[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No.

.]




                                          NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

      MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION,
     APPELLEE, v. UNION COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES;
                RESIDENCE AT COOKS POINTE, L.L.C., APPELLANT.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Marysville Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty.
                Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Taxation—R.C. 5715.19—R.C. 5717.01—R.C. 5717.01 as amended effective
        July 21, 2022, does not apply to cases in which a challenge to an auditor’s
        real-property tax valuation was pending before a board of revision when the
        amendment took effect—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed and cause
        remanded to Board of Tax Appeals.
   (No. 2023-0964—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided September 4, 2024.)
                APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Union County,
                             No. 14-23-03, 

.
                                  __________________
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         STEWART, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
DEWINE, DONNELLY, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., dissented,
with an opinion.


         STEWART, J.
         {¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a recent amendment
to R.C. 5717.01 that limits a political subdivision’s ability to appeal a county board
of revision’s determination of real estate value for tax purposes to the Board of Tax
Appeals (“BTA”) applies to cases that were pending before the county board of
revision when the amendment took effect. Because the language of the amended
statute is written in the present tense and ties the right of appeal to the moment a
complaint is filed with a board of revision, we determine that the amended statute
does not apply to cases that were pending before a board of revision when the
amendment took effect.
         {¶ 2} We therefore affirm the decision of the Third District Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the BTA dismissing a school board’s appeal
from a county board of revision’s tax valuation of an apartment complex, and we
remand this matter to the BTA to consider the appeal.
                               Facts and Procedural History
         {¶ 3} On February 25, 2022, appellees Dean and Dave Cook, who are third-
party taxpayers, filed a complaint for the 2021 tax year with appellee the Union
County Board of Revision (“the board of revision”). In their complaint, the Cooks
sought an increase in the property valuation for tax purposes of an apartment
complex located in Marysville that is owned by appellant, The Residence at Cooks
Pointe, L.L.C. (“the property owner”). The Union County auditor had assessed the
true value (i.e., the fair-market value) for the subject property as $8,787,3101 for

1. This figure represents the total value of the subject property, which is split into two parcels—an
improved parcel on which the apartment complex sits, which is valued at $8,642,730, and a plot of




                                                 2
                                     January Term, 2024




the 2021 tax year. The Cooks alleged in their complaint that the property’s true
value was $24 million based on a “current loan amount [of] $24,000,000.00.”2 On
May 3, 2022, appellee the Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of
Education (“the school board”) filed a counter-complaint regarding the tax
valuation of the same property. Although the school board’s calculation of the
apartment complex’s value differed slightly from the Cooks’ calculation, overall,
the school board agreed with the Cooks that the county auditor had significantly
undervalued the property for the 2021 tax year. The board of revision held a hearing
on August 1, 2022. On August 4, the board of revision determined that the Cooks
and the school board did not meet their evidentiary burden, citing a “lack of
competent or probative evidence” sufficient to change the auditor’s property
valuation.
        {¶ 4} On September 30, the school board appealed the board of revision’s
denial of its requested increase in value to the BTA. The BTA, however, dismissed
the school board’s appeal in December 2022 for lack of jurisdiction. In so doing,
the BTA cited R.C. 5717.01—which had been amended effective July 21, 2022, see
2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126 (“H.B. 126”)—as “permit[ting] boards of education to
appeal a decision of a county board of revision . . . only if the board of education
owns or leases the property at issue in the original complaint.” The BTA determined
that since there was no dispute that the school board in this case did not own or
lease the property in question, the school board could not appeal. The school board
appealed the BTA’s dismissal to the Third District and the Third District reversed.
See 

 (3d Dist.). The court of appeals concluded that the July 21,



unimproved land that is also identified as property of The Residence at Cooks Point, L.L.C, which
is valued at $144,580.

2. Although the record does not make clear the type of loan referred to in the Cooks’ complaint, we
assume the loan referred to was one taken out by the property owner, using the property as the
security interest.




