[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
v. Beatty, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                           NOTICE
       This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
       advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
       promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
       South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
       formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
       the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 

             THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BEATTY, APPELLANT.
     [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as State v. Beatty, Slip Opinion No. 

.]
Criminal law—R.C. 2929.41(A) and 2929.14(B) and (C)—Prison terms for
          multiple firearm specifications—Judgment reversed and cause remanded to
          trial court with instructions that it amend its sentence to run the two
          discretionary prison terms imposed for the firearm specifications
          concurrently with each other and with the other prison terms imposed.
 (No. 2022-1290—Submitted September 13, 2023—Decided December 9, 2024.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Clermont County,
                         No. CA2021-10-057, 

.
                                   __________________
          DONNELLY, J., announcing the judgment of the court, with an opinion joined
by STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in judgment only.
FISCHER, J., dissented. DETERS, J., dissented, with an opinion joined by DEWINE,
J.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       DONNELLY, J., announcing the judgment of the court.
       {¶ 1} One of the more straightforward rules in Ohio’s criminal-sentencing
scheme is that “a prison term . . . shall be served concurrently with any other prison
term” unless an exception applies, R.C. 2929.41(A). But as we get tangled in the
complex web of felony-sentencing rules set forth in R.C. 2929.14, it becomes
difficult to discern when an exception to the presumption of concurrent prison terms
applies. For the two prison terms at issue in this appeal—which were imposed at
the trial court’s discretion under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) for firearm specifications—
there is no applicable exception. The plain language of R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) and
2929.41(A) requires that they be served concurrently with each other and with the
other prison terms imposed on appellant, Aunrico Beatty. This court reverses the
judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals holding otherwise and remands
the cause to the trial court with instructions that it amend its sentence accordingly.
                                I. BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} In 2021, Beatty was tried for offenses arising from allegations that he
shot at a group of four people. A jury found Beatty guilty of four counts of
felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), and four attendant firearm specifications,
R.C. 2941.145(A). The jury also found Beatty guilty of one count of discharging a
firearm on or near prohibited premises, R.C. 2923.162(A)(3), along with an
attendant firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145(A), and one count of improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle, R.C. 2923.16(B).
       {¶ 3} At sentencing, the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas did not
impose any prison term for the firearm specification attached to the firearm-
discharge offense, but it imposed three-year prison terms for each of the four
firearm specifications attached to the felonious-assault offenses. Two of those
prison terms were mandatory under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) and two were imposed
at the trial court’s discretion, as authorized by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). The trial




                                          2
                                 January Term, 2024




court ran all four sentences consecutively, for a total of 12 years. The trial court
imposed prison terms of four to six years for each of the four felonious-assault
offenses, 18 months for the offense of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited
premises, and 12 months for the offense of improperly handling firearms in a motor
vehicle.   The prison terms for Beatty’s offenses were ordered to be served
concurrently with each other and consecutively to the firearm-specification prison
terms, for an aggregate prison term of 16 to 18 years.
       {¶ 4} On appeal to the Twelfth District, Beatty argued that only two of his
four firearm-specification prison terms should run consecutively and that the trial
court’s decision to run all four of those prison terms consecutively was not
permitted by R.C. 2929.14(C)(1).        In opposition, the State argued that R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(g) required consecutive service of any prison terms imposed for
firearm specifications.
       {¶ 5} The three-judge panel for the Twelfth District disagreed with both
parties, though it ultimately upheld the sentencing decision. 

 (12th
Dist.) (“Beatty I”).      It held that R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) governs whether the
imposition of prison terms for firearm specifications is mandatory or discretionary
and does not govern how any prison terms are to be served. Id. at ¶ 13. It held that
R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) requires consecutive service of mandatory prison terms for
firearm specifications and that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) permits consecutive service of
discretionary firearm-specification prison terms, as long as the appropriate findings
are made. Id. at ¶ 19-20. The Twelfth District panel overruled a previous Twelfth
District decision that held that R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) requires consecutive service
of all prison terms imposed for firearm specifications, State v. Isreal, 2012-Ohio-
4876 (12th Dist.). Beatty I at ¶ 16.
       {¶ 6} The Twelfth District sua sponte determined that the conflict between
its decisions in Beatty I and Isreal should be considered en banc. 

