[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodman, Slip Opinion No. 

.]




                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.




                         SLIP OPINION NO. 

                       DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GOODMAN.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
      may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Goodman, Slip Opinion No.
                                    

.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
        Permanent disbarment.
     (No. 2023-0740—Submitted July 18, 2023—Decided March 12, 2024.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2022-040.
                                 __________________
        KENNEDY, C.J.
        {¶ 1} Respondent, Amber Renee Goodman, of Elida, Ohio, Attorney

 was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2017.
        {¶ 2} Over a period of four to six months, Goodman actively and fully
participated in the repeated rape of a 13-year-old child, engaging in sexual conduct
with the victim—including cunnilingus and digital penetration—while the child’s
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




father alternated having sexual intercourse with each of them.           Goodman’s
willingness, in the victim’s words, to “join in” perpetuated and added to the abuse
that the child suffered, and Goodman became just another “monster” in the child’s
life. And rather than report this abuse to authorities, Goodman told the victim not
to tell anyone about it.
        {¶ 3} Goodman was convicted on one count of unlawful sexual contact with
a minor. We suspended her license to practice law on an interim basis, and relator,
disciplinary counsel, charged her with violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. A three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct found that
Goodman had committed professional misconduct and recommended that we
indefinitely suspend her from the practice of law with no credit for the time she has
served under her interim felony suspension. In addition, the panel recommended
that notwithstanding the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(2), Goodman not be
permitted to petition for reinstatement to the practice of law until she has
successfully completed the five-year term of community control imposed in her
criminal case. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommended sanction. No objections have been filed.
        {¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct but reject its
recommended sanction. Instead, after a thorough review of the record and our
precedent, we conclude that the only appropriate sanction for Goodman’s
misconduct is permanent disbarment.
                                 MISCONDUCT
                                Goodman’s Crimes
        {¶ 5} In January 2019, the victim, L.H., then 13 years old, revealed to a
school counselor that she had been sexually assaulted by her father. The counselor
contacted L.H.’s mother, who brought L.H. to the Fostoria Police Department to
report the crimes.




                                         2
                               January Term, 2024




       {¶ 6} According to L.H., the abuse started when she was 9 years old, when
her father penetrated her vagina with his fingers and his penis. L.H. “didn’t know
what was happening, and [she] didn’t move and [she] pretended [she] was
sleeping.” L.H.’s father later told her not to tell anyone. When L.H. was 11 years
old, her father would pull down her pants, touch her vagina and buttock, and insert
his penis in her vagina without her consent. The victim’s father continued to have
vaginal intercourse with the child and had her perform oral sex on him on numerous
occasions until the victim was 13 years old. L.H.’s father would have sex with her
even when it hurt her, and she would sometimes say that she was having her period
in an effort to avoid having sex with him.
       {¶ 7} L.H. also reported to police that Goodman had molested her.
According to L.H.’s statements to police, which were admitted into evidence at
Goodman’s disciplinary hearing before the three-member panel of the board, L.H.’s
father said that Goodman wanted one of his children to walk in on them having sex
and that Goodman selected L.H. “because she [was] 13 and she [could] learn
things.” Goodman and L.H.’s father would first have the child watch them have
sex. He would then touch L.H.’s vagina while having sex with Goodman and
alternate having sex with Goodman and the child. This included an occasion when
L.H.’s father had the child wear her cheerleading uniform and had sex with her
before Goodman “joined in.” L.H. reported that Goodman “penetrated [L.H.’s]
vagina with her fingers 7 times and penetrated [L.H.’s] vagina with her [tongue] 7
times.” The child did not see Goodman as another victim of her father but instead
described Goodman’s actions as those of a “monster.”
       {¶ 8} On May 3, 2022, Goodman executed a waiver of indictment,
acknowledging that she would be charged with unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(3), a third-degree felony. In the
Seneca County Common Pleas Court that same day, she pleaded guilty to a one-
count bill of information charging her with that offense.




