true that “public policy favors the finality of litigation,” Van
DeRyt v. Van DeRyt, 

 (1966), and that “[t]he law encourages
settlement of disputes,” Blodgett v. Blodgett, 

 (1990).
But these considerations cannot sway my reading of R.C. 5717.02, because “‘[t]he
role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other
approach might “accord[] with good policy.”‘ ” (Second brackets in original.)
Johnson v. Montgomery, 

, quoting Burrage v. United States,

 (2014), quoting Badaracco v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 

 (1984). This court is not Ohio’s General Assembly and must enforce
the statute as written if a party has not raised a constitutional challenge to the statute.




                                            19
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 58} By its terms, R.C. 5717.02(A) does not limit the scope of a county
auditor’s right to appeal, even when an appeal may disrupt another party’s interest
in the finality of a settlement agreement. Any limitation to that effect must derive
from a legislative enactment. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield, 

 (1970) (“Neither the Board of Tax Appeals, nor this court, may
legislate to add a requirement to a statute enacted by the General Assembly.”).
       {¶ 59} For its part, Nexus observes that R.C. 5703.05(C) empowers the tax
commissioner to “compromise and settle[] . . . tax claims.” In exercising this power
with respect to the matters set forth in the settlement agreement, Nexus claims that
the tax commissioner “put an end to the litigation” before the board. In support,
Nexus points to a line of cases stressing the binding nature of settlement agreements
and the judiciary’s role in enforcing them according to their terms. See, e.g.,
Bostick Foundry Co. v. Lindberg, a Div. of Sola Basic Industries, Inc., 

 (6th Cir. 1986) (“Once concluded, a settlement agreement is as binding,
conclusive, and final as if it had been incorporated into a judgment and the actual
merits of the antecedent claims will not thereafter be examined.”); Continental W.
Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 

 (1996) (“It is axiomatic that a settlement agreement is a contract designed to
terminate a claim by preventing or ending litigation and that such agreements are
valid and enforceable by either party.”); Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc., 

 (1972), quoting Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. v. The Falcon, 

 (7th Cir. 1962) (“‘a settlement agreement . . . voluntarily entered into
. . . will be summarily enforced by the Court’ ”).
       {¶ 60} Nexus argues that when the tax commissioner exercises her
settlement authority under R.C. 5703.05(C), a county auditor’s right to appeal under
R.C. 5717.02(A) is foreclosed. This reading would render the Ohio General
Assembly’s law, R.C. 5717.02(A), superfluous, thus “violat[ing] the precept that
we ‘should construe statutes to give effect to all the enacted language,’ ” Ceccarelli




                                          20
                                  January Term, 2024




v. Levin, 

, quoting Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin,

. And Nexus is mistaken in saying that this reading trades
one problem for another by rendering R.C. 5703.05(C) superfluous. Contrary to
Nexus’s argument, preserving R.C. 5717.02(A) does not leave R.C. 5703.05(C)
without any work to do. See Polselli v. Internal Revenue Serv., 

, 443
(2023), quoting Nielsen v. Preap, 

 (2019) (“a clause that ‘still has
work to do’ is not superfluous”). A county auditor’s ability to appeal a final
determination tracing to a settlement agreement does not automatically mean that
in every case the settlement is a nullity. At most, it means that the settlement (or
parts of it) may be potentially at risk. If that is problematic from a tax-policy
perspective, as Nexus says that it is, then the General Assembly can enact a fix. See
Stingray Pressure Pumping, 

, at ¶ 22 (“Our task is not to make tax
policy but to provide a fair reading of what the legislature has enacted . . . .”). But
it is not the role of this court to fix a problematic policy.
        {¶ 61} This court’s decision in Lucas v. Limbach, 

 (1988),
which Nexus cites, is not to the contrary. There, the tax commissioner consented
to a plan of arrangement in a bankruptcy proceeding that had stipulated a specific
amount that the state would be paid toward a corporation’s sales-tax indebtedness.
After consenting to this arrangement, the tax commissioner assessed a derivative
liability against one of the corporation’s officers. This court held that the tax
commissioner’s consent to the arrangement barred her from assessing the officer.