 (12th Dist.) (“Beatty II”). A majority of the en banc court reversed Beatty I and



                                          3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




held, consistently with Isreal, that R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) required the trial court to
run all the firearm-specification prison terms consecutively. Id. at ¶ 4. The Twelfth
District affirmed the trial court’s sentencing decision on these alternative grounds.
       {¶ 7} Beatty sought our discretionary review of the en banc court’s
decision. We accepted the appeal on the following proposition of law:


               R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) does not provide statutory authority
       for the consecutive service of multiple prison terms imposed on
       firearm specifications; the service of those prison terms is set forth
       in, and limited to, R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) which only permits the
       consecutive service of “mandatory prison terms” imposed on
       firearm specifications.


See 

.
                                      II. LAW
                              A. Standard of review
       {¶ 8} The dispute here is over the meaning of multiple related statutory
provisions. Questions involving statutory interpretation are legal questions that we
review de novo. State v. Straley, 

. Our primary focus is on
the text. “‘[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the
text is unambiguous.’ ” State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland,

, ¶ 38, quoting BedRoc Ltd., L.L.C. v. United States, 

 (2004). The question that we ask in this inquiry “is not what did the general
assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.”
Slingluff v. Weaver, 

 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. And if
“a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, the statute is applied as written.”
State v. Fazenbaker, 

.




                                          4
                                 January Term, 2024




                                B. Relevant statutes
                            1. Imposition of prison terms
       {¶ 9} An offender convicted of a felony offense may be subject to an
additional three-year prison term if the charge for the offense “specifies that the
offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s
control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the
firearm, indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the
offense.” R.C. 2941.145(A). See also R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii).
       {¶ 10} R.C. 2929.14(B)(1) governs the imposition of prison terms for
firearm specifications connected to felony offenses. It states that “if an offender
who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony also is convicted of or pleads guilty
to a [firearm] specification . . . the court shall impose” a prison term for that
specification. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a). For the type of specification at issue in this
case, the prison term is three years, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii). However, the statute
states that a trial court “shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender
under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for felonies committed as part of the same act or
transaction.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b). An exception to the
prohibition is found in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which provides:


               If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more
       felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder,
       murder,     attempted    aggravated     murder,    attempted    murder,
       aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is
       convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described
       under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or
       more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the
       offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this
       section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the



                                           5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in
       its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term
       specified under that division for any or all of the remaining
       specifications.


Thus, if an offender is convicted of a group of offenses and firearm specifications
that were all part of the same transaction, the trial court must impose one prison
term for the firearm specifications and it must not impose prison terms for any other
firearm specifications. But if any of the offenses is a serious felony such as murder
or felonious assault, the trial court must impose prison terms for two of the firearm
specifications and it may impose prison terms for any remaining firearm
specifications. Because the trial court “must” impose prison terms for two of the
firearm specifications, those prison terms are “mandatory prison term[s],” which
are defined as “the term[s] in prison that must be imposed for the offenses or
circumstances set forth in . . . [R.C. 2929.14(B)].” R.C. 2929.01(X)(1). And
because the trial court “may” impose prison terms for the remaining firearm
specifications, those prison terms are not “mandatory prison term[s].”
           2. Concurrent or consecutive service of imposed prison terms
       {¶ 11} The statutes governing concurrent or consecutive service of prison
terms that we must examine in this appeal are R.C. 2929.41(A) and 2929.14(C).
The first of these two statutes provides the general presumption of concurrent
service:


               Except as provided in [R.C. 2929.41(B), 2929.14(C), or
       2971.03(D) or (E)], a prison term, jail term, or sentence of
       imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison
       term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of
       this state, another state, or the United States.