                                         3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 9} The common pleas court sentenced Goodman to serve a 30-month
prison term, ordered her to serve a five-year mandatory term of postrelease control,
and classified her as a Tier II sex offender. The court ordered Goodman to report
to the sheriff of Seneca County on May 17, 2022, for transport to prison. After
Goodman served almost eight months in prison, the court granted her motion for
judicial release, placed her on community control for five years, and imposed
conditions for her release, including that she serve 120 days in the county jail as
scheduled by the probation department, participate in counseling and substance-
abuse rehabilitation and/or treatment, undergo random drug and/or alcohol
urinalysis testing, and abstain from the use of alcohol and illegal substances.
Goodman remains classified as a Tier II sex offender and must comply with all
registration requirements for 25 years.
                             Disciplinary Proceedings
       {¶ 10} On May 24, 2022, we suspended Goodman’s license on an interim
basis following her felony conviction, and that suspension remains in effect. See
In re Goodman, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 11} In a September 2022 complaint, disciplinary counsel charged
Goodman with professional misconduct arising from her felony conviction.
Goodman waived a probable-cause determination and, in her answer to relator’s
complaint, admitted all but one of the factual allegations and all the alleged rule
violations. The parties jointly submitted stipulations of fact, misconduct, and
aggravating and mitigating factors, and they jointly recommended that Goodman
be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no credit for the time she
has served under her interim felony suspension.
       {¶ 12} At the disciplinary hearing, Goodman admitted committing the
misconduct described in the stipulations that resulted in her conviction for unlawful
sexual conduct with a minor and her classification as a Tier II sex offender. She
testified that she met L.H.’s father in March 2018, moved in with him in late April




                                          4
                                  January Term, 2024




or early May, began engaging in sexual conduct with L.H. by the summer, and
maintained a relationship with L.H.’s father for two years after L.H. reported the
abuse.
         {¶ 13} When asked how the sexual abuse began, Goodman explained: “I
was initially told that the victim had entered the room on [her] own accord. I later
found out that that’s probably not what happened at all.” Goodman said that she
could not remember how many times she had engaged in sexual conduct with L.H.,
stating, “As part of the coping, I’ve blocked a lot of things out.” She asserted that
she told L.H’s father to stop the abuse “[e]very single time,” and she claimed that
she said to L.H., “ ‘If you do not want this to happen, you need to tell me.’ ”
Nonetheless, Goodman admitted that a 13-year-old child could not consent to
sexual activity with her, and she stipulated that she told the victim not to tell anyone,
because it would negatively impact her professionally. Goodman claimed that
L.H.’s father had manipulated her into sexually abusing L.H., but she admitted,
“[W]hat I did was wrong. I had a choice the whole time, and I still chose to do it.”
         {¶ 14} Goodman testified that she obtained psychological counseling
before she went to prison and that she resumed weekly sessions after her release
from prison. She claimed that as part of the drug, alcohol, and mental-health
assessment conducted for her judicial release, she was diagnosed with adjustment
disorder with anxiety and depression and with posttraumatic stress disorder arising
from suppressed childhood trauma—though she has offered no other evidence to
substantiate that testimony.
         {¶ 15} Goodman asserted that she had been the victim of neglect and abuse,
and she suggested that her past had left her susceptible to manipulation by L.H.’s
father. According to Goodman, her father left home when she was three years old
and nothing she ever did as a child was good enough for him. Unable to obtain his
approval, she stated that she has striven to get the attention of a man to fill that void.




                                            5
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




She has been twice married and divorced, and by her own account, she was
mentally abused by one of her husbands and was physically abused by both of them.
       {¶ 16} Goodman testified that she understands the damage that she did to
the victim and that the victim would carry that damage throughout her life. When
a panel member asked how she was living with herself after committing the
offenses, Goodman answered, “Not very well,” and stated that it is “a daily
struggle” to do so.
       {¶ 17} On this evidence, the panel and board found that Goodman’s conduct
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h)
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the
lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The board found that those violations had been
proved by clear and convincing evidence and acknowledged that the Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(h) violation was predicated on the egregiousness of Goodman’s conduct. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 

, 

, 

.
       {¶ 18} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct.
                        RECOMMENDED SANCTION
       {¶ 19} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
       {¶ 20} The parties stipulated and the board found that four aggravating
factors are present in this case: Goodman acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and harmed a
vulnerable victim. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (3), (4), and (8). As for mitigating
factors, the parties stipulated and the board agreed that Goodman had a clean
disciplinary record, that she had made full and free disclosure to the board and