                                                3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




2022 amendment to R.C. 5717.01 did not apply to the school board’s appeal from
the board of revision’s valuation decision here, because the school board’s counter-
complaint seeking an increase in the auditor’s property valuation was filed with the
board of revision before the effective date of the amendment. 

 (3d Dist.). The property owner appealed to this court. We accepted
jurisdiction over the following three propositions of law:


               Proposition of Law No. 1: Under the plain reading of
       amended R.C. 5717.01, a board of education has no authority to
       appeal a decision of a board of revision issued after July 21, 2022.
       A court cannot delay the effectiveness of the legislation by reading
       into the statute a later effective date not expressly provided by the
       General Assembly.
               Proposition of Law No. 2: Amended R.C. 5717.01 is
       prospective as written.
               Proposition of Law No. 3: Amended R.C. 5717.01 is
       remedial legislation that is not a prohibited retroactive law.


See 

.
       {¶ 5} These three propositions of law raise the same issue: whether the BTA
erred in dismissing the school board’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Therefore,
we address these propositions of law together.
              Real-Property Tax-Valuation Process and H.B. 126
       {¶ 6} Under Article XII, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution, “[l]and and
improvements thereon shall be taxed by uniform rule according to value.”
R.C. 5713.01 sets forth the criteria for assessing real-property values and provides
that county auditors are responsible for conducting appraisals of the real property
located within their respective counties. R.C. 5715.19 provides the procedure for




                                         4
                                       January Term, 2024




challenging an auditor’s property valuation before a county board of revision, and
R.C. 5717.01 provides the procedure for appealing a board of revision’s decision to
the BTA.3
         {¶ 7} In April 2022, while the valuation challenges were pending before the
board of revision in this case, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 126 with an
effective date of July 21, 2022. Section 1 of H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5715.19 and
5717.01, while Section 2 repealed the preexisting versions of those statutes.
Section 3 provided additional information about the effective date of amendments
to the statutory procedure for filing a complaint or counter-complaint with a board
of revision under R.C. 5715.19. Section 3 stated:


                   (A) The amendment by this act of section 5715.19 of the
         Revised Code, except for the enactment by this act of division (I) of
         that section, applies to any original complaint or counter-complaint,
         as those terms are defined in that section, filed for tax year 2022 or
         any tax year thereafter.
                   (B) The enactment by this act of division (I) of section
         5715.19 of the Revised Code applies to any private payment
         agreement, as defined in that division, entered into on or after the
         effective date of that enactment.




3. County boards of revision are composed of the county treasurer, the county auditor, and a member
of the board of county commissioners. R.C. 5715.02. R.C. 5715.11 provides that a board of revision
“shall hear complaints relating to the valuation or assessment of real property as the same appears
upon the tax duplicate of the then current year.” County boards of revision are required to
“investigate all such complaints and may increase or decrease any such valuation or correct any
assessment complained of, or [they] may order a reassessment by the original assessing officer.” 

The BTA is a bipartisan state board composed of three members who are each appointed for six-
year terms by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. R.C. 5703.03. R.C.
5703.02(A)(2) authorizes the BTA to “hear and determine all appeals of questions of law and fact
arising under the tax laws of this state in appeals from . . . [d]ecisions of county boards of revision.”




                                                   5
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




          {¶ 8} The repealed version of R.C. 5715.19(A) provided a list of persons
and entities that had the right to challenge an auditor’s property valuation by filing
a complaint with a board of revision. Those persons and entities included the
owners of the property in question, a local school board, and third-party taxpayers
who resided in the county where the property in question was located. Former
R.C. 5715.19(A), 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 57. Specifically, former R.C. 5715.19(A)
stated:


                 Any person owning taxable real property in the county or in
          a taxing district with territory in the county; such a person’s spouse;
          a tenant of the property owner, if the property is classified as to use
          for tax purposes as commercial or industrial, the lease requires the
          tenant to pay the entire amount of taxes charged against the property,
          and the lease allows, or the property owner otherwise authorizes, the
          tenant to file such a complaint with respect to the property; . . . the
          board of county commissioners; . . . the board of township trustees
          of any township with territory within the county; the board of
          education of any school district with any territory in the county; or
          the mayor or legislative authority of any municipal corporation with
          any territory in the county may file such a complaint regarding any
          such determination affecting any real property in the county . . . .


