[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoover, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.




                         SLIP OPINION NO. 

                        DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HOOVER.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoover, Slip Opinion No.
                                   

.]
Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of
        Professional Conduct—18-month suspension, with six months conditionally
        stayed, and immediate suspension from judicial office without pay for
        duration of disciplinary suspension.
   (No. 2023-0188—Submitted May 17, 2023—Decided September 24, 2024.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2021-034.
                                   ______________
        FISCHER, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ., joined. DEWINE, J., concurred in judgment
only. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       FISCHER, J.
       {¶ 1} Respondent, Kim Richard Hoover, of Stow, Ohio, Attorney

 was admitted to the practice of law in 1979 and serves
as a judge on the Stow Municipal Court. Relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged in a
May 2022 amended complaint that Hoover had committed 48 violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and 16 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
based on his methods of collecting fines and court costs from 16 municipal-court
defendants.    Following a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of
Professional Conduct concluded that Hoover committed all 64 of the alleged
violations and recommended that Hoover be suspended from the practice of law for
two years. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommended sanction, and further, it recommended that Hoover be suspended
from judicial office, without pay, for the duration of his suspension.
       {¶ 2} Hoover objects to the board’s findings and the recommended
sanction. Hoover argues that a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with
six months stayed, is appropriate.
       {¶ 3} After review, we agree with the board that Hoover committed the
alleged violations; however, we find that the appropriate sanction is an 18-month
suspension from the practice of law with the final six months of the suspension
stayed on the condition that Hoover commit no further misconduct. Hoover is also
immediately suspended from judicial office without pay for the duration of his
suspension.
                 I. FINES, COSTS, AND INCARCERATION
       {¶ 4} Our criminal-justice system strives to ensure that no matter how rich
or poor, each defendant receives equal justice under the law. See Bearden v.
Georgia, 

 (1983). “The overriding purposes of misdemeanor
sentencing are to protect the public from future crime . . . and to punish the
offender.” R.C. 2929.21(A). Unless a jail term is required by the Revised Code, a




                                          2
                                  January Term, 2024




court that sentences an offender for a misdemeanor or minor misdemeanor “has
discretion to determine the most effective way to achieve the purposes and
principles of [misdemeanor] sentencing.” R.C. 2929.22(A). Such a punishment
may include a financial sanction by means of a fine. See R.C. 2929.28(A)(2). And
the court is required to impose various costs related to the prosecution and sanctions
imposed against the defendant. See R.C. 2947.23; R.C. 2929.28(A)(3); State v.
Taylor, 

.
        {¶ 5} Fines and costs are treated differently in our criminal-justice system.
The General Assembly has set forth a procedure in R.C. 2947.14 by which
offenders may be incarcerated for failing to pay their fines. A court may order that
an offender be jailed for failing to pay a fine that is a part of the offender’s sentence
if the court determines at the offender’s sentencing hearing that “the offender is
able, at that time, to pay the fine but refuses to do so.” R.C. 2947.14(A). The
offender is entitled to several procedural safeguards during this process, like the
right to be represented by counsel and to present evidence as to his or her ability to
pay the fine. R.C. 2947.14(B). It is only after the court finds that the offender has
the ability to pay the fine at the hearing and the offender has failed to pay the fine
that the court can issue a warrant for the offender’s arrest. R.C. 2947.14(C).
        {¶ 6} An offender who is arrested and taken into custody under R.C.
2947.14(C) is also entitled to a hearing on the “first regularly scheduled court day
following the date of arrest in order to inform the court . . . of any change of
circumstances that has occurred since the time of sentencing.” 

 At this change-
of-circumstances hearing, the offender has the right to testify and present evidence
regarding his or her inability to pay the fine. 

 If, after the hearing, the court finds
that the offender is able to pay the fine, the court must support that determination
with findings of fact in a judgment entry. 

 If an offender is imprisoned under
R.C. 2947.14, that offender receives a credit toward his or her fine of $50 per day
or a fraction of a day that he or she is incarcerated. R.C. 2947.14(D). The General




                                            3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Assembly has expressly prohibited courts from imprisoning offenders in
satisfaction of a fine except as provided by R.C. 2947.14. R.C. 2947.14(D).
       {¶ 7} As for costs, a court cannot order that a defendant be sent to jail for
failing to pay court costs. See Taylor, 

. The imposition of
court costs is civil in nature and, constitutionally, a person cannot be imprisoned
for his or her failure to pay a civil debt. 

; Ohio Const., art. I, § 15.
Rather, the court can order the defendant to perform community service in
satisfaction of the costs or place the defendant on an approved payment plan for the
costs, so long as the court follows the proper procedural requirements. See R.C.
2947.23; 

.
       {¶ 8} It is absolutely imperative that courts do not jail offenders for failing
to pay their court costs, as such an action is forbidden by the Ohio Constitution.
Ohio Const., article I, § 15 (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil
action . . . .”); see also Strattman v. Studt, 

 (1969). To
help judges navigate this legal framework, since 2014, this court has provided each
Ohio judge with a bench card that explains the rules concerning the imposition and
collection of fines and costs and when incarceration is authorized for nonpayment
of fines. See Bret Crow, Bench Card Offers Guidance On Collection of Court
Fines, Costs, Court News Ohio (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.courtnewsohio.gov
/happening/2014/benchCards_020414.asp (accessed July 29, 2024).
       {¶ 9} While this court has made numerous revisions to the bench card, each
version has explained the difference between fines, which are a criminal sanction,
and court costs, which are a civil obligation. And each version of the bench card
has made clear that R.C. 2947.14 is the sole and exclusive authority to commit an
offender to jail for willful refusal to pay a fine in a criminal case. See, e.g., Bench
Cards, Guides, & Toolkits, The Supreme Court of Ohio, Collection of Court Costs
& Fines in Adult Trial Courts, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/docs
/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf         (accessed      July      29,      2024)




                                          4
                                     January Term, 2024




[https://perma.cc/7HM4-P35S].1 Additionally, the bench card informs judges that
they must segregate fines from court costs and cannot order a person to appear or
issue a warrant for unpaid court costs. 

 And as explained in the bench card, a
person may be jailed for a willful refusal to pay a fine that the person has the ability
to pay. Id.; see also R.C. 2947.14(A); State v. Ellis, 

 (2d
Dist.).
          {¶ 10} In the bench card, this court has explained how courts may enforce
fines by imposing jail, listing the procedural safeguards designed to ensure a
defendant is not wrongfully jailed: (1) segregating fines from costs and other
financial sanctions, (2) providing reasonable notice to the defendant of a hearing,
(3) conducting an evidentiary, economic-ability-to-pay hearing, (4) advising the
defendant of the right to counsel, (5) providing the defendant with the opportunity
to be heard, and (6) making a specific finding that the defendant has the ability to
pay the fine and willfully refuses to do so. Additionally, as we recently observed in
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr, 

, “the bench card is replete
with citations to caselaw and statutes indicating that a person’s ability to pay must
be considered when assessing and collecting fines.” In the May 2021 version of
the bench card submitted by the parties as a joint exhibit, this court clarified that
judges may not collect fines, costs, or other fees by setting bond based on the
amount owed and that “[i]ncarceration for nonpayment [of fines] should only be
used as a last resort and after compliance with all statutory and procedural
safeguards.”




1. In addition to the version of the bench card currently available on the Ohio Supreme Court
website, the parties have included the February 2014 and May 2021 versions of the bench card as
stipulated exhibits. Moreover, at least one other revised version of the bench card was published in
March 2022. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Carr, 

 (citing to the March 2022
version of the bench card).




                                                 5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                          II. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
       {¶ 11} Disciplinary counsel alleged that Hoover committed 48 violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and 16 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
as a result of the methods he used to collect fines and costs from 16 municipal-court
defendants. Specifically, disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with 16 counts, with
each count alleging the same four violations: (1) Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (2) Jud.Cond.R.
2.2; (3) Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B); and (4) Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
       {¶ 12} Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 requires a judge to act at all times in a manner that
“promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary” and to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” A judge
can create the appearance of impropriety by making “inappropriate comments” or
by demonstrating a “lack of proper judicial demeanor.” Disciplinary Counsel v.
Porzio, 

. And “[a]ctual improprieties include violations of
law, court rules, or provisions of [the Code of Judicial Conduct.]” Jud.Cond.R. 1.2,
Comment 5.
       {¶ 13} Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 requires a judge to “uphold and apply the law” and
“perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.” “To ensure impartiality
and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded.”
Jud.Cond.R. 2.2, Comment 1. Further, “a judge must interpret and apply the law
without regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in
question.” (Emphasis added.) Jud.Cond.R. 2.2, Comment 2. Good-faith errors
made by the judge do not constitute violations of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2. Jud.Cond.R.
2.2, Comment 3; compare Carr, 

 (judge found to have
committed numerous violations of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 by improperly using capias
warrants to collect fines and court costs) with Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 2023-
Ohio-4751, ¶ 44, quoting In re Judges of Mun. Court of Cedar Rapids, 

 (1964) (explaining that a judge cannot be disciplined for a mere exercise




                                          6
                                January Term, 2024




in judicial discretion, as the “‘remedy for mistakes of law or fact in individual cases
is by appeal, certiorari, or other proper proceeding’ ”).
       {¶ 14} Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) prohibits a judge from using language or acting
in a manner that could be perceived as engaging in bias, prejudice, or harassment
based on matters like race, disability, or socioeconomic status. A judge may
demonstrate bias or prejudice by using the following: “epithets; slurs; demeaning
nicknames; negative stereotyping; [or] attempted humor based upon stereotypes.”
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3, Comment 2; see Gaul at ¶ 23-25 (judge found to have violated
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), among other rules, by demeaning an African-American
defendant by calling him a “brother,” a “murderer,” and a “remorseless predator”).
Further, a judge may demonstrate bias or prejudice by engaging in “threatening,
intimidating, or hostile acts.” Jud.Cond.R. 2.3, Comment 2.
       {¶ 15} A judge may also exhibit bias or prejudice by making “irrelevant
references to personal characteristics.” 

 Additionally, manifestations of bias or
prejudice may come in the form of a judge’s “facial expressions and body
language.” 

 However, we have recognized that an adverse ruling, without more,
is not evidence that a judge is biased or prejudiced. In re Disqualification of
Bickerton, 

, ¶ 9. Judges are permitted to express dissatisfaction,
but that dissatisfaction should be expressed in a manner that nonetheless promotes
public confidence in the judiciary. See 

.
       {¶ 16} And Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from “engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Dishonesty or a breach
of trust, especially over a series of repeated offenses, “can indicate indifference to
legal obligation” and serve as a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4. Prof.Cond.R. 8.4,
Comment 2.
                               III. MISCONDUCT
       {¶ 17} This court is the “final arbiter” of attorney and judicial discipline.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 

; see also Cincinnati Bar




                                          7
                                   SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Assn. v. Powers, 

, ¶ 21. We “render[] the final determination of
the facts and conclusions of law” and are “not bound by the [Board of Professional
Conduct’s] findings of fact or conclusions of law. Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 

 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus.
         {¶ 18} Disciplinary counsel bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the facts necessary to establish a violation. 

 at paragraph
two of the syllabus. Here, Hoover and disciplinary counsel submitted 200 factual
stipulations and 176 stipulated exhibits. Additionally, the parties stipulated to three
aggravating factors and four mitigating factors. Hoover has stipulated to violating
Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 in Counts 1 and 4, but he has contested all other charged violations.
         {¶ 19} Hoover has raised a single objection before this court, contesting the
board’s findings regarding professional misconduct and aggravating factors, as well
as its recommended sanction. With respect to the board’s findings of professional
misconduct,2 Hoover breaks the 16 cases down into three categories: (1)
“[d]efendants who were not jailed following their hearing”; (2) “[d]efendants
sentenced to serve previously issued jail time”; and (3) “[d]efendants who were told
they could be released early if they paid their fines and costs, or some portion
thereof.” Hoover’s main argument is that many of these defendants were not
ordered to jail for failing to pay their fines and costs, but rather, he jailed or
threatened to jail them because they had shown themselves to be irresponsible.
Specifically, Hoover argues that R.C. 2947.14 does not apply to seven defendants
because they were not incarcerated or threatened with incarceration due to


2. Hoover supports three of his arguments to this court by citing to the posthearing brief he submitted
to the board and noting that portions of that brief are “incorporated as if restated herein.” This
court’s rules require parties’ briefs to contain arguments relevant to their positions. S.Ct.Prac.R.
16.02. As we stated in Gaul, 

, we have no intention of permitting parties
to incorporate arguments made to this court by referencing prior briefs. However, since Gaul was
decided while Hoover’s case was pending before this court, and in the interest of giving all of
Hoover’s arguments full consideration, we reluctantly consider the arguments that he has
incorporated by reference in his objection to the board’s report.