. Dispositive here is that Lucas says nothing about the scope of the county
auditor’s appeal rights under R.C. 5717.02(A) that remain after settlement.
        {¶ 62} I note that Snodgrass argues that Nexus has tacitly conceded that the
final determination is appealable under R.C. 5717.02(A), citing language in the
sixth (unnumbered) paragraph of the settlement agreement.            Even if the tax
commissioner and Nexus agreed that an appeal would lie, this would not matter.




                                           21
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




See Chapman Ents., Inc. v. McClain, 

 (parties’ agreement that
a taxpayer had properly appealed under R.C. 5717.02 was immaterial).
       {¶ 63} I also find the majority opinion’s analysis, including its reliance on
the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, unpersuasive. See majority
opinion, ¶ 4, 17-21. “Under the in pari materia rule of statutory construction, a
court must read all statutes relating to the same general subject matter together to
give proper force and effect to each one.” In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio,
Inc., 

. However, “[t]he in pari materia rule may be used to
interpret a statute but only when some doubt or ambiguity exists.” 

 Like other
canons of construction, the in pari materia rule may not be used to create ambiguity
when none exists in the statutory text. See Cleveland v. State, 

 (lead opinion), citing State v. Krutz, 

 (1986), and Ali
v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 

 (2008).
       {¶ 64} The majority opinion’s resorting to the in pari materia rule is
improper in this case. Standing alone or together, neither R.C. 5717.02(A) nor R.C.
5703.05(C) is ambiguous. R.C. 5717.02(A) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, appeals from final determinations by the tax commissioner of . . .
valuations . . . may be taken to the board of tax appeals . . . by the county auditors
of the counties to . . . which the revenues affected by that decision would primarily
accrue.” The tax commissioner in this case made a final determination of the
taxable value of Nexus’s property, and by its plain terms, R.C. 5717.02(A) grants
Snodgrass the right to appeal that final determination unless some other provision
of law creates an exception to that right to appeal.
       {¶ 65} The majority opinion posits that R.C. 5703.05(C) provides such an
exception, see majority opinion at ¶ 3, 17, but R.C. 5703.05(C) does not address a
county auditor’s right to appeal. Rather, its plain and unambiguous language
merely authorizes the tax commissioner to compromise and settle tax claims. If the
General Assembly intended to limit a county auditor’s right to appeal settlements




                                         22
                                 January Term, 2024




that have been reduced to a final settlement determination by the tax commissioner,
it would have said so. Instead, the legislature unambiguously and broadly provided
in R.C. 5717.02(A) that appeals from final determinations may be taken by a county
auditor.
       {¶ 66} In fact, R.C. 5703.05(C) uses only a few words to authorize the tax
commissioner to settle tax claims—it provides that the tax commissioner may
“[e]xercis[e] the authority provided by law relative to consenting to the compromise
and settlement of tax claims.” Missing from this language is any mention of an
appeal brought by a county auditor from a settlement agreement reduced to a final
determination. Notwithstanding that silence in R.C. 5703.05(C), the majority
opinion’s analysis relies on its own notions of common sense to input a limit on
appellate rights into the statute—i.e., that a county auditor may appeal a settlement
reduced to the tax commissioner’s final determination on “a host of possible issues”
so long as those issues “do not depend on undoing what was agreed to in the
settlement,” majority opinion at ¶ 22. Those words, however, are the words of the
majority, not of the applicable statute.
       {¶ 67} Thus, the majority opinion never justifies the line it draws, and its
reasoning is obviously logically inconsistent. The basic premise of the majority
opinion’s argument is that there must be a limit on a county auditor’s right to appeal
to avoid rendering the tax commissioner’s power to settle “meaningless,” id. at
¶ 21. But under that reasoning, there could never be a right to challenge a settlement
on appeal, because doing so could potentially negate the tax commissioner’s power
to settle a tax claim. But the majority opinion attempts to avoid that extreme
position by, for example, allowing the county auditor to challenge a settlement
procured by fraud, id. at ¶ 22, even though such an appeal could undo the settlement
agreement itself.
       {¶ 68} While the majority opinion’s interpretation might make good
policy—after all, “settlement agreements are highly favored in the law,”