(Emphasis added.)
          {¶ 9} Former R.C. 5715.19(B) provided a list of persons and entities that
had the right to receive notice that a complaint challenging an auditor’s property
valuation had been filed. Additionally, former R.C. 5715.19(B) provided that
certain persons and entities had the right to file a separate complaint in support of
or in objection to a property-valuation complaint. Former R.C. 5715.19(B) stated:




                                            6
                                January Term, 2024




              Within thirty days after the last date . . . complaints may be
       filed [under R.C. 5715.19(A)], the auditor shall give notice of each
       complaint in which the stated amount of overvaluation,
       undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or
       incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred
       dollars to each property owner whose property is the subject of the
       complaint, if the complaint was not filed by the owner or the owner’s
       spouse and to each board of education whose school district may be
       affected by the complaint. Within thirty days after receiving such
       notice, a board of education . . . may file a complaint in support of
       or objecting to the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation,
       discriminatory    valuation,    illegal   valuation,   or    incorrect
       determination stated in a previously filed complaint or objecting to
       the current valuation.


(Emphasis added.) 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 57.
       {¶ 10} Regarding the procedure for a party to appeal to the BTA after
receiving an unfavorable decision from a board of revision, former R.C. 5717.01,
2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34, stated:


              An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may
       be taken to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of
       the decision of the county board of revision is mailed as provided in
       division (A) of section 5715.20 of the Revised Code. Such an appeal
       may be taken by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any
       board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized




                                         7
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against
        valuations or assessments with the auditor.


        {¶ 11} While the persons and entities authorized to file complaints with a
board of revision did not change with H.B. 126’s amendments to R.C. 5715.19(A),
the legislation reworded the statute in such a way that it now refers to certain entities
differently.    Specifically, the amendment deleted “the board of county
commissioners,” “the board of township trustees of any township with territory in
the county,” “the board of education of any school district with any territory in the
county,” and “the . . . legislative authority of any municipal corporation with any
territory in the county” from the list of entities authorized to challenge an auditor’s
property valuation and replaced those terms with the “legislative authority of a
subdivision.”    The General Assembly defined “legislative authority” in the
amended statute as “a board of county commissioners, a board of township trustees
of any township with territory in the county, the board of education of any school
district with territory in the county, or the legislative authority of a municipal
corporation with territory in the county.” R.C. 5715.19(A). The General Assembly
also defined the terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” as they are
used in the amended statute. See 

 An “original complaint” is defined as a
“complaint filed under division (A) of [R.C. 5715.19],” and a “counter-complaint”
is defined as a “complaint filed under division (B) [of R.C. 5715.19] in response to
an original complaint.” R.C. 5715.19(A).
        {¶ 12} Regarding the legislation’s effect on R.C. 5717.01, H.B. 126 left
intact the list of parties that are authorized to appeal a board of revision’s decision
to the BTA. However, H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5717.01 to include an exception
that limits the circumstances under which a political subdivision may appeal to the
BTA to only those instances in which the subdivision owns or leases the property
in question. As amended, R.C. 5717.01 now states:




                                           8
                                      January Term, 2024




                  An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may
         be taken to the board of tax appeals. . . by . . . any board, legislative
         authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19
         of the Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or
         assessments with the auditor, except that a subdivision[4] that files
         an original complaint or counter-complaint under that section with
         respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may not
         appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that
         original complaint or counter-complaint.