                                                  8
                                January Term, 2024




nonpayment but rather due to irresponsibility for prior conduct, namely, failing to
appear for past court dates or failing to pay fines and costs imposed for an earlier
conviction. He argues that R.C. 2947.14 does not apply to three other defendants,
because they had previously been convicted and ordered to serve jail time if they
did not comply with the court’s orders. And Hoover argues that he fashioned
alternatives to incarceration for four defendants who could make financial
payments—that is, “serve jail or pay the fine.”
       {¶ 20} Hoover maintains that because, in his view, R.C. 2947.14 does not
apply to the 14 defendants among the three categories he identified in his objection,
the violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) are not supported
in those respective counts. And while Hoover concedes that R.C. 2947.14 applied
to two defendants and he therefore committed two violations of Jud.Cond.R. 2.2,
he maintains that he did not violate Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 or Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) in those
cases, because even though he made “mistakes” in those matters, his conduct does
not amount to a “fail[ure] to promote public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary” or an “ethical impropriety.”
       {¶ 21} Disciplinary counsel maintains that R.C. 2947.14 applied in all 16
defendants’ cases, but he contends that even if it did not, Hoover still violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) given his “coercive,
draconian tactics to compel payment of fines and costs.” Disciplinary counsel
stresses that “[t]hreatening incarceration on non-jailable offenses to compel
payment of fines and costs—regardless of the statute—constitutes unethical
conduct.”
       {¶ 22} Hoover also maintains that the evidence does not support the board’s
findings that he treated defendants with a bias or prejudice in violation of
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B). Hoover argues that 16 out of the thousands of cases that he
has presided over during his lengthy service as a judge do not demonstrate how he
runs his courtroom. He emphasizes his deep commitment to his community and




                                          9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




explains that his objective was to “impose a punishment that was actually impactful
on these defendants and did not allow them to skirt responsibility.” (Emphasis in
original.) During oral argument, Hoover’s counsel specifically noted that the board
had found that Hoover was genuine when he testified that his collection of fines
and costs was about more than money, and specifically, that these efforts were
about his obligation to hold defendants accountable and teach them responsibility.
His counsel further argued that Hoover cannot be found to have exhibited prejudice
when he was following the purposes and principles of misdemeanor sentencing.
See R.C. 2929.21.
       {¶ 23} After reviewing the record, we adopt the board’s findings of
misconduct regarding the stipulated rule violations. We turn our focus to the
remaining 62 charged violations that Hoover disputes and his objections to the
board’s report.
                        A. Count 1: the Dawson Matter
       {¶ 24} In July 2019, Douglas Dawson was charged with driving under
suspension, a nonjailable offense with a maximum penalty of a $1,000 fine. The
court issued a warrant for Dawson’s arrest when he failed to appear for his
arraignment.
       {¶ 25} In September 2019, Dawson was arrested and appeared without
counsel before Hoover for the arraignment. Dawson pleaded guilty to the offense,
and Hoover sentenced him to a $100 fine and court costs, totaling $537. Hoover
noted on the entry that Dawson was to pay $100 in two weeks and the remaining
balance within 30 days, or else he would be required to return to court. Dawson
failed to pay anything by Hoover’s initial deadline, but he returned to court several
days later and paid $100 toward his fines and costs.
       {¶ 26} Hoover set another hearing date for Dawson to return to court on the
matter a month later if Dawson had not yet paid the remaining balance. Dawson,




                                         10
                                  January Term, 2024




however, made no additional payments and failed to appear. Thus, a magistrate
issued a capias for his arrest.
        {¶ 27} Dawson was arrested and jailed a month later on the outstanding
capias. Dawson appeared before Hoover the following day. Hoover explained that
Dawson had previously been given a month to pay the fines and costs or come back
to court, and he had failed to do either. Hoover stated, “After I give you that kind
of a break, I don’t give you another one.” Hoover then informed Dawson that he
needed to pay $507 or he would “stay about ten days” in jail.
        {¶ 28} Dawson attempted to tell Hoover that he would not get paid until a
certain date, but Hoover refused to listen. He interrupted Dawson and stated, “Oh,
man, you’re going to be staying then. Once I’ve given you the break . . . and you
blow it off. I don’t want to hear anymore.” Dawson attempted to explain that
serving time would affect his employment, and Hoover responded, “Yeah. It
probably will. That’s the problem with screwing with me. . . . When it comes time,
I don’t care. And that’s where we’re at right now.” Hoover explained that if
Dawson could come up with the money, he would be out of jail sooner, getting a
$50 credit for each day he served. Hoover said, “So if you came up with $407,
they’d release you. Tomorrow you come up with $357, they’d release you. If you
don’t come up with anything, they’re gonna release you” when there is no longer a
balance.
        {¶ 29} Hoover ordered Dawson released upon payment in full or on the date
when the $50 credit he received for each day in jail was enough to satisfy the total
amount due. Dawson could not pay his fines and costs and, as a result, he spent
seven more days in custody. Upon his release from jail, Hoover credited Dawson
with $350.
        {¶ 30} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). The board agreed with disciplinary
counsel and determined that Hoover had violated all four rules specified in Count




                                          11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




1. In his objections to the board’s report, Hoover concedes that he violated
Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 when he sent Dawson to jail without the legal authority to do so,
but he maintains that he did not violate Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.3(B) or Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(d). Hoover insists that it was not his intention to manifest bias or prejudice
based on socioeconomic status in sending Dawson to jail. After reviewing the
record, we agree with the board.
       {¶ 31} Hoover had Dawson arrested for failing to pay his fines and costs.
However, Hoover failed to segregate the fines and costs, as he was required to do
by law, see State v. Swift, 

 (2d Dist.). And Hoover ignored
the applicable law establishing that a defendant cannot be incarcerated for failing
to pay court costs. See Strattman, 

. Moreover, Hoover
did not hold any discussion with Dawson about his right to counsel concerning his
ability to pay his fines, see R.C. 2947.14(B), which is harmful to an unrepresented
defendant.
       {¶ 32} And Hoover acted with a level of indifference toward Dawson that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Hoover’s statements at the hearing
show that he did not care that Dawson’s employment—one way that Dawson would
be able to make payments toward his fines and costs—would be in jeopardy were
he incarcerated. And most concerning was Hoover’s statement to Dawson that
failing to pay fines and costs on time was “screwing” with Hoover. A defendant’s
failure to pay fines in a timely manner, without the court determining the reason for
such a failure, is insufficient to justify incarceration and certainly cannot be deemed
a purposeful act of “screwing” with the court. Hoover’s explicit disregard for the
law and the decorum and respect owed to the bench by using that type of demeaning
commentary was prejudicial to the administration of justice, and it weakens the
public’s perception of a fair and independent judiciary. Therefore, we agree with
the board that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).




                                          12
                                January Term, 2024




       {¶ 33} As for Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), we also find that there is sufficient
evidence to support the board’s finding that Hoover manifested bias or prejudice
on the basis of socioeconomic status in the performance of his official duties.
Hoover’s disdain for Dawson was made apparent during Hoover’s testimony at his
disciplinary hearing:


               [Relator]: And you agree [that Dawson] should have never
       spent a night in jail in this case, it’s a non-jailable offense?
               [Hoover]: If you saw Dawson’s record, you’d think any time
       he spent in jail was a good thing for the world.


Hoover jailed Dawson for seven days because of Dawson’s inability to pay his fines
and costs and due to his criminal record. Hoover admitted that if Dawson could
have paid, then he would not have served time in jail. Hoover’s actions go beyond
a simple mistake of failing to follow the law and the record supports a finding of a
violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B).
       {¶ 34} Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings that Hoover violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) in the Dawson matter.
                        B. Count 2: the Smitherman Matter
       {¶ 35} In February 2020, Darcell Smitherman was arrested and charged
with criminal trespass, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. Smitherman appeared before
Hoover by video conference the following day. Hoover informed Smitherman that
criminal trespass carried a penalty of a maximum fine of $250 and a jail term of up
to 30 days. Smitherman pleaded not guilty and informed the court that he wished
to take the matter to trial. Hoover then reviewed Smitherman’s past criminal
conduct, noting that Smitherman “owe[d] hundreds of dollars.” Smitherman asked
if there was a possibility that he could be released and Hoover said, “Yeah, I don’t
want you released owing five or six thousand dollars for former trespasses.”




                                          13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




Hoover informed Smitherman that he intended to look over Smitherman’s criminal
record to see if he had an “excuse to transfer” Smitherman to the Community
Alternative Sentencing Center (“CASC”) or “some other jail.”
       {¶ 36} Hoover observed that it was unlikely Smitherman would be held in
the Summit County jail for the criminal-trespass charge before going on to explain:


       I’m tired of playing with you just like the deputies are. You make a
       fool of the system by constantly being arrested for the exact same
       thing, never paying a dime, and by doing that, you know that the jail
       won’t hold you on a misdemeanor in the fourth degree. Therefore,
       you get out and you do the exact same thing again and none of it
       matters to you, so this time, I’m going to try to get clever, figure out
       a reason to hold you for a month or two ‘cause I gotta do something
       to punish you or you’ll just keep doing the same old, same old.


When Smitherman asked again if he would be released, Hoover responded, “I’m
hoping not.”
       {¶ 37} Smitherman had $500 in outstanding fines, $1,841 in outstanding
costs, and 40 days of incarceration that had been previously suspended, stemming
from five prior convictions in the Stow Municipal Court. Hoover, in an order
entered that day, noted that Smitherman had repeatedly been convicted of criminal
trespass and had “always failed to pay fines/costs or do community service to
satisfy his debts and/or return to court to address these issues.” Hoover ordered
that Smitherman be remanded to CASC for 30 days and also credited him with
$1,500 toward his outstanding fines and costs.
       {¶ 38} Hoover did not advise Smitherman of his right to counsel. Nor did
he segregate the fines from costs or inquire into Smitherman’s ability to pay.




                                         14
                                January Term, 2024




       {¶ 39} Smitherman eventually pleaded guilty to the criminal-trespass
offense before a different judge. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail but was
credited with 17 days for the time already served under Hoover’s order.
       {¶ 40} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). The board concluded that the
violations were supported by sufficient evidence.         It found that Hoover had
“imposed suspended jail time on Smitherman without any procedural due process.”
Hoover objects to these findings, arguing that Smitherman was ordered to serve
“previously issued jail time.”      Disciplinary counsel maintains that Hoover’s
decision to incarcerate Smitherman was about “punishing a repeat offender who
[had] repeatedly failed to pay his fines and costs.” We agree with the board’s
findings.
       {¶ 41} A judge who makes an error of law in good faith or commits “‘a
mere mistake in the exercise of judicial discretion’ ” is not and should not be subject
to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Gaul, 2023-Ohio-
4751, at ¶ 44, quoting Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 

, 30
(1958); see also Jud.Cond.R. 2.2, Comment 3. The remedy for good-faith errors of
fact or of law is an appeal, as “‘[a] judge has a right to be wrong so far as any
discipline by [a court is] concerned except as his decisions may be reversed or writs
sustained.’ ” (Second brackets added in Gaul.) 

, quoting Judges of
Mun. Court of Cedar Rapids, 

. In Gaul, we determined that a
judge who failed to follow the proper procedure in determining bond could not be
subjected to attorney discipline. Id. at ¶ 46-50.
       {¶ 42} However, we find that Hoover’s actions went beyond a simple
mistake. Hoover maintains that he incarcerated Smitherman for a previously issued
suspended sentence. This assertion is not supported by the record. A court “‘speaks
only through its journal.’ ” State v. Leegrand, 

, quoting
Schenley v. Kauth, 

 (1953), paragraph one of the syllabus. And




                                          15
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




here, as indicated by the journal entry, Hoover incarcerated Smitherman for being
a repeat offender who had failed to pay previously imposed fines and costs.
           {¶ 43} The record demonstrates that Hoover did not make a good-faith
effort to follow the law and instead wanted to come up with a “clever” way to keep
Smitherman in jail. Even if Hoover had imposed jail time on Smitherman based on
suspended sentences, as he argues in his objections, Hoover imposed suspended jail
time on Smitherman without any due process.
           {¶ 44} At his disciplinary hearing, Hoover agreed that he did not give notice
to Smitherman regarding the purported revocation of his suspended sentences, his
right to counsel, or other procedural guarantees, see Crim.R. 32.3. In an effort to
justify his actions depriving Smitherman of the due process that he was owed,
Hoover said that in order to give Smitherman adequate notice, “We’d have to create
the Darcell Smitherman Municipal Court.” This is not the type of attitude that
judges should hold when a defendant has been deprived of the rights owed to him
under our law. Furthermore, if Hoover had appropriately incarcerated Smitherman
for the $500 in fines that he owed, Hoover could only have incarcerated
Smitherman for 10 days, not 30 days, based on the $50-per-day jail credit provided
in R.C. 2947.14(D).
           {¶ 45} We have explained before that when a judge has no appreciation for
the fact that a reasonable person may recognize that these sorts of actions are
problematic, this supports a determination that the judge “is not able to view his
conduct objectively,” which may create an appearance of impropriety. In re
Disqualification of Winkler, 

. Hoover’s interaction with
Smitherman and his testimony at his disciplinary hearing show a biased attitude
toward Smitherman that is inappropriate and prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
           {¶ 46} Hoover ignored the law and attempted to justify his actions after the
fact based on his claim that he believed it was in the public’s best interest to hold




                                            16
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Smitherman in jail, even if he acted at the expense of Smitherman’s rights.
Therefore, we agree with the board that the record supports findings that Hoover
(1) acted in a manner prejudicial to the public’s confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, (2) failed to uphold and apply the law
and perform all judicial duties fairly and impartially, (3) engaged in conduct that
manifested a bias or prejudice against socioeconomically disadvantaged people,
and (4) acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. This
conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                        C. Count 3: the Fovozzo Matter
       {¶ 47} Frank Fovozzo was charged with various offenses in two cases,
including operating a vehicle while under the influence (OVI) and resisting arrest.
In August 2020, Fovozzo pleaded guilty to reduced charges of a physical-control
violation in his OVI case and to an open-container offense in the resisting-arrest
case. He was sentenced to serve three days in jail and pay a total of $976 in fines
and costs for both cases. Fovozzo entered into a payment plan, agreeing to pay
$244 a month for four months toward his fines and costs, and he made his first
payment on time.
       {¶ 48} In October 2020, Fovozzo was arrested for failure to reinstate and
display his driver’s license, both unclassified misdemeanor offenses. He appeared
before Hoover without counsel. After Fovozzo pleaded not guilty to the nonjailable
offenses, Hoover began questioning him about his prior cases and the fines and
costs associated with them.
       {¶ 49} Fovozzo explained to Hoover that he was going through a hard
time—he had lost his job and was being evicted from his home, and he did not have
the money to pay his fines and costs. Hoover responded that Fovozzo’s previous
charges and convictions “[don’t] sound like poverty.” When Fovozzo attempted to
correct Hoover by explaining that he had not been convicted of resisting arrest and




                                         17
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OVI, Hoover responded that he was looking at the amount Fovozzo currently owed
and what he had originally been charged with.
        {¶ 50} Hoover noted that he did not believe that Fovozzo had “done
anything” to pay the fines and costs from his prior cases. Fovozzo explained to
Hoover that he had had a public defender who helped him plead down his prior
charges. Hoover asked Fovozzo again why he had made no attempt to take care of
his prior cases. Fovozzo answered, “I just don’t have the money.” Fovozzo
emphasized that he wanted to pay but that he was “down on [his] luck.” Hoover
responded, “I want to play shortstop for the Yankees, but hoping is not going to get
the job done. Wanting doesn’t get the job done.”
        {¶ 51} Hoover then proceeded to inquire as to how Fovozzo was eating.
Fovozzo explained that he was “barely” eating. Hoover retorted, “[I meant] how
are you . . . getting money for food,” to which Fovozzo replied, “I got a little bit of
money in my account.” Following up, Hoover asked, “Why won’t you answer my
questions?” Confused, Fovozzo repeated Hoover’s first question, “[H]ow am I
eating?” Hoover responded by asking how Fovozzo was paying any bills. Fovozzo
then explained that he had a little bit of money in his account because a family
member had lent him $2,000. Upon learning that, Hoover asked Fovozzo how
much he was willing to pay on his prior cases. Fovozzo responded that he could
not pay anything “right now.” Hoover then replied, “All right. I’m gonna put you
in jail then. And here’s the good news though, I’m gonna give you credit for $50
a day. That way you don’t have to worry about food, clothing, anything.”
        {¶ 52} Fovozzo asked Hoover about his charge for driving under
suspension and reminded him that he needed a public defender. Hoover answered,
“Well I’ll get you a public defender if you’re not employed.” However, Hoover
then said, “Whoops, I can’t give you the public defender . . . [because] you can only
get the public defender if it’s a case you can go to jail for.”