                                          6
                               January Term, 2024




R.C. 2929.41(A). The second of these two statutes contains various exceptions to
the presumption of concurrent sentences. The exceptions relevant to our discussion
are found in R.C. 2929.14(C)(1), which governs consecutive sentences for firearm
specifications, and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), which governs consecutive sentences for
offenses.
       {¶ 12} R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) provides:


              Subject to [R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(b)], if a mandatory prison
       term   is   imposed    upon   an       offender   pursuant   to   [R.C.
       2929.14(B)(1)(a)] for having a firearm on or about the offender’s
       person or under the offender’s control while committing a felony, if
       a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to
       [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(c)] for committing a felony specified in that
       division by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, or if both
       types of mandatory prison terms are imposed, the offender shall
       serve any mandatory prison term imposed under either division
       consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under
       either division or under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(d)], consecutively to
       and prior to any prison term imposed for the underlying felony
       pursuant to [R.C. 2929.14(A), (B)(2), or (B)(3)] or any other section
       of the Revised Code, and consecutively to any other prison term or
       mandatory prison term previously or subsequently imposed upon the
       offender.


To sum up the portion of R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) that is pertinent here, if a court
imposes a “mandatory prison term” for a firearm specification, it must be served
consecutively to any other “mandatory prison term” imposed for the enumerated



                                          7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




specifications and consecutively to the prison term for the underlying felony to
which the specification is attached.
       {¶ 13} Finally, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that “[i]f multiple prison terms
are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may
require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively” if the court makes
certain findings regarding the offenses and the offender.
                                      C. Analysis
       {¶ 14} There is no dispute that the trial court was required to impose prison
terms for two of the four firearm specifications attached to Beatty’s felonious-
assault offenses under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) and that the trial court was required
to run those two prison terms consecutively under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1). There is
also no dispute that the trial court had the discretion to impose prison terms for the
remaining two firearm specifications under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).           The sole
dispute is whether the two additional prison terms can or must run consecutively.
       {¶ 15} Our focus is on whether any of the foregoing statutory provisions
creates an exception to the default of concurrent sentences in R.C. 2929.41(A).
According to Beatty II, 

 (12th Dist.) and Isreal, 

(12th Dist.), an exception is found in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). According to Beatty
I, 

 (12th Dist.), an exception is found in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
According to the State, an exception is found in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) and
2929.14(C)(1)(a).    And according to Beatty, the only possible source for an
exception in this case is R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) and none of the exceptions therein
are applicable. Beatty’s position is correct, as it is the only position supported by
the plain language of the statutes.
         1. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is not an exception to R.C. 2929.41(A)
       {¶ 16} In Beatty II, the Twelfth District reiterated its previous holding that
“‘pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), sentences for multiple [firearm] specifications
should be run consecutive to each other.’ ” (Bracketed text in original.) Beatty II




                                           8
                                January Term, 2024




at ¶ 6, quoting Isreal at ¶ 72. In Isreal, the trial court had imposed three prison
terms under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) for firearm specifications attached to three
felonies and ordered that they be served consecutively. Isreal at ¶ 69-70. On
appeal, Isreal argued that all three prison terms should run concurrently because
they were part of the same act or transaction under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) and
because the exception in division (B)(1)(g) says nothing about consecutive service.
Id. at ¶ 71-72. The Twelfth District held that although R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) does
not mention consecutive service, it contains the phrase “court shall impose,” which
the appellate court said “indicates the General Assembly’s intention that the
defendant serve multiple sentences for firearm specifications associated with the
enumerated crimes.” Id. at ¶ 73. It further noted, “Had the Legislature intended a
per se rule that sentences for firearm specifications must be served concurrent with
one another, it could have stated as much.” Id.
       {¶ 17} We disagree with the Twelfth District’s reasoning in Isreal to the
extent that it applied to Isreal’s third firearm specification, and we disagree that
such reasoning should be applied to Beatty’s third and fourth firearm specifications.
The phrase “court shall impose” in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) applies to “the two most
serious specifications” only and not to any additional firearm specifications.
Further, the plain language of R.C. 2929.41(A) evinces the General Assembly’s
intent that all prison terms—including those for firearm specifications—run
concurrently unless a specific exception applies within the statutory provisions
enumerated in R.C. 2929.41(A).        Although R.C. 2929.14(C) is one of the
enumerated statutory provisions in R.C. 2929.41(A), R.C. 2929.14(B) is not.
       {¶ 18} Accordingly, the language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) does not
provide an exception to R.C. 2929.41(A) to allow discretionary prison terms for
firearm specifications to run consecutively.