(Emphasis added.)
                                            Analysis
         {¶ 13} This case requires us to determine whether the former version or the
amended version of R.C. 5717.01 applies to the school board’s appeal to the BTA.
This is a question of statutory interpretation. As with any question of statutory
interpretation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. See Sarmiento v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 

, ¶ 25.
“To determine the intent of the legislature, we first look to the plain language of the
statute.” State v. Gordon, 

, citing State ex rel. Burrows v. Indus.
Comm., 

, ¶ 5. “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply
the statute as written.” 

 citing Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 2006-
Ohio-954, ¶ 52. We hold that the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01 makes
clear that the amended statute does not apply to cases in which a challenge to an


4. Although neither R.C. 5715.19 nor 5717.01 defines the term “subdivision,” there appears to be
no disagreement among the parties that “subdivision” is intended to mean “political subdivision”
and that a school district is a political subdivision. Accord Avon Lake City School Dist. v. Limbach,

 (1988) (“We are persuaded that a school district is a political subdivision
created by the General Assembly . . . .”).




                                                 9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




auditor’s property valuation was pending before a board of revision when the
amendment took effect.
       {¶ 14} The amendment to R.C. 5717.01 is written in the present tense and
states that an appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be made to
the BTA by any legislative authority, “except that a subdivision that files an original
complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the
subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of
revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.” (Emphasis
and underlining added.). The fact that amended R.C. 5717.01 uses the present tense
“files” instead of the past tense “filed” or “has filed” indicates that the amendment
was intended by the legislature to apply prospectively, i.e., to cases filed with a
board of revision after the amendment took effect. Had the General Assembly used
the past tense in its phrasing, that would have indicated an intent that the statutory
amendment be applied to cases pending before a board of revision when the
amendment took effect. But that is not what the General Assembly did.
       {¶ 15} Additionally, the phrasing of amended R.C. 5717.01 clearly ties the
right of appeal to the filing of a complaint or counter-complaint with a board of
revision and not to the filing of an appeal from a board of revision’s decision on a
complaint. This indicates that the point in time when the statute becomes effective
is the point in time when a political subdivision “files” a complaint or counter-
complaint with a board of revision. Since the school board in this case filed a
counter-complaint with the board of revision prior to the effective date of H.B. 126,
the former version of R.C. 5717.01 controls the school board’s right of appeal.
       {¶ 16} Indeed, we reached a similar conclusion, albeit in a different context,
in State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty. Bd. of Elections, 

. In that case,
we determined that when a statutory amendment ties itself to a specific operative
event, it is the occasion of the operative event that controls whether the amended
statute is applicable to a pending case or whether the prior version of the statute




                                          10
                                January Term, 2024




applies. If, for instance, the amended statute in this case had made the filing of an
appeal to the BTA the operative event on which the new prohibition on political-
subdivision appeals to the BTA was conditioned, then it might be said that the
General Assembly intended the amendment to apply to cases that were pending
before a board of revision when the amendment took effect. But again, that is not
how the General Assembly worded the amended statute.
       {¶ 17} Lastly, our conclusion here that amended R.C. 5717.01 applies
prospectively, i.e., to cases that were not pending before a board of revision when
the amended statute took effect, is bolstered by the context in which the statutory
amendment was adopted—specifically, amended R.C. 5717.01’s relationship to the
amendments imposed by H.B. 126 on R.C. 5715.19. Amended R.C. 5717.01
provides an exception to the prior general rule that political subdivisions could
appeal decisions of a board of revisions as a matter of course. The amended statute
now restricts a subdivision’s appeal rights by stating that “a subdivision that files
an original complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to
property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the
board of revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.”
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 5717.01. However, the terms “original complaint” and
“counter-complaint,” which are present in the amended version of R.C. 5717.01,
were not present in former R.C. 5717.01 or 5715.19—the statutes that were in effect
when the school board in this case filed its counter-complaint.
       {¶ 18} The terms “original complaint” and “counter-complaint” are new to
this statutory scheme and are a product of H.B. 126’s amendments to R.C. 5715.19.
Former R.C. 5715.19 did not distinguish an “original complaint” from a “counter-
complaint.” Instead, former R.C. 5715.19 simply used the term “complaint” to
refer to challenges to an auditor’s property valuation filed under division (A) of the
statute—which represented the first complaint initiating a challenge—as well as
complaints brought under division (B) of the statute—which represented