                                           18
                                 January Term, 2024




       {¶ 53} Hoover did not inquire further into Fovozzo’s ability to pay or advise
him that he had a right to have counsel present at the proceeding. Fovozzo was
then detained in the courthouse for five hours with other defendants until he used a
credit card to pay $622.50, the balance owed on the two prior cases. Hoover and
disciplinary counsel agree that after adjustments and credit-card fees, Fovozzo paid
$875.65 in full satisfaction of his fines and court costs.
       {¶ 54} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and the board found that the charged
violations were supported by sufficient evidence. The board found that Hoover did
not follow the law because he did not provide the required due process, make the
requisite inquiries, or segregate Fovozzo’s fines from his costs. The board found
that Hoover’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and weakened
the public’s perception of a fair and independent judiciary. Further, it found that
Hoover demonstrated bias toward Fovozzo based on his socioeconomic status. The
board supported these findings with its determination that had Fovozzo been able
to pay his outstanding fines and costs immediately, he would not have been
detained and threatened with incarceration. Additionally, the board emphasized
that Hoover’s comments to Fovozzo were sarcastic and demeaning.
       {¶ 55} Hoover objects to the violations because Fovozzo did not serve any
time in jail for nonpayment. At his disciplinary hearing, Hoover justified his
holding Fovozzo at the court by claiming that it was an effort to see “what the rest
of the—the next couple hours did.” Hoover has provided no other basis for why he
did not commit the alleged violations.
       {¶ 56} We agree with the board. Just because Fovozzo did not end up being
transported to jail does not mean that Hoover did not keep him in custody for failing
to pay his fines and costs. Without any meaningful inquiry into Fovozzo’s ability
to pay, without giving Fovozzo prior notice, and without advising Fovozzo that he
had a right to have counsel present at the proceeding, Hoover had Fovozzo held in




                                          19
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a secured area in the court, with several other defendants, until he could be
transported to jail or obtain the funds needed to pay the fines and costs on the closed
cases. Hoover stipulated that he had Fovozzo “held in custody.” Hoover’s
disregard for the law and the defendant’s due-process rights constitutes a violation
of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
       {¶ 57} As for Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), the audio recording of Fovozzo’s hearing
and the hearing transcript reveal that Hoover’s attitude and commentary
demonstrated a clear violation of the rule. The statements concerning Fovozzo’s
ability to pay rent and eat—and particularly Hoover’s commentary noting that
Fovozzo would not need to worry about either when he was incarcerated—
manifested a bias and prejudice toward Fovozzo based on his socioeconomic status.
       {¶ 58} While incarceration is certainly a useful deterrent when properly
employed, judges cannot simply wield this stick in any manner that they deem fit.
Judges must follow the law and required procedures to the best of their ability. That
did not happen here. We agree with the board that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                         D. Count 4: the Cannon Matter
       {¶ 59} In October 2018, Matthew Cannon was arrested and charged with
driving under suspension, an unclassified misdemeanor, and turning at intersection,
a minor misdemeanor—both nonjailable offenses. When Cannon failed to appear
for his arraignment, Hoover issued a capias for his arrest.
       {¶ 60} Cannon was eventually arrested on the outstanding warrant nearly a
year later. He appeared at his arraignment without counsel and pleaded guilty to
both charges. Hoover sentenced Cannon to pay a total of $125 in fines for both
offenses and ordered him to pay $442 in court costs. In the entry, Hoover ordered
Cannon to pay before he was released or return to court three days later with a credit
of $50 per day for each day he spent in jail. When Cannon could not pay that day,




                                          20
                                January Term, 2024




he was incarcerated for four days. Hoover did not inform Cannon that he was
entitled to counsel; nor did he conduct an ability-to-pay hearing.
       {¶ 61} When Cannon was brought back to court, Hoover credited him with
$250—$50 for each day that Cannon was incarcerated plus an additional $50. At
the beginning of the hearing, Hoover asked Cannon, “[Y]ou’ve learned your lesson
about being a deadbeat?” Cannon replied, “Yes, sir.” Hoover then stated, “When
you don’t take my orders, what happens, I put you in an orange suit and say just sit
there and look at the walls.” Hoover continued this discussion with Cannon,
discussing how the hours in jail go by very slowly, and later following with the
question, “How come you don’t do what you’re supposed to do?”                Cannon
expressed a variety of hardships, including the death of his son and the possibility
of losing his house, but overall, he took responsibility for not appearing in court.
       {¶ 62} After a discussion with Cannon about how long he had been in jail,
Hoover agreed to release him and credit him $250 toward the fines and costs he
owed. However, Hoover expressed that Cannon would need to pay the balance
within 30 days “or we’re gonna be talkin’ orange again.” The journal entry
confirmed that Cannon was released, credited with $250, and ordered to pay the
balance within 30 days.
       {¶ 63} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). Hoover stipulated to a violation of
Jud.Cond.R. 2.2. The board found that the other violations were supported by
sufficient evidence.
       {¶ 64} Hoover objects to the board’s findings that he committed the
remaining violations. He alleges that a “true clerical error resulted in a bad result”
and that it was “never his intent” to send Cannon to jail. Disciplinary counsel
responds that Hoover’s actions were more than a simple mistake, emphasizing that
Hoover had referred to Cannon as a “deadbeat” and threatened to jail him again if
he did not pay the balance of his fines and costs within 30 days.




                                         21
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           {¶ 65} We agree with the board’s findings that all four violations were
supported by sufficient evidence. As we recognized above, a judge who makes an
error of law in good faith or commits “‘a mere mistake in the exercise of judicial
discretion’ ” is not and should not be subject to disciplinary proceedings under the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Gaul, 

, quoting Franko, 168
Ohio St. at 30. But once again, Hoover’s actions went beyond a simple mistake.
Hoover threatened Cannon with jail time on a nonjailable offense if he did not pay
his fines and costs immediately, though at his disciplinary hearing, Hoover
characterized his statements as “[e]ncouraging” Cannon to pay and insisted that he
“had not planned on putting him in jail.” Nonetheless, Hoover ignored R.C.
2947.14 by failing to inform Cannon of his right to counsel, failing to hold an
ability-to-pay hearing, and failing to segregate the costs from the fines, see Swift,

. In failing to segregate the costs from the fine, Hoover
violated the Ohio Constitution by incarcerating Cannon for not paying his costs,
see Strattman, 

; Ohio Const., art. I, § 15. Hoover told
Cannon that he would be going to jail again if he did not pay the balance by the
stated date. While Hoover maintained that this was an honest mistake that he
discovered following discussions with his bailiff, Hoover fully admitted that he
does not follow R.C. 2947.14, because the statute does not work effectively for him.
           {¶ 66} But even if the original jailing had been an honest mistake, Hoover’s
actions after discovering that mistake were prejudicial to the administration of
justice.     During his disciplinary hearing, Hoover testified that when Cannon
reappeared before him after spending four days in jail, he was alerted to the fact
that his bailiff had “screwed up” and that Cannon should never have been
incarcerated in the first place. Yet even after discovering that Cannon had been
unlawfully jailed, Hoover did not back down from his position that Cannon would
be jailed again if he failed to pay his remaining balance because, Hoover explained,
he “generally tr[ies] not to admit liability that’s going to get us sued.” This type of




                                            22
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behavior—ignoring the application of a statute and failing to admit when the court
has unlawfully deprived a person of his liberty—fails to promote public confidence
in the integrity of the judiciary and is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Therefore, we agree that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(d).
          {¶ 67} Making matters worse, Hoover suggested that Cannon was a
“deadbeat” after he failed to pay his fines and court costs. At his disciplinary
hearing, Hoover attempted to justify his comment by claiming that he has “got
names for anybody that irritates me probably,” despite acknowledging that such
language is “[n]ot particularly respectful.” This type of rhetoric amounts to a
violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) by showing a bias or prejudice toward Cannon
based on his socioeconomic status, and such rhetoric and threats of incarceration
are problematic to the wheels of justice. See Porzio, 

;
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3, Comment 2.
          {¶ 68} Therefore, we agree and adopt the findings of the board that Hoover
committed violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                         E. Count 5: the Ridenour Matter
          {¶ 69} In January 2021, Luke Ridenour was charged with a first-degree-
misdemeanor drug offense after he had overdosed in his home. Ridenour appeared
before Hoover for arraignment, without counsel, and was advised of the potential
penalties, including a $1,000 fine and up to six months in jail. Ridenour then
pleaded guilty after being told by Hoover that he could not plead no contest.
Hoover did not inform Ridenour of his right to counsel and instead directed him to
“sign a rights form” after he entered his plea.
          {¶ 70} Hoover then asked Ridenour about the situation, and Ridenour
explained that he had relapsed but was going to try to get clean and resume working.
Hoover explained, “I don’t put people in jail for this kind of stuff, Luke. I mean,
you’re gonna kill yourself, of course. If you wanna kill yourself, that’s your




                                          23
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business. At the same time, the police gotta get involved, then it becomes my
business.” Hoover then explained that because Ridenour was charged with a first-
degree misdemeanor due to his prior drug convictions, Hoover had to fine him
$750.
        {¶ 71} Hoover followed with, “How long do you gotta work to make $750
plus court costs?” Ridenour estimated that it would take him about a month, if his
entire paycheck went to fines and costs. But after discussing with Hoover the total
amount, which Hoover said would likely exceed $1,000, Ridenour estimated that it
would take six to nine months to pay the fine and costs. Hoover responded, “Geez,
well, I am not giving you six to nine months to pay this off. . . . If you’ve got money
for heroin, you got money for fines and costs [and] you better start calling people
[and] raise enough money.” Hoover then fined Ridenour $750 and sentenced him
to serve 30 days in jail but suspended the jail sentence provided that Ridenour paid
his fines and costs.
        {¶ 72} Hoover then told Ridenour, “You’re going to start making some
telephone calls to raise money, I guess. How much you got with you now?”
Ridenour explained that he did not have any money with him but that he had $45
at home. Hoover exclaimed, “Oooh. That’s not good.” Hoover then proceeded to
order Ridenour to pay the fine “now,” and told Ridenour that he would need to
“start calling mom and dad and grandma and ask them for birthday presents early.”
Hoover stated that he would write “pay today” but if Ridenour “could come up with
a substantial amount,” Hoover would give him some leniency. Hoover wrote, “Pay
today” on the journal entry.
        {¶ 73} Ridenour went to the clerk of courts to get the total amount owed
and contact his family. At Hoover’s disciplinary hearing, the clerk of courts
testified that based on subsequent discussions she had with her employees and the
Ridenour family, she believed that Ridenour “was being kept and his jail sentence
was contingent upon his mother paying.” Further, she was told that Ridenour “was




                                          24
                                January Term, 2024




crying in the lobby. And there was bartering back and forth between the Bailiffs
as to exactly how much money was going to be acceptable for him to get out.”
Ridenour was able to secure $500 after contacting his family. The bailiff informed
Hoover, who agreed to release Ridenour after a few hours. Hoover crossed out the
original note of “Pay today,” and wrote “Pay $500 today.”
       {¶ 74} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). At his disciplinary hearing, Hoover
offered a rationale for these actions, maintaining that he sentenced Ridenour
because he was “giving him a way out” by either taking “his heroin money” or
putting him in jail to “keep[] him away from heroin.” And in his posthearing brief,
Hoover claimed that “judicial discretion of this type is exercised across the state”
and “at this juncture, the law in Ohio does not label such an order inappropriate.”
The board found that Hoover committed all four violations. We agree.
       {¶ 75} Ridenour was charged with a first-degree-misdemeanor offense that
was punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of up to $1,000, see R.C.
2929.24(A)(1) and 2929.28(A)(2)(a)(i). This means that Ridenour could not have
been sentenced to a term of confinement “unless after being fully advised by the
court,” he “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[d] assignment of
counsel.” Crim.R. 44(B); see also State v. Brooke, 

, ¶ 20, citing
Crim.R. 44(B). At Hoover’s disciplinary hearing, Ridenour testified that he had
signed a waiver of rights, but that he did not read that waiver before signing it, nor
did Hoover explain the waiver to him. Ridenour also testified that he had asked to
plead no contest because he did not understand the situation, and he explained that
he had not fully read the waiver because he “felt kind of rushed” and was “scared.”
Without the waiver, Ridenour would never have had a period of incarceration
hanging over his head at that hearing. See 

; Crim.R. 44(B).
       {¶ 76} Hoover fined Ridenour $750 and sentenced him to serve 30 days in
jail, but he suspended the jail term provided that Ridenour pay his fines and costs.