                                         9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




              2. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not apply to specifications
       {¶ 19} In Beatty I, the Twelfth District held that the power to run Beatty’s
third and fourth prison terms consecutively needed to come from R.C. 2929.14(C)
rather than R.C. 2929.14(B). 

 (12th Dist.). It noted that
R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) requires consecutive sentencing for a “mandatory prison term”
imposed for a firearm specification and that a prison term is mandatory under R.C.
2929.01(X)(1) only if the relevant statute provides that the prison term “must be
imposed.” Id. at ¶ 17. Because R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) instructs that a court “may”
impose prison terms for firearm specifications beyond the first two mandatory ones,
the appellate court held that the additional prison terms are discretionary rather than
mandatory. Id. at ¶ 19. And because R.C. 2929.14(C)(1) applies only to mandatory
prison terms, the court held, it did not apply to additional prison terms imposed at
the trial court’s discretion under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). Id.
       {¶ 20} We agree with the foregoing portion of the Twelfth District’s
reasoning. However, the Twelfth District went on to hold that the trial court had
the discretion under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to run the discretionary prison terms
imposed for the firearm specifications consecutively notwithstanding the fact that
division (C)(4) applies only to “‘prison terms [that] are imposed on an offender for
convictions of multiple offenses.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 23, 28, quoting R.C.
2929.14(C)(4).
       {¶ 21} We have held that a specification is “a penalty enhancement, not a
criminal offense.” State v. Ford, 

. Firearm specifications are
not “offenses,” because they “do not contain a positive prohibition of conduct.”

; see also R.C. 2901.03(B). The Twelfth District acknowledged this
court’s holding in Ford, but nonetheless it held that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) applies to
firearm specifications based on the definition of the term “sanction” in R.C.
2929.01(DD). 

; see also R.C. 2929.01(DD) (“‘Sanction’ means
any penalty imposed upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an




                                          10
                               January Term, 2024




offense, as punishment for the offense. ‘Sanction’ includes any sanction imposed
pursuant to any provision of [R.C. 2929.14 to 2929.18 or 2929.24 to 2929.28].”).
The Twelfth District reasoned that because (1) under R.C. 2929.01(DD), firearm-
specification prison terms are “sanctions” (since they are imposed under R.C.
2929.14), (2) a “[s]anction” constitutes a penalty imposed as punishment for an
offense, and (3) firearm specifications are attached to an underlying offense, a
prison term imposed for a firearm specification is the same as a prison term imposed
for a conviction of an offense for purposes of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

       {¶ 22} We disagree with the Twelfth District’s reasoning in Beatty I
because it interjects the broader terms “sanction” and “punishment” into the
language of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) instead of applying the unambiguous language of
the statute as written. Although prison terms imposed for firearm specifications are
punishments that are attached to underlying offenses, they are not themselves
“prison terms . . . imposed on an offender for convictions of . . . offenses,” R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). The General Assembly made clear in its sentencing provisions for
firearm specifications that being convicted of or pleading guilty to a felony is
separate from being convicted of or pleading guilty to a specification. See R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(a).     The prison terms imposed under R.C. 2929.14(B) are for
convictions of specifications and therefore cannot be subject to the consecutive-
sentencing rules for prison terms imposed for offenses.
       {¶ 23} Accordingly, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) does not provide an exception to
the presumption of concurrent sentences in R.C. 2929.41(A) regarding any prison
terms for firearm specifications, including those that were imposed at the trial
court’s discretion.
                      3. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) does not cause
                 discretionary prison terms to become mandatory
       {¶ 24} The State argues that the language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a),
(B)(1)(b), (B)(1)(g), and (C)(1)(a), when considered together, creates an exception