                                           23
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn., 74 Ohio St.3d at 502—it also
makes good policy to do what the General Assembly has done: provide a method
by which the tax commissioner may settle tax controversies while allowing county
auditors the ability to “check” the tax commissioner’s settlement authority when it
threatens a local government’s tax revenue. That check and balance helps ensure
that the county is not harmed by a tax commissioner’s poor decision to settle a case.
        {¶ 69} And as the majority knows, “policy arguments cannot supersede the
clear statutory text,” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 

 (2016), and “the text of a law controls over purported legislative intentions
unmoored from any statutory text,” Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 

(2022). This court therefore cannot read into statutes a limit on a county auditor’s
right to appeal that the General Assembly itself chose not to enact.
        {¶ 70} For the above reasons, I conclude that neither the settling parties’
interest in finality nor R.C. 5703.05 overrides a county auditor’s right to appeal
under R.C. 5717.02(A).
                             2. Proposition of law No. 2
        {¶ 71} Snodgrass’s second proposition of law states: “A county auditor
cannot be barred from appealing the tax commissioner’s final determination under
R.C. 5717.02 merely because it did not intervene in the taxpayer’s prior appeal.”
Snodgrass’s second proposition of law takes aim at the board’s conclusion that
because he did not appeal the tax commissioner’s first final determination (which
is not at issue here), he became bound by the results of the second final
determination (which is at issue here). In reaching this conclusion, the board cited
this court’s decision in Mason City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of
Revision, 

, construing it for the proposition that litigants cannot
prosecute appeals before the board when they “see[k] to be released from the
outcome of . . . proceedings . . . [they] chose not to participate [in].”




                                           24
                                 January Term, 2024




        {¶ 72} This court’s decision in Mason involved the valuation of a building
for tax purposes when a new owner took title to the building during the board’s
proceedings but was not advised by the board of those proceedings. After the board
rendered its valuation decision, the new owner appealed to this court, claiming a
right to notice of the board’s proceedings from the board. This court disagreed,
observing that the new owner had failed to cite any law that the board give such
notice to a new owner. Id. at ¶ 37-38. In doing so, this court observed that despite
the lack of notice from the board, the new owner could have protected its interests
by appearing before the board as the new owner or moving to intervene. Id. at
¶ 39.
        {¶ 73} Mason is inapt. Unlike the new owner in that case, Snodgrass has
pointed to a specific statute—R.C. 5717.02(A)—that provides the basis for the
relief he seeks. And nothing in that statute requires a county auditor to have
appealed a former final determination in order to preserve his right to appeal a later
final determination.
        {¶ 74} This court should conclude that Snodgrass’s failure to appeal the
first final determination did not bar him from appealing the second final
determination.
                            3. Proposition of law No. 3
        {¶ 75} Snodgrass’s third proposition of law states: “The auditor’s
independent right to appeal the tax commissioner’s final determination under R.C.
5717.02 was not rendered ‘moot’ by the fact that the tax commissioner entered into
a settlement agreement with the taxpayer.” Snodgrass’s third proposition of law
faults the board for dismissing his appeal on mootness grounds. Snodgrass’s view
is that, contrary to what the board found, this controversy still presents a live issue
and that he has a legally cognizable interest in the outcome based on the right to
appeal created by R.C. 5717.02(A).




                                          25
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 76} “A ‘“case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”‘ ” State ex rel.
Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 

, quoting Los Angeles Cty. v.
Davis, 

 (1979), quoting Powell v. McCormack, 

(1969). When something happens that makes it impossible for the court to grant
the requested relief, the case is moot. State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v.
LaRose, 

.
                      a. The board’s approach to mootness
       {¶ 77} To support its mootness determination, the board cited its decision
in Kelsch v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA Nos. 2002-T-1271 and 2002-T-
1322, 