                                         25
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While Hoover could have required that Ridenour be committed to jail until he paid
the fine under R.C. 2947.14(A), Ridenour had a right to be represented by counsel
and present evidence as to his ability to pay the fine. R.C. 2947.14(B). However,
Ridenour was never provided that opportunity. Hoover had Ridenour held in
custody for hours, threatened to jail him for his inability to pay fines and costs,
failed to provide him due-process protections, did not segregate fines from costs,
and did not credit Ridenour with $50 toward his fine for the time he was in custody.
Hoover’s actions demonstrate a willful failure to follow the law. Therefore, the
record supports a finding that he violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(d).
          {¶ 77} Additionally, Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) by engaging in
conduct that demonstrated a bias or prejudice against Ridenour based on his
socioeconomic status. Hoover engaged in insensitive questioning and commentary
concerning Ridenour’s financial status and drug use. Ridenour told the hearing
panel that he felt humiliated and believed that he was being punished for his
financial status since Hoover had not ordered him to jail based on the drug offense.
The clerk of courts verified Ridenour’s belief, explaining that she had had
conversations with Ridenour’s family and her employees about the bartering that
went on between the bailiffs on exactly how much money Ridenour or his family
would have to pay to get him released from custody. And Hoover engaged in this
behavior knowing that it was likely that Ridenour’s mother would ultimately pay
the fine. We agree with the board’s findings and its conclusion that “[j]ustice
cannot be conditioned on a defendant’s, or his family’s, ability to pay.”
          {¶ 78} Therefore, we find that Hoover committed all four charged
violations.
                          F. Count 6: the Riddle Matter
          {¶ 79} In October 2018, Phyllis Riddle was arrested and charged with two
counts of driving under suspension, both unclassified misdemeanors, and one count




                                         26
                                January Term, 2024




of driving with expired tags, a minor misdemeanor. At Riddle’s pretrial hearing
two weeks later, Hoover noted that all of the charges were nonjailable offenses but
that he could impose a fine of up to $1,000. Appearing without counsel, Riddle
entered a plea of guilty to one of the driving-under-suspension offenses, and the
other two charges were dismissed. Thereafter, Hoover imposed a $200 fine and
court costs. He noted that Riddle would need to pay her fines and costs within 30
days or return to court.
       {¶ 80} Riddle failed to pay her fines and costs within 30 days and did not
appear at her scheduled hearing. Hoover then issued a warrant for her arrest and
wrote on the corresponding journal entry that Riddle failed to appear, that the court
had issued a bench warrant, and that bail would be set at “$5,000/10% or surety.”
       {¶ 81} Riddle was arrested over nine months later on the outstanding
warrant. A family member posted Riddle’s bail, and Riddle appeared in court a
few days later. The following exchange then occurred between Hoover and Riddle:


               Hoover: Phyllis, you’ve been hiding from me. You didn’t
       come back, you didn’t do anything. So here’s the bad news. It looks
       like whoever posted the bond for you says you can’t use it for fines
       and costs. So, now it’s time to pay the piper. What it means is that
       you now have to pay fines and costs or you don’t go home. And, it
       says you owe $664.40 ‘cause you got the extra charges with it going
       to the Attorney General. If you go to jail, you get credit for $50 a
       day. That means that you’d be in there for approximately two
       weeks. You gonna be able to come up with any or all of it to shorten
       your time?
               Riddle: Mmmm. I just lost my job. And, no.
               Hoover: Okay.
               Riddle: I have a child. Right.




                                         27
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                 Hoover: You haven’t done what you were supposed to do.
        All we said was either pay it or come back and talk to us. You didn’t
        do either. Because of that, now we don’t talk anymore.


        {¶ 82} Hoover, after finding out that Riddle’s mother had posted her bail,
asked Riddle whether her mother would “step up” to pay the fines. Hoover then
asked Riddle why she had not returned to court. She claimed that her failure to
appear was not deliberate. Hoover emphasized that the order stated that she was to
appear if the fines and costs were not paid and that he had given her a “month to
try to come up with something.” Hoover then prepared an entry to remand Riddle
to jail and release her once she paid her fines and costs in full, with Riddle receiving
credit in the amount of $50 for each day served. Riddle, while still in custody, was
able to pay her outstanding fines and costs, totaling $664.40, and she was released
that same day.
        {¶ 83} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). During his disciplinary hearing,
Hoover admitted that he had threatened to put Riddle in jail and that that was the
reason she paid her fines and costs. Hoover justified this behavior based on his
familiarity with Riddle and his belief that she had the money to avoid being
incarcerated. Hoover characterized Riddle’s being held in custody until she could
pay her fines and costs as “being inconvenienced.”
        {¶ 84} In its report, the board found that the only distinguishing factor
between the Dawson and Cannon matters and Riddle’s case was that Riddle was
able to come up with the money owed before she was transferred to jail. The board
concluded that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4.(d).
        {¶ 85} Hoover objects to the board’s findings because, he claims, he did not
“jail” Riddle. However, Hoover admitted that Riddle was “not free to leave” and
was “being held” for nonpayment of fines and costs even though she had been




                                          28
                                 January Term, 2024




convicted of a nonjailable offense. Riddle was arrested for failing to show up to
court to discuss why she had failed to pay her fines and costs on a nonjailable
offense, and she was not permitted to leave the courthouse without payment; the
fact that she had not yet been transferred to jail is a distinction without a difference.
See R.C. 2947.14(A) through (C). Hoover deprived Riddle of her liberty without
due process to coerce the payment of a fine and court costs. We agree with the
board that Hoover used the same improper threats of incarceration to compel Riddle
to pay her fines and court costs as those that he used against Dawson and Cannon
and thereby violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
        {¶ 86} As for the alleged violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), the board found
that Hoover engaged in conduct that demonstrated bias and prejudice against Riddle
due to her socioeconomic status. The board noted that Hoover had acknowledged
his belief that if pressured, Riddle would pay. And during his disciplinary hearing,
Hoover even boasted that this was how he had coerced Riddle to pay her fines and
costs in past cases, at least five other times. Hoover knew that it was improper to
threaten and then hold Riddle on a nonjailable offense in order to compel her to pay
her fines and costs. The board found that Hoover’s behavior toward Riddle
demonstrates the following: “if a defendant has money to pay, she walks out of the
courthouse; if not, she goes to jail.” We agree with the board that Hoover’s actions
demonstrate an indifference toward poor defendants, which in turn prejudices them
based on socioeconomic status. Such behavior violates Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B).
        {¶ 87} Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings that Hoover violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                         G. Count 7: the Mitchell Matter
        {¶ 88} In June 2020, Erica Mitchell was cited for driving under suspension,
an unclassified misdemeanor and a nonjailable offense. The following week,
Mitchell failed to appear for her arraignment, and a warrant was issued for her
arrest. Mitchell was eventually arrested and arraigned without counsel.




                                           29
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       {¶ 89} Hoover began the proceeding by noting that Mitchell was charged
with a nonjailable offense unless she failed to appear. Again, Hoover noted that
Mitchell’s charge was not punishable with jail time and asked her how she would
plead. Mitchell, without counsel, pleaded guilty.
       {¶ 90} Hoover then questioned Mitchell about her failure to appear.
Mitchell explained that her grandmother had passed away and that she had missed
a lot of things during that time. Hoover responded, “All right here’s the problem.
I fine you a hundred dollars, I don’t want you in jail, but I don’t trust you to pay
now.” Mitchell explained that she could pay the fine, but “not right this second.”
Hoover answered, “Yeah, I was thinkin’ I was just gonna keep you in jail until you
could pay it. That way I’d know for sure.” Mitchell asked, “a hundred dollars?,”
and Hoover explained that it would be a $100 fine plus court costs, which would
be several hundred dollars more. Hoover explained that Mitchell had accrued some
court costs by missing court and having a warrant issued for her arrest. Hoover
then asked Mitchell, “[W]hat could you come up with now [so that] I’d have the
excuse to let you out?” Mitchell replied that she could pay “about $100 today.”
Hoover agreed that if Mitchell could come up with $100, then she would be
released, and he would then give her 30 days to pay the balance. Mitchell explained
that she received $189 per week in unemployment benefits. Hoover responded that
she would be released upon payment of $100 and ordered Mitchell to pay the
balance within 30 days. Mitchell paid the $100 and was released later that day.
       {¶ 91} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with violations of Jud.Cond.R.
1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and the board determined that Hoover
had violated all four rules.
       {¶ 92} Hoover objects to the violations because, he claims, he was
responding to Mitchell’s irresponsible behavior and his actions in her case were a
direct result of her failure to appear for her arraignment. Hoover argues that by




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requiring Mitchell to pay her $100 fine before her release, he was just trying to hold
her accountable. This argument lacks merit.
        {¶ 93} Again, Hoover’s failure to segregate costs from fines creates a
significant issue with how he attempted to collect fines and costs. Hoover did not
conduct an ability-to-pay hearing, did not advise Mitchell of her due-process rights,
and did not otherwise comply with R.C. 2947.14. Hoover continued to threaten
Mitchell with incarceration, even after his discussion with her established that she
was receiving unemployment and on a fixed income. We agree with the board that
Hoover’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
        {¶ 94} With respect to Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), the board found that in addition
to demonstrating bias against Mitchell based on her socioeconomic status, Hoover
demonstrated a bias against Mitchell based on her race by using “coercion and
racial undertones in his speech.” In a posthearing brief to the board, disciplinary
counsel, citing to the stipulated transcript, alleged that “[i]n this particular instance,
aside from treating Mitchell differently due to her socioeconomic status, [Hoover]
demeaned Mitchell by speaking with racial undertones—“‘I’s thinkin’ I’s just
gonna keep ya in jail ‘til you could pay it.’ ” (Emphasis added by disciplinary
counsel.) However, when listening to the audio recording of Mitchell’s hearing,
reading the hearing transcript of the audio from the disciplinary hearing, and
reading the stipulated transcript, we note that there are inconsistencies. While the
stipulated transcription reflects the use of a dialect that could be considered racial
stereotyping, the audio recording of Mitchell’s hearing and the disciplinary-hearing
transcript indicate that Hoover used the same informal speech throughout his
interaction with Mitchell as he did with each of the other 15 defendants in relator’s
complaint, some of whom are identified in the record as Black and some of whom
are identified in the record as White. Therefore, we find that the board’s finding of
a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) based on racial undertones is not supported by
this record.




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       {¶ 95} Nonetheless, the evidence still supports a violation under
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) based on socioeconomic status.            Hoover threatened to
incarcerate Mitchell, who was receiving unemployment benefits and living on a
fixed income, when there was no legal basis for her incarceration. During his
disciplinary hearing, Hoover described these actions as “merciful” rather than
coercive. But there is nothing merciful about threatening to jail a defendant for a
nonjailable offense simply because the defendant is unable to pay a fine at that very
moment. If Mitchell had been financially stable, it is unlikely that she would have
been subjected to this tactic. Thus, while we cannot agree with the board that
Hoover’s actions were racially biased, we do conclude that Hoover manifested bias
against Mitchell based on her socioeconomic status.
       {¶ 96} Therefore, we agree with the board that Hoover violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2., and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                         H. Count 8: the Miller Matter
       {¶ 97} In November 2018, Naima Miller was charged with driving under
suspension, an unclassified misdemeanor, and speeding, a minor misdemeanor—
both of which were nonjailable offenses.         Miller failed to appear for her
arraignment, and the court issued a warrant for her arrest. Miller was apprehended
on the warrant in January 2021, and she appeared before Hoover without counsel.
       {¶ 98} Hoover called Miller’s case and said, “Where you been child?
We’ve been looking for you for two years.” Miller responded, “Working. I be
workin’.” Hoover asked, “You’ve been workin’ round the clock for more than two
years?” Miller explained that she had been working 12-hour shifts.
       {¶ 99} Hoover explained the charges to Miller and noted that they were “not
the kind of charges [he] put people in jail for” and that he could fine Miller up to
$1,000 for driving under suspension and $150 for speeding. Miller said that she
understood and pleaded guilty. Hoover then fined Miller $100 for driving under




                                         32
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suspension, $25 for speeding, and assessed the court costs associated with each
offense.
       {¶ 100} After fining Miller, Hoover said, “Now tell me you got money.
‘Cause this isn’t something where after two years I can give you time to pay.”
Miller responded affirmatively, and Hoover said, “So what happens is they’ll figure
out what you owe, you gotta pay it. . . . We get that done, they’ll cut you loose, get
you outta that beautiful orange suit.”
       {¶ 101} Hoover wrote on the sentencing entry, “Pay today.” And on the
commitment paper, it stated, “TO PAY $512 BEFORE RELASE [sic],”
representing the sum of Miller’s fines and costs. Miller paid the total amount that
day and was released.
       {¶ 102} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and the board determined
that Hoover had violated all four rules. In his objections to the board’s report,
Hoover argues that his actions in this matter are not cause for findings of the four
violations. He maintains that he issued a fine and costs to be paid the same day
because Miller had failed to come to court on a previous occasion. We are not
convinced.
       {¶ 103} Hoover did not make a good-faith effort to follow the law, namely,
R.C. 2947.14. Hoover told Miller that she would not be released from custody until
she paid her fines and costs, despite the fact that she had been convicted of
nonjailable offenses. As with the defendants discussed above, Hoover did not
conduct an ability-to-pay hearing, did not advise Miller of her due-process rights,
and did not segregate the fines from the costs. Hoover’s conduct supports a finding
that he violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
       {¶ 104} Hoover also used demeaning and paternalistic language with racial
undertones by referring to Miller, an adult Black woman, as “child” at the beginning
of the hearing. While we acknowledge that Hoover has generally spoken in a very




                                         33
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familiar and informal manner to the defendants who come before him, such
commentary in Miller’s case supports a violation of Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B). See Gaul,

 (judge’s “demeaning use of the word ‘brother’ ” when
referring to a Black defendant appearing before him supported a violation of
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B)).
       {¶ 105} Therefore, we find that Hoover committed violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2., and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                        I. Count 9: the Cesaratto Matter
       {¶ 106} On May 26, 2015, Anthony Cesaratto entered guilty pleas, without
counsel, in three separate matters in the Stow Municipal Court. The offenses
included two first-degree misdemeanors for driving under suspension. Hoover
sentenced Cesaratto to serve ten days in jail and pay $450 in fines. However, on
the sentencing entry, Hoover ordered, “Release on payment in full or return to court
on 5/29/15 @ 8:30am.” Per the terms of the order, Cesaratto would not have had
to serve any jail time had he been able to pay his fines and costs; but because he
could not pay, he remained in jail until May 29, 2015, when he was returned to
court. Hoover ordered Cesaratto’s release but required him to return to court on
June 19, 2015, if he had not fully paid his fines and costs. Cesaratto failed to pay
and did not return to court; Hoover issued a warrant for his arrest.
       {¶ 107} Five years later, Cesaratto was arrested on the outstanding warrant,
although no further charges were pending. Hoover began Cesaratto’s hearing by
stating, “Anthony, now you just haven’t cooperated with us very much. . . . There’s
three different cases and you owe like twelve-hundred bucks and you haven’t done
anything.” Hoover asked why he should not just keep Cesaratto in jail and credit
him with $50 per day and let him “stay there a month.” Cesaratto explained that he
could get the fine paid. Hoover responded, “I am not interested in the future, what
do you got right now to pay?” Cesaratto said that he had a “couple hundred”
dollars, and Hoover responded, “You stay. I’m not playing with you for ten years.”