                                         11
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




complaints filed in support of or in opposition to the initial complaint. Given that
the appeal exception in amended R.C. 5717.01 is tied to the filing of an “original
complaint” or “counter-complaint”—terms that did not exist within the statutory
scheme when the school board filed its counter-complaint5 with the board of
revision under former R.C. 5715.19(B)—it cannot be said that the General
Assembly intended the appeal exception to apply to cases that were pending before
a board of revision when the amendment took effect. What is more is that Section
3 of H.B. 126 specifically states that the terms “complaint” and “counter-
complaint,” as defined in the amendments to R.C. 5715.19, are effective “for tax
year 2022 or any tax year thereafter.” Importantly, the school board’s counter-
complaint in this case concerned tax year 2021, not 2022 or any year thereafter.
                                           Conclusion
         {¶ 19} Based on the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01, we hold that
the General Assembly did not intend for the appeals exception contained in the
amended statute to apply when a school board had filed a counter-complaint with a
board of revision prior to the amended statute’s effective date of July 21, 2022.
Because the school board in this case had filed a counter-complaint with the board


5. Throughout this opinion, we have referred to the complaint the school board filed as a “counter-
complaint.” We have done so because that is how the school board designated its filing with the
board of revision. It appears that even though former R.C. 5715.19(A) did not define an initial
complaint filed with a board of revision as an “original complaint” and former R.C. 5715.19(B) did
not classify a filing made in response to an initial complaint as a “counter-complaint,” these terms
were commonly used for such filings prior to the enactment of H.B. 126. Nevertheless, this court
has refused to recognize that these terms had any legal meaning under former R.C. 5715.19:

                   But although the official-complaint form uses the term
         “countercomplaint,” as does our case law, that word does not appear in the statute
         itself. Instead, both R.C. 5715.19(A) and 5715.19(B) authorize the filing of a
         “complaint.” For that reason, we will refer to a complaint filed under division (A)
         of R.C. 5715.19 as an “A complaint,” and we will refer to a complaint filed under
         division (B) as a “B complaint.”

Licking Hts. Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

.




                                                 12
                                   January Term, 2024




of revision prior to the effective date of H.B. 126, it maintained the right to appeal
the board of revision’s decision to the BTA under former R.C. 5717.01.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the BTA dismissing the school board’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, and we remand the matter to the BTA to consider the school board’s
appeal.
                                                                      Judgment affirmed
                                                                    and cause remanded.
                                  __________________
          FISCHER, J., dissenting.
          {¶ 20} I would conclude that the plain language of R.C. 5717.01 as
amended effective July 21, 2022, see 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, prohibits a
school board from appealing a decision of a county board of revision related to the
valuation of property that the school board does not own or lease, regardless of
when the underlying complaint or counter-complaint was filed. I thus respectfully
dissent and would reverse the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals.
          {¶ 21} Amended R.C. 5717.01 provides that


          [a]n appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be
          taken . . . by . . . any board . . . authorized by section 5715.19 of the
          Revised Code to file complaints against valuations or assessments
          with the auditor, except that a subdivision that files an original
          complaint or counter-complaint under that section with respect to
          property the subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the
          decision of the board of revision with respect to that original
          complaint or counter-complaint.