 (Feb. 7, 2003), in which a taxpayer had sought and received
from the county board of revision a reduction to the value of his property. The
taxpayer appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, which determined that because the
taxpayer had received his requested relief, he had not suffered an injury and
therefore lacked standing to bring the appeal. Id. at *2. Not only was the Board of
Tax Appeals’ determination in Kelsch not decided under the judicial doctrine of
mootness, Kelsch is also distinguishable as a factual matter. Unlike the litigant in
Kelsch, Snodgrass has not received his requested relief—that is, an order from this
court reversing the board’s decision and remanding the cause for further
proceedings.   Moreover, Kelsch did not address the effect that a settlement
agreement has on the board’s proceedings.
                        b. Nexus’s approach to mootness
       {¶ 78} For its part, Nexus advances a more ambitious argument in support
of the board’s mootness determination. Nexus’s position spans multiple sub
arguments, but the crux of its view is reducible to four key concepts. First,
settlement agreements are binding on their signatories. Second, those in privity
with the signatories are likewise bound. Third, resolution of a privy’s claim by way
of a settlement agreement extinguishes the claim. Fourth, extinguishment of a




                                        26
                                  January Term, 2024




privy’s claim by way of a settlement agreement renders moot the pending
controversy regarding that claim. Snodgrass does not take issue with this chain of
logic in the abstract. Rather, he says that as applied to the specific facts of this case,
Nexus is mistaken in characterizing this case as moot because he is not bound by
the settlement agreement.
                i. Whether Nexus may raise its mootness argument
        {¶ 79} Before addressing Nexus’s argument, I will first address whether
Nexus may raise it. Relevant here is the sixth (unnumbered) paragraph in the
settlement agreement in which the tax commissioner and Nexus recognized that
although the settlement agreement “is binding on both the Taxpayer and the
Commissioner, it is understood that it is not binding on others if they elect to file
an appeal.” Snodgrass’s argument appears to be that because Nexus agreed that the
settlement agreement would not be binding on a nonsignatory, Nexus is estopped
from arguing that Snodgrass is bound by the settlement agreement.
        {¶ 80} This argument is intuitively appealing: if Nexus stipulated that only
the tax commissioner and it were bound by the settlement agreement, then Nexus
should be barred from taking a position here that contradicts the stipulation.
Although I may sympathize with Snodgrass’s desire to prevent Nexus from having
it both ways, intuition is not the standard by which to measure an argument’s
success. Because Snodgrass cites no authority rooted in the doctrine of estoppel, I
decline to reach the question. See Mason, 

 (observing that
the proponent of an argument had effectively waived it by failing to cite any
relevant caselaw in support).
    ii. Whether Nexus’s substantive argument regarding mootness is correct
        {¶ 81} I now turn to Nexus’s substantive argument. Among the many
decisions cited by Nexus, Gough Family Trust v. Vos, 

 (7th Dist.),
is an apt place to begin. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant on various
property-related claims. While the case was pending, the defendant negotiated a



                                           27
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




settlement agreement with the plaintiff that the trial court adopted. The defendant
then appealed, raising issues covered by the settlement. The Seventh District Court
of Appeals determined that because “the parties resolved the underlying
controversy with a settlement of all issues pending before the trial court[,] . . . those
issues [were] moot, rendering [the defendant’s] appeal moot.” Id. at ¶ 28.
        {¶ 82} Gough is readily distinguishable because it dealt with a signatory to
the settlement, while this case does not. Generally, that distinction would be
dispositive because a settlement agreement cannot bind third parties. See State ex
rel. Dillard Dept. Stores v. Ryan, 

 (“The settlement
agreement between Dillard and Scott cannot bind the [Bureau of Workers’
Compensation] to reimburse Dillard.”). But, Nexus says, the law also recognizes
that those who are in privity with a signatory—which Nexus claims Snodgrass is—
may be bound to a settlement agreement. No decision by this court appears to
explicitly endorse this principle, but Nexus points to The Cadle Co. v. Reed, 

 (N.D.Texas 2008) (“federal courts have held that in certain
circumstances a settlement can bind others. At common law, this preclusive effect
extended to persons ‘in privity’ with the judgment creditor, judgment debtor, or
parties. Privity is merely another way of saying that there is sufficient identity
between those entities to bind that other party to the outcome”), and Triplex Co. v.
R.L. Pomante Contr., Inc., 

