[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Hunter v. Goldberg, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

            THE STATE EX REL. HUNTER v. GOLDBERG, JUDGE, ET AL.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as State ex rel. Hunter v. Goldberg, Slip Opinion No.
                                     

.]
Mandamus—Supersedeas—Posting of bonds—Relator cannot show a right to a
        writ of mandamus or supersedeas to stay a judgment until she posts a bond
        and bond is approved by court—Writs denied.
  (No. 2024-0205—Submitted September 3, 2024—Decided October 17, 2024.)
                            IN MANDAMUS and SUPERSEDEAS.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ. DONNELLY, J., did not participate.


        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Relator, Michelle Hunter, f.k.a. Michelle Troutman, filed this original
action requesting a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of supersedeas,
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




against respondents, Judge Francine Goldberg, of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division (“trial court”), and Judges Eileen A.
Gallagher and Sean C. Gallagher, of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, ordering
a stay of execution of a divorce judgment entered by the trial court while she
appeals the judgment. We deny the writs.
               I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} In 2020, Hunter filed a complaint for divorce against her husband,
Holden Troutman in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On December
27, 2023, the trial court issued a final judgment of divorce, ordering that Hunter’s
residence be immediately listed for sale and that all proceeds be allocated to
Troutman. The trial court also allocated the remaining property and ordered Hunter
to pay $192,960.22 of Troutman’s attorney fees.
       {¶ 3} On December 28, 2023, Hunter appealed the divorce decree to the
Eighth District. That same day, she filed a Civ.R. 62(B) motion in the trial court to
stay enforcement of the judgment and the division of property pending appeal,
conditioned upon her posting a $192,960.22 bond (the amount of the attorney-fee
award). Hunter did not actually post or otherwise submit a bond to the trial court.
On January 2, 2024, the trial court denied Hunter’s motion for a stay.
       {¶ 4} On January 3, 2024, Hunter filed a motion under App.R. 7 in the
Eighth District for a stay pending appeal.          She again proposed a bond of
$192,960.22. Troutman, in his memo in opposition, argued that the motion should
be denied but that if the court were to grant the stay, a supersedeas bond of
$1,500,000 would be appropriate. On January 29, the court of appeals denied the
motion. The journal entry states in its entirety, “Motion by appellant for stay
pending appeal is denied.”
       {¶ 5} On February 9, Hunter filed this complaint for a writ of mandamus
ordering either the trial court or the court of appeals to grant a stay of execution and
enforcement of the judgment pending appeal, conditioned on her filing an adequate



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                                  January Term, 2024




bond or other appropriate security as set by the respondents. Alternatively, she
seeks a writ of supersedeas to stay execution and enforcement of the judgment
conditioned on her filing an adequate bond as set by this court. She also filed with
this court an emergency motion for a temporary stay of execution of the trial court’s
judgment during the pendency of this case.
        {¶ 6} We issued an alternative writ and ordered the submission of evidence
and briefs. 

. We also granted Hunter’s motion for a temporary stay
and ordered “[e]xecution and enforcement of the trial-court judgment . . . stayed
pending resolution of this action.” 

                              II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                 A. Writ of mandamus
        {¶ 7} Hunter first seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court “and/or”
the court of appeals to grant her a stay of execution and enforcement of the trial
court’s judgment pending appeal, conditioned on her filing an adequate bond in an
amount set by either the trial court or court of appeals.
        {¶ 8} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Hunter must prove by clear and
convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the relief she requests, (2) a clear legal
duty on the part of the trial court or court of appeals to provide it, and (3) the lack
of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Manley v.
Walsh, 

. “Although a writ of mandamus will generally not
issue to control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is abused, the writ will lie
in certain circumstances where a lower court has no discretion on a matter.”
(Emphasis in original.) State ex rel. State Fire Marshal v. Curl, 

.
        {¶ 9} The core of Hunter’s argument is that under Civ.R. 62(B) and App.R.
7(A), she is entitled as a matter of right to a stay of the trial court’s judgment if she
posts an adequate supersedeas bond. She argues that the trial court and court of
appeals have discretion to set the amount of the bond but have no discretion to deny



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her the right to post a bond. In response, the trial court and court of appeals first
argue that they have discretion to deny the stay, and second, that Hunter did not
actually post a bond for them to consider.
       {¶ 10} Civ.R. 62(B) sets forth how an appellant obtains from the trial court
a stay of judgment pending appeal. It states:


       When an appeal is taken the appellant may obtain a stay of execution
       of a judgment or any proceedings to enforce a judgment by giving
       an adequate supersedeas bond. The bond may be given at or after
       the time of filing the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when
       the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.