                                        11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




to R.C. 2929.41(A) and requires the consecutive service of any prison terms
imposed for firearm specifications. The State notes that the provision requiring two
prison terms and allowing additional prison terms in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is an
exception to the limitation in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) to a single prison term for
specifications involved in “the same act or transaction,” which is in turn an
exception to the baseline rule in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) that a trial court “shall
impose” a prison term on an offender convicted of a firearm specification. The
State posits that because R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is an exception to an exception to
division (B)(1)(a), any prison terms ultimately imposed under division (B)(1)(g)
regain their status as prison terms that the trial court “shall impose” under division
(B)(1)(a) and are therefore mandatory prison terms for purposes of R.C.
2929.14(C)(1).
       {¶ 25} If R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) were stated as a negation of the limitation
in division (B)(1)(b), then perhaps the State’s argument would be grounded in the
text of the statute. But that is not how R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) is worded. Rather,
the statutory provision states that the trial court “shall impose on the offender the
prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a)” for two of the specifications and
then states that the trial court “in its discretion, also may impose” additional prison
terms for any of the remaining specifications. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). The word
“may” generally connotes a discretionary, nonmandatory action unless the
surrounding terminology strongly suggests otherwise. See State ex rel. Niles v.
Bernard, 

 (1978). The surrounding terminology in division
(B)(1)(g) provides no opportunity for an unusual interpretation, given that the terms
surrounding “may” include the word “discretion.” R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g). The
State’s proposed interpretation of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(g) does
violence to the plain language of those provisions, and its argument is therefore not
well-taken.




                                          12
                                January Term, 2024




                    4. There is no exception to R.C. 2929.41(A)
         for discretionary prison terms imposed under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g)
         {¶ 26} The only statutory provision allowing for consecutive prison terms
for firearm specifications—R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a)—applies to “mandatory prison
term[s]” only, and therefore does not apply to prison terms imposed at the trial
court’s discretion under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g).         Thus, there is no statutory
provision providing an exception to the presumption of concurrently run prison
terms in R.C. 2929.41(A) that is applicable to discretionary firearm-specification
prison terms.
         {¶ 27} It is well-settled that judges have no inherent authority to create
sentences. State v. Anderson, 

, ¶ 10; State v. Beasley, 

 (1984); Colegrove v. Burns, 

, 438 (1964). Both crimes
and criminal punishments are statutory, and “the only sentence which a trial court
may impose is that provided for by statute.” 

. The General
Assembly has not given trial courts the power to require that discretionary prison
terms for firearm specifications be served consecutively, and therefore, under R.C.
2929.41(A), such prison terms “shall be served concurrently” with other prison
terms.
         {¶ 28} This conclusion, though based on the plain language of the
applicable text, is by no means obvious. Ohio’s criminal-sentencing scheme is a
bloated labyrinth of specialized provisions, inter- and intra-statutory cross-
references, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions.        The complexity of the
scheme largely prevents criminal defendants and the general public from
understanding how criminal sentencing works. It leaves trial courts struggling to
impose sentences that are fair, proportional, and not repeatedly reversed for
technical errors. In the event that the General Assembly changes the statutory
language at issue, we pray that it does so in a way that creates clarity.




                                          13
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




                               III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 29} The judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions that it amend its
sentence to run the two discretionary prison terms imposed for the firearm
specifications concurrently with each other and with the other prison terms
imposed.
                                                                  Judgment reversed
                                              and cause remanded to the trial court.
                               __________________
       DETERS, J., joined by DEWINE, J., dissenting.
       {¶ 30} Today the justices joining the lead opinion would render essentially
meaningless the legislature’s decision to give trial-court judges the option to impose
sentences for firearm specifications beyond the first two. In the lead opinion’s
view, a trial-court judge may impose sentences for third and fourth firearm
specifications, but the judge must run those sentences concurrently with other
sentences imposed. So, a judge may impose additional sentences, but the offender
will never serve additional time for those sentences.
       {¶ 31} Because I would give the statutory scheme a sensible reading, I
respectfully dissent.
   The General Assembly gave trial-court judges the discretion to impose
                               additional sentences
       {¶ 32} Start with the language of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g):