 (10th Dist.) (observing that a
corporate officer who was neither a party to the case nor a signatory to the
settlement agreement was nevertheless bound by it because the officer was
“deep[ly] involve[d]” in and had a “financial interest” in the case).
        {¶ 83} When addressing privity within the context of res judicata, this court
has said that privity connotes a “mutuality of interest, including an identity of
desired result.” Brown v. Dayton, 

 (2000). Yet that meaning
of privity is not what Nexus has in mind when it says that Snodgrass is bound to
the settlement agreement as a privy. Indeed, rather than sharing a mutual interest




                                           28
                                  January Term, 2024




in the result contemplated by the settlement agreement, Snodgrass’s interest is
antagonistic to that result.
        {¶ 84} Nexus instead seeks to establish Snodgrass’s role as a privy to the
settlement agreement based on doctrines that this court has developed in the field
of public law. Nexus argues that accounting for these doctrines leads to the
conclusion that Snodgrass is in privity as a nominal party with the real parties in
interest, namely, the state of Ohio and Nexus. Nexus contends that when the tax
commissioner entered into the settlement agreement, the tax commissioner did so
as the state’s agent, thereby binding Snodgrass to the settlement.
        {¶ 85} In characterizing the parties’ relationship this way, Nexus cites State
ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 

 (1962). In that case, the relator brought
a mandamus action against the director of highways, a state official, claiming that
his property had been appropriated. The director of highways argued that the
relator lacked a compensable property interest, but this court rejected that defense.
In an earlier suit, the relator was determined to have a compensable interest—a
determination that was not appealed—against the director of the department of
public works, also a state official. Notwithstanding the fact that the two suits
involved different state officials, this court concluded that the doctrine of res
judicata bound the director of highways to the judgment that had been entered
against the director of the department of public works. This court explained, “[T]he
state, although represented by the Director of the Department of Public Works, was
the party plaintiff [in the prior suit], and in this action, although the Director of
Highways is the nominal party, the state is the real party in interest. This is
necessarily true because the state can act only through its agents.” Id. at 210-211.
Thus, “it is clear that, where an action is properly brought against a state official to
compel him to perform his duty, the state, since the officer is the agent of the state,
is the real party in interest.” Id. at 212.




                                              29
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 86} Even assuming arguendo only that this court’s logic in Wilson
carries over to settlement agreements, Nexus’s analogy fails because Snodgrass is
a county official, not a state official. See R.C. 319.01 (“A county auditor shall be
chosen quadrennially in each county . . . .”). That is, unlike the facts presented in
Wilson, this case lacks a pairing of two public officials from the same unit of
government.
       {¶ 87} This court’s decision in State ex rel. Hofstetter v. Kronk, 

 (1969), which Nexus also cites, reinforces the point. In that case, this
court held that the real-party-in-interest rule in Wilson extended to county officials
and county government, observing that “agents of the same government are, for the
purposes of res judicata the same party or in privity with each other when they
represent the government’s right and not their own rights.” 

.
Under that rule, the relator in Hofstetter, who had sued a county auditor, was barred
from litigating whether he was entitled to retain his position as judge because in an
earlier suit he had litigated an identical question against the county prosecutor. 

(observing that Wilson applies “notwithstanding the fact that county officials and
county government, rather than state officials and state government, are involved”).
       {¶ 88} The Seventh District Court of Appeals’ decision in State ex rel.
DeWine v. Crock Construction Co., 

 (7th Dist.), is not to the
contrary. There, the court of appeals invoked Wilson and Hofstetter in determining
that the Ohio Attorney General was barred from bringing an environmental-
enforcement action because the county prosecutor, acting on behalf of the county’s
health district, had previously brought an enforcement action against a business that
was predicated on the same provisions of law for the exact same violations.

