[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Goldschmidt v. Triggs, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

THE STATE EX REL . GOLDSCHMIDT , APPELLANT , v. TRIGGS, JUDGE, ET AL.,
                                        APPELLEES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
      may be cited as State ex rel. Goldschmidt v. Triggs, Slip Opinion No.
                                     

.]
Prohibition—Magistrate’s order did not exceed trial court’s subject-matter
        jurisdiction—Appellant has or had adequate remedy in ordinary course of
        law—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.
      (No. 2023-1649—Submitted July 9, 2024—Decided August 28, 2024.)
     APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-230555.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Appellant, Ronald Goldschmidt, appeals the First District Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of his prohibition claim against Judge Alan Triggs and
Magistrate Thomas Beridon of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.
Goldschmidt alleged that Magistrate Beridon exceeded his authority under Civ.R.
53(C) when he issued a magistrate’s order instead of a magistrate’s decision.
Goldschmidt contends that by exceeding his authority, the magistrate acted without
jurisdiction. The appellate court dismissed the claim, holding that the trial court’s
action was within its jurisdiction and that Goldschmidt had an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. We affirm.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       {¶ 2} This case stems from a civil action that was filed in 2016. The facts
of that case, as summarized by the First District when that case was on appeal before
it, are that the City of Cincinnati leased downtown Cincinnati property to
Goldschmidt’s companies for development and the development was financed with
a mortgage loan from U.S. Bank. 435 Elm Investment, L.L.C. v. CBD Investments
Ltd. Partnership I, 

 (1st Dist.). Subsequently, Goldschmidt
executed guaranties with U.S Bank, making him personally responsible for
payment of the debt. 

 In 2016, U.S. Bank filed a lawsuit against Goldschmidt
and his companies, seeking a money judgment and foreclosure of the leasehold
mortgage. Id. at ¶ 2-3. During the course of the litigation, U.S. Bank transferred
all of its rights and interests in the loan to 435 Elm Investment, L.L.C., (“Elm
Investment”), and Elm Investment was substituted as the plaintiff in the
proceedings and subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a
monetary judgment in the amount of the unpaid debt. Id. at ¶ 4. Ultimately,
Goldschmidt and his companies were found liable for over $1.5 million. Id. at ¶ 4.
       {¶ 3} Elm Investment sought to collect on its judgment through a charging
order, which would allow Elm Investment to collect any funds that Goldschmidt



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                                 January Term, 2024




was entitled to receive based on his membership interest in certain limited-liability
companies. Id. at ¶ 5. The trial court issued the charging order, but the First District
reversed, concluding that several of the companies named in the charging order
were not limited-liability companies and that Elm Investment’s evidence did not
establish that Goldschmidt had a membership interest in the companies that were.
Id. at ¶ 9-15.
        {¶ 4} In September 2023, Elm Investment filed an emergency motion in the
trial court, again seeking a charging order to obtain the funds that would otherwise
go to Goldschmidt because of his membership interest in several limited-liability
companies. A hearing was held before Magistrate Beridon. At the hearing, the
parties disputed whether the charging order could be issued as a magistrate’s order
or whether such an order could be issued only as a magistrate’s decision.
        {¶ 5} In October, Magistrate Beridon issued a magistrate’s order granting
the motion for a charging order, finding that Elm Investment had a right to receive
any distribution that Goldschmidt would otherwise be entitled to receive with
respect to his membership interest in four limited-liability companies. See R.C.
1706.342. Because the record before the magistrate was unclear about (1) the
amount of money that was held in trust for the benefit of the companies and
Goldschmidt and (2) the percentage interest that Goldschmidt had in each of the
companies, the order also required (1) an accounting of the companies’ funds held
in Goldschmidt’s counsel’s trust account and (2) documentation to confirm the
percentage of Goldschmidt’s ownership in each company.                    Goldschmidt
subsequently filed a motion in the trial court seeking “relief” from the magistrate’s
order as well as two motions to stay it, one asking the magistrate for a stay and the
other asking the judge for a stay.
        {¶ 6} While his motions were pending in the trial court, Goldschmidt filed
an original action in the First District seeking a writ prohibiting the magistrate from
enforcing the charging order. He alleged that Magistrate Beridon exceeded his



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authority in issuing the order because charging orders require judicial approval. He
also argued that the accounting ordered by Magistrate Beridon was not permitted
under the charging-order statute. Judge Triggs and Magistrate Beridon filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that Magistrate Beridon did not exceed his authority in
issuing the order. In response, Goldschmidt reiterated his arguments about the
magistrate’s limited authority and the requirement of judicial approval of charging
orders.
          {¶ 7} In November 2023, the First District dismissed the case, holding that
a court of common pleas generally has subject-matter jurisdiction to issue a
charging order and that “[a]ny error in how a charging order was issued is more an
issue of the exercise of jurisdiction and not a patent and unambiguous lack of
jurisdiction.” The court held that Goldschmidt’s ability to file a motion to set aside
the magistrate’s order constituted an adequate remedy.
          {¶ 8} Goldschmidt appealed that judgment as of right, and that appeal is
before us.
                                      ANALYSIS
          {¶ 9} This court reviews de novo a court of appeals’ judgment of dismissal
for failure to state a claim. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 