               If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more
       felonies, if one or more of those felonies are aggravated murder,
       murder,    attempted    aggravated     murder,   attempted    murder,
       aggravated robbery, felonious assault, or rape, and if the offender is
       convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described




                                         14
                                 January Term, 2024




       under division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or
       more of the felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the
       offender the prison term specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this
       section for each of the two most serious specifications of which the
       offender is convicted or to which the offender pleads guilty and, in
       its discretion, also may impose on the offender the prison term
       specified under that division for any or all of the remaining
       specifications.


       {¶ 33} By its plain language, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) purports to give trial-
court judges the discretion to impose prison terms for third and fourth firearm
specifications. But the lead opinion’s reading makes this grant of authority illusory:
A judge may impose the prison terms, but the terms must run concurrently to other
sentences. The authorization to impose additional firearm-specification prison
terms has no practical effect.
       {¶ 34} To get to this point, the lead opinion takes a myopic view of another
part of the statutory scheme and concludes that it doesn’t apply to the prison terms
imposed for the third and fourth specifications. I turn my attention to R.C.
2929.14(C)(1)(a):


               [I]f a mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender
       pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) of this section for having a firearm on
       or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control while
       committing a felony, . . . the offender shall serve any mandatory
       prison term imposed . . . consecutively to any other mandatory
       prison term imposed under [division (B)(1)(a) of this section] . . .
       consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the
       underlying felony pursuant to division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this



                                         15
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively
       to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or
       subsequently imposed upon the offender.


       {¶ 35} The statute requires that a mandatory prison term imposed for a
firearm specification run consecutively to any other prison term imposed for a
firearm specification and consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for
the underlying felony. The faulty premise on which the lead opinion’s conclusion
is based is that because a trial-court judge is given discretion to impose a prison
term for firearm specifications beyond the first two, a prison term so imposed is not
a “mandatory prison term.” See lead opinion, ¶ 10. The lead opinion arrives at its
conclusion with no analysis of what “mandatory” means. Proper understanding of
the word is informed by consideration of its place in the statutory sentencing
scheme.
                      “Mandatory” in the statutory scheme
       {¶ 36} “Mandatory prison term” is defined as “the term in prison that must
be imposed for the offenses or circumstances set forth in divisions (F)(1) to (8) or
(F)(12) to (21) of section 2929.13 and division (B) of section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.01(X)(1). The lead opinion seemingly ignores the
article “the” preceding “term” and instead reads the definition to say, “a term in
prison that must be imposed.” But use of the definite article “the,” as opposed to
“a,” indicates that the definition is limited to a particular prison term that is
specified in either R.C. 2929.13(F)(1) through (8) and (12) through (21) or R.C.
2929.14(B). See Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “the” as “[a]n
article which particularizes the subject spoken of. In construing statute, definite
article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes and is word of limitation as
opposed to indefinite or generalizing force ‘a’ or ‘an.’”).        In contrast to the
definition of “mandatory prison term,” “prison term” is defined as “A stated prison




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term” or “A term in prison shortened by, or with the approval of, the sentencing
court . . . .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.01(BB)(1). There is no definite article
limiting the definition to specific terms. Considered in the context of the definition,
“mandatory” does not refer to the court’s discretion in determining whether to
impose a term at all; it refers to circumstances in which, if a term is imposed, the
particular term is specified by statute and must be served by the offender.
       {¶ 37} A look at the sections referenced in the definition of “mandatory
prison term” confirms that “mandatory” refers not to the trial court’s decision to
impose the term but to the requirement that the term be served in its entirety. Both
R.C. 2929.13(F) and 2929.14(B) provide that the terms specified under those
sections shall not be reduced pursuant to judicial release (R.C. 2929.20) or earned
days of credit (R.C. 2967.193 and 2967.194). When considered with these sections,
a mandatory prison term is one that, unlike other prison terms imposed by a trial-
court judge, cannot be reduced.
       {¶ 38} The difference between mandatory prison terms and nonmandatory
prison terms is brought into focus when the prison terms for firearm specifications
are compared to those for felonies under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1). Take, for instance, a
sentence for a first-degree felony. Under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), “the prison term
shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by the court
of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum term
that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis
added.) The trial-court judge is given no discretion whether to impose a sentence,
but the judge may choose among the prison terms listed. Generally, there is no
prohibition against reducing the terms through judicial release or earned credit; they
are nonmandatory prison terms.
       {¶ 39} Under certain circumstances, however, felony prison terms under
R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) are mandatory. For example, if an offender is convicted of
trafficking cocaine in an amount between 50 to 100 times the bulk amount, not only