. In DeWine, the key to the court of appeals’ analysis was its
recognition that the state officials and the county officials had concurrent powers
to enforce the same provisions of law. Id. at ¶ 24-26. Here, in contrast, only the
tax commissioner may value and assess public utility property, see Toledo Edison,




                                         30
                                 January Term, 2024

, and the county auditor has a separate statutory right to appeal,
R.C. 5717.02(A).
        {¶ 89} This court’s decision in Wasteney v. Schott, 

 (1898),
perhaps best supports Nexus’s argument in support of its real-party-in-interest
theory. In Wasteney, a collection action was brought by the county treasurer against
a taxpayer to recover unpaid personal-property taxes. Although the action was
technically untimely under the statute of limitations, this court determined that the
treasurer was entitled to bring the action because the state was the real party in
interest and, under this court’s caselaw, a statute of limitations will typically not
run against the state in the absence of express statutory language to the contrary.
This court took “notice that general taxes levied by the state directly, or through
local agencies to which it has delegated that power, constitute a source of revenue
for use in the due performance of the functions of the state government.” Id. at 415.
This court further observed that the taxes “go partly to the general funds of the state,
for its disbursement in the administration of public affairs, and are in part disbursed,
in the due course of local administration, by officers exercising the delegated
powers of the state, deemed necessary and proper for that purpose.” Id. In both
instances, “the fund belongs to the state’s revenues, and the disbursement is for the
public benefit, although local advantages may also result.” Id. at 415-416.
        {¶ 90} This case may concern a different type of tax, but as Nexus points
out, Ohio’s public-utility personal-property tax is a matter of statewide concern.
That tax is assessed by the tax commissioner, who is a state official under R.C.
5727.06(A), and accounts for a public utility’s personal property on a statewide
basis under R.C. 5727.06(A)(3)(c). The public-utility personal-property tax also
creates a lien running to the state under R.C. 5727.06(C). Therefore, according to
Nexus, the state is the real party in interest regarding matters affecting the public-
utility personal-property tax. I think that this argument proves too much.




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        {¶ 91} Were this court to extend the reasoning in Wasteney here, it is hard
to see how the county auditor may ever be able to appeal a tax commissioner’s final
determination under R.C. 5717.02(A) because, by Nexus’s logic, the county
auditor’s interests would always be eclipsed by the state’s as the real party in
interest. That is, any final determination—whether entered against a public utility
or, as here, by settlement agreement—would implicate no interests beyond those of
the state and the public utility, thereby foreclosing the county auditor’s right to
appeal. Yet R.C. 5717.02(A) expressly vests a county auditor with the right to
appeal a tax commissioner’s final determination, provided that that decision affects
revenues that primarily accrue to the county in which he or she serves. Adopting
Nexus’s view would effectively nullify that right, which is contrary to established
rules of statutory interpretation. See In re Adoption of M.B., 

(disfavoring an interpretation that renders a statute meaningless); R.C. 1.47(B) (in
enacting a statute, it is presumed that the General Assembly intended the entire
statute to be effective).
        {¶ 92} Finally, Nexus attempts to bolster its argument by citing cases from
the Eleventh District Court of Appeals that involve taxpayer actions. See Laituri v.
Nero, 

 (11th Dist. 2000) (taxpayer action brought on behalf
of the city); State ex rel. Kolkowski v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 

(11th Dist.) (taxpayer action brought on behalf of the county). Nexus characterizes
these decisions as standing for the proposition that “taxpayers with nominal
standing to represent the interests of political subdivisions are subject to dismissal
under the mootness doctrine where the political subdivision itself has settled.” But
this case is not a taxpayer action, and it is unclear how Snodgrass could be construed
as a taxpayer for the purpose of this case. I conclude that this controversy is not
moot.




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                            4. Proposition of law No. 4
       {¶ 93} Snodgrass’s       fourth   proposition   of   law   states:   “The   tax
commissioner’s final determination . . . did not involve the mere performance of a
ministerial act.” Snodgrass’s fourth proposition of law challenges the board’s
conclusion that he could not appeal the tax commissioner’s final determination,
because that determination was the product of a ministerial act. The board reasoned
that “[t]he issue of valuation was the subject of prior litigation, and that case ended
in settlement. That appeal was remanded to the Commissioner, and she issued a
final determination as the last ministerial step to finalizing the agreement.” BTA
Nos. 2022-1296 and 2022-1247, 

, *5 (Feb. 9, 2023).
       {¶ 94} The board did not cite any authority to support this conclusion, but
Nexus says that the board’s conclusion is supported by this court’s decision in
Rowland v. Lindley, 

 (1979). In Rowland, the tax commissioner
had entered a journal entry that gave effect to this court’s mandate in a prior appeal
involving the same taxpayer. The taxpayer appealed that entry to the board, and
this court affirmed the board’s dismissal of the taxpayer’s appeal, holding that “a
journal entry which the Tax Commissioner issues only to carry out the expressed
mandate of this court is not a ‘final determination’ within the purview of R.C.
5717.02.” 