                                        6
                                January Term, 2024




exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and that other
penalties or sanctions had been imposed for her misconduct. See Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (6).
       {¶ 21} The board also found as a mitigating factor evidence of Goodman’s
good character or reputation, citing the ten character letters that she had presented.
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5). Most of the letters were written by friends who
generally described Goodman as caring, compassionate, loyal, hardworking,
honest, and generous. However, although Goodman testified that the authors of
these character letters were aware of the charge against her and of her guilty plea,
none of them mentioned the crime of which she was convicted.
       {¶ 22} In accord with the parties’ proposed sanction, the board recommends
that we indefinitely suspend Goodman from the practice of law with no credit for
the time she has served under her interim felony suspension. In addition, the board
recommends that notwithstanding the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(2),
Goodman not be permitted to petition for reinstatement to the practice of law until
she has successfully completed the five-year term of community control imposed
in her criminal case.
       {¶ 23} In making this recommendation, the board primarily relied on
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wanner, 

, 

 (1984), and
Disciplinary Counsel v. Pansiera, 

, 

 (1997),
cases that the board viewed as involving attorneys who committed crimes similar
to the offense Goodman was convicted of committing—unlawful sexual conduct
with a minor. The attorney in Wanner had been convicted of a single count of
sexual battery for engaging in sexual conduct with two 17-year-old girls who were
under his supervisory and disciplinary authority in a group home. Wanner at 319.
The attorney in Pansiera had been convicted of seven counts of corrupting a minor
for engaging in sexual conduct with a child between the ages of 13 and 16 whom
he had befriended in an Alcoholics Anonymous program. Pansiera at 437.




                                          7
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 24} However, in disciplining an attorney for misconduct that also
constitutes a criminal offense, we are not limited to considering the charges brought
for a particular crime; rather, we must also examine the conduct underlying the
offense. We did this recently in Disciplinary Counsel v. Romer, 

, 

, 

.          In that case, the attorney had been
convicted of one felony count of attempted corrupting another with drugs, but that
conviction did not reflect that the attorney had also engaged in sexual activity with
a child. 

. In indefinitely suspending the attorney, we did not rely
solely on the elements of the offense. Instead, our analysis focused on caselaw
applicable to sexual misconduct involving an underage victim, and we imposed a
sanction consistent with that precedent. 

.
       {¶ 25} R.C. 2907.02 establishes the crime of rape, and R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)
provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the
offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”
The definition of “sexual conduct” includes cunnilingus and the insertion of any
part of the body into the vaginal opening of another. R.C. 2907.01(A).
       {¶ 26} We have stated that “it is nearly impossible to imagine the rape of a
child without force involved,” State v. Dye, 

, 

 (1998), and we have noted “the coercion inherent in parental authority when a
father sexually abuses his child,” State v. Eskridge, 

, 

 (1988). “ ‘The youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the
power inherent in a parent’s position of authority, creates a unique situation of
dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not
necessary to effect the abuser’s purpose.’ ” 

, quoting State v. Etheridge,

, 

 (1987).
       {¶ 27} As discussed above, the victim’s statements to police demonstrate
that her father compelled her to have sex with him and that he overcame her will
with the minimal threat of force needed to commit the rape of a child. Those




                                          8
                               January Term, 2024




statements also show that Goodman participated in the repeated rape of the child
when the child was made to submit on multiple occasions to cunnilingus and
vaginal penetration by Goodman.
       {¶ 28} Goodman admitted at her disciplinary hearing that this sexual
conduct was “probably not” of “[L.H.’s] own accord.”             That is a gross
understatement. Goodman knew at the time of her misconduct that a 13-year-old
child could not consent to sexual conduct with an adult, and according to L.H.,
Goodman saw her physically hurting during sex with the victim’s father. Yet rather
than report this abuse to the police, Goodman urged L.H. not to tell anyone about
it, because it could get Goodman in trouble and ruin her career. And given these
facts and the history of sexual abuse that L.H. endured, Goodman’s claim that she
told L.H. to tell her if she did not want to engage in sexual conduct—and the
implication that L.H. never said “no”—strains credibility.
       {¶ 29} Instead, Goodman could not have reasonably believed that her
sexual conduct with a 13-year-old child was anything but forced on the victim. As
in Eskridge, “we are confronted with a child being told to do something by an
important figure of authority, and commanded not to tell anyone about it. In such
a case, we find nothing unreasonable about a finding that the child’s will was
overcome,” 