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must one of the sentences listed in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) be imposed, but the
sentence imposed must be a mandatory prison term. R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(e) (“the
court shall impose as a mandatory prison term a first degree felony mandatory
prison term”).    The prison term required by R.C. 2925.03(C)(1)(e) is not a
mandatory prison term because the court is required to impose it (courts are
required to impose a prison term for a first-degree felony drug-trafficking offense,
regardless of the quantity of drugs involved); what makes the sentence a mandatory
prison term is that it cannot be reduced through judicial release or earned credit.
See R.C. 2929.13(F)(5).
       {¶ 40} The sentencing-hearing statute, R.C. 2929.19, reinforces the
understanding that a mandatory prison term is a specified term that must be served
in its entirety. During the sentencing hearing, “if the court imposes a mandatory
prison term, [it must] notify the offender that the prison term is a mandatory prison
term.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(a). If the lead opinion’s reading of the statute is correct,
this requirement is nonsensical. Why would a court have to inform an offender that
the court is required to impose a prison term? The better reading is that the statute
requires the notification so that the offender knows that all of the mandatory term
must be served.
       {¶ 41} The statutory scheme under which Aunrico Beatty was sentenced
also supports this understanding of “mandatory.”           Recall that for firearm
specifications beyond the first and second, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) permits the
imposition of “the term specified under [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)].” (Emphasis
added.) Because Beatty was found guilty of a firearm specification under R.C.
2941.145(A), R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii) provides the “term specified”—three years.
But imposition of that term is not permitted unless R.C. 2941.145(A) is satisfied,
and R.C. 2941.145(A) makes crystal clear that the specified three-year prison term
is mandatory.




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        {¶ 42} The lead opinion’s discussion of R.C. 2941.145(A) omits an
important phrase. See lead opinion at ¶ 9. The first sentence of R.C. 2941.145(A)
reads in full:


                 Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an
        offender under division (B)(1)(a)(ii) of section 2929.14 of the
        Revised Code is precluded unless the indictment, count in the
        indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that the
        offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under
        the offender’s control while committing the offense and displayed
        the firearm, brandished the firearm, indicated that the offender
        possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.


(Emphasis added.)         Beatty was sentenced to the term specified in R.C.
2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii), a prison term referred to as a “three-year mandatory prison
term” in R.C. 2941.145(A). Thus, his additional firearm-specification prison terms
are mandatory and must be served consecutively.
                                     Conclusion
        {¶ 43} The lead opinion bemoans the complexity of the criminal-sentencing
scheme. Lead opinion at ¶ 28. That complexity is not an excuse for refusing to
meaningfully engage with the word “mandatory” and its use throughout the
statutory scheme. When the word “mandatory” is considered in the context of the
scheme, it is clear that the word refers not to a trial-court judge’s decision whether
to impose prison terms for third and fourth firearm specifications but to the nature
of those prison terms. A mandatory prison term is a specific term that must be
served in its entirety.
        {¶ 44} When the trial-court judge decided to impose prison terms for the
third and fourth firearm specifications of which Beatty was convicted, the terms



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were mandatory prison terms. Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a), the terms had to run
consecutively to one another and to the other firearm-specification prison terms and
consecutively to and prior to the sentences for the underlying felonies. The Twelfth
District Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Because the majority sees it otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
                               __________________
       Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick Horton,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
       W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F.
Benintendi, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
                               __________________




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