. As Snodgrass correctly points out, Rowland does not apply
here, because the tax commissioner did not enter the final determination in response
to a mandate from this court.
       {¶ 95} Nexus fares no better under Makowski v. Limbach, 

 (1992), another case it cites in support of the board’s decision. In Makowski,
the Geauga County auditor had appealed the tax commissioner’s certification of
Geauga County’s share in the state library fund to the board. This court held that
the certification was not appealable under R.C. 5717.02, because the
“commissioner [did] not adjudicate any matter in this process; she perform[ed]
ministerial functions by applying known numbers to estimated income tax



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collections.” 

. The values reflected on the tax commissioner’s final
determination in this case, however, hardly memorialize the computations of a
mechanical exercise. Indeed, as Nexus itself says, the values are “discretionary” in
their character, reflecting the resolution of multiple contested issues of fact and law.
        {¶ 96} Even if the settlement agreement was the product of discretion,
Nexus says that the final determination was not, because the tax commissioner
merely “repeated” the settlement agreement’s values in the final determination. But
by this logic, a preliminary version of a final determination that the tax
commissioner copies and pastes into a final version would also not be a final
determination appealable under R.C. 5717.02(A), because the final version would
be merely repeating by rote the text of the preliminary version. This court’s
decision in Adams does not countenance such an overly thin distinction. See
Adams, 

 (identifying the elements of an appealable final
determination).
        {¶ 97} I conclude that the tax commissioner’s final determination did not
arise from a ministerial act.
                             5. Proposition of law No. 5
        {¶ 98} Snodgrass’s fifth proposition of law states that the board “erred by
applying its erroneous ruling to the auditor’s timely appeal of the commissioner’s
final determinations of value for tax years 2020 and 2021.” Snodgrass argues that
even if the court were to hold that the board was right as a general matter in
concluding that his failure to participate in the earlier proceedings had a preclusive
effect, then that effect should not extend beyond the 2019 tax year, because only
that tax year was the subject of the first final determination. I need not reach this
argument given my analysis of Snodgrass’s second proposition of law.




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                              III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 99} I would—and I believe this court should—reverse the Board of Tax
Appeals’ decision dismissing Snodgrass’s appeal and remand the cause to the board
for further proceedings. Hence, I must dissent.
                              __________________
       Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Stephen W. Funk, David J. Wigham, and J.
Benjamin Fraifogl, for appellant.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Samantha Cowne, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee Tax Commissioner Patricia Harris.
       Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Anthony L. Ehler, John J.
Kulewicz, Steven L. Smiseck, Jeffrey Allen Miller, and Kara M. Mundy, for
appellee Nexus Gas Transmission, L.L.C.
       Bricker Graydon, L.L.P, Rebecca C. Princehorn, Nelson M. Reid, and Brodi
J. Conover, urging affirmance for amici curiae Margaretta Local School District,
Perkins Local School District, Columbiana County Auditor Nancy Milliken, Erie
County Auditor Richard H. Jeffrey, Fulton County Auditor Brett J. Kolb, Henry
County Auditor Elizabeth Fruchey, Huron County Auditor Roland J. Tkach,
Sandusky County Auditor Jerri Miller, Stark County Auditor Alan C. Harold, and
Wayne County Auditor Jarra L. Underwood.
       Mark Anthony Long, Ohio Chamber of Commerce; and Clarence Luther
Heckman, Ohio Council for Retail Merchants, urging affirmance for amici curiae
Ohio Chamber of Commerce and Ohio Council for Retail Merchants.
                              __________________




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