, 

.
       {¶ 30} Looking to the misconduct underlying Goodman’s conviction shows
that her actions were tantamount to rape. Goodman encouraged and perpetuated
the sexual molestation committed by the victim’s father, and at the very least, she
was complicit in his crimes. But she was actually more than complicit—she
actively engaged in the repeated rape of the child.
       {¶ 31} For this reason, our precedent disbarring attorneys for rape and other
forcible sex offenses provides the appropriate sanction in this case.           See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Polizzi, 

, 

, 

 (attorney disbarred for committing forcible gross sexual imposition in




                                         9
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




addition to sexual battery); Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams, 

,

, 

, ¶ 4-5 (attorney disbarred for raping a 7-year-old
child); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ostheimer, 

, 

 (1995) (attorney disbarred for committing attempted felonious sexual
penetration by “deceiv[ing] and coerc[ing] his adopted daughter into submitting to
his sexual demands for at least three years”); see also Cincinnati Bar Assn. v.
Lisner, 

, 

 (1981) (attorney disbarred for
committing gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition).
       {¶ 32} Further, although Goodman admitted that she knew at the time of
her misconduct that engaging in sexual activity with a child was wrong, we are not
convinced that she has fully accepted responsibility for her misconduct. At her
disciplinary hearing, Goodman portrayed herself as the victim of manipulation and
lies but she failed to explain how that could possibly cause her to molest a child.
Goodman also asserted that she could not remember certain details of the sexual
abuse in which she engaged, testifying that her memory lapse was “part of a trauma
response” to her own prior abuse that she says she had suffered and that “[a]s part
of the coping, [she had] blocked a lot of things out.” Yet she could clearly
remember facts that minimized her misconduct, such as Goodman’s claims that she
told L.H. to let her know if the child did not want to engage in the abuse and that
she told L.H.’s father that she did not want to molest the child. And while Goodman
sought to attribute her misconduct to trauma that she says she had suffered as a
child and as an adult, she did not produce supporting evidence to prove that her
experiences could cause a partial memory loss or that the abuse she had suffered
contributed to her misconduct.
       {¶ 33} “ ‘[Disbarment] is intended to protect the public, the courts and the
legal profession. * * * [T]he moral character of an attorney is at all times to be
scrutinized for the purpose of [e]nsuring that protection.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel
v. Lawson, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 34, quoting In




                                        10
                                 January Term, 2024




re Disbarment of Lieberman, 

, 41, 

 (1955).
Goodman’s participation in the repeated rape of a 13-year-old child demonstrates
that she lacks the moral character necessary to practice law in this state, and in these
circumstances, disbarment is the only sanction sufficient to protect the public from
further misconduct.
                                  CONCLUSION
        {¶ 34} For these reasons, Amber Renee Goodman is permanently disbarred
from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs are taxed to Goodman.
                                                               Judgment accordingly.
        FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
        DONNELLY, J., concurs, with an opinion.
        STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only.
        BRUNNER, J., not participating.
                                _________________
        DONNELLY, J., concurring.
        {¶ 35} I join the majority’s decision to impose a sanction more severe than
that proposed by the Board of Professional Conduct and to permanently disbar
Amber Renee Goodman from the practice of law in Ohio. I write separately,
however, to express my concerns about the series of events that resulted in the
majority’s having to reject the board’s proposed sanction here. In short, had the
criminal-justice system properly held Goodman to account for the criminal acts she
committed, then the board would have been able to recommend a more appropriate
sanction, thereby making it unnecessary for this court to go further.
        {¶ 36} When deciding what sanction to recommend to this court in
attorney-discipline cases, the board looks to the sanctions previously imposed on
similarly situated attorneys. Goodman stipulated to misconduct arising from her
conviction for one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of
R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(3). And so the board properly looked to those cases in