                                             13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 22} In my view, the plain language of this statute clearly indicates the
General Assembly’s intent that a school board, like appellee the Marysville
Exempted Village Schools Board of Education (“the school board”), not be allowed
to appeal a board of revision’s decision regarding the valuation of property that the
school board does not own or lease. It seems to me that in concluding otherwise,
the majority opinion’s analysis overcomplicates this clear statutory provision.
       {¶ 23} The first sentence of amended R.C. 5717.01 (which is the sentence
of that statute relevant to this appeal) begins by authorizing a broad range of
individuals and entities, namely “the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or any
board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized by section
5715.19 of the Revised Code,” to appeal a decision of a county board of revision
by filing complaints against valuations or assessments with the county auditor. The
clause following this provision in the statute sets forth an exception to who may file
an appeal: “a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint
under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease
may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original
complaint or counter-complaint.”
       {¶ 24} Significantly, the right-to-appeal exception in amended R.C.
5717.01 does not set forth when or how an appeal may be filed. Instead, the
exception merely identifies who may not file an appeal. Thus, in my view,
appellant, The Residence at Cooks Pointe, L.L.C., is correct that the phrase “a
subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint” defines a class to
which the exception applies and does not function to delay the application of the
amended version of R.C. 5717.01 based on when the underlying complaint was
filed. In this case, it is undisputed that the school board is a subdivision under R.C.
5717.01 and that the school board filed a counter-complaint regarding the valuation
of property that it does not own or lease. See majority opinion, ¶ 3, 12, fn. 4.
Therefore, according to the plain language of amended R.C. 5717.01, the school




                                          14
                                 January Term, 2024




board could not file an appeal from the board of revision’s decision pertaining to
that property.
       {¶ 25} The majority opinion’s holding appears to be premised on three
aspects of the amended version of R.C. 5717.01, which are treated as compelling a
conclusion that the prior version of the statute, see 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34, applies
in this case. First, the amended version of the statute is “written in the present
tense,” using the phrase “subdivision that files” (rather than the past tense
“subdivision that filed”). Majority opinion at ¶ 14. Second, “the phrasing of
amended R.C. 5717.01 clearly ties the right of appeal to the filing of a complaint
or counter-complaint with a board of revision.” Majority opinion at ¶ 15. Third,
“the context in which the statutory amendment was adopted” indicates that the prior
version of R.C. 5717.01 did not tie any appeal exception to the filing of an “original
complaint” or “counter-complaint,” so it cannot be said that the General Assembly
intended the appeal exception in the amended version of the statute to apply to cases
pending when the amendment took effect. Majority opinion at ¶ 17.
       {¶ 26} Each of these points overcomplicates the analysis by essentially
treating the identifying phrase “a subdivision that files an original complaint or
counter-complaint,” R.C. 5717.01, as creating a right to appeal. Again, this phrase
is merely a descriptive term identifying “who” is subject to the limited exception to
the right of appeal established by R.C. 5717.01. First, the fact that the present-tense
word “files” is used rather than the past tense “filed” is a distinction without a
difference, because by the time the board of revision has issued its decision, the
complaint or counter-complaint will have already been filed, meaning the filing will
have always occurred in the past. Second, this identifying phrase does not tie the
right of appeal to the filing of a complaint or counter-complaint, because that right
is already established in the first clause of amended R.C. 5717.01, with this
particular identifying phrase merely setting forth the exception to that general right
to file an appeal. Third, the use of the terms “complaint” and “counter-complaint”




                                          15
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




in the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 do not impact this analysis, because as
noted in the majority opinion, the school board initiated its participation in this case
by filing a counter-complaint, see majority opinion at ¶ 3, a procedure that predated
the amendment to R.C. 5717.01, see 2018 Sub.H.B. No. 34.
        {¶ 27} An illustration of the above points can be made by examining the
primary case relied on by the majority opinion, State ex rel. Thomas v. Wood Cty.
Bd. of Elections, 