                                         34
                                 January Term, 2024




         {¶ 108} Cesaratto told Hoover that he had bills to pay, but Hoover
responded that everyone has bills. Hoover then asked whether Cesaratto wanted to
make calls to see if anyone would lend him money to pay his fines and costs.
Cesaratto said, “[N]o.” Hoover ordered that Cesaratto be held in custody, giving
him $50 credit for each day, until he paid his fines and costs in full; but Hoover’s
order also directed that Cesaratto be returned to court three days later. Cesaratto
failed to pay, so he remained in custody until he was returned to court per Hoover’s
order.
         {¶ 109} Hoover began, “Cesarrato, get on up here. You fool.” Hoover
explained that if Cesarrato had “behaved [himself],” Hoover would have let him go
after his last appearance. Hoover observed that Cesaratto had been “passing gas,
and laughing, banging on the door acting the fool.” Hoover asked, “What the hell’s
wrong with you?” Cesaratto attempted to explain that his disruptive behavior had
been the product of annoyance and boredom. Hoover scolded him, but eventually
turned Cesaratto’s behavior into a joke to lighten the mood.
         {¶ 110} Hoover then turned the conversation to fines and costs that
Cesaratto still owed on the previous convictions. Hoover noted that Cesaratto had
paid most of his fines and costs back in 2015, but the clerk’s office had
miscalculated the total amount due and Cesaratto still owed more than $600.
Hoover expressed that while the clerk’s office had made a mistake, it did not matter.
Hoover asked, “What are we gonna do about that?” Cesaratto asked for a couple
of weeks to pay off the remaining balance, but Hoover pointed out that Cesaratto
had already had five years to pay it off. Hoover decided to give Cesaratto $100
credit for the two days that he believed Cesaratto had served.
         {¶ 111} Hoover explained to his bailiff that it was essentially the “the five-
year anniversary” of Cesaratto’s order to pay, and he concluded that “we’ve still
made no progress.” Hoover then began educating Cesaratto on the Juneteenth




                                           35
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holiday, given that it was June 19, and told Cesaratto that he had “the attention span
of a gnat” when he did not know the purpose behind the holiday.
       {¶ 112} Hoover then discussed with Cesaratto when he thought he could
pay the remaining balance. When Cesaratto stated that he could probably pay it off
within a few weeks, Hoover asked Cesaratto, “What happens if you haven’t paid
this off by July 10?” Cesaratto responded, “Go to jail.”
       {¶ 113} Hoover ordered Cesaratto to pay the remaining balance within four
weeks, after discussing Cesaratto’s employment situation. Hoover released
Cesaratto, but credited him with only $100 toward his fines and costs despite
Cesaratto’s having spent four days in custody.
       {¶ 114} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                 violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). When questioned at his
disciplinary hearing about his treatment of Cesaratto, Hoover responded, “I did not
put him in jail for failing to pay. I put him in jail for not coming back, not showing
responsibility. . . . I just want[ed] to wake him up.” The board found that Hoover
committed the four violations.
       {¶ 115} Hoover objects to the board’s report because, he claims, he ordered
Cesaratto to serve time on his “previously issued” sentence. Hoover also continues
to maintain that he did not put Cesaratto in jail for failing to pay fines and costs but
rather, for failing to appear and not showing responsibility. We agree with the
board’s findings. While Hoover could have lawfully incarcerated Cesaratto for the
remaining portion of his original ten-day sentence, he did not do so. This is borne
out by Hoover’s statements at the June 16 and June 19, 2020 hearings and in the
corresponding journal entries. See Leegrand, 

 (a court
speaks only through its journal).
       {¶ 116} If Hoover was going to incarcerate Cesaratto for failing to pay his
fines, then he needed to comply with R.C. 2947.14. But Hoover did not segregate
the fines from costs, did not protect Cesaratto’s due-process rights, and did not give




                                          36
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him adequate credit for the time that he had served. And even though Cesaratto
had paid most of the fines and costs, Hoover threatened to jail him again if he did
not pay the balance within four weeks.
       {¶ 117} Furthermore, Hoover called Cesaratto a “fool” and told him that he
had the “attention span of a gnat.” Judges are held to the “highest standards of
professional behavior.”     Carr, 

, citing Disciplinary
Counsel v. O’Neill, 

, ¶ 57. While Cessaratto’s behavior in the
courthouse may have been disruptive, that did not relieve Hoover from his duty to
treat Cessaratto with “patience, courtesy, and dignity” and to “exercise fair and
impartial judgment,” Gaul, 

. Hoover plainly did not meet
these standards.
       {¶ 118} Through his treatment of Cesaratto, Hoover failed to act in a
manner that promoted confidence in the judiciary, uphold the law impartially, and
perform his duties without manifesting bias, prejudice, or harassment. Hoover’s
conduct was also prejudicial to the administration of justice. Therefore, we adopt
the board’s findings that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                       J. Count 10: the Juersivich Matter
       {¶ 119} On May 19, 2020, Michael Juersivich Jr. was arrested and charged
with theft, a first-degree misdemeanor. The following day, Juersivich appeared
before Hoover, without counsel, for arraignment. Hoover began, “Michael, good
God man, it looks like it’s been a hard night.” Hoover informed Juersivich that he
had an old case and a new case, with the theft charge carrying a penalty of up to six
months in jail and a $1,000 fine. Juersivich then pleaded guilty to the theft charge.
       {¶ 120} Hoover noticed that Juersivich still owed $751.30 in fines and costs
on an older case. Juersivich said that he would be able to pay back that amount if
the court placed him on a payment plan. Juersivich explained that he was disabled
and had schizophrenia. Hoover responded, “I couldn’t understand you. You’ve




                                         37
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gotta talk like a man.”     Juersivich reiterated that he was “on disability” for
schizophrenia and did not have a lot of money. Juersivich explained that he had a
case manager who could help him with a payment plan.
       {¶ 121} Hoover told Juersivich that he could not let him out of jail because
he “didn’t listen” the last time—Hoover said that he had previously released
Juersivich from jail on the condition that he would “take care of things within 30
days or come back to court.” Juersivich explained that he thought his sister had
taken care of the fines and costs in his first case. Hoover responded, “If someone
comes in and takes care of it for you, I’ll cut you loose, but right now you’re
untrustworthy.”
       {¶ 122} Juersivich asked how long Hoover was going to put him in jail, to
which Hoover responded, “[T]en days.” Hoover then explained to Juersivich,
“[T]hey’ll release you if you pay in full. If you haven’t, they’re going to hold on
to you, at least for five days. . . . After five days, I’m going to tell them to let you
loose, and then you’ve got 30 days to pay.” Juersivich was sentenced to ten days
in jail, with five days suspended, and a $250 fine. Hoover wrote on the sentencing
entry, “Release upon payment in full or 5-24-20, then [to pay] 30 days.”
       {¶ 123} Juersivich did not pay his fines and costs on either case;
consequently, he served five days in jail. Had he been able to pay, Juersivich would
not have had to serve any jail time.
       {¶ 124} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                 violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). The board found that
Hoover had violated all four rules. Here, Hoover objects to the board’s findings
based on his assertion that he exercised his discretion in sentencing Juersivich to
either serve time in jail or pay a fine. Hoover claims that this is a common tactic
used by other courts in Ohio, and he has cited a few examples in a footnote in his
objections.




                                          38
                                January Term, 2024




         {¶ 125} Hoover is correct that he could have imposed jail time or a fine.
See R.C. 2929.24(A)(1); R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2929.28(A)(2)(a)(i). But a
jail sentence is appropriate only when a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. See Brooke, 

, at ¶ 20;
Crim.R. 44(B). Here, Juersivich was not appointed counsel or told that he could
have counsel, and instead, he simply pleaded guilty. Additionally, Juersivich
explained that he was schizophrenic and receiving disability for that mental illness.
Thus, without a waiver of counsel—of which there is no evidence in this record—
Hoover could not sentence Juersivich to jail time. See 

; Crim.R.
44(B).
         {¶ 126} But assuming arguendo that the sentence was permissible, Hoover
relied on the fines and costs from Juersivich’s previous case in determining whether
he would sentence Juersivich to serve time in jail or release him. During his
disciplinary hearing, Hoover admitted that “[b]ecause the old case still existed, I
put him in jail on the new case.” The board found that “[i]n doing so, the
protections of R.C. 2947.14 should have been triggered.”            We agree—the
procedural safeguards of R.C. 2947.14 should have been followed.
         {¶ 127} Hoover failed to separate the fines and costs, and he should have
afforded Juersivich his due-process rights and conducted an ability-to-pay hearing.
Hoover’s failure to do so is even more egregious because Juersivich explained that
he was receiving disability benefits for schizophrenia, was poor, and was not
represented by counsel. And Hoover admitted that if Juersivich had had the money
to pay the fines and costs, he would have “cut [him] loose.”
         {¶ 128} Again, Hoover’s conduct supports findings that he failed to
promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, see Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, failed to perform all duties of his office fairly and
impartially, see Jud.Cond.R. 2.2, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice, see Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). Additionally, Hoover’s conduct




                                         39
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supports a finding that he performed his duties with bias or prejudice toward
Juersivich based on his socioeconomic status, see Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B). Therefore,
we adopt the board’s findings and conclude that Hoover committed all four charged
violations.
                       K. Count 11: the Williams Matter
       {¶ 129} In September 2007, Glen Williams was charged with driving under
suspension, a first-degree misdemeanor, and a taillight/license-plate-light violation,
a minor misdemeanor. After failing to appear for his arraignment, a bench warrant
was issued for Williams’s arrest. The next year, he was arrested on the outstanding
warrant but again failed to appear for his arraignment, and a second warrant was
issued for Williams’s arrest.
       {¶ 130} Williams was arrested in May 2020, and he appeared before
Hoover, without counsel, for arraignment on the 2007 offenses. Hoover began,
“Oh man. You’ve been dancing this thing around for 13 years?”               Williams
explained certain hardships that he had experienced, and he told Hoover that he was
now trying to take care of the issues involving his license so that he could resume
working, since his employment in downtown Cleveland—which he could get to
using public transportation—had ended. Hoover found Williams guilty of both
offenses and told him that “when I sentence you . . . I’m gonna order you to make
sure you pay all fines and costs before you are released, because I’m not gonna go
looking for you ever again.”
       {¶ 131} Hoover explained that if Williams did not have the money to pay
the fines and costs that day, then he would not be released. Hoover informed
Williams that it was going to be a lot of money given that Williams had several
warrants issued for his arrest. Hoover fined Williams $100 for driving under
suspension and $10 for the taillight/license-plate-light violation, in addition to
costs. Hoover told Williams that he did not want to put Williams in jail but
emphasized that “fines and costs must be paid before your release, and if they are




                                         40
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not paid, then you will serve 20 days in jail.” Hoover told Williams that the clerk’s
office would figure out what he owed and if he could pay it that day, then he would
be released; however, if Williams could not pay it, then he would be placed in
custody and would be brought before the court in three weeks. Williams paid $629
in fines and costs that day and was released without serving any jail time.
        {¶ 132} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and the board found that
he had violated all four rules. In his objections to the board’s findings of
misconduct, Hoover contends that the violations are not supported in this matter
because he sentenced Williams lawfully by imposing a 20-day suspended jail term
and ordering that he be released if he paid his fines and costs that day. We agree
with the board.
        {¶ 133} At his disciplinary hearing, Hoover testified that he was giving
Williams “choices,” and he explained his rationale: “I’m going to punish you either
with a fine and jail, just a fine, and if you can’t pay anything, I might just use jail.
In this case, I gave him an option. That option allowed him to do what was best for
him. . . . [H]e had the money in his pocket and went downstairs and paid it in full.”
        {¶ 134} The board disagreed with Hoover and determined that R.C.
2947.14 was implicated, because Hoover threatened incarceration in order to coerce
full payment on a 13-year-old case. We agree with that reasoning. At Hoover’s
disciplinary hearing, disciplinary counsel asked, “You told [Williams] you didn’t
want to put him in jail, so the real reason you put him in jail was to squeeze him to
pay his fines and costs?” Hoover responded, “I’m going to teach him a lesson one
way or the other.” And Hoover’s statements to Williams demonstrate that this
approach was not about Williams having a choice concerning his punishment—
Hoover plainly told Williams that he did not want to place him in jail but was not
going to release him unless he paid his fines and costs that day. At his disciplinary
hearing, Hoover explained that he was going to sentence Williams to jail not