                                          11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




which this court had disciplined attorneys for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor
and concluded that an indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction here. Yet
the majority correctly rejects the board’s recommended sanction because an
indefinite suspension does not adequately reflect the seriousness of Goodman’s
conduct, nor would it adequately protect the public. Majority opinion, ¶ 30-33. If
the board did exactly what it is supposed to do, why the more severe sanction? The
answer to that question lies with the criminal process that led to Goodman’s
conviction.
       {¶ 37} In the record before us, Goodman has admitted that she engaged in
sexual activities with a minor victim multiple times and over several months. She
admitted that as part of those sexual activities, she touched the victim’s genitals and
breasts. And she admitted that she knew that a minor of the victim’s age when the
sexual activities began could not consent to sexual activity. The record also
contains details of Goodman’s sexual conduct, in the form of the victim’s sworn
statements to police. In those statements, the victim states that Goodman penetrated
the victim’s vagina with her fingers seven times and with her tongue seven times.
       {¶ 38} As the majority opinion convincingly sets out, Goodman’s conduct
amounts to repeated acts of rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). See majority opinion
at ¶ 25-30. And I am sure that had prosecutors presented to a jury the evidence that
is available to us, Goodman would have been convicted of rape. Yet in the criminal
prosecution that lies at the root of this disciplinary case, the state charged Goodman
by way of information with only a single count of unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor under R.C. 2907.04(A) and (B)(3)—a charge to which Goodman pleaded
guilty. R.C. 2907.04(A) prohibits a person who is 18 years of age or older from
engaging in sexual conduct with another person when the offender knows that the
other person is 13 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age or the offender
is reckless in that regard. To be clear, that offense does not contain the elements of
compulsion through force or the threat of force found in the offense of rape under




                                          12
                                January Term, 2024




R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). Indeed, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor is not a lesser
included offense of rape, because an offender can commit all the elements of rape
under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) without also committing all the elements of unlawful
sexual conduct with a minor under R.C. 2907.04(A). See State v. Shadoan, 4th
Dist. Adams No. 03CA764, 

 (noting that the offense of rape
does not contain age as an element). Therefore, a jury could not have independently
found Goodman guilty of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor if it had been asked
to determine Goodman’s culpability for rape.
       {¶ 39} Based on the facts contained in this record, Goodman participated in
the repeated rape of a 13-year-old child. But she has been found criminally liable
only for engaging in sexual conduct with a victim who was 13 years of age or older
but less than 16 years of age. In effect, the criminal-justice system failed to hold
Goodman accountable by allowing her to plead guilty to a crime distinguishable
from the crime she committed.
       {¶ 40} Eight years ago, this court had the chance to prevent situations like
Goodman’s from occurring when the Commission on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure proposed a new criminal rule requiring a felony charge in plea bargains
to have a factual basis in the conduct defendants actually committed. See Ludlow,
State Supreme Court Rejects Truth-In-Sentencing Rule, Columbus Dispatch (Jan.
25, 2016), available at https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/crime/2016/01/15
/state-supreme-court-rejects-truth/23850357007/      (accessed   Feb.   14,   2024)
[https://perma.cc/Y2BQ-PVD7]. But this court rejected the proposed rule change.

 As a result, Goodman managed to plead guilty to a crime that does not come
close to accounting for the vile acts she committed. And her plea, in turn, hindered
the board’s ability to properly assess the severity of her misconduct and to
recommend the appropriate disciplinary sanction.
       {¶ 41} In the end, this court’s decision to permanently disbar Goodman is
the correct one. Goodman raped a 13-year-old child, and for that she should be




                                        13
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




permanently disbarred. See majority opinion at ¶ 31 (collecting cases in which this
court disbarred attorneys for rape and other forcible sex offenses). But I worry that
our decision to go beyond the board’s recommended sanction, while necessary to
protect the public, gives the impression that we are using this disciplinary
proceeding to mete out the punishment Goodman should have received through the
criminal process. Such appearances could have been avoided if Goodman had
pleaded guilty to a crime commensurate with her conduct, thereby giving the board
the information necessary for it to take appropriate action. I hope the circumstances
of this case will inspire this court to revisit its rejection of a criminal rule requiring
a felony charge in plea bargains to have a factual basis in the conduct defendants
actually committed.
                                 _________________
        Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Audrey E. Varwig,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
        Montgomery Jonson, L.L.P., and George D. Jonson, for respondent.
                                 _________________




                                           14