.
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is appropriate “if, after all factual
allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made
in relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that relator can prove no set of facts
warranting relief.” Clark v. Connor, 

 (1998).
          {¶ 10} There are three elements necessary for a writ of prohibition to issue:
the exercise of judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power,
and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Elder
v. Camplese, 

. However, if an absence of jurisdiction is patent
and unambiguous, a relator need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the




                                            4
                                January Term, 2024




ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 2008-
Ohio-2637, ¶ 15.
        {¶ 11} “[T]he court of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction, with
subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all matters at law and in equity that are
not denied to it.’ ” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

, ¶ 20, quoting
Saxton v. Seiberling, 

, 558-559 (1891); see also Ohio Const., art.
IV, § 4(B). With limited exceptions, R.C. 2305.01 grants courts of common pleas
“original jurisdiction in all civil cases in which the sum or matter in dispute exceeds
the exclusive original jurisdiction of county courts.”
        {¶ 12} Goldschmidt’s central argument is that under Civ.R. 53(C),
Magistrate Beridon lacked the authority to issue the charging order as a magistrate’s
order. Under Civ.R. 53(C)(1)(a), magistrates are authorized “[t]o assist courts of
record” in several ways, including “[d]etermin[ing] any motion in any case.” Under
Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(a)(i), a magistrate may issue a “magistrate’s order” “without
judicial approval if necessary to regulate the proceedings and if not dispositive of a
claim or defense of a party.” To address a motion that is dispositive of a claim or
defense, a magistrate issues a “magistrate’s decision,” which is not effective unless
it is adopted by the court, Civ.R. 53(C)(4)(a). A party can challenge a magistrate’s
order through a motion to set aside, and it can challenge a magistrate’s decision
through written objections; both types of challenges are reviewed by the trial-court
judge. Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b), (D)(3)(b), and (D)(4)(d).
        {¶ 13} Goldschmidt asserts that a magistrate cannot issue a charging order
as a magistrate’s order, because a charging order disposes of a party’s claim or
defense. In support of this argument, Goldschmidt points to cases in which
charging orders were issued by trial-court judges through their adoption of
magistrates’ decisions. But he does not cite any case in which a court has found
that a magistrate’s issuing such an order exceeds the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the trial court.



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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 14} Even assuming that a charging order disposes of a party’s claim or
defense, the erroneous issuance of a magistrate’s order rather than a magistrate’s
decision does not implicate the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court.
“Noncompliance with Civ.R. 53 is a procedural irregularity that does not affect the
trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” State ex rel. Jones v.
Paschke, 

. This court has previously rejected claims that
procedural errors by a magistrate implicate a trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, finding that such errors render the related decisions voidable, not void.
See, e.g., In re J.J., 

, ¶ 16 (erroneous transfer order issued by
magistrate “did not divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction”); State ex rel. Lesher
v. Kainrad, 

 (1981) (magistrate’s failure to prepare report
for judge’s review rendered decision voidable, not void). The Sixth and Eighth
District Courts of Appeals have similarly found that a magistrate’s issuing a
magistrate’s order when he or she arguably should have issued a magistrate’s
decision does not exceed the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel.
Speweik v. Stierwalt, 

 (6th Dist.); State ex rel. J.R. v.
Jones, 

 (8th Dist.).
       {¶ 15} In this case, as the First District correctly held, the issuance of the
charging order as a magistrate’s order did not exceed the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the trial court. Because Goldschmidt’s allegations do not show that Magistrate
Beridon patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the magistrate’s
order, for a writ of prohibition to issue, Goldschmidt would have to show that he
lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. But Goldschmidt did
have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of a motion to set
aside the magistrate’s order, see Fipps v. Day, 

 (8th Dist.) (A
motion to set aside a magistrate’s order is an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.), and by way of an appeal from any subsequent ruling on such a




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                                January Term, 2024




motion, see State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof, 

 (An appeal from a
trial court’s decision is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.).
       {¶ 16} We affirm the First District’s judgment because Goldschmidt
possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to address his
objections to the magistrate’s order.
                                 CONCLUSION
       {¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the First District Court of
Appeals’ judgment dismissing Goldschmidt’s complaint for a writ of prohibition.
                                                                Judgment affirmed.
                              __________________
       Statman Harris, L.L.C., Alan J. Statman, and William B. Fecher, for
appellant.
       Melissa Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Dmitriy
Bikmayev and Pamela J. Sears, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellees.
                              __________________




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