                                          41
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because he deserved it for the offenses he was convicted of, but rather, because he
could not “allow him to escape responsibility from 13 years before.”
          {¶ 135} Hoover coerced payment on a 13-year-old case by threatening
Williams with 20 days in jail. Additionally, like in the other cases, Hoover did not
segregate the fines from the costs, did not provide Williams with a hearing, and did
not afford him procedural due process. We agree with the board that Hoover
violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
          {¶ 136} As for Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), we agree with the board that Hoover’s
statement, “If you don’t have any money, then it ain’t gonna work out [for you]
today,” supports a finding of bias against Williams based on his socioeconomic
status. Therefore, we agree with the board that Hoover also violated Jud.Cond.R.
2.3(B).
                        L. Count 12: the Hudspath Matter
          {¶ 137} In January 2020, Steven Hudspath was charged with theft, a first-
degree misdemeanor. He failed to appear for his arraignment, and a warrant was
issued for his arrest. Two weeks later, Hudspath was arrested on the warrant and
appeared before Hoover, without counsel, the same day. Hoover informed him of
the charge and explained that it was punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and six
months in jail. Hudspath pleaded guilty to the theft charge and waived his rights
by signing a written form.
          {¶ 138} Hoover asked Hudspath why he committed the crime, and
Hudspath explained that he was “saving a dollar” by stealing two bottles of Coke
from a convenience store. Hoover then noted that Hudspath had a lengthy criminal
record and asked, “[A]ren’t you getting a little old to be a petty thief?” Hudspeth
responded, “Yes, sir.” Hoover then quipped, “You enjoy time in jail, do ya?” He
asked why Hudspath had not shown up for his arraignment, and Hudspath explained
that he had wanted to attend a family gathering following his sister’s death and




                                         42
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thought that if he showed up to court but could not pay the fine, he would be sent
to jail and unable to attend the event.
        {¶ 139} Hoover looked at Hudspath’s record once again and noted that
“thievery travels with you.” When Hoover asked Hudspath how he supported
himself, Hudspath told Hoover that he was employed as an equipment operator.
Hoover, after describing Hudspath’s crime, told Hudspath, “You ought to stay in
jail. . . . You’re just a thief. This isn’t a mistake. This is a complete plot.”
        {¶ 140} Hoover sentenced Hudspath to serve ten days in jail and imposed a
$250 fine, but he agreed to release Hudspath the following day if he paid all fines
and costs by then. However, Hoover then explained that if Hudspath failed to pay
by the next day, then he would remain in jail until Hoover was next available, which
would be several days later. Hudspath said that he did not have the funds.
Nevertheless, Hoover stated, “If there is no money coming, get comfortable. I’m
gonna make you pay a price somehow, since you’ve done this over and over again.”
Hudspeth was able to pay his fine and costs the following day and was released
from jail.
        {¶ 141} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                 violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). During his disciplinary
hearing, Hoover maintained that R.C. 2947.14 was not implicated because
Hudspath “was going to go to jail no matter what he did.”
        {¶ 142} R.C. 2947.14(A) allows a court to impose a fine as part of a
sentence and to commit the offender to jail until the fine is paid, if the court
determines at a hearing that the offender can pay the fine but refuses to do so. In
its report, the board acknowledged that the sentence Hoover imposed on Hudspath
was “ostensibly lawful,” but it determined that the sentence “became problematic”
when Hoover conditioned Hudspath’s release on the payment of his fines and costs,
thereby triggering R.C. 2947.14. The board found that Hoover had committed each
of the charged rule violations.




                                           43
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




          {¶ 143} Hoover ordered Hudspath to serve only one day in jail and then be
released if he paid his fine and costs, which Hudspath did. Hoover argues this was
lawful. While incarcerating Hudspath may have been lawful, Hoover failed to
segregate the fine from the costs, failed to hold an ability-to-pay hearing, and failed
to appoint counsel, all while demeaning Hudspath throughout the proceedings. So,
although Hoover’s failure to follow R.C. 2947.14 would not likely violate
Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 if the error were made in good faith, the record does not support
such a finding here. Hoover never held an R.C. 2947.14 hearing and has admitted
that he ignored the statute. His conduct constituted violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2
and 2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
          {¶ 144} Furthermore, Hoover’s name-calling and demeaning comments
toward Hudspath, especially concerning his age and socioeconomic status, were
improper. See Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B), Comment 2. During oral argument before this
court, Hoover’s counsel argued that it was not improper to call Hudspath a thief
because he was one. It is true that Hudspath admitted guilt and explained his crime,
but Hoover made several demeaning comments concerning Hudspath’s age.
Jud.Cond.R. 2.3(B) prohibits judges from engaging in biased, prejudicial, or
harassing conduct. Hoover’s commentary was unnecessary and demonstrated a
bias or prejudice toward Hudspath that constitutes a violation of Jud.Cond.R.
2.3(B).
          {¶ 145} Therefore, we agree with the board that the record supports
violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2., and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                           M. Count 13: the Davis Matter
          {¶ 146} In 2000, William Davis pleaded guilty in the Cuyahoga Falls
Municipal Court3 to one count of driving under suspension, a first-degree
misdemeanor. The court sentenced him to serve 90 days of home incarceration,

3. Effective January 1, 2009, the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court was abolished and replaced by
the Stow Municipal Court. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 171, 151 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2084, 2126, 2131.




                                             44
                               January Term, 2024




with 60 days suspended on conditions, and ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine, with
$500 suspended, and $125 in court costs within 30 days. Davis failed to pay and
therefore a warrant was issued for his arrest. Davis also failed to report for his
home-incarceration installation. Eventually, Davis’s delinquent fines and costs
were sent to the Ohio Attorney General’s Office for collections.
       {¶ 147} Twenty-two years later, Davis was charged in the Stow Municipal
Court with possession of drug paraphernalia, a minor misdemeanor, and three
traffic offenses: driving under suspension, an unclassified misdemeanor; making
an improper right turn, a minor misdemeanor; and expired or unlawful plates, a
minor misdemeanor. He appeared before Hoover for his scheduled arraignment in
February 2022.
       {¶ 148} Hoover informed Davis that his 22-year-old case had not been paid.
Davis explained that he had been in Florida. Hoover responded, “Man I hope
Florida was good to you and you came home with a bank account. Because we’re
not leaving here with a 22-year-old case unresolved.”
       {¶ 149} Hoover then proceeded to talk about the new offenses, informing
Davis of the charges and the potential fines that could be imposed for each offense.
Davis pleaded not guilty to those charges. Davis then expressed that he did not
have knowledge of the 22-year-old case and that he would have resolved it sooner
if he had “had a recollection of it” while he was living in Florida. Hoover
responded, “Well, we’re going to take care of it today, or you’re not going home.”
Davis tried to explain that he was planning to file his taxes that day, but Hoover
responded, “No. It’s 22 years old. . . . You then apparently took off.”
       {¶ 150} An exchange occurred between Davis and Hoover, during which
Davis implored Hoover to work with him on paying the outstanding $792 in fines
and costs, but Hoover told Davis his “promises mean nothing” and that he would
get a $50 credit for each day he remained in jail. Hoover instructed Davis to make




                                         45
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telephone calls to get someone to pay the outstanding amount or else he would send
Davis to jail.
        {¶ 151} Hoover ordered Davis to a custodial program and noted on the
journal entry that Davis had failed to complete the jail sentence imposed in 2000
and failed to pay what was due from that case. Hoover ordered Davis to serve 90
days and then be returned to court.
        {¶ 152} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with              violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). During his disciplinary
hearing, Hoover maintained that R.C. 2947.14 was not implicated because Davis
was ordered to serve time on his prior sentence.
        {¶ 153} The board determined that Hoover had a lawful reason to
incarcerate Davis but found that “the exchange between them made clear [the] fact
that Davis would only be incarcerated if he could not pay his outstanding fines and
costs” from his 2000 conviction. It was especially troubled by the fact that Davis
“begged” Hoover to release him because he did not have the financial means to pay
the outstanding fine and costs. Additionally, the board noted that Hoover had also
failed to segregate fines and costs, failed to protect Davis’s due-process rights, and
failed to hold an ability-to-pay hearing.
        {¶ 154} In his objections to the board’s report, Hoover challenges the
board’s findings that he committed these violations, maintaining his claim that
“R.C. 2947.14 was not implicated” in Davis’s case, because Davis had already been
sentenced to serve 30 days of home-incarceration when he took off in his prior case.
Hoover is right that Davis could have been properly incarcerated for that sentence,
but the rhetoric used against Davis concerning his finances was inappropriate. By
telling Davis that he hoped “he came home with a bank account” in order to resolve
the case by paying his fines and suggesting that Davis begin calling people to get
them to pay his fines or else be sent to jail to serve his sentence, Hoover was
coercive. Those comments also support the implication of R.C. 2947.14. Hoover’s




                                            46
                                January Term, 2024




conduct and failure to follow the proper procedures, like segregating fines from
costs and informing Davis of his right to counsel, support the board’s findings that
he violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                        N. Count 14: the Murray Matter
       {¶ 155} In November 2017, Tarra Murray was charged with a second-
degree-misdemeanor drug offense, with a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail and
a $750 fine, and a fourth-degree-misdemeanor drug offense, with a maximum
penalty of 30 days in jail and a $250 fine. She pleaded guilty to both charges and
was ordered to pay a $750 fine and $358 in court costs and serve 30 days in jail,
with all time suspended on the condition that she return to court to pay her fines.
She did not pay her fines and costs, so the matter was eventually sent to the attorney
general’s office for collections. Murray was, however, credited with $351 toward
her costs for payments she made after the matter was sent to collections.
       {¶ 156} In 2021, Murray was charged with possession of drugs, a fifth-
degree felony, and a drug-paraphernalia offense, a fourth-degree misdemeanor. A
warrant was issued for her arrest, and she was summoned to appear for arraignment
in February 2022. Murray appeared voluntarily for her scheduled arraignment
before Hoover.
       {¶ 157} Hoover noted that Murray had not paid her fines and costs from her
2017 case and then told her, “That makes it difficult for me to give you the bond
your attorney is going to ask for because you’re already showing yourself to be
irresponsible.” Hoover asked how Murray supported herself, and she explained
that she was not working but could go back to work once the warrant was cleared
up. Murray told Hoover that she could “pay something” on the fines that day. A
public defender then represented Murray for the rest of the bond hearing and
expressed that Murray had some money she could put forth toward the amount due
in the 2017 case.




                                         47
                                 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶ 158} Hoover asked Murray, “What kind of money do you have to pay on
your five-year-old drug convictions.” Once Murray told Hoover she could pay it
all off, Hoover responded, “That’s a big difference then.” Hoover expressed that
he would consider a personal recognizance bond, but only if he knew that the
remaining balance was paid. Murray again told Hoover that she could pay the
amount due and explained that she would do so with her bank card.
        {¶ 159} Hoover directed Murray to go make the payment and come back,
at which point he would address bond on the new charges. Hoover told Murray
that he was inclined to give her a “signature bond.” Murray then paid $882.20 in
satisfaction of her outstanding fines and costs from the 2017 case, and Hoover
issued a personal-recognizance bond.
        {¶ 160} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                       violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). In his arguments to the
board, Hoover maintained that he did not order Murray to serve time for the purpose
of satisfying her fine, asserting that R.C. 2947.14 did not apply. He contended that
he took into consideration Murray’s ability to pay her outstanding fines and costs
when setting her bond on the new charges that came before him.
        {¶ 161} The board agreed with disciplinary counsel that Hoover had
committed the four violations. The board noted that Murray was the only one of
the 16 defendants included in relator’s complaint who had the benefit of counsel.
And the record shows that even if Hoover did not have her incarcerated for failing
to pay her overdue fines, he conditioned his granting Murray a recognizance bond
on her ability to pay her outstanding fines and costs—not on the application of
former Crim.R. 46, see 157 Ohio St.3d CXXIX.4 While Hoover maintains that he
could have considered Murray’s record of appearance in determining her bond, see

4. Former Crim.R. 46 was repealed effective July 1, 2023, and replaced by the General Assembly
with R.C. 2937.011. See 2023 H.B. No. 191; Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis,
H.B.      No.    191,     at     2-3,      available     at     https://www.legislature.ohio.gov
/download?key=21315&format=pdf (accessed Aug. 1, 2024).




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                                    January Term, 2024




former Crim.R. 46(C)(4), it is apparent from the transcript of Murray’s arraignment
that her record of appearance was not a consideration. We agree with the board
that Hoover failed to follow former Crim.R. 46 in setting bail and instead decided
to condition bond solely on Murray’s ability to pay her outstanding fines and costs.
       {¶ 162} The purpose of bond is to ensure that a person appears for the next
hearing, not to coerce that person to pay previous fines and court costs. In the May
2021 bench card submitted as a joint exhibit by the parties, we expressly stated that
setting bond based on the amount of fines, costs, and other fees owed was a “Non-
Permitted Method” of collecting those fines and costs. This type of coercive
conduct does not promote the public’s confidence in the judiciary and is prejudicial
to the administration of justice.
       {¶ 163} Further, this conduct indicates that Hoover approached Murray’s
case with a socioeconomic bias. During the hearing, Hoover’s focus was entirely
on Murray’s failure to pay her fines and costs associated with a previous drug
conviction. Even after Murray informed Hoover that she was unemployed and her
public defender took over to explain the various reasons why Murray should receive
a low bond, Hoover’s view on setting Murray’s bond did not change until Murray
confirmed that she could pay off the fines and costs from her previous case. To
Hoover, that was “a big difference.” Even still, Hoover, told Murray that he would
not consider a signature bond, also known as an own-recognizance bond, until he
knew the fines and costs from the previous case were paid. This type of rhetoric
indicates to the public that those who have the ability to pay fines and costs have a
better opportunity to have a reduced bond in Hoover’s courtroom than someone
who does not have the means to pay. While Hoover may have believed that only
those who pay their fines and costs are demonstrating responsibility, such an
attitude demonstrates a bias against those who are socioeconomically
disadvantaged.