       {¶ 11} App.R. 7 contains similar language regarding a stay requested from
a court of appeals, although the rule specifies that the stay must ordinarily first be
sought from the trial court. In addition, although the parties in this case rely upon
the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, they also cite R.C. Ch. 2505, which
addresses supersedeas bonds and stays during appeals. R.C. 2505.09 provides:


       [A]n appeal does not operate as a stay of execution until a stay of
       execution has been obtained pursuant to the Rules of Appellate
       Procedure or in another applicable manner, and a supersedeas bond
       is executed by the appellant to the appellee, with sufficient sureties
       and in a sum that is not less than, if applicable, the cumulative total
       for all claims covered by the final order, judgment, or decree and
       interest involved [but shall not exceed fifty million dollars], as
       directed by the court that rendered the final order, judgment, or
       decree . . . or by the court to which the appeal is taken.




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                               January Term, 2024




       {¶ 12} Even if Hunter is correct that she would be entitled to a stay if she
posted a bond, she did not actually post a bond. Rather, she filed a motion with the
trial court (and then with the court of appeals) to stay the judgment upon posting a
$192,960.22 bond.
       {¶ 13} Civ.R. 62(B) states, “The stay is effective when the supersedeas
bond is approved by the court.” Thus, Hunter cannot actually obtain a stay until
the court approves the bond. But the rule does not specify at what point the court
determines whether a proposed bond is appropriate. App.R. 7(A) refers to an
“application . . . for the determination of the amount of and the approval of a
supersedeas bond,” but Hunter did not make such an application.
       {¶ 14} Nothing in Civ.R. 62(B) or App.R. 7 requires a court to determine
whether a bond is appropriate before it is posted, and we will not add such a
requirement to the rules by judicial opinion. Rather under the plain terms of Civ.R.
62(B), an appellant must post an adequate supersedeas bond and the stay becomes
effective when the bond is approved by the court. Because Hunter did not post a
supersedeas bond, she cannot show a clear legal right to an order staying execution
of the judgment or a clear legal duty on behalf of the trial court or the court of
appeals to provide one.
                              B. Writ of supersedeas
       {¶ 15} In addition to requesting a writ of mandamus, Hunter alternatively
requests that we issue “a writ of supersedeas, to stay execution and enforcement of
the Judgment, conditioned on Hunter’s filing of an adequate bond or other
appropriate security as set by this Court.”      We deny the requested writ of
supersedeas.
       {¶ 16} R.C. 2503.40 provides, “[T]he supreme court when in session, and
on good cause shown, may issue writs of supersedeas in any case, and other writs
not specially provided for and not prohibited by law, when necessary to enforce the
administration of justice.” But we have rarely exercised this authority. Hunter



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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




points to only one case in which we have issued a writ of supersedeas: State ex rel.
Jackson v. Allen, 

 (1991). Jackson was decided by entry, i.e.,
without an opinion.
       {¶ 17} Hunter argues for a writ of supersedeas in her merit brief, but her
argument contains almost no analysis and does not explain why a writ of
supersedeas is proper in this case. Hunter’s lack of analysis regarding her request
for a writ of supersedeas makes it difficult to analyze her request, and we conclude
that Hunter has not shown entitlement to a writ of supersedeas. See Mason City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

(rejecting undeveloped argument that lacked authority and argumentation).
                               III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 18} Hunter has not shown a clear legal right to a stay of execution of the
divorce judgment, nor has she shown that either the trial court or the court of
appeals has a clear legal duty to issue such a stay. Therefore, we deny her request
for a writ of mandamus. We also deny her request for a writ of supersedeas. We
also lift the stay entered by our February 29, 2024 order.
                                                                      Writs denied.
                              __________________
       Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Jill Friedman Helfman, and Daniel H.
Bryan, for relator.
       Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora
E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Judge Francine B.
Goldberg.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Kristopher A. Haines and Bryan B. Lee,
Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents Judge Sean C. Gallagher and Judge
Eileen A. Gallagher.
                              __________________




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