. The majority opinion states that Thomas stands
for the proposition that “when a statutory amendment ties itself to a specific
operative event, it is the occasion of the operative event that controls whether the
amended statute is applicable to a pending case or whether the prior version of the
statute applies.” Majority opinion at ¶ 16. This court’s statutory analysis in
Thomas, however, undermines the analysis of the majority opinion in this case.
        {¶ 28} In Thomas, we considered whether a previous version of R.C.
519.12(H) (setting forth a requirement that a referendum petition contain a number
of signatures equal to at least 8 percent of the total votes cast for governor in the
township at the most recent gubernatorial election) or an amended version of R.C.
519.12(H) (setting forth a requirement that a referendum petition contain a number
of signatures equal to at least 15 percent of the total votes cast for governor in the
township at the most recent gubernatorial election) applied to a proposed
referendum related to a zoning amendment adopted by a board of township trustees
two weeks before the amended version of the statute became effective. 

. In our analysis, we noted that the amended version of the statute provided
that the proposed amendment would become effective 30 days after its adoption
unless a valid referendum petition was presented to the board within that 30-day
window. Id. at ¶ 29-30. We emphasized that because the requirements of the statute
were tied specifically to the date of the adoption of the zoning amendment, it was
logical to apply the amended version of R.C. 519.12(H) only to zoning amendments
adopted after the effective date of the amended statute. 

.




                                          16
                                 January Term, 2024




        {¶ 29} If we are to apply the same rationale that we applied in Thomas to
this case, we must reverse the decision of the court of appeals. To use the phrase
employed by the majority opinion in this case, the “specific operative event,”
majority opinion at ¶ 16, in Thomas was the adoption of the zoning amendment,
which started the 30-day clock for submitting a referendum petition. Because that
“specific operative event” occurred before the effective date of the amended version
of the statute, the prior version of the statute applied in Thomas. In this case, the
“specific operative event” under the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 is the
mailing of notice of the county board of revision’s decision, which starts the 30-
day clock for one of the persons or entities identified in that statute to file an appeal
from that decision. Because that “specific operative event” occurred in September
2022, after the July 21, 2022 effective date of the amended version of R.C. 5717.01,
see 2022 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 126, we must apply the amended version of that statute
here and conclude that the school board was barred from filing its appeal. I
accordingly view the rationale applied by this court in Thomas as supporting the
conclusion that the decision of the court of appeals must be reversed in this case.
        {¶ 30} Furthermore, I see no constitutional concerns that would prevent the
application of amended R.C. 5717.01 to cases like this. The amended version of
R.C. 5717.01 is clearly prospective in nature. It provides that after the statute’s
effective date, political subdivisions cannot file appeals from decisions of county
boards of revision related to the valuation of property that those subdivisions do not
own or lease. “Because the law in question applies only prospectively—that is, to
[appeals] after its effective date—and because it is a rule of procedure, it does not
implicate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws.” State v.
Brooks, 

, citing Ohio Const., art. II, § 28 (DeWine, J.,
concurring in judgment only). I accordingly conclude that no retroactivity concerns
exist here, because the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 applies only prospectively,




                                           17
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




to cases in which a political subdivision seeks to appeal a decision of a board of
revision after the effective date of the statute.
        {¶ 31} “When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute as
written.” State v. Gordon, 

, citing Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs.
v. Akron, 

, ¶ 52. In my view, this case does not need to be
overcomplicated and can be resolved based on the plain language of the amended
version of R.C. 5717.01, which provides that “a subdivision that files an original
complaint or counter-complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the
subdivision does not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of
revision with respect to that original complaint or counter-complaint.” Here, the
school board filed a counter-complaint with respect to the valuation of property that
it does not own or lease. It therefore may not appeal the board of revision’s decision
in this case. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the decision
of the Third District Court of Appeals.
                                __________________
        Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Kelley A. Gorry, and
Karol C. Fox, for appellee Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of
Education.
        Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., Nicholas M.J. Ray, Steven L.
Smiseck, and Lauren M. Johnson, for appellant.
        Zaino Hall & Farrin, L.L.C., Stephen K. Hall, Thomas M. Zaino, and Robert
C. Maier, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce.
                                __________________




                                           18