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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




          {¶ 164} Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings and conclusions that
Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) in this
matter.
                         O. Count 15: the Somma Matter
          {¶ 165} In February 2022, Logan Somma was charged with possession of
marijuana, a nonjailable minor-misdemeanor offense, with a possible fine of up to
$150. Somma appeared without counsel for his arraignment before Hoover and
pleaded guilty.
          {¶ 166} Somma and Hoover engaged in a discussion of Somma’s criminal
record and talked about several warrants for his arrest. Hoover told Somma,
“Here’s your problem: because you’ve shown yourself to not obey court orders,
and you have an extensive record, I fine you $150. . . . But here’s the part you’re
not going to like. I don’t trust you to pay this. Therefore, they’re going to figure
out what you owe. You’re either going to pay it, or you’re going to stay.” Somma
explained, “I don’t have any money right now,” and Hoover responded, “You’re
going to stay. What happens is, you’ve done this over and over and over again.
The reason you’ve got warrant blocks, it looks like ten of them, is because you
never do what you’re supposed to do.”
          {¶ 167} Somma told the court that he was supposed to meet with probation
that same day regarding a different case, a fact he had told Hoover earlier in their
discussion, but Hoover retorted, “Boy, aren’t they going to be ticked when they
find out you can’t come because you’ve got new drug convictions? Looks to me
like you’re almost looking to go back to prison. . . . But you obviously are not
learning the lessons.”
          {¶ 168} Somma told Hoover that he would pay the fine, but Hoover
continued to reprimand Somma: “Drugs. Theft. Violence. . . . You don’t do what
you’re supposed to do. That’s what the problem is. Do you think I want to just get
in line with a warrant myself? Your drug problems are obviously very bad.”




                                         50
                                January Term, 2024




Somma explained that he was in court that day trying to take care of the matter.
But Hoover said, “Yep. With all your problems, you’re still bouncing weed in your
pocket, huh?” Somma told the court that he did not have marijuana on him and that
he did not have any money with him.
       {¶ 169} Hoover then asked Somma whether there was anyone he could call
“or are we just wasting our time?” Somma said that he could call his wife to make
a payment over the phone, and Hoover responded by directing him to wait in the
courtroom while the court determined exactly how much Somma owed. That day,
Somma’s wife paid the $150 fine and $140 in court costs, and Somma was released.
       {¶ 170} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with               violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), and the board determined
that he had violated each rule. Hoover objects to the violations found by the board,
emphasizing the fact that he did not jail Somma following the hearing.
       {¶ 171} Hoover threatened to incarcerate Somma on a nonjailable offense,
telling Somma that he was either going to pay the $150 fine that was imposed that
day or spend time in jail. Somma was then held in custody at the courthouse until
his wife paid the fines and costs that same day. Hoover did not conduct an ability-
to-pay hearing, did not advise Somma of his due process-rights, and did not
segregate his fine from the costs. Furthermore, Hoover demeaned Somma with his
comment alleging that Somma had brought drugs into the courtroom. Hoover’s
statement asking Somma if there was anyone he could call to pay his fine and costs
in order to avoid going to jail does not reflect a push for responsibility; rather, it
amounts to the extortion of a person who is without funds needed to immediately
pay a fine and costs. Therefore, we agree with the board and conclude that Hoover
violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                         P. Count 16: the Pruitt Matter
       {¶ 172} In January 2018, Lanee Pruitt pleaded no contest to one count of
OVI, a first-degree misdemeanor, and she was found guilty. Pruitt was ordered to




                                         51
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serve 5 days in jail, 30 days of home incarceration, and 6 months of community
control and comply with treatment recommendations and ignition-interlock/alcohol
monitoring. She was also ordered to pay $3,312 in fines and court costs.
       {¶ 173} Several months later, Pruitt entered into a payment plan in which
she agreed to pay $100 every two weeks toward her fines and court costs. Nothing
in the plan required Pruitt to return to court. However, Pruitt did not pay according
to the payment plan, and she was sent past-due notices informing her that the entire
balance was due.
       {¶ 174} In September 2018, a magistrate improperly issued a warrant for
Pruitt’s arrest based solely on her failure to pay her fine and court costs. No hearing
was scheduled, and Pruitt had not received any notice requiring her appearance.
       {¶ 175} More than three years later, in February 2022, Pruitt was arrested
on the outstanding warrant during a traffic stop during which she was a passenger
in the vehicle. Pruitt appeared before Hoover later that day. At that time, Pruitt
had paid $1,511.80 toward her fine and costs and had completed all other terms of
her sentence.
       {¶ 176} Hoover addressed Pruitt and informed her that she had not paid her
fine and costs and that she had not come back to court. Pruitt explained that she
did not know that she had to come back to court and admitted that she had not paid
all of her fine and costs, but she noted that the government had seized her tax refund.
Hoover responded, “Tell me something good. Tell me you showed up today and
you got $2,469 with you.” Pruitt informed Hoover that she did not have the money
to pay the fine but that she believed she would have it soon because it was income-
tax season.
       {¶ 177} Hoover, after noting that Pruitt had not paid her fine and costs from
four years prior, asked, “Why shouldn’t I just keep you in jail?” Pruitt said she
could make payments, but Hoover retorted, “You didn’t, for four years. . . . [Y]ou
just walked away. Why should I trust you now?” Pruitt told Hoover that she had




                                          52
                                 January Term, 2024




a job and an infant. Hoover then asked, “What can you come up with today?”
When Pruitt responded that she had $200, Hoover said, “Nah.” Hoover told Pruitt,
“I don’t think I’m gonna let you go when you’ve taken a four year vacation from
it. See ya.”
        {¶ 178} Hoover ordered Pruitt to be held in custody until she paid $250 and
ordered her to return to court in two weeks. Hoover failed to credit Pruitt with $50
toward her fine for the time she had been held in custody. Pruitt paid $250 an hour
later, and she was released.
        {¶ 179} Pruitt returned to court as required, and she brought proof that the
attorney general had seized her tax refund, which was credited toward her
outstanding fine and costs. Hoover then ordered Pruitt to return to court two months
later for “further orders.”
        {¶ 180} Pruitt paid another $200 toward her court costs and again appeared
in court as ordered, at which point Hoover issued another order directing Pruitt to
appear the following month for “further orders.”
        {¶ 181} Disciplinary counsel charged Hoover with                violations of
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). Hoover disputed these
violations, claiming that he never intended for Pruitt to serve any jail time. During
his disciplinary hearing, Hoover recognized that the warrant for Pruitt was issued
in error, but he justified holding her in custody until she paid on the basis that she
was already in court and should not have been permitted to leave until she made
arrangements to pay her overdue fine and costs.
        {¶ 182} The board found that Hoover committed all four violations. It
determined that Hoover “extorted money from Pruitt, who was wrongfully arrested
and then held in custody under threat of continued custody until she paid $250”
toward her fine and costs. The board concluded that Hoover failed to segregate
Pruitt’s fine from the costs, violated her due-process rights, and did not credit Pruitt




                                          53
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$50 for the time she spent in custody. Additionally, the board found that Hoover
demonstrated a bias toward Pruitt based on her socioeconomic status.
       {¶ 183} We find that the board’s findings and conclusions are supported by
the record. Therefore, we conclude that Hoover violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and
2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).
                                  IV. SANCTION
       {¶ 184} Having found that Hoover committed 64 violations and having
overruled his objection as it relates to the board’s findings of misconduct, we now
consider the appropriate sanction.       The board recommends that Hoover be
suspended from the practice of law for two years and that he pay the costs of these
proceedings. Hoover objects to the board’s recommended sanction because, he
maintains, the board did not adequately consider that (1) he gave defendants an
initial opportunity to enter into payment plans, (2) his imposed sentences are light
in comparison to what the law allowed him to impose, and (3) he made a practice
of giving defendants additional opportunities to be responsible, provided that the
defendant showed some interest in being responsible. Hoover also asserts that the
board did not adequately consider his “judicial philosophy” that to get people on
the right track, they must face consequences for their actions. Hoover argues that
a one-year suspension from the practice of law with six months stayed is
appropriate.
       {¶ 185} “The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the
public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and
enhance public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Disciplinary Counsel
v. Bachman, 

, citing O’Neill, 

, at ¶ 33.
“[S]anctions also serve as a deterrent to similar violations by judges, lawyers, and
judicial candidates in the future.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Horton, 2019-Ohio-
4139, ¶ 60. In determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct, “we
consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the judge violated, the




                                          54
                                January Term, 2024




aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Berry, 

.
    A. Hoover committed the same four violations against each of the 16
                                    defendants
         {¶ 186} Hoover committed the same four violations, Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2,
and 2.3(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), in all 16 criminal cases at issue here. Each
violation stemmed from Hoover’s methods of collecting fines and costs from the
defendants in those cases, most of whom were poor and without counsel.
         {¶ 187} Hoover found that applying R.C. 2947.14 and holding ability-to-
pay hearings was impractical. He thought that his actions, namely, threatening
defendants with incarceration to compel them to pay fines and costs, ensured that
those defendants learned “basic discipline” and “basic responsibility.” But these
tactics also helped ensure that the Stow Municipal Court was self-funded. And
Hoover believed that it was his “responsibility to see that [he did] not burden the
innocent taxpayers by our lack of collecting what’s been sentenced to a Defendant.”
         {¶ 188} A judge must comply with the overriding purposes and principles
of sentencing, to punish the offender and protect the public. See R.C. 2929.21.
This may include sentencing a defendant to pay a fine in lieu of incarceration, but
it must be done within the confines of the law to ensure that each defendant receives
due process. Hoover did not act to guarantee defendants their due-process rights to
safeguard against their being wrongfully incarcerated for failing to pay fines and
costs.
         {¶ 189} As stated above, the General Assembly has expressly prohibited
courts from imprisoning offenders in satisfaction of a fine except as provided by
R.C. 2947.14. R.C. 2947.14(D). And a court cannot order that a defendant be sent
to jail for failing to pay court costs, because costs are civil in nature and,
constitutionally, a person cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay a civil debt. See
Taylor, 

; Ohio Const., art. I, § 15. To protect individuals




                                         55
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from improper imprisonment for failure to pay fines or costs, judges must observe
the safeguards provided by statute, such as (1) segregating fines from costs and
other financial sanctions, (2) providing the defendant reasonable notice of a
hearing, (3) conducting an ability-to-pay hearing, (4) advising the defendant of the
right to counsel, (5) providing the defendant with the opportunity to be heard, and
(6) making a specific finding that the defendant has the ability to pay the fine and
willfully refuses to do so. Those safeguards have been published by this court and
made readily available to judges since 2014, as reflected in the February 2014 and
May 2021 bench cards submitted as joint exhibits by the parties.
           {¶ 190} “[A]t its core, procedural due process under both the Ohio and
United States Constitutions requires, at a minimum, an opportunity to be heard
when the state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property right.” State v.
Cowan, 

, ¶ 8, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 

(1971). And the procedures that are in place protect the rights of the citizens,
especially those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, by preventing a judge
from improperly sending individuals to jail for failing to pay fines and costs.
           {¶ 191} As a result of Hoover’s actions, 2 defendants, Douglas Dawson and
Matthew Cannon, were wrongfully incarcerated, and 14 defendants were coerced
into paying fines and costs under unlawful threats of incarceration. Hoover’s
overzealous collection of unsegregated fines and costs manifested a bias against
those of lower socioeconomic status, a bias that, as detailed above, was readily
apparent during his interactions with these defendants. Moreover, by disregarding
statutorily required procedures to achieve his goals of teaching defendants “basic
discipline” and “basic responsibility,” Hoover acted in a manner that diminished
the public’s confidence in the judiciary and was prejudicial to the administration of
justice.




                                          56
                                January Term, 2024




               B. Stipulated aggravating and mitigating factors
       {¶ 192} As for aggravating factors, the parties stipulated that Hoover
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and harmed
vulnerable individuals. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3), (4), and (8). The board
determined that Hoover “fail[ed] to comprehend the significant impact that his
conduct . . . had on both the victims and their families”—people who were
struggling financially, battling addiction and mental illness, and grieving the loss
of family members. The board recognized the “repeated and obvious disparate
treatment of the socioeconomically disadvantaged.”
       {¶ 193} Additionally, the board determined that Hoover expressed no
sympathy toward the defendants during their respective cases before him or during
his disciplinary hearing. When Hoover was questioned about testimony that Lanee
Pruitt gave as a witness during his disciplinary hearing, Hoover characterized it as
“theatrical.” Hoover also treated the matter concerning Darcell Smitherman with
sarcasm, quipping that “[w]e’d have to create the Darcell Smitherman Municipal
Court” to provide Smitherman with proper notice regarding probation violations.
       {¶ 194} While the parties stipulated that Hoover had cooperated during the
disciplinary proceedings, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), the board found that Hoover
was “not entirely forthcoming during the hearing.” It noted that Hoover was, at
times, “combative” with disciplinary counsel and had “shifted blame to others.”
For instance, he attempted to justify his mistake in wrongfully incarcerating
Dawson by pointing out that he was handling another judge’s docket. In the
Cannon matter, Hoover blamed his staff for altering the court order. Therefore, the
board recognized that Hoover was generally cooperative but did not fully
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.
       {¶ 195} Perhaps more troubling is the board’s observation that Hoover
attempted to justify his failure to provide due-process protections to the defendants
by pointing to their criminal histories. When he was asked at his disciplinary




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hearing if he believed that Dawson should have spent any time in jail for his
nonjailable offense, Hoover responded, “If you saw Dawson’s record, you’d think
any time he spent in jail was a good thing for the world.”
        {¶ 196} Hoover’s lack of concern for his behavior is also problematic. The
board noted that even after he was sent a letter of inquiry on the matter and
following disciplinary counsel’s initial complaint in December 2021, Hoover
continued to engage in the same coercive tactics when collecting fines and costs
from defendants. Hoover admitted that he did not follow R.C. 2947.14 because he
found it impractical. Hoover’s decision to disregard the Ohio Constitution, statutes
enacted by the General Assembly, and this court’s thorough guidance in favor of
his own preferences is unjustifiable. See Jud.Cond.R. 2.2, Comment 2 (“a judge
must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or
disapproves of the law in question”).
        {¶ 197} Additionally, it was not until his disciplinary hearing that Hoover
recognized that his informal and casual manner of interacting with defendants could
be considered problematic: “I’ve learned that you’ve got to watch your words. . . .
I use words like knucklehead, other slang like that. And I’m going to be more
careful. . . . I can’t be as informal as I have been.”
        {¶ 198} As for mitigating factors, the board found that Hoover does not
have a disciplinary record, did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive, cooperated
with disciplinary counsel, and submitted substantial evidence of good character.
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (2), (4), and (5). Moreover, the board noted that
Hoover had an “unblemished career of nearly 40 years as a lawyer and judge.” He
has been actively involved in the community and created programs to educate and
rehabilitate defendants. Hoover also made changes to the municipal court’s budget,
cutting various expenses and increasing the collection of debts.
        {¶ 199} The board recognized that Hoover has done great things for the
Stow Municipal Court, many defendants, and the community, but nonetheless, his




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good intentions and actions do not excuse his failure to comply with the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Disciplinary Counsel
v. Lemons, 

. It found that Hoover’s casual attitude toward
defendants and improper application of the law led to violations of defendants’
liberties and hindered the administration of justice.
             C. An 18-month suspension from the practice of law
                       with 6 months stayed is warranted
       {¶ 200} The board considered various cases in which we imposed sanctions
ranging from a six-month suspension to an indefinite suspension against judges
who committed misconduct similar to Hoover’s actions here. The board found that
Hoover’s case falls somewhere between the misconduct in Disciplinary Counsel v.
Medley, 

, ¶ 43, in which this court imposed an 18-month
suspension with six months stayed, and Carr, 

, in which
we imposed an indefinite suspension. It has recommended that we suspend Hoover
for two years. During oral argument, Hoover’s counsel agreed that Medley and
Carr are on point, but he asserted that Hoover’s conduct was not as severe as the
judicial misconduct in either of those cases. Hoover maintains that a one-year
suspension, with six months stayed, is the appropriate sanction.
       {¶ 201} Hoover’s misconduct caused harm in the form of the unlawful
incarceration of two defendants, and such “abuse of the public trust warrants an
actual suspension from the practice of law,” Bachman, 

.
In order to determine the proper length of the suspension, we look to other cases
involving similar conduct.
       {¶ 202} In Bachman, we ordered a magistrate to serve a six-month
suspension from the practice of law for unlawfully holding a woman in custody for
two days for contempt of court after she created a brief disturbance outside of his
courtroom.    Id. at ¶ 5-11, 37.     We determined that Bachman had violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.8(B) (requiring a judge to be “patient, dignified, and




                                         59
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courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity”). 

.
Bachman did not have a prior disciplinary record, did not act with a selfish or
dishonest motive, exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings, presented evidence of good character and reputation, and had other
sanctions, like the loss of his employment, imposed for his misconduct. Id. at ¶ 14.
We recognized that even though Bachman had engaged in only a single, isolated
instance of misconduct, his actions were more egregious than the misconduct in
several judicial-officer cases in which this court had ordered a public reprimand or
fully stayed suspension; thus, an actual suspension from the practice of law was
warranted. Id. at ¶ 17, 21.
       {¶ 203} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Repp, 

, we ordered a
judge to serve a one-year suspension from the practice of law after he violated
Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.8(B) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) by ordering a spectator
in his courtroom to submit to a drug test and then sentencing her to ten days in jail
for contempt of court after she refused to be tested. 

. As for
aggravating factors, Repp had committed multiple offenses, caused harm to
vulnerable victims, and acted with a selfish or dishonest motive. Id. at ¶ 23. In
mitigation, Repp had a clean disciplinary record, and he made a full and free
disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at ¶ 24. Repp also had numerous letters attesting to his good
character and reputation. Id. While Repp’s case was similar to Bachman, we
acknowledged that Repp’s improper demeanor had been directed at two victims—
the spectator and her defendant-boyfriend—and that one of those victims suffered
“great personal indignities and emotional distress” due to her wrongful
incarceration. Id. at ¶ 25, 30. We agreed with the board that Repp’s conduct was
far more egregious than that in Bachman and determined that a one-year suspension
from the practice of law was warranted. Id. at ¶ 32.




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       {¶ 204} Most recently, in Gaul, 

, we ordered a judge to
serve a one-year suspension from the practice of law after finding that he had
violated multiple rules, including Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B) and
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), for a litany of misconduct that included coercing a defendant
into a plea deal crafted solely by the judge, improperly questioning a defendant
during a criminal trial, making demeaning and racially biased comments to a
defendant during sentencing, making demeaning comments toward a party in a civil
action, using his position in an attempt to have a defendant’s federal conviction
overturned, making a legal error resulting in a man’s prolonged incarceration,
quarreling with a criminal defendant during the defendant’s arraignment, and
coercing another defendant into a plea deal. 

. Gaul had received
prior discipline, refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, and acted
with a dishonest or selfish motive. Id. at ¶ 71. Gaul also engaged in a pattern of
misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and caused harm to multiple vulnerable
victims. Id.
       {¶ 205} We compared Gaul’s misconduct to the judge’s misconduct in
Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 

, a case in which this court
imposed an 18-month suspension from the practice of law, with six months
conditionally stayed, against a judge who had committed 31 rule violations by
abusing his contempt power, failing to act impartially, attempting to coerce plea
agreements in two criminal cases, and routinely mistreating criminal defendants
and others, 

. We found that Gaul’s misconduct was at least as
egregious as Parker’s, given that he had coerced plea deals in more serious felony
offenses and had prior discipline, but we nevertheless accepted the board’s
recommended sanction and imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law
on Gaul. Gaul at ¶ 108-109, 117.
       {¶ 206} In Medley, 

, we suspended a judge from the
practice of law for 18 months, with six months stayed, after the judge violated rules




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requiring judges to promote the integrity and independence of the judiciary by
accepting a defendant’s guilty plea to three criminal charges in exchange for the
dismissal of a fourth charge without any counsel present. 

. Medley
also showed actual bias in favor of a local political party by repeatedly issuing ex
parte orders to prevent a creditor from collecting on a default judgment against an
official, and in other cases, he facilitated collections by granting default judgments
against debtors who failed to answer complaints and then issuing warrants for the
debtors’ arrests if they did not pay or appear within 30 days. 

.
Medley’s unlawful collection procedure increased judgment collections in his court
from $90,000 in 1993 to $800,000 in 2003. 

.
       {¶ 207} Medley justified this procedure by claiming that it was consistent
with the law and helped the judgment creditors of Gallia County ensure collection
of debts owed to them by the judgment debtors. 

. While the procedure
was effective, it was wholly unlawful: the procedure “circumvented the protections
afforded by law to . . . judgment debtors by making freedom from incarceration
dependent upon payment in full of a small-claims judgment.” 

. We found
that Medley had failed to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary
and prejudiced the administration of justice. 

.
       {¶ 208} In determining the appropriate sanction, we recognized that Medley
had engaged in a pattern of misconduct. 

. Medley had also previously
been disciplined and had refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions.

 However, Medley had not acted with a selfish motive, had a reputation for good
character, and cooperated fully in the disciplinary proceedings. 

 We began with
the starting point of a six-month suspension from the practice of law based on
Medley’s ex parte communications and previous discipline. 

. Noting
that Medley had decided the merits of legal issues in criminal and civil cases in
derogation of procedural rules, that sanction increased to an 18-month suspension
from the practice of law with six months stayed. 

. We explained that




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“[a] judge may not blatantly disregard procedural rules simply to accomplish what
he or she may unilaterally consider to be a speedier or more efficient administration
of justice.” 

.
        {¶ 209} In Carr, 

, we ordered that a judge be indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law for violating several rules of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rules of Professional Conduct, including Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and
2.2 and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), after she created what amounted to a “modern-day
debtors’ prison” by using capias warrants and incarceration as a means to compel
the payment of fines and costs by tying bond amounts to the amount of the fines
and costs. Id. at ¶ 31-32. Carr’s misconduct was readily distinguishable from the
misconduct in Medley because, while both Medley and Carr had improperly used
arrest warrants and bonds to compel the collection of judgments or fines, Medley
had not concealed those actions with false journal entries as Carr had done in her
cases. 

.
        {¶ 210} We also recognized that “the deprivation of numerous defendants’
liberty occasioned by Carr’s misconduct vastly exceed[ed] the one- or two-day jail
stays occasioned by the misconduct of Bachman and Repp.” Id. at ¶ 95. At least
five of Carr’s victims had spent time in jail as a result of her improper use of capias
warrants. Id. “Carr created a risk that dozens of people would be wrongfully
arrested and jailed if they were unable to pay their fines.” Id. Therefore, we
determined that Carr’s misconduct warranted a sanction far greater than a six-
month or one-year suspension. Id.
        {¶ 211} In determining the appropriate length of Carr’s sanction, we
acknowledged that Carr had also engaged in other misconduct—namely, she had
issued additional improper capias warrants and made false statements, engaged in
ex parte communications and improper plea bargaining, exhibited a lack of
decorum and dignity in judicial office, and abused the contempt power and failed
to recuse herself from proceedings in which she had a conflict. Id. at ¶ 14-16, 25-




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26, 42-43, 62. The board would have recommended an indefinite suspension but
for Carr’s cooperation during the disciplinary proceedings and her commitment to
mental-health treatment. Id. at ¶ 96. However, we rejected Carr’s mental disorders
as a mitigating factor based on insufficient evidence regarding their contribution to
her misconduct. And we also found that Carr’s evidence of good character and
reputation was “procured with a false narrative.” Id. Thus, we found that an
indefinite suspension was appropriate. Id. at ¶ 98.
       {¶ 212} In this case, an actual suspension from the practice of law is
required, because Hoover wrongfully incarcerated at least two individuals. See
Bachman, 

 (six-month suspension for wrongful
incarceration of one individual). A term suspension of more than six months is a
consequence that will protect the public from future misconduct, because it will
require Hoover to end his position in office and therefore prevent him from
continuing to use threats of incarceration to intimidate defendants into paying their
fines and costs.   See Disciplinary Counsel v. Burge, 

;
Gov.Jud.R. III(1)(B)(4).
       {¶ 213} However, a one-year suspension, like in Repp, is also insufficient
in this case. See Repp, 

. Hoover’s misconduct was more
serious than that in Bachman and Repp, as he caused two people to be wrongfully
incarcerated for more than one- or two-day jail stays: Dawson spent seven days in
jail, and Cannon spent four days in jail. Hoover’s misconduct is more similar to
the misconduct in Medley and Carr, as he used incarceration and threats of
incarceration as a means of collecting fines and costs from numerous defendants.
Hoover, like Carr and Medley, created a risk that numerous people would be
wrongfully incarcerated. Thus, a six-month or one-year suspension from the
practice of law is not sufficient under these circumstances. See Carr, 2022-Ohio-
3633, at ¶ 96 (indefinite suspension); Medley, 

, at ¶ 43 (18-month
suspension with 6 months stayed).




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       {¶ 214} Hoover argues that his misconduct was less egregious than the
misconduct in Medley and Carr, whereas the board finds his misconduct is more
egregious than Medley but less egregious than Carr. While Medley, Carr, and
Hoover each created an environment where criminal or civil defendants were
wrongfully held in order to coerce payments, Medley and Carr engaged in other
improper conduct, like coercing plea agreements. See 

, 42-
43; 

.      Additionally, Hoover also did not engage in acts of
dishonesty like Carr. See 

. Therefore, we agree with the board that an
indefinite suspension is not appropriate here.
       {¶ 215} Hoover did, however, act with bias toward socioeconomically
disadvantaged people and failed to act in a manner that guaranteed them due
process under the law. Hoover ordered most of the defendants who were included
in disciplinary counsel’s complaint to be held in custody under the threat of being
transferred to jail if they did not pay their fines and costs. Hoover leaned into the
idea of a debtors’ prison, unlawfully incarcerating or threating to incarcerate
individuals for nonpayment of fines without due process, and unconstitutionally
incarcerating or threatening to incarcerate individuals for nonpayment of court
costs. And he routinely failed to inform the defendants of their right to counsel.
       {¶ 216} Hoover has an unblemished career, and he has helped improve the
Stow Municipal Court and created programs to help first-time offenders stay out of
jail. And like Medley, Hoover was operating to ensure that justice was done;
Medley wanted plaintiffs to receive their judgments owed by judgment debtors and
Hoover wanted to ensure that defendants were adequately punished and that
innocent taxpayers were not burdened by defendants failing to pay their fines and
costs. But Hoover, like Medley, acted outside the confines of the law, specifically
R.C. 2947.14 and Article I, Section 15 of the Ohio Constitution, and he harmed
vulnerable people. In addition to harming the defendants, Hoover purposely
involved the families of the defendants—innocent people—to extort money from




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them. The families of the defendants were not the wrongdoers, and Hoover’s
endeavor to squeeze money from them so that they might keep their loved ones out
of jail was reprehensible.
       {¶ 217} We keep in mind that the focus of our judicial-discipline system is
to “protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and
maintain and enhance public confidence” in the judiciary. O’Neill, 2004-Ohio-
4704, at ¶ 33. In Ohio, “[w]e hold judges to the highest standards of professional
behavior because they are invested with the public trust.” Carr, 

, citing 

. As noted above, a judge “may not blatantly disregard
procedural rules simply to accomplish what he or she may unilaterally consider to
be a speedier or more efficient administration of justice.” Medley, 

,
at ¶ 42. We find that Hoover’s misconduct, especially his unlawful and coercive
methods of collecting fines and costs from defendants, as well as the aggravating
and mitigating factors present here are similar enough to the misconduct and
aggravating and mitigating factors in Medley to warrant an 18-month suspension
from the practice of law, with six months stayed on the condition that Hoover
commit no further misconduct.
                               V. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 218} Accordingly, Kim Richard Hoover is suspended from the practice
of law in Ohio for 18 months with six months stayed on the condition that he
commit no further misconduct. If Hoover fails to comply with the condition of the
stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire 18-month suspension.
Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A), Hoover is immediately suspended from judicial
office without pay for the duration of his disciplinary suspension. Costs are taxed
to Hoover.
                                                             Judgment accordingly.
                              __________________




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       Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kelli C. Schmidt, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
       Montgomery Jonson L.L.P., George Jonson, and Lisa Zaring for
respondent.
                